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1Abstract
The Growth of Speculative Building in Greece:
Modes of Housing Production and Socioeconomic Change, 1950-1974
During the postwar period the economy of urban housing in Greece
has undergone a major transformation. The great bulk of housebuilding
in the 1950ls could be described as "precapitalist". "Speculative"
building, i.e. the production of housing as a corrmodity for the market
under the control of capitalists, prevailed, albeit in ~ rather primi-
tive form, in the limited sector of middle-class apartment housing. By
the 19701s, however, the latter economic form has grown into the domi-
nant mode of housing production and distribution.
The generality and signiffcance of this transformation for the
early stages of capitalist urbanisation has seldom been recognised.
Thus, the study begins with a theoretical model of the different
modes of housing production and housing sectors relevant to such a
historical context, and the concept of the "dual" system where both
speculative-capitalist and precapitalist modes operate. AnalysiS of
postwar housebuilding on the basis of this model establishes rigor-
ously the extent, character, and sociospatfal correlates of each
mode. It is argued that popular precapitalist owner-building is not
reducible to a residual phenomenon of socially marginal "squatter"
housing, but constitutes a major historical form based on distinc-
tive aspects of Greek society and autonomy vis-a-vis capitalist
relations and modern administrative controls. Thus, the decline of
this sector has not been tne outcome of voluntary assi.milation into
the market but the result of political and economic constraints. This
hypothesis is corroborated by a detailed analysis of demand and allo-
cation of housing in Athens.
Given the decline in the role of precapitalist housing, the
grm'lth of speculative building is a corollary of trends in aggre-
gate residential investment. The rest of the study examines the
formation of the latter, first, in relation to the pattern of Greek
economic development, and then, with the help ofa model of household
behaviour and the economics of the early capitalist housing system as
a whole.
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Introduction
1.
Greece in the postwar period has consistently devoted a very high
share of national resources to new housing. The share of dwelling con-
struction in the Gross Domestic Product approached 6% in the 1950's and
well exceeded 7% in the 1960's and early 1970's. Thus, although the rate
of growth of :he Greek Domestic Product was throughout the period among
the highest internationally - more than 6% annually - construction out-
put rose even faster, surpassing 9% for all the post-1950 years. Urban
residential development absorbed the greatest part of this construction
activity.
Although this record is somewhat exceptional, the case is not atypical.
The pattern of relatively high rates of housing investment has been also
observed in a broad category of countries of similar intermediate "middle-
income" level in the international scale of development. A rough positive
association between the level of economic development (income per capita)
and construction activity per capita becomes evident by a simple compar-
ison of the advanced countries and the rest of the world.1 This is obvious-
ly a matter of available resources. Further analysis of this relationship,
however, shows that it is not linear but takes the form of an S-curve. In
terms of shares of GOP, dwelling construction and construction as a whole
are lower in the highest-income and lowest-income countries in comparison
to middle-income ones.2 As Paul Strassman has put it "one will not find a
statistically significant relationship between construction and income
per head generally. But if one divides countries into richer and poorer
groups, one finds a negative association in one and a positive association
in the other."3 Whereas, in the second half of the 1950's the countries
. 1. See, for instance, D. Turrin liTheEconomic Significance of Con-
struction", Ekistics 29, 171 (1970): 108-113 abstracted from Architect's
Journal 150, 42-rI969): 923-929.
2. See Paul W. Strassman "Construction Productivity and Employment
in Developing Countries" International Labour Review, 101, 5 (1970):
503-518 and U.N. SecretarTat "Investment on Dwelling Construction"
Ekistics 90 (1963): 281-282.
3. Strassman, "Construction Productivity".
12 .
with over 1000 dollars per capita and those with under 300 had on the
average 3.8% and 2.1% of their GDPs respectively going to dwelling
construction, countries between the 300-1000 range allocated a 4.2%.4
Does this pattern, which is.,derivedfrom cross-country data, signi-
fy the existence of a certain universal time-path of the economic role
of housing and thus the occurence of a major expansion of housing pro-
duction at a certain "stage" of each country·s development? The relevant
studies~seem to imply that this is so. The 'argument is that countries
that reach a certain income level and are passing into an urbanised
state, necessarily enter a phase of large-scale city-building, to pro-
vide for the modern urban infrastructure they lack. Hence the increase
of the relative weight of housing in the economy. Long-term data, how-
ever, on national incomes and housing expenditure of a number of Western
advanced countries do not support any such clear-cut model.S Residential
construction fluctuates historically in "long-wavesll that are determined,
to a large extent, by wars, demographic changes, international movements
of people and capital and particular national conditions that, in combi-
nation, would make any mechanistic model unlikely. Thus, though the rela-
tionship between a dual rt'ans;tion to higher income-level and an urbanised
society and a changed economic significance of housing is certainly a
suggestive one, it should be put in its historical context. The economic
expansion of the residential economy in IImiddle-incomell countries must
be seen in the context of the specific character of the postwar period;
a period of fast growth and geographic diffusion of the capitalist eco-
nomy and of rapid urbanisation and modernisation.
4. U.N. Secretariat, "Investment on Dwelling cons truct ton". Gre~ce
with a share for dwellings around the 6% level and a GOP p~r capita
approaching 400 dollars in 1961 and fastly growing,clearly belongs to
the middle-income category.
5. A long-term decline of the role of housing in the national ecollomy
of the U.S. (up to 1950 that is) has been well substantiated in,Leo Grebler
et al. ~ital Formation in Residential Real Estate (New York,.1956) ch. 9.
No such clear pattern emerges in other advanced countries, tho~gh th~ re1e-
vant statistical material ;s limited. In England, there seems to haye been
a fall after the middle of the nineteenth century, whereas in the interwar'
period the trend was reversed. See S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth,
(New Haven, 1966) tables 5.3. and 5.6., and H.W~ Richardson and D.H. Ald-
croft. Building in the British Econgmy between the Wars, (London, 1968)
table 27 and p. 273 . See also the discussion in Chapter 5 of the present
study. "
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The relative weight, then, of housing growth in the national economy
is, as such, of secondary significance (though it may point to the over-
all IImodel"of economic development); what is of theoretical interest is
the systematic occurrence of a major expansion in the urban housing sec-
tor of relatively high-income developing countries, in association with
a major transformation of the economy of housing. It has, indeed, been
recognised by reviewers of the international evidence, that the fast
growth of house building involves such a transformation. The latter
results from the changes following the transition from a rural social
organisation to a predominantly modern-urban one. Two broad components
of these changes have been stressed: the transition from non-monetary
to monetary. relations and the transition from a traditional to a modern
construction organisation. The first change is a corollary of the growth
of cities. In Strassman's words,"essentially what happens is this. As
housing moves out of the non-monetary sector \'/ith.rising urbanisation, it
reaches peak growth rates in middle-income countries. Other construction
rises to a lesser extent".6 The second involves the increased role of
modern construction techniques and materials, higher labour productivity,
and employment of technical and managerial skills.?
Are these two general mechanisms the proper theoretical focus for
the analysis of housing change in such conditions? Do they point to
realistic models of the dynamic of the residential economy in early
capitalist urbanisation: Compared to certain widespread simplistic
accounts limited to the quantitative effects of population movements
and income growth, the above models point to the right direction: for
underneath the development specialist's jargon of "monetarylland "modern-
efficientll sectors we have an argument for the significance of the transi-
tion to market relations and to a capitalist organisation of housing
production. This important transformation of the hOUSing economy, however,
is considered as a simple corollary of urbanisation and economic-techno-
logical development. In this respect, the above theoretical orientations
are inadequate.
6. Strassman, "Con~truction Productivity". An automatic association of
urbanisation with a sharp increase in residential investment could not be
assumed as necessary or even probable in a "Soviet" model of economic
growth. This formulation refers to a capitalist "model" of development.
7. Turrin, IIEconomic Significance".
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The assumption of general ised "monetary" relations in cities implies
the existence of a market of housing, and in the case of new construction,
the production and distribution of housing as.a commodity; it also implies
a market of labour exchanged for wages or fees for small contract work.
The transition, however, to monetary relations thus understood, is not
the automatic product of city growth; non-monetary relations in the form
of family labour producing for family use, and, more importantly, extensi-
ve non-market supply of housing by small owner-controlled housebuilding
are a substantial part of the residential economy of cities in developing
countries. "Squatter" housing is a familiar non-market form. Attention
to squatter housing - which has the dubious luck to be considered a
"social problem" - may have hidden the broader picture, namely, that
even in high-income developing countries in the postwar period, specu-
lative building and the market economy supply a limited part of urban
housingBthough we may have a prevalence of the market and monetary
exchange in labour, building materials, and urban land.
Excepting a number of countries with developed public housing sectors
(e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong) the greatest part of new residential capital
for lower-class and probably for lower middle-class families in IIdevelop-
ing" cities, must be essentially non-capitalist production; petty owner-
controlled production for use and, in varied degrees, marginal forms of
petty speculation and small investments in rental property. In Marxist
terminology, such an economy could only be described as a "petty mode
of production" with limited commodity exchange relations. After all,
even if commodity exchange prevails in the construction sphere - which
is but a part of the total complex of housing production - we could
hardly call capitaiist an economy based on independent labourers or
small contractor groups owning their means of production, which is
certainly the case in developing countries, and in early capitalist
cities in general.
Thus, we should properly recognize the role of what we may theoreti-
cally call a preeapi.tald-et: mode of housing production. "squatter" housing,
after all, is simply such a precapitalist mode, its particular characte-
B. See Orville F. Grimes, Jr, Housin for Low Income Urban Families:
Economics and Policy in the Developing World Baltimore, 1976 , ch. 2.
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ristics with regard to land appropriation and'security of tenure not-
withstanding. The theoretical emphasis on the transition to "monetary",
relations hides the fact of important discontinuities in modes of pro-
duction in the residential economy: the existence of "dual" systems of
housing production and distribution within cities. The growth of cities
as a vehicle for the expansion of monetary relations in general is there-
fore of secondary importance to the structural characteristics of this
"dual" system and the determinants of the expansion of speculative and
capitalist modes of housing production.
I have equally great doubts that the nature and dynamic of an expanding
business sector of housing supply can be adequately approached through the
blanket use·of a stereotype of "modern" and "efficient" construction orga-
nisation. First, housing production, by the nature of the product, is more
a matter of control' and utilisation of capital and land than of construction
technology. This is less so in other types of construction. In housing,
the organisation and size of the construction unit is largely dictated
by the economics of land and finance and their level of development.
This leads us to the second point, namely that references to a "modern
business" type imply that prototypes of the advanced countries can de-
scribe theoretically the object· in question. This may be adequate for
construction technology, but definitely not for housing supply in general.
Speculative housebuilding and the structure of land-use controls and
house finance have undergone such radical changes in the last hundred
years in Western countries, that we can justifiably argue that specu-
lative-capitalist building in the conditions of the early capitalist
Western city has been a distinct type of economy with significant varia-
tions between countries and periods, but certainly different from its
present-day forms. Thus, international and historical comparisons, to
be of any use, require a certain theoretical clarification, namely, a
systematic distinction between modern-capitalist housing economics and
a "model" of a speculative building economy as a specific type appro-
priate for conditions of relative capitalist underdevelopment.9
9. Fer instance, Neo-Marxist explanations of housing "over-invest-
ment" stress the tendencies of dominant classes associated with conditions
of "underdevelopment" towards luxury consumption and easy commercial and
real estate ventures. Speculative building thus, ;n this sense, is the
outgrowth of the class structure and economic "distortions" of under-
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The structure of this early speculative economy determines its role
in the growth and modernisation of housing in a developing city, as
well as the issues that,are relevant to the study of the development
of capitalist relations in housing.
I would argue, then, that the growth and modernisation of housing
in countries undergoing a transition to a relatively advanced stage
of economic development and ubranisation, and the character of the
housing system during such periods are to a large extent determined by
the specific character of the early capitalist housing economy,namely,
the structure and relative role of precapitalist and speculative-capi-
talist modes of production of residential capital, and the process of
the development of capitalism in housing. The latter, and the wider
social and political factors that influence the rate and "path" of this
development, thus acquire a distinctive theoretical importance. In the
present work we will study the structure of postwar urban housing in
Greece in exactly these terms with the main emphasis on the growth of
the speculative sector. The analysis will also involve us with the issue
of the determinants of housing investment at the "macroeconomic" level
since the broad pattern of resource allocation has obviously been a
major factor in the postwar growth of speculative building. In the pro-
cess we will find ample opportunity for showing the close interconnection
between the formation of rates of housebuilding at the national level
as Greek economic development proceeded, and the changing structure of
the housing system. The importance, thus, of the study of the development
of capitalism in housing for th~ comparative analys ts of the relationship
between housebuilding and economic development will become apparent.
The main emphasis, however, of the present study will be on the former,
i.e. on the growth of speCUlative-capitalist building.'
2.
A study of the mechanisms and determinants of the growth of specu-
lative building has an obvious relevance in the Greek case. The great
bulk of urban housebuilding in the 1950i could be described as ~pre-
capitalist". Houses were built for use rather than exchange in the market,
under the complete control of households owning small plots and the neces-
development. In an alternative formulation, as we argue in the first chap-
ter, the speculative residential "mode" derives its specific characteri-
stics from the relative backwardness of financial institutions and the
'limited concentration of capital in early capitalist cities.
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sary capital. "Speculative" building, i.e. the production of housing as
a commodity to be sold in the market, under the control of a class of
capital owners distinct grom both users (or other final owners) and land-
owners, prevailed, albeit in a rather primitive form, only in the limited
sector of middle-class apartment housing. By the 1970's, however, this
economic form has clearly grown into the dominant mode of housing pro-
duction and distribution. No account of Greek housing and urban growth
in the postwar period can be constructed without a full treatment of
this change and the fact of the "dual" character of the system of housing
production, i.e. the coexistence of two radically different modes. This
provides an additional and wider purpose to a study of Greek urban housing
from the viewpoint of the expansion of capitalist relations. For it poses
in a very clear way the problem of the development of concepts, theories
and methods for the social and economic analysis of "dua'" early capitalist
housing systems. For this problem, modern urban and housing economics
offer very little: at best, some starting points and contrasts for the
exploration of alternatives.
The analysis of Greek experience in these terms, moreover, can be
of wider theoretical significance for a class of similar problems in the
historical and comparative study of housing systems and so suggest some
necessary revtsf ons in current theories of the structure of cities
in Western and non-Western societies.
A study of the development of capitalism in residential production
and of "dual" housing systems in the early stages of urban-industrial
growth could highlight some neglected aspects of the history of cities
of Western advanced economies. Urban studies have unduly narrowed the
significance of the concept of the residential system of early indu-
strial cities by an unbalanced emphasis on the typicality of the
"English" model. Marx and Engels, with the weight of their authority,
helped create a myth of the archetypal capitalist English city. It is
time we recognise that in terms of residential economy the latter re-
presents a rather,special case among nineteenth-century cities; England,
we should remember, did not have any small-holding peasant economy, ur-
ban landownership was extremely concentrated, aristocratic anti-urbanist
controls of popular building had a long history, and the share of resi-
dential construction in the national product - at least for the second
18
half of the century - was somewhere between 1% and 1.5% whereas in
Germany and the U.S., for instance, it well exceeded 4%.10 These insti-
tutional and economic characteristics are closely related to the fact
that urban housing was, even since the beginnings of the last century,
dominated by speculative builders and commodity relations and the fact
that urban land and non-speculative housing production were not acces-
sible to the working class.
North American cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth century
presented a substantially different picture. The "American" model seems
more relevant for countries where urban-industrial growth took place
"in the context of small-holder peasant economies, relatively easy access
to ownership of urban land, few public controls and a comparatively high
rate of saving and access to ownership of petty-capital by popular strata.
Not surprisingly, non-speculative housing production in the form of popu-
lar petty owner-building was quite widespread, especially in the smaller
urban centres. The existence of a substantial sector of non-capitalist
relations dynamically related to the pattern of access to urban land and
control over housing production in citles that were thoroughly capitalist
from a societal perspective, and the systematic variations in this respect
among cities in different societies suggest a number of significant re-
search problems. What is the extent, character and role of non-capitalist
(neither public or quasi-public) housing sectors? What factors account
for the different structure in terms of modes of housing production and
distribution among early capitalist cities of different countries? What
are the determinants of the process towards the dominance of speculative-
capitalist housing? The fact that "primitive" forms of non-capitalist
housing have rapidly declined in this century in all advanced countries
having, in addition, 1ittle a~peal to urban reformers, can hardly excuse
the complete lack of studies of these issues. As a result, Western urban
theory is extremely ill-equiped to deal wi th the political economy of
housing in cities of develop inq countries, whereas a systematic comparison
10. S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, tables 5.3. and 5.6. Unfortu-
nately, systematic studies of the residential political economy as it
changed from the nineteenth century to the present are lacking. We need
more studies like the indispensable (for the U.S.) volume of Grebler
et al. (Capital Formation).
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of the latter with nineteenth-century Western cities in the context of a
comprehensive theory of the early capitalist city could have been of
great significance.
Comparisons of nineteenth-century English and American 8peau~ative
building with that of present-day developing countries, could be of equal
significance. In this respect at least, the two sides of the Atlantic
presented substantial simi1ari ties, stenmtnq, mainly, from the chara-
cteristics of an analogous stage in the development of housing finance
and the accumulation and concentration of capital in public and private
building agencies. The theme will be examined further in chapter 1 of
this study. Though generalisations from historical experience are
always a risky affair, especially in housing where local characteristics
and institutions exert a strong influence, it certainly appears worth-
while to consider the nineteenth-century speculative market as a distinct
theoretical type of early capitalist residential production and system
of housing relations, and examine its implications for the comparative
study of housing growth and change.11
Comparative theoretical approaches to urban structure and change for
cities in developing ,countries, are not, of course, new; nor is the con-
cept of a transition from a "traditional", "pre-industrial" organisation
to a "modern-industrial" one. Comparative studies of changes in the spa-
tial distribution of population and social classes within cities have,
indeed, stressed the long-term effects of a rising public and private
income-capacity and of related improvements in the technology, resources
and expertise that together bring the modernisation of urban infrastruc-
ture, transportation, and the building industry. Along with a process of
8oaia~ modernisation - that is, a gradual formation of Western types of
11. For a comprehensive study of the structure of late nineteenth-
century English speculative residential development, see, H.J. Dyos,
Victorian Suburb (Leicester, 1961). Most references to the particula-
rities of the twentienth-century ear1y-capitalist IIstructure of the
housing market" (a rather misleading term), can be found only in eco-
nomic histories of IIlongwavesll of building. It is unfortunate that
the very rich literature on building 10ng-cy1es has not received much
attention in urban studies (this is less true for housing economics).
A comprehensive review of the existing literature (with a wealth of
international references) is contained in Manuel Gotlieb, Long Swings
in Urban Development (New York, 1976). See also the references in ch. 1.
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employment structure and family life-styles - the above bring about the
development of certain universal trends: the long-term trend towards
lower density gradients,12 towards a "North Americanll residential pat-
tern,13 and the trend towards a universal homogeneity of economic and
social urban institutions.14
These approaches imply an economistic-evolutionary theory of change.
In comparison, say, to the majority of so-called "comparative" case stu-
dies of ethnographic or legal-institutional vein and the dangers of
being swamped by a multitude of "culturally-specific" descriptions,
these theories, no matter how much we may react to their evolutionism
and determinism, are of positive value. Econom;c development and modern-
isation (capitalist or otherwise) are universal processes, and social
change should be understood, to a large extent, as the product of a
world-system of relations, governed by the historical process of the
diffusion of markets, technology and modernity from the developed
"core" to the world "periphery".15
But these processes, though caused by universal forces, are certain-
ly not ones of "natural" and unilinear change unfolding gradually. The
particularities of local class-structures and history, and variations
in the outcomes of conflicts over change, make for much greater complex~
ity~ Moreover, the critical literature of the last years has success-
•
12. Colin Clark, po~ulat;on Growth and Land Use (London, 1967), ch. 9,
B.J.L. Berry et al. IIUran Population Densities: Structure and Chanqe";
Geographical Review, 53, (1963): 389-405.
13. Leo F. Schnore, "On the Spatial Structure of Cities in the Two
Americasll, The Study of Urbanization, P.M. Hauser - L.F. Schnore (eds.),
(New York, 1965): 347-401.
14. Gideon Sjoberg, "Cities in Developing and Industrial Societies:
A Gross-cultural Analysisll, in the Hauser - Schnore volume (1965): 213-263
15. For economic and sociological discussions of these world-scale
processes and their interaction with the local structures of various
countries and the consequent social changes, see, Eric J. Hobsbawm,
The Age of Capital: 1848-187~ (London, 1975), Reinhart Bendix, "Tradi-
tion and Modernity Reconsideredll in Embattled Reason: Essays on Social
Knowledge (Oxford, 1970): 250-314, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Origins
of the Modern t~or1d System (New York, 1974). For the limitations of such
an approach, however, see chapter 1, especially note 10.
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fully established that peculiarly non-modern "deviations" in class
structure and urban patterns seem to be a systematic and persistent
aspect of cities in the capitalist "periphery". This critique and
the effort to account for the recurrence of these patterns led to the
development of models of the "Third World" city. The concept is by now
fairly well established in urban studies, to the point of running the
risk of becoming a new orthodoxy, though certainly a more fruitful one.
Since the concepts I have introduced have strong affinities with the
problematic of the "Third World" city - the concept of a "dual" system
consisting of distinct modes of production, the resemblances of a fami-
ly economy in housing (the petty owner-building sector) to the wider
peasant-type sector described for these cities - it seems necessary to
state my reservations for this model, especially in relation to housing.
(a). The model does not specify the conditions for its applicability
at various levels of economic development or any specific mechanism of
change; this is, in part, due to its static and morphological construc-
tion and the methodology of Weberian "ideal types". The elements of the
"type", however, have been worked out mainly with reference to South-
east Asian and partly African cities.18 Thus, by structure and empirical
content, the model is a poor means of analysis in situations of rapid
change and in relatively high-income developing countries of a different
historical background. Even if the claimed theoretical and geographical
scope was justified, such a concept would be of limited value for a broad
range of social formations and issues; how useful would a concept of the
"Western city", that covered two centuries of history and a large number
of countries, be?
Cb}. The model seems to overlap uncritically an economic mode - the
low-income peasant-type sector and/or "informal" and/or non-modern sec-
tor1? with a social and political situation - "marginal", lumpenproleta-
riat, poor migrants in cities - as well as with certain housing conditions
18. T.G. McGee, The Urbanization Process in the Third World (London,
1971): eh, 3.
17. These concepts and the two-sector or "dual" model of the Third
World city are advanced in McGee, The Urbanization Process, ch. 3, his
liThePersistence of the Proto-Proletariat: Occupational Structures and
planning of the Future of Third World Cities" Progress in Geography, 9
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and economic organfsation - slums and "squatter" housing. I do not see
why these three aspects. should necessarily overlap, that is delimit the
same population, or, at that, be causally interrelated, since they be-
long to three distinct and relatively autonomous aspects of the social
system. Of course, they might do so under certain conditions. The whole
matter remains, however, unclear; a legacy, it appears, of the ideolo-
gical concern with squatters, marginality and the like, as "social pro-
blems", which, together with unstable petty-service employment, tend to
characterise a substantial section of poor migrants.
(c). There is, lastly, a simplistic economic determinism running
through this model; the existence of a "dual" economic mode in general,
and in housing in particular, that is the existence of squatter housing
in the latter, are explained by the fact of "urbanisation-without-
industrialisation" and the limited exterit of the modern high-income
sector. This implies that the expansion of industrial and "modern"
employment and income opportunities, in essence a more successful
effort to achieve urban capitalism proper (i.e. Western), will make
the precapitalist sector to wither away naturally. This gets us back
to the terms of the evolutionists with a bit of pessimism added. To
view precapitalist modes of production and residential economy as
merely residuaZ, violates both their long history and their social
and economic significance ..I'talso assumes away the conflicts of the
transition to capitalism. Besides, if we are to follow this economistic
explanation, we should have expected nineteenth-century London with its
periods of structural unemployment to have substantial numbers of squat-
ter communities; as far as I know this was not the case.
(1976): 3-38, J. Friedman and F. Sullivan, "The Absorbtion of Labor
in the Urban Economy: The Case of Developing Countries", Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 22, 3 (1974) and K. Hart, "Informal
Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana", R. Jolly et al.
(eds.), Third World Employment (London, 1973): 66-70.
An extended critical discussion of two-sector mode1s and, in general,
theories of the social and ecological structure of Third World cities
and their implications for the study of Greek urban society, ;s provi-
ded in Lila Leontidou Emmanuel, Urban Class Polarisation in Underdeve-
loped Countries: Latin America and the Case qf Greece, unpublished Msc
thesis, Department of Geography, London School of Economics and Poli-
tical Science (London, 1973).
23
The "Third World City" literature has done us the great service
of introducing the concepts of non-capitalist types of economic orga-
nisation and of IIdual"systems in urban theory; it has not done so,
however, for the residential economy, neither examined adequately the
relation of the latter with the broader urban structure, or the problem18of capitalist expansion and concomitant changes in such cases. The
Greek postwar experience demonstrates, in my opinion, the usefulness
of an emphasis on the issues of capitalist development in housing in
their own right, as relatively autonomous economic and social relations.
18. Perhaps a cautionary note on the use of the concepts of "mode
of production" and IIdualism" is required here. It has been pointed that
an uncritical use of the concept of "mode of production" for economic
forms that are very particular and of narrow historical scope, may
deprive it of its general-theoretical and "epochal" content as applied
in the Marxist historical method (Ernesto laclau, Politics and Ideology
in ~1arxist Theory (london, 1977), pp. 49-S0).Are we justified then, to
employ it in reference to the economy of housin~ at particular historic
periods? If we can demonstrate that it refers, 1n this context, to no
isolated and particularistic occurrences, but belongs to a broader
IImodellwith wider societal significance, I think we would be somewhat
justified.
Still, the criticism is valid. Since, however, more abstract terms like,
say, "the structure of production" do not convey the meaning of the con-
cept (briefly: type of ownership, division of labour, distribution of
surplus, productive capacity for expansion, all interconnected systema-
tically to form a particular type of economy of production), I would opt
for keeping the concept with an explicit recognition of the fact that
we refer to something certainly narrower than its established signifi-
cance in historical-epochal analysis.
With regard to "dualismll, some Marxist critiques of the concept have
claimed that it necessarily implies an unrealistic lack of interrela-
tionships between the sectors of the "dua'" structure (between, say,
the "modern" and the "traditional"), or an over-emphasis on the deter-
minant role of the internal structure of sectors (see the critique
by Andre Gunder Frank, mainly with reference to analyses of Brazilian
agriculture, Ca italism and Underdevelo ment in Latin America,(New York.
1969, Pelikan ed. 1971 , pp. 268-269 .I have always" been at loss Why this
is necessar+ty so. Differences of theory on the role of exchange economic
relations (in contrast to "internal" productive relations) in the analysis
of social change among Marxists, may account for the debate over "dualismll.
Ernesto laclau has offered the opinion that the alleged limitations of
the concept derive in part by its garticular usage .by nineteenth century
liberals involved in latin American agriculture (Laclau, Politics and
I?eOlo9a, p. 33). This is, however, of no concern for the present discus-S10n an seems entirely fortuitous.
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3.
The present work is.a study of the growth and distribution of urban
housing in postwar Greece with particular reference to Athens, as it is
determined by the "dual" political economy of early capitalism, and by
the process of the expansion of the speculative sector. The main concern,
however, wi1l be the nature of this "dualll housing system as such, the
characteristics of precapitalist popular owner-built housing, and the
socioeconomic and political factors that account for,the growth of
specu1ative building. The latter will be the unifying theme of the
study.
In the first chapter I expand theoretically on the concepts of pre-
capita1ism, "speculationll, modern capitalism in housing production and
distribution, the nature of a "dual" early capitalist system and offer
some pre1iminary hypotheses on the socioeconomic and political factors
that determine the rate and pattern of the expansion of speculative and
capitalist relations. Although I am mainly concerned with the Greek case,
this chapter tries to provide the widest possible scope, given limita-
tions of material, for the concepts introduced, by using cross-country
Ind historical references. After all, there is nothing more useless in
comparative research than so-called "culturally specific" theories.
In the second chapter I substantiate with empirical material the
thesis of a "dual" structure for postwar Greek urban, housing, and exa-
mine the extent and socia-spatial distribution of speculative and pre-
capitalist modes. Since the origins and socioeconomic foundations of
precapitalist petty owner-building are the object of some debate, and
are also essential in understanding the reasons for its decline, I dis-
cuss them separately in the third chapter. The thrust of the argument in
this chapter is that popular precapitalist owner-building in Greek ci-
ties is not reducible to a residual phenomenon restricted to socially
marginal IIsquatter" housing, but constitutes a major historical form,
valued as such and based on certain distinctive aspects of Greek socie-
ty and on autonomy vis-a.-vis capitalist market influences and modern
administrative controls in the allocation of urban land and economic
resources. As an implication of this analysis I advance the hypothesis
that the deciine of this sector in the 1960's has not been the outcome
of voluntary assimilation of popular resources into the market as a
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result of the growth of incomes and the modernisation of consumption
patterns, but mainly the effect of political and economic constraints.
These alternative interpretations are examined in chapter 4 through a
detailed analysis of the pattern of demand and the allocation of housing
in Athens.
Given the decline in the role of precapitalist housing, the growth
of speculative building is a corollary of trends in aggregate invest-
ment in housing as these are determined by postwar economic growth and
the specificities of the Greek housing system and wider economy. The
last two chapters examine the determinants of aggregate residential
capital formation, first in relation to the broad pattern of resource
allocation in Greek economic development (chapter 5) and, then, with
the help of a more detailed model of household behaviour and the eco-
nomics of the early capitalist housing system as a whole (chapter 6).
At a more than one point in the study the analysis of the growth
of speculative building and the decline of the precapitalist mode of
popular housing points to the overriding importance of the "political
factor": determinant interventions by the State and the corresponding
pattern of class relations, ideologies, and distributions of political
power. This aspect opens up a whole new set of significant questions
for research and theory that cannot be adequately confronted in this
work, though they are of singular importance for the historical and
comparative study of the development of capitalism in housing. In the
concluding remarks of this study, I advance alongside the main arguments
about the changes in the housing system, some theoretical conjectures
on the nature of the relationships of ideology and conflict between
social classes that were associated with these changes. The conclusions
will also return to some of the general issues raised in this intro-
duction namely the limitations of evolutionist and "Third World" theories
of structure and change in early capitalist cities, and the need for more
complex comparative models of the determinants of houslng capital formation
in "middle-income" countries in the process of capitalist development and
modernisation.
1· Modes of Production and Developmentof Capitalism in Housing
In the study of periods of fundamental change we should be sceptical
of explanations that project backwards, in a teleological manner, either
some evolutionary process or the realisation of historical goals. We
must recognise that both the dead-ends and the losers of development are
a significant part of the historical process. We can thus derive more
valid analogies and theories for the study of the present. This point
needs stressing because current comparative studies of cities, biased
as they are towards a view of historical development that culminates
in modern economies of housing and public policies, have relegated a
number of significant phenomena of the housing process in early capi-
talist cities of the past or the present to an obscure and neglected
role. These are:
1. The specific nature of early capitalist housing, i.e. small-rentier
speculative building, its significance for the pattern of growth
and distribution of housing, and its relations to the social stru'-
cture, landownerwhip patterns and politics of "developing" cities.
2. The important role in the history of cities of pre-capitalist,
"simple" modes of house-building and urban development, as distinct
from speculative building or the use of - even primitive - capitalist
organisation in the construction "industryll. Such modes are based
(to use Marxist concepts) on a lIpetty mode of production" and limited
commodity exchange relations: an economy of independent labourers and
craftsmen working to order, and small owners building mainly for their own
use rather than for sale or rent. It should be recognised that precapi.
talist housing production is not necessarily connected to precapita-
list land aZlocation (e.g. corporatist as in medieval cities). Private
property, land rent and a market in urban land have occurred very
early, and for some time now are universal in capitalist societies.
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The rise of the market in urban 1and and real property, however , does
not automatically lead to the predominance of speculative production:
precapitalist building may be important for extended periods in early
capitalist cities,
3. The social conflicts and economic and spatial changes that are involved
in the expansion of the speculative economy and the decline of "simple"
popul ar housebiJildi"ng and corr-espondtnq .property relations.
These forms of residential economy and these processes of change have
been important during earlier periods of Western capitalist cities. They
are of particular significance, however, for an understanding of cities
in developing countries, particularly for those cases which have under·
gone major expansions in urban residential development and the growth
of modern capitalist institutions in the postwar period, with the transi·
tion to relatively high levels of economic development and urbanisation.
They have certainly been of major importance in postwar Greek cities.
In order therefore to study the problem of urban housing change in
postwar Greece and more particularly the growth of speculative building
- and do so in terms that would be relevant to the wider case of "transi-
tionalll countries in intermediate stages of economic development - we
require some theoretical understanding of the concepts of precapitalist
and early-capitalist "modes of housing productionll in the context of
predominantly capitalist societies; their relations to the wider social
structure; and the characteristics of the overall housing system that
results from the coextstence of different modes. This way, we may also
surpass the pitfalls of a view of changes in housing as a mere ~e~ection
of wider economic changes - growth of incomes, technology, and modern
public policies - which also implies a concept of the non-modern and the
non-capitalist as a simple IIsurvival" or a "residual" form, the unhappy
by-product of a lack of success in development.
In this chapter I will first review some accepted theories of the
housing system in early capitalist cities and question their universali-
ty and basic assumptions. Then I will clarify the concept of "modes of
production" as it applies to residential development and distinguish the
types of precapitalist petty o\mer-buildinr, petty commodity production,
"speculativell bullding and modern capitalist production of housing, in
order to arrive at a general typology.
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1. The structure of the housing "market" in early capital ist cities
We have been so accustomed to the accepted ideas about the capitalist
city of the nineteenth century and its residential patterns, that it re-
quires a substantial effort to go beyond them and form a more balanced
historical and comparative perspective. Our concepts have been mostly
influenced by the historical experience of English cities in the last
century. James Vance Jr, in a remarkable paper,l has given a systematic
account of the housing system of the period, drawing also from the histo-
ry of other European cities. Vance distinguished this.capitalist system
of "land-assignment" from the precapitalist "medieval" organisation of
land and employment and from "post-capitalist" systems with a high degree
of state intervention. According to his argument, the rise of capitalist
class structure and social institutions in early capitalist cities leads
to a generalised system of allocation of land and housing by rent-paying
ability and a concentration of new residential development in higher-
income markets. This leaves the working classes dependent on land and
housing abandoned by higher-income groups as they move to better new
housing - the well-known "filtering" process. As a consequence, any
increase in the rate of urbanisation would, in most cases, produce a
shortage of working-class housing and a deterioration of living condi-
tions for the majority of urban dwellers. Hence the familiar image of
the city we associate with Engels' depiction of Manchester or the Chi-
cago Ecologists of the 1930's: a stratified residential system with a
hierarchy of housing situations and areas of increasing real value,
rental cost and social class ascription, where residential growth takes
place at the one end, and slum conditions and stagnation prevail at the
other.
Such a housing system is integrated-hierarchicaZ in two senses. First,
on the level of the aZlocation of existing housing stock, there is an
overall market of houses which, on a set of common criteria, distingui-
shes a series of housing stock classes with different rents: these are
1. James E. Vance, Jr, "Land Assignment in the Precapital ist, Capi-
talist and Post-capital ist City", Economic Geography_, 17, 2 (1971):
101-120.
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allocated to the various income classes competing for the housing stock
with priority running from top to bottom in the income hierarchy. Second,
on the level of produation of new stock, building responds to the market
values and shortages formed through the aforementioned stratified compe-
titive mechanism, and does so, moreover, mainly for the higher-income
segments. Given a sufficient expansion of the income and population de-
mand for new housing in this system, and the prevalence of exchange-
values, the predominance of a speculative building sector becomes, given
sufficient resources, a natural corollary of the overall IImodelll• The ope-
ration of this IIcapitalistll pattern of the formation and allocation of new
residential stock implies, or rather encourages,an analogous mechanism of
commodity production.
The model we have been describing is based on a number of particular
assumptions. First, it assumes a unitary mode of housing production. Se-
cond, it assumes the 8oaioZogiaaZ fact of the dominance of exchange values
and of a concensus among social classes with regard to the available
housing situations and their value. This concensus may be voluntary or
a practical adaptation effected by an economic class of land-rentiers
controlling urban property, and by the operation of a system of capital-
ist rent. In the latter case, there is a further basic assumption of
the model, implying certain conditions of economic differentiation and
a certain distribution of ownership of land and housing.
The conditions that would realise this series of fundamental assump-
tions, however, are neither necessary nor universal in early capitalist
cities, but vary historically and among countries. Non-market valuation
and non-capitalist production of housing for use by households of lower
social strata owning urban land has been, and still is, a widespread phe-
nomenon. This is based on conditions of urban landownership and eco-
nomic differentiation that diverge significantly from the ones assumed
above.
To be more precise: a diffuse distribution of landownership and insti-
tutionalised rights over the free use of land among broad segments of the
urban population, particularly the lower-income strata, and a lack of
differentiation of the roles of landowner/producer/user, similar to a
small peasant economy, would permit a widespread precapitalist production
and distribution of housing which may take place alongside speculative-
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capitalist building proper. This would lead to what we may call a duaZ
housing system with regard to the principles of production and allocation.
Existence, however, of different modes of housing production related to
particular social strata and, consequently, the operation of relatively
autonomous processes of growth and distribution in the different places
of the social and spatial structure leads to the necessary conclusion
that neither overall market integration nor hierarchical allocation of
housing and land can be assumed as the fundamental principles of the
early capitalist housing economy. This poses the problem of the analysis
of residential growth and change on a wholly different basis.2 This is
especially significant for the atas8 distribution of the housing product
and the access to space of lower-income groups where petty precapitalist
production tends to be concentrated. But it is equally important for the
formation of total housing "investment" and its spatial distribution.
It is somewhat surprising that a model of a totally "integrated"
housing market (or,as Vance would put it, a "generalised" one), exclu-
sively dominated by speculative production, has come to be generally
associated with the structure of early capitalist industrial urbanisation.
After all, the English experience from which it is mainly derived is
2. The assumptions of "vertical integrationll and hierarchical allo-
cation according to rent-paying ability in a competition process are
the cornerstones of current housing market models. For instance, see
W.G. Grigsby, Housing Markets and Public Policy (Philadelphia, 1963)
and Wallace Smith, Filtering and Neighborhood Change, Research Report
No. 24, Center of Real Estate and Urban Economics, Univ. of California,
(Los Angeles, 1964). Models of the IIspatial structure IIof the housing
market (land and ground-rent distribution) are similarly based on
assumptions of integrated capitalist markets and hierarchical allocation
(for a review of the more well-known models, see E.S. Mills, Studies
in the Str~ture of the Urban Econony (Baltimore, 1972). pp. 63-BO}.
The fact that the current models of the structure of the 1and market
and ground-rents are based on certain very limiting assumptions about
the mode of housing supply is seldom realised. Though a generalised
market of land property may exist even when the supply system is not
economically unified and inteqrated, in a "dual" system of semi-segre-
gated economies of building the st~tct~~e of land allocation and ground-
rents will be largely different. We cannot go into this ~ow, but we may
say in passing that to the degree that sectors of housing supply are of
limited spatial mobil ity and consumers are not neutral tov:ards housing
types and areas , the assumptions of models of capital ist land market and
land rents are substantially unde~ined. In connection to this, see
Appendix 6.1 and chapter 4.
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rather exceptional in nineteenth-century urbanisation, though perhaps
with similarities in patterns of tenure and urban landownership with
most European urban centres. In North America a strikingly different
pattern can be clearly discerned. Diffuse access to landownership,-
household-controlled building, and, therefore, supply of housing out-
side speculative production and a stratified market of old structures-
has been widespread among the lower middle class and the working class
in the nineteenth and twentienth centuries,especially in smaller urban
centres.3 The most important outcome of such a residential political
economy was the radically different rates of access to house ownership
of the Amerjc;a-n~and the English proletariat. The latter has been stereo-
typically (and quite rightly, at that) described as the victim of a
ruthless ho~sing market, high rents and extreme scarcities.4
Higher wages, and therefore a certain ability to save on the part
of the working classes of the New World, made some of the difference.
Growing economic resources, however, would have been dissipated in a
housing system of high rents and limited speculative supply, 'if popular
3. Gotlieb, Long Swings in Urban Development, p. 140, refers
to the widespread practice, in the U.S., of custom-building in privately
procured lots. Speculative production of urban housing in the U.S. has
begun to playa predominant role only by the turn of the century and
increased fastly during the 1920's boom;(Clarence D. Long, Building
Cycles and the Theory of Investment, Princeton, 1940 , pp. 187-88).User-
owner-controlled building was still quite widespread during the 1930's; see
L. Grebler, Production of New Housing (New York, 1950), p. 7. Even in
the 1960's, owner-built housing, as distinct from contractor-built or
developer-built, accounted for 20% of new single housing and 12% of all
new housing; most of it was built in rural areas, but still, as much---
as one-third in the periphery of metropolitan areas (W.C. Grindley,
"Owner-builders: Survivors with a Futurell in Freedom to Build, ed. by
J.F.C. Turner & R. Fichter, 1972, New York, pp. -3-21). F6r the extensive
role of user-controlled building in postwar France, see C. Topalov,
Les Promoteurs Immobiliel"s (Paris, 1974), p. 52.
4. Stephan Thernstrom in his Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility
in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), contrasts the
English experience, recorded by Engels, Rowntree, Booth and others, where
working-class home ownership was virtually non-existent (in most cases
well under U~!) and American urban centres around 1850-1880. In the case
he studied, IIreal estate was strikingly available to working-class men
who remained in Newburyport for any length of time" (p. 117). Actually,
the proportion of owners after 20 years of residence rose to 60-80%
(P. 1l7). This growth of house property was based on family-controlled
building on owned land with the help of small personal savings.
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access to urban peripheral land and the reproduction of petty owner-
building outside the market was not an established historical form. We
are familiar with the effects of easy access to land and a high degree
of competition among landowners in America, in contrast to the Continent,
on agriauZturaZ rents, prices, and production.S It is unfortunate that
the implications of similar patterns in relation to land in the urban
periphery have not been sufficiently explored. As Manuel Gotlieb has
pointed in a passage pregnant with theoretical insights,
liThegreater partitioning of land ownership in America, the
infrequent use of the long-term ground lease, the policy
of overdevelopment or the creation of pockets of vacant
land in or around growing cities, and our system of property
taxation of vacant sites perhaps induced a lower mean level
of site values or a lesser difference between agricultural
and urban land values, than in Europe where the tradition
of land appreciation had deeper historical roots, where land
on city outskirts was often laid out in princely holdings,
and where land dealing was more of a professional business
pursuit. "6
Popular access to urban land, in itself, does not secure substantial
non-capitalist housing supply unless accompanied with established
rights to built in a manner independent from restrictive and costly
controls. Differences in effective public restrictions and controls
over popular house-building between U.S. and European cities seem a
5. Hence the puzzle presented to European economists by the peculia-
rities of the "strangell American system of easy access to land, and the
collapse of agricultural rents from the third quarter of the nineteenth
century onwards in Britain and the Continent due to competition from
rent-free lands of the new countries: Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange
(london, 1972), p. 238.
6. Gotlieb, long Swi~s in Urban Develo ment, p. 142. The differences
in the levels and behaviour of ground-rents specifically, absoZute ground-
rents) in the history of urban growth in the U.S. and Europe has been no-
ted also by Karl Pribram. "Restdua l, Differential and Absolute Urban
Ground Rents and their Cyclical Fluctuationsll, Econometrica, 8 (1940):
62-78. This does not necessarily contradict the occurrence of huge land
gains and values (which at the time caused the well-known critique of
Henry George and his disciples). Even if "absolute" ground-rents are low
(depending on the existence of monopoly power over new development land),
differentiaZ rents and development values in areas of intensive specula-
tive development can be very high.
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further important determinant of contrasts in housing systems; European
cities, particularly the great capitals, had a long tradition of ari-
stocratic anti-urbanism effected through severe restrictions on urban
growth and on house building for the emerging proletariat.?
Thus, the "American" model would seem to cast strong doubt on the
universality of the accepted concept of the housing system in the early
capitalist city. The evidence of present-day cities in developing coun-
tries of similar stages of development and urbanisation should have
shifted the emphasis decisively. Market provision and speculative
building incorporate only a part of urban housing, even in relatively
high-income developing countries (see Introduction). Moreover, there 1s
by now ample international evidence on the extensive role of popular
petty-ownership and owner-building outside capitalist relations, of
which the most publkised part has been "squatter" housing. Even if
legal forms of autonomous popular owner-building are not as well docu-
mented, the size of squatter populations in some cities, the recurrent
incorporation and legalisation of squatter areas into "nonna1" urban
growth, and the institutionaUsation of such "self-help" housing through
programs of provision of sites and services should have led to the
realisation of the existence of a different economic mode of housing
of a historical character that goes beyond the colourful "deviance"
of squatters.
A number of reasons may explain why this broader theoretical formu-
lation is generally lacking. The most important is the exclusive focus
on the process of "squatting" and the "marginal" poor associated with
7. Severe building controls against new housing for the poor were in
effective operation in London since the Elisabethan Era (instituted first
in 1580). (Doroty George, London Life in the Eighteenth Century, Penguin
edition, London, 1965,:p.78). As Raymond Williams comments, "It is
ironic to reflect that much of the physical squalor and complexity of
eighteenth-century London was a consequence not simply of rapid expansion
but of attemps to control that expansion"(The Country and the City,
(London, 1971, p.145). Antipathy for industrial urbanisation and the
growth of urban proletariat and policies of growth control, slum clear-
ance etc. were common throughout European Capitals of the Victorian
period. The latter, after all, were the strongholds of non-industrial
parasitic aristocracies of land and Government. See for a review,
Victor Kiernan, "Victorian London: Unending Purgatory", New Left Review,76 (1972): 73-90.
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it, to the effect that the wider issue of popular housing and its economy
in the context of urban growth has been approached through the distortion
8of official definitions of the "problem". Ideologically motivated empha-
sis on the "social problem" aspect, be it the violation of property rights
and building controls or "slum" conditions, can hardly be the basis of
adequate conceptualisation and valid comparisons. After all, on an ad hoc
modern view we may characterise as "slums" or illegal-uncontrolled settle-
ments almost at; historical forms of popular housing, or, at that, present-
day village housing in most countries!
Even when the historical typicality and persistence of non-market and
non-modern forms of housing production in "transitional" societies is real-
ised, these forms are most often not understood as important phenomena
in themselves, but as a reflection of the structural peculiarities of
the overall economic organisation of cities, namely the existence of
masses of low-income migrants with. instability of employment, poor
integration in the industrial sector, and mainly occupied in "informal",
8. The language used is very instructive: "marginality", "illegality",
etc., not to mention the concerns over the alleged revolutionary leanings
, of squatter settlements. Hence, the whole subject is overburdened with
a problematic of "integration" into normal housing and social life. For
a review of the political assumptions of approaches to squatter housing,
see Lila Leontidou Emmanuel, "Squatter Settiements: A Bibliography of
Controversies", Unpublished Paper, Department of Geography, London School
of Economics (London, 1973). The amassing evidence on "cross-cultural"
residential patterns has led urban geographers into acknowledging the
normal character of "squatter" housing and its association with abroad
spectrum of lower and lower-middle-class strata in developing countries; see
for instance, R.J. Johnston, "Towards a General Model of Intra-urban
Residential Patterns: Some Cross-cultural Observations", Progress in
Geography,4 (1972): 85-124. Johnston, however, goes to the other extreme:
he negates the specificities of such situations with respect to class
structure and housing mode (and real conditions) and equates them with
middle- and lower-income areas in advanced industrial countries. They
supposedly reflect the same social "ethos", tenure and spatial position.
This is grossly unhistorical. It is the outcome of a tradition of urban
studies which by a reflectionist method relate a statistical and uncon-
ceptual "stratification" pattern with cartographers I "space". Comparisons
of subjective orientations out of economic and social context can hardly
be considered an advance towards more knowledge in these matters.
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non-modern, service and petty-production activities.9 Since I have already
touched on these points in the Introduction, and since little of interest
can be said about those misconceptions that stem from normative definitions
of what constitutes "normal" modern housing, r will comment only on pro-
blems in theory and method that the view described in the last paragraph
raises,
The use of the theory of the "Third World" city or wider models of
"underdevelop~ent" in explaining housing conditions and organisation
raises a general question: is the history of housing, particularly
working-class housing, determined by the structure and development
of the capitalist system at the 80cietaZ level? There are reasonable
grounds for preferring such a general working hypothesis instead of
the unhistorical minutiae of specialised housing economics; its heuri-
stic and explanatory value can be judged then on the'strength of evi-
dence. As it happens, however, such an economic reductionism has passed
unquestioned. We have already referred to the accepted idea that the orga-
nisation and conditions of housing in nineteenth-century Britain typify
the necessary outcome of early capitalist urbanisation in generat. Marx,
Engels.and a host of progressive historians have put their authority
behind this view. Thus the particular institutional and urban-economic
conditions of the country and ,the period have not been taken into full
account.10 We have already pointed to the specific assumptions that are
9. This thesis has been more clearly stated in A.G. Frank, "Urban
Poverty in Latin America", I.L. Horowitz, (ed.), Masses in Latin America,(New York, 1970): 215-234.
10. This issue has been greatly obscured by the debate between Conser-
vative and Progressive historians over the effects of industrial capital.
ism in the early nineteenth century on the standards of living of the
English working class. I find myself in the unhappy position of having
to side with the Conservatives on the issue of housing conditions; extre-
mely poor conditions and speculative over-exploitation were to a large
extent the product of the specific characteristics of the English build-
ing economy of the period, and thus not wholly the systematic product
of the structure of the early industrial system. T.S. Ashton stresses
high prices of imported materials, scarcities caused by the Napoleonic
Wars and State controls and taxation. See Capitalism and the Historians,
ed. by F.A. Hayek (Chicago, 1954) for the Conservatives' arguments andAshton's article "The Treatment of Capitalism by Historians", pp. 31-61.
A most balanced evaluation of the evidence concerning the debate (not,
however, housing) is E.J. Hobsbawm's "The British Standard of Living,
1790-1850" in his Labouring Men (London, 1964, paperback 1968): 64-104.
For a bibliography see p. 124 in the same.
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behind the corresponding model as systematised by Vance. A similar simpli-
stic approach seems to be prevalent, however, among current studies of
urban conditions in "underdeveloped" countries, where the concepts at"
"Third World" city, "urbanisation-without-industrialisation", and "para-
sitic" primate cities have been developed in order to account for the
character of early urban capitalism in these conditions, and explain
in turn the housing situation. As a result, significant variations in
housing structures have been ruled out, at least as an important theo-
retical issue in comparative analysis.
Part of the problem lies deeper. Are we to use the concept of "capi-
talism" as a "model" of a determinate social system, perhaps with certain
major sub-types, universally applied to broad categories of countries -
say "developedll or "peripheral-underdeveloped" - in order to explain
concrete situations: Or should we, in the tradition of Marx, distinguish
the "mode'" as an abstract theory, from the variety of social systems -
or "social formations" - that may be found in particular times and places
and which are the product of the combined history of different modes of
production and class structures? The former view has been associated
with a number of historical theories, from Pirenne and Adam Smith to
some modern Neo-Marxists, that attribute the emergence of capitalism
and tne formation of a fundamentally uniform series of systems to the
diffusion of the capitalist market and the growth of the urban commercial
bourgeoisie. This view has been criticised on the grounds that it involves
a concept of capitalism and its genesis which pays near-exclusive attention
to processes belonging to the sphere of exchange rather than production,
and that it lacks the necessary emphasis on changes in the ownership
structure, the extinction of independent small producers and the rise
to predominance of wage-labour and a class .of capitalists direct~ng
production along the prototype of industrial organisation.11
11. These issues have been raised in the course of arguments over the
passage from feudalism to capitalism in Europe. See the papers collected
in The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London, 1976). Maurice
Oobb has been the major exponent of an emphasis on production relations
in the concept of capitalism (mainly in his Studies in the Development
of Capitalism, London, 1963:, ch. 1).The critiques levelled against those
stressing the growth of trade and to~~s in the rise of capitalism (e.g.
Pirrene, Sweezy), have been lately directed also against some current
Neo-r~arxist theories of capitalist development (or "underdeve Iopment ") in
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Marx, however, has directed our attention to the class struggles
and political processes in history that are connected with the develop-
ment of capitalism, with his celebrated analysis of "primitive accumula-
tion" - the extraction of surplus from the precapitalist economies of
rural peripheries and the colonies, the expropriation of small producers,
the usurpation of land, the enclosures.12 Similarly, the particular out-
comes of agrarian class-struggles and revolutions have been emphasised
as a crucial ~variable" in an adequate explanation of the rise of capi-
talism and its subsequent economic and political character.13 Whereas
the concept of "primitive accumulation" points to the importance of an
initial process of concentration of capital and the destruction of inde-
pendent pet~y-production for the development of capitalism, the latter
may very well be hindered by a tradition of large parasitic "feuda1"
property, and therefore be facilitated by an agrarian revolution that
creates a class of small and middle holders. The importance of such·
different "paths", depending on conditions of class structure and poli-
tical institutions, and different historical articulations of modes of
production, is clearly overlooked by any blanket application of a uni-
versal concept of a capitalist "system" emerging with the expansion of
trade and the incorporation of peripheral regions.14 The deterministic
and uniform use of models of "Third Wor1d" capitalist urbanisation has
carried over much of the crudity and assumptions of such applications.
The importance of different historical patterns of class structure
with regard to landownership distribution, the status of petty production
and petty-bourgeois strata and the associated political institutions
backward countries (namely these of A.G. Frank, Sweezy, and I. Waller-
stein). See E. Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America" ch. 1
in his Politics and Ideology in ~1arxist Theory, and R. Brenner, liTheOri-
gins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism",
New Left Review, 104 (1977): 25-92.
12. Karl Marx, Capital, Moskow edition, vol. 1, part 8.
13. See the articles by M. Dobb, "A Reply" and K. Takahashi "A Contri-
bution to the Discussion'~ in the Transition volume, pp. 165-169 and
68-97 respectively.
14. This has been especially stressed in the criticism of theories of
underdevelopment as the quasi-automatic effect of world-wide diffusion of
capitalist markets, to the point of gross undervaluation of the role of lo-
cal class structures (see, Brenner, liTheOrigins of Capitalist Development").
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not limited to the rural sector where these aspects are obviously relevant:
in unitary States the same aspects influence relations of national scope.
It is certainly so in the institutions and politics of land and the rights
of small property; but it is also so for the urban economic processes
that link cities with the rural periphery - the relations created through
migration, the role and character of smaller urban centres, and the pro-
cesses of conversion of land from rural to urban uses in the process of
urban growth. I have already referred to significant historical variations
in the distribution and control of urban land and access to petty-ownership.
Different national histories and outcomes of class conflicts over the land
question and the status of petty production in present-day developing
countries seem to influence significantly the political economy of urban
growth and residential development, though systematic material is rare.15
An explicit recognition of a wider set of possibilities in terms of
systems of housing production and distribution seems especially necessary
for an understanding of early capitalist systems with a "dual" structure
where a modern capitalist-speculative building economy expands in the
context of extensive precapitalist petty production and relatively diffused
landownership. Such a formation has wide empirical relevance, most probably
greater than the more systematically studied experience of nineteenth-
century European cities. Nevertheless, it has seldom been properly
conceptualised in the otherwise rich literature on "Third World" cities.
We now turn to an examination of the theoretical elements involved in
the analysis of such urban formations.
2. Early capitalist modes of housing production: capitalist-speculative
and popular petty owner-building
Conceptualisation of the economic structure of housing presents a
number of problems due to the fact that between the initial labour pro-
cess of construction and the final consumption of housing IIservices"
15. A particularly important structural aspect that may vary signifi-
cantly seems to be the degree of concentration of landownership.
"In latin America, the Philippines and ether areas once governed
by Spain, concentration is partly a carry-over from the haciendas
and large agrucultural estates in the Spanish tradition. Some of
these estates have moved into the urban orbit"
(Charles Abrams, Manis Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanisinq World,
Cambridge, Mass., 1964, p. 55).
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a number of interwoven processes take place and a number of economic
roles are involved. There are also wide differences in the institutional
and legal arrangementes that are related to particular types of housing
in various countries. Lastly, the very nature of housing as a physical
"good" or "use value" is not clear; this has led economists to endless
disputes over whether it should be allocated to the category of capital
goods or consumption goods. In current economic practice these issues
are resolved by some ad hoa analytical or accounting definition with
an aim to uniformity in relation especially to the construction of
National Accounts. Usually a class of "housing producers II is assumed,
owning residential capital and supplying housing "services" to consumers
in exchange.for payments of rent; in order to invest in new capital
these producers buy structures as capital goods supplied by the con-
struction industry and 1and suppl ied by 1andowners ..
The division of labour thus outlined can be said to form a "pure"
market economy of full commodity-exchange relations in aZI spheres of
the housing process, since it is usually assumed that in construction,
labour and capital are similarly fully separated, the former offered
in the market as a commodity in exchange for wages.16
In the real world, of course, consumers and housing investors
might be the same persons (owner-occupiers) and there may be a class
of capitalists ("developers") producing houses as commodities (inclu-
ding land). In some cases owners of urban land perform the latter role.
More significantly, all four roles - landowner/producer/house-owner/con-
sumer may overlap substantially.
For accounting purposes these complexities may be immaterial, although
they create some problems in the correct calculation of imputed rents
and values when these do not arise in monetary form. In terms of a
theoretical model of the real process of housing and the behaviour
and relations of various actors, however, such "complexities" can lead
to greatly varied results. We therefore need models~of precapitalist
and early capitalist housing systems that diverge in specific ways from
16. Such a "pure" set of assumptions has been most lucidly formulated
by Richard Muth in his general model of the residential economy (Citiesand Housing, Chicago, 1969, ch. 3).,
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the "pure" model of commodity exchange relations and a modern differ-
entiation into economic roles. This necessarily involves both conceptual
clarification and empirical-historical relevance. Let us proceed step by
step.
To begin with, we must dispense with the notion that a systematic
typology of housing economies can be based on the form of the use and
allocation of urban land and housing stock. We may have a market that
is "integrated" in the sense of being formed by interdependent segments
(as in the "filtering" model) related through uniform prices (or stru'-
ctureddifferentials) and movements of people; or it may be oompart-
mentaZised into client-specific and localised segments with little
interdependence. The relative role of rental and owner-occupation sub-
markets is a further basis for distinctions. Lastly, substantial areas
of non-market allocation may exist, namely, simple owner-building for
use. Thus, we may have an extensive variety of types according to the
morphology of the system of the use and allocation of land and stock.
The structure of this system, however, tells us little without a know-
ledge of the system of housing produotion and is to a very large extent
determined by the latter. We have already spoken of the simplistic
assumptions about ownership and production of the "filtering" model.
The degree of "integration" is itself related to the development of
commodity relations, the role of ground-rents and the mobility of spe-
culative capital. Variations in tenure largely depend o~ ownership of
land and capital. Lastly, non-monetary relations of allocation are but
another aspect of precapitalist production. After all, prices themselves
are determined m3inly in the plane of production and the relative role
of the various claims over the distribution of the product made by land,
capital,and labour, which, in turn, depend on the particular mode of
production.
Types of housing production, furthermore, tend in history to be syste-
matically related to the social classes and geographic zones of cities.
Small-scale precapitalist building is fundamentally associated with the
working class or other lower-income strata - in general "popular" strata.
Although independent owner-user~controlled building for middle and upper
strata may exist, when a substantial speculative sector grows it will
tend to be concentrated in tnese higher-income groups, rendering non-
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speculative middle-class housing secondary in absolute numbers (albeit
important for the spatial structure of urban growth).17
Thus on the level of general theoretical concepts and comparative
typology, the "mode of housing production" is the important analytical
unit. For the analysis of concrete historical situations and processes
of change we may employ more specific units interrelating modes with
parts of the social and spatial structure of the city. We may define
such complex socioeconomic units as housing sectors encompassing
alongside modes of housing production certain types of "demand", t.e.
sociospatial groups, and furthermore, institutions, ideologies and
interests connected to a housing mode and its related social classes.18
17. The fundamentally middle-class character of early speculativebuilding is well known.
liThethird quarter of the nineteenth century was the first world-
wide era of urban real-estate and constructional boom - for the
bourgeoisie .•• Paradoxically, the more the middle class increased
and flouri'shed diverting resources towards its own housing, offices.
the department stores which were so characteristic a development of
the era, and its prestige buildings, the less went relatively to the
working-class quarters, except in the most general form of social
expenditure - streets, sanitation, lighting and public utilities".
(LJ. Hobsbawn, The Age oT .Capital, 1848-1'375. London, 1975, paperbackedition 1977, pp. 249-250).
18. Our concept of housing "sectors" has certain affinities with
John Rex's later formulations of his theory of IIhousingclasses".
These are conflicting housing systems that crystallise around them
housing interests, social classes, ideologies and political institu-
tions. His description of the conflict between "property-owning
democracyll (with an emphasis on the owner-occupier sector) and a
system of public housing provided as a right and opposed to the capi-
talist process in land and housing allocation, is a case in point.
In Rex, however, one cannot find the slightest reference to housing
Or land economics, a fact that makes his model rather weak. His earlier
formulations of the concept of "housing classll were related more to the
Chicago model of the city - a hierarchically stratified, competitive
(and not antagonistic) system of housing allocation, with a unified
system of housing valuations (essentially the usual model of the early
capitalist city, as in J. Vance, Jr.). Rex has been criticised for his
assumptions of an integrated social system (i.e. a universally accepted
scale of housing values), and had later revised his initial concept. A
similar critique can be levelled against unwarranted assumptions of so-
cial integration in accounts of early capitalist systems with substantial
precapitalist sectors (the "alternative-antagonistic" system here is not
provision by the State, but autonomous family owner-building and non-
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A certain interconnection between modes of housing production, housing
sectors and patterns in the use and allocation of land and stock may be
understood as a specific housing "system".
Having introduced the concepts of housing "sectors", "systems" and
.their relation with modes of housing production, we must now turn to a
more analytic conceptualisation of the latter in the sphere of housing
and the description of those modes relevant for early capitalist cities.
We may designate as a mode of production in accordance with the Marxist
usage of the concept,
"the logical and mutually coordinated articulation of; 1. a determ-
inate type of ownership of the means of production; 2. a determinate
form of appropriation of the economic surplus; 3. a determinate
degree of the division of labour; 4. a determinate level of develop-
ment in the productive forces. This is not merely a descriptive
enumeration of isolated "factot-s",»but a totality defined by its
mutual interconnections. Within this totality, property of the
means of production constitutes the decisive element .•. (since it)
determines the forms of the canalization of the economic surplus
and the effective degree of the division of labour, the basis in
turn of the specific capacity of the productive forces for expansionll 19
On the basis of this rather demanding definition, even speculative·
building, utilising concentrated capital for the production of housing
as a commodity (as exchange-value), falls short of capitalism proper
- certainly so if our point of reference are the characteristics
of industrial capitalism. Indeed, some Marxists have voiced strong
doubts if, in general, commodity production organised .by merchant
capital through relations with independent small producers (as, say,
in the "putting-out" system) could be called capitalist or even cons i-
commodity relations). For the initial formulation of "hous tnq class" see,
J. Rex & R. Moore, Race, Community and Conflict (London, 1967), pp. 36-41.
As for the later one, see J. Rex, liThe Sociology of the Urban Zone of
Transition" in R. Pahl (ed,), Readings in Urban Sociology (Oxford, 1968):
211-232, and his review of criticisms of the earl ier model, "The Concept
of Housing Class and the Sociology of Race Relations", Race, Colonialism
and the City, (London, 1973): 32-42.
19. Ernesto LaclalJ, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America" in his
Politics and Ideology, p. 34.- ---
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dered as leading to capitalist development (i.e. extended use of wage-
labour directZy organised by capital).20 Speculative building, histori-
cally, has been notoriously primitive in comparison to industry; it is
normally based on small work g·re-upsexternally contracted, and dominated
by commercial short-term motives (thus "speculative"). But we will take
up these issues later.
For now it suffices to say that from the point of production as a
whole, house-building for the market does not necessarily imply a capi-
talis:tmode of production. (Production for the market should be under-
stood in contrast to the one aimed at the use of housing either by the
labourers themselves or, more commonly, by those controlling resources
and the building process: the user-producer). Most students of·early.
'"' ...
capitalist cities would agree that the bulk of residential building
has been based on what is termed by Marxists as a "petty mode of pro-
duction" that is, an economy of independent labourers (or smallish
groups for contract work), owning their tools as their own property
and freely exchanging their product (in this case structures). Even
when such a construction economy is utilised by small-scale capital
for the building and exploitation of a few houses through rent or sale
we hardly go beyond a "simple commodity economy" - essentially a
precapitalist mode (though perhaps one of incipient capitalism) for
residential production as a whole. Thus even in the context of full
commodity relations we may have an extensive sector of essentially
precapitalist petty-building, for instance the erection of two or three
houses by land owners or builders of small capital in order to rent them
to working-class or lower middle-class families.21 Such a mode presents
certain continuities with more substantial speculative building, which,
after all, is itself a rather primitive form of capitalist production
in the context of early industrial cities. The use of more concentrated
capital and a higher level in the organisation of construction, however,
set the latter apart •.
20. Kohachiro Takahashi, "A Contribution to the Discussion II, in the
Transition volume, and more specifically pp. 90-93.
21. Such a housing economy seems to have prevailed in early nineteenth.
century Britain. See, H.J. Habakkuk, "Fluctuations in House-building in
Britain and the United States in the Nineteenth Century", Journal of Eco-
nomic History, 22 (1962): 198-230.
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Far more radical are the differences between the speculative capi-
talist organisation and a widespread non-commodity precapitalist pro-
duction where the building process is controlled by small owners of land
(and capital) aiming at their own use (though some marginal elements of
renting or exchange may coexist). In such a IIpettyoumer-buiZding" mode,
a "petty mode or production" follows as a natural corollary; it is not,
however, the most important determinant element: diffuse landownership,
a family organisation of the utilisation of land and the accumulation
of capital, the predominance of lIuse-values~an~, of course, owner-
occupation are also essential aspects. Land; and ~t some later stage
even structures, may be sold and bought as private property: but their
valuation lies outside the market of "factors" for speculative-capital-
ist production and the economic calculation of profit and ground-rent
as specific economic categories.
It may be oejected that we conceptualise the IIpettyowner-building"
mode by aspects that largely involve the sphere of exchange as distinct
from production. This distinction is indeed crucial for a correct
understanding of modern capitalism as different from forms of mercantile
capital. The relevance of this is obvious for the analysis of the specu-
lative housing mode as distinct-from modern capitalist organisation.
We should not carry this rationale, however, into the problem of defining
modes of pveoapi tal.iet: economy. Housing production, after all, is not
limited to the construction process only. Ownership and control of land
and the capital value of structures are hardly separable from the whole
process of creation of housing services. A misplaced emphasis on construct-
ion sometimes leads to an equation of non-commodity production with con-
ditions where direct family labour is predominant in the labour process.
Though participation of family labour may be an important component, main-
ly in more underdeveloped societies, it cannot be the defining element,
for this would limit drastically the significance of precapitalist modes
in urban situations.
Petty owner-building should be sharply distinguished from petty commo-
dity production in housing. This is again a matter of avoiding an excessive
emphasis on the construction aspect, with respect to which both modes are
more or less similar. In a broad perspective both cases are precapitalist
but it is better to distinguish the second one as an intermediate type,
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or as a form of primitive speculative production, since they differ in
essential aspects. In addition to the absence of the sale motive in the
first case, the land factor does not enter the process as a socially
structured claim for capitalist ground rent: nor does the profit logic
and the costs/returns accounting,typical to an even primitive commercial
venture, predominate in the accumulation of housing capital. Though a
market of land and labour may exist, the situation is not dissimilar,
in the case of urban growth through petty owner-building, to a rapidly
growing small subsistence agriculture of !!frontier!!settlements.
The significance of the distinction between a petty mode of incipient
capitalist nature and a household production/consumption economy of small-
holders we just made for housing, has been recognised. in the long debate
over the nature of the peasant mode of production. It has been rightly
pointed out that the Marxist concept of a "petty mode" or !!simple commo-
dity product lcn''applied to small-scale family agriculture, if helpful
to a degree, is too-general and underestimates the peculiarities of
the peasant family economy, i.e. its gearing to the family life-cycle,
the effects of inheritance and family intergenerational. assistance (e.g.
dowries), the rationale of the balance within the family of resources
and the costs of. increased effort in any considerations of accumulation
(elements, I may add, that I find crucial for the family housing process
too). It also underestimates the positive economic and social functions
of the family economy and thus the forces that make for its persistence
outside the orbit of the capitalist sector.22
The importance of the family economy should not be limited to rural
areas. Even in Western advanced countries before the .First World War ~
substantial part of material needs and services for the working classes
were provided for by household production. The increased spread of wage
labour - particularly for women - capitalist competition and public
22. The idea of the "peasant economy!! as an economic system sui
generis has achieved quite some currency in present-day economic studies.
It aerives mostly from the work of A.V. Chayanov, a Russian agricultural
economist of the mid-war period. For a very illuminating review of
Chayanov's ideas, see, Basile Kerblay, "Chayanov and the Theory of
Peasantry as a Specific Type of Economyll, in Teodor Shanin led.),
Peasants and Peasant Societies (London, 1971): 150-160.
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regulations introduced either for reasons of hygiene or simply admini-
strative control, standardisation and taxation, have largely eroded such
non-commodity relations.23 Popular household production outside the ca-
pitalist market network is certainly a vital phenomenon in present-day
cities of developing countries. Housing, after all, by its very nature
does not offer itself to great lIeconomies of scalell or economies of
standardised capitalist production, as the persistence of small-scale
house-building or even family-controlled building in that most competi-
tive and aggressively capitalist of countries, the United States, testi-
fies (see note 3.).
Let us now turn to speculative building and modern capitalist pro-
duction of housing. Two questions are of fundamental importance in our
construction of a theoretical typology: can building for the market as ts
found in early capitalist cities be subsumed under a more general mode
of capitalist housing production, or does it differ systematically from
the modern prototypes of private housebuilding in advanced economies?
And if, as we have already suggested, a "speculative" mode has distinctive
characteristics, what are these and what are the conditions that make
for the emergence and functioning of such an economy?
3. The small-rentier speculative mode of housing production
Even the more common and narrow definitions of "speculation" and
"speculative building" convey an important part of the economic essence
of this mode. For speculation we read: litoprofit by the rise or fall in
the market value, as distinct from regular trading or investmentll or to
profit from enterprises "of venturesome kind or risky nature, but offer-
ing the chance of great or unusual gain,,24. For speculative building:
"building houses in anticipation of the d~rnand for themll•25 It is the
23. For the story of these changes in the U.S., see, Harry Braverman,
Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York, 1974): ch. 13.
24. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Illustrated Edition,
Oxford, 1964 .
25. Oyos, Victorian Suburb, p. 122,
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derogatory "distinct from regular trading or investment" that points
to the reasons for which speculative building in the context of the nine-
teenth century has been considered more of a social problem that a parti-
cular form of economy the emergence of which transfored urban growth.
In the first years of the last century very little was built on speculation
(i.e. for inknown demand) even in London: by 1850, in contrast, very little
was built on order.28 And by then, as Marx quoted from a testimony of 1857.
"...a man who wishes to rise in the world can hardly expect to rise
by fallowi ng a fair trade... it is necessary for him to add specu-
lative building to it, and that must be done not on a small scale".27
What are the conditions for th.eemergence of an extensive speculative
housing sector and what are its particular characteristics that distin-
guish it from the modern capitalist organisation of residential develop-
ment?28 Let us lista number of essential points:
26. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 2, p. 238. The English case should be
viewed as rather untypical. A speculative residential and land economy
has risen exceptionally early in English history. In London, speculative
building could be found even at the time of the Great Fire. It has
expanded rapidly during the later part of the sixteenth century and
onwards (M. Dorothy George, London Life, p. 87).
27. Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 774.
28. In my account of the general and systematic traits of early
speculative residential production, ! have drawn from a number of studies
on the economic history of housing in Britain and the U.S. and my study
of the Greek residential economy. I will not try to give detailed refer·
ences for all the propositions advanced in this chapter (the Greek case
will occupy us, anyway, in the rest of this work). After all, at this
stage I am mainly concerned with the construction of a tentative "theory·
model" of speculative and "dual" economies. Such an operation (which H
a prerequisite for systematic research aiming at more general conclusions).
is, by nature, somewhat eclectic with empirical material and more concerned
with theoretical consistency and elaboration 9f convincing concepts. Re·
search will demonstrate afterwards the capacity (or lack of such) of the·
ory to generate more convincing arguments or more fruitful new problems
than other theoretical alternatives. This J:oncept of theory as "research
program" aiming at a "progressive problemshift" in a given field {vs.
a "degeneratingll one} is advanced in Imre Lakatos, IIFalsification and
the Methodology of Scientific Research Proqrenmes", in 1. Lakatos &
A. Musgrave (eds .),Criticism and the Growth of Kno\',ledge(Cambridge,
1970): 91-196. .
The most helpful sources on the economic history of speculative building
have been the following: Marx, Capital, vol. 2, pp.237-239; vol.3,pp.773-81;
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1. Speculative building as an establ Ished economic activity is essentially
the production by a class of entrepreneurs of houses as finished commo-
dities for exchange in the market as a response to a demand for real
estate investment or owner~occupation. A mature sector of building
businesses presupposes a certain separation of the capital that orga-
nises residential development, and partly finances it, from the mass
of small one-time ventures of investment in and development of rentable
property. By the same token it implies a certain level in yearly acti-
vities - reflected in the increased size of the building projects
or the number of projects undertaKen - in order that speculative
builders qualify as an effective category of "capital II.
2. Therefore, some concentrations of capital with regard to both the orga-
nisation of the building process and the financing of development,
either personally accumulated or based on savings mobilisation ~echa-
nisms (which may be informal, associational, or institutions of mort-
gate credit), is a historical precondition for the growth of a specu-
lative sector.29
3. It is a fundamental characteristic of early "capitalistll building,
however, that concentration of capital either in firms or in social
institutions - like mortgage and savings associations - and the con-
centration of capital in utilities and infrastructure development
(public or private), remains at low levels for the greatest part of
the residential sector.30 That, furthermore, this capital is toaaZ
and autonomous in that it is not integrated in a developed capital-
market (which is, of course, partly a corollary of its low level of
Grebler et al., Capital Formation; Oyos, Victorian Suburb; Habbakuk,
"Fluctuations in House-Building"; Pribram, "Residual, Differential and
Absolute Urban Rents"~ These I have already mentioned. Of great interest
are also, M. Bowley, The British Buildin Industr, (Cambridge, 1966),
A.A. Nevitt, Housing, Taxation and Subsidies London, 1966): chs. 1-3,
LLoyd Rodwin, Housing and Economic Progress (Cambridge, Mass., 1961) and
the exhaustive monograph by H.W. Richardson & O.H. Aldcroft, Building in
the British Economy Between the Wars (London, 1968).
29. Marx, Capital, vol. 2, p. 238. ,
30. Even in the 1880~s in a london suburb, 80% of speculative housing
projects were of less than 18 houses each (Oyos, Victorian Suburb, p. 125).
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concentration). This situation, where on the whole there are substantial
capital resources easily mobilisable for fast speculative growth yet
fragmented, localised and autonomous from organised finance, is, to a
large degree, the determinant feature of a "speculative mode" as distinct
from a modern capitalist economy of housing.
4. Fragmentation of capital means small units in the building industry
and the business of residential development. Small size, little special-
isation and limited requirements of capital, coupled with sub-contract-
ing arrangements, permit the easy entry of new "firms" and produce a
highly competitive economy. By its nature residential development re-
quires large inltial capital. In a financially underdeveloped, highly
competitive, risk-ridden economy, a fortiori; the need to keep capital
requirements low is a major imperative. This, among other things, re-
produces a low rate of internaZ growth of firms, limited development
of rational organisation and a 1tmtted division of labour. ~lhereas
internal growth may stagnate, the very same conditions (easy entry
etc.) in connection with the autonomous and "elastic" supply of ca-
pital mentioned above can sustain major 10M term s\'1ingsof speculative
development and urban change.31 w
5. Because of the relative underdevelopment of housebuilding capital which
intensifies the intrinsic problems of finance of urban development, the
"speculative" mode in early capitalist cities has been dependent on
small and middle reniriere , and thus economically linked to the broader
social stratum of the old-type urban petty-bourgeoisie. Dependence on
31. The formation of a relatively independent and decentralised base
of savings institutions and housing finance in the later part of the nine-
teenth century has most probably been an essential precondition of the rise
of the first major long cycles of speculative building in Britain and the
U.S. which moved relatively independently from the overall economy (see.
Habakkuk, "Fluctuations", Pribram, "Residual, Differential and Absolute
Urban Rents II ). In earl ier periods when only small personal or petty-build-
ers' capital was available, house-building reflected mostly the ups and
downs of the economy at large, that is, it was "cyclical". In a modern
financial context, in the other extreme, the control of semi-centralised
financial and state institutions over house-finance, will most probably
make house-building "residual~ to industrial finance requirements, hence,
when total credit is limited, short-term "counter-cyclical" (see J.M.
Guttentay, "The Short Cycle in Residential Construction", American
Econom;c Rev;ew, 51, 3, 1961).
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a diffuse category of asset-owners interested in real estate placements
or personal accomodation of some substance is but one aspect of this
relation. More important in its implications for the productive chara-
cter of the speculative mode in contrast to capitalism proper is
the resultant role of land, ground-rents,and rentierist motives. For
one, despite a certain separation of speculative builders' capital
from localised landed capital, landowners playa decisive controlling
part in the development process which tends to be geared to the con-
siderations of maximum improvement of property estates. Landowners'
control usually involves both the decision to build, the type and
quality of building, and certain exchange or lease and sub-lease
arrangements made between builder, landowner and investors. Thus,
land participates in financing as an effective and distinct catego-
ry of capital and is not simply bought as another "factor" in the
development process. This is essential in keeping capital require-
ments low by removing the need for a substantial lump sum for land.32
The above pOintslead to a major principle that seems to govern
speculative urban growth, namely that the main object of such an
activity is not profit but ground rents, or more appropriately the
realisation of higher "dev~lopment values" created by urban growth
and changes in spatial patterns.33 Limitations to long-term builders'
finance and the imperative to shorten the "working period" of produ-
ction, i.e. sell as early as possible in order to reduce the need for
own-financing on the part of the speculative builder, make for a
tendency towards areas that are relatively urbanised, with well-formed
investment demand responding to rising ground-values and opportunities
32. Lease and sub~lease arrangements between the owners of capital
and land were essential aspects of the structure of finance in nineteenth-
century English housing. (Nevitt, Housing, Taxation, ch. 2, Dyos, Victorian
Suburb, pp. 87-88). Dyos stresses also the Tact that speculative building
was more in the nature of estate improvement: under the landowner s '
initiative (Victorian SuBurb, Zoe. ait.}
33, The fundamental tendency of the speculative building economy in
the context of early capitalism to aim mainly at ground rents and the
realisation of development values and less at normal profit on capital
has been noted by most observers. It has been forceful ly stressed also
by Marx (Capital, vol. 2, p. 238). Marxts great emphasis on the signi-
ficance oT-sUcndistinctions is well known, a fact that adds authority
to the proposition.
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for intensive land exploitation.-This, in turn, strengthens the role
and monopoly power of Iandowners of such "ripe" land and reinforces
the specifi.cally "speculat.ive" element- in .this mode of res identf al
development.
The composite picture of speculative residential development we have
just outlined contains a number of elements that as a mode of production
distinguish it sharply from capitalist production proper. Thus the adjective
"specu'lative'' can be seen as referring to real structural properties
of such an economy and not to any superfluous moralistic allusions to
profiteering and market orientation, which are after all natural in a
capitalist society. The "speculativelt mode is basically a Itmercantilistlt
economy, ge~red to classes of owners-rentters of money~capital and land,
and commercial intermediaries that expJoremovements of,prices and demand
effected over particular urban areas and largely dependent on conditions
of favourable publ tc regulations and urban growth policies.
Certain long-term changes in the twentieth century in the wider economy
and the policies of states in the advanced countries of Europe and North
America have generally brought about the decline of speculative structures
in the economy of urban housing and tfjes~cular growth of modern capitalist
systems. The most signif'icant of these have'been the concentration of
financial resources for housing in mortgage banks, insurance companies
and similar institutions, and .their integration into a national "capita1
narket". Simil arly important has been .the development of public policies
towards the support of and/or the direct distribution of mortgage credit
and the finance of large-scale houseouilding operations, a general trend
towards increased control of private property of land, land-rentierism
and speculation, and the growth of urban planning and organised urban
development, though with varied degrees of effective application in
different countries.
The resultant increase in financial power, centralisation and size
of operations in residential production has permitted a diminution of
the role of landowners and a capacity for the mobility of capital away
from excessive land values ~ith the help of comprehensive new develop-
ments. We can also observe a greater capacity on the part of capitalist
builders for expansion beyond particular local markets, as well as an
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increased emphasis on building technology, capital-intensive operations
and innovations in organisation.S4
Undoubtedly housing production and distribution even in the most
advanced countries preserves a substantial segment of primitive specu-
lative builders and strong elements of land and property speculation.
But we must always keep in mind the specific character of housing as a
product. Housing does not offer itself to easy modernisation and a "pure"
capitalist organisation of production; housing markets are local and
particularistic; housing has high unit-costs and presents limited oppor-
tunt ties for "economies of scale" and "vertical integration" of production;
lastly, capital gains and ground rents are ever-present in the economics
of urban development. In the. perspective of these limitations, the signi-
ficance of the changes we have described cannot be underestimated. A reco-
gnitionof the fundamental difference Between a modern capitalist and a
speculative mode of housing production is even more important, however,
for the theory of residential growth and distribution; it points to
significant differences in motives and behaviour over technological
change, public policies, the dynamic of investment, spatial distribution,
and the formation of costs and prices.
The more sensational aspects of modern building, such as the large-
sized oligopolistic organisation, tne dominant role of financial insti-
tutions and "managerialism", though an integral part of the picture, should
not lead us to any "sociological" understanding of the modern capitalist
housing economy as a distinct type. r find the distinction between a "compe-
titive" and a "monopolist"ic" economy theoretically misleading insofar as
it purports to define different modes of production: the above distinction
simply refers to the morphoZogy of supply and demand. The theoretically
S4. For the structure of modern capitalist house-building and parti-
cularly the increasing role and form of large-scale housing producers,
the following studies are indispensable: Leo Grebler, Large Scale Housing
and Real Estate Firms (New YorK, 1973); J.P. Herzog, The Dynamics of
large Scale Housebuildin (Berkeley, 1963}; S.J. Maisel, Housebuilding
in Transition Berkeley, 1953); Topalov, les Promoteurs Immobiliers.
For lana-term trends in the size distribution of construction firms in
Britain: see Bowley, The British Building Industry. For historical develop-
ments in the structure of cap itel financing of buildir.g firms and "consu-
mersn in general, the exhaustive study by Grebler et al., Capital Formation
in Residential Real Estate has a wealth of material and ideas. It is very
unfortunate that it is the only one of its kind.
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essential attributes ofa capitalist mode of residential production lie on
the level of the division of labour and the "logic" of production. They
involve an economy of capitalist producers distinct from land or real
estate rentiers, conforming to the prototype of medium and large-scale
profit-oriented organisation of capital and wage labour. They are subject
to the rules of spatial and inter-branch mobility of capital and the
drive for continuous expansion. In such an economy land and labour are
normally considered as costs, i.e. as antagonistic claims on the product
with the dynamic consequence of an intrinsic drive for their reduction
through changes and' "innovations" in the production process and the pro-
duct itself. It is in these respects that a modern capitalist mode dif-
fers significantly from the forms of "speculative" building found in ci-
ties in the early stages of capitalist urbanisation.
~onclusion:A Typoloo,y of r·1odes'
Having discussed the various modes of housing production relevant to
the study of structure and change of the residential process in early
capitalist cities, we can summarise their main characteristics in the
following typology. The four types presented should not be considered
as necessarily signifying "stages" in a process of gradual evolution
from one to the other in the order they are arranged. Each contains
elements that are fundamentally opposed to other modes, and thus changes,
instead of evolving "naturally", will always involve radical transforma-
tions and conflicts. Though a sequence that begins with a mode of family
petty production based on use values continues with simple commodity pro-
duction, speculative capital, and ends in modern capitalist production
may seem a highly probable one for a country intent on capitalist modern-
isation of its housing economy, it is not the only possible one nor is
it necessary. Usually various modes will coexist or be combined into
intermediate types. The concept of "modes of productionll, after all,
is an qnaZytiaaZ device of relatively high generality for the historical
and comparative study of structure and change.
The occurrence of complex or even "anomalous" cases is made very
probable by the fact that housing production is ,an extremely complex
process involving a number of separate economic activities: construction,
the utilisation of land, the preparation and distribution of units of
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housing property as a finished product complete with land, and, often,
the further utilisation of the latter by rentiers as a form of capital
investment. The most important division i~ of course, that between the
construction sphere and the sphere of the organisation of land, stru-
ctures and forms of tenure into a certain type of final "product". The
development of capitalism in the two spheresmay proceed along different
paths and thus produce combinations that are difficult to categorise.
Consider a case where a fully capitalist, modern construction industry
supplies a range of mass~produced types of houses .to individual house-
holds that own land plots and build for use rather than exchange. Such
a "perverse~ case is quite probable in contexts of advanced capitalist
economies with an extremely diffuse ownership of developable land; France
is a case in point. Certain trends in the supply of summer houses in
Greece point to the same direction. A more familiar "anomaly" is the
combination of a publ tc housing sector \tTitha fully capital ist con-
struction industry and financial system, as in Britain. Such cases,
and a multitude of other imaginable ones, are not covered by the
following typology, The reasons are straightforward: we are not con-
cerned here with "mixed'· housing economies having substantial publ ic
housing sectors. Hare import.antly, we are not interested in exceptional
cases and marginal economic forms but in broad patterns in the political
economy of housing when conditions in the various relevant spheres should
be expected to be correlated.
A "mode of housing production", thus, in the following typology should
be understood as a complex concept involving a systematic combination of
more specific "modes» describing relationships in the various aspects of
the housing process. Similarly, the "development of capt ta1ism" in hous-
ing is but a synthesis of the movement towards capitalist ~elations in
these same aspects. It is useful) then, to delineate the various sub-
processes that our concept of the development of capitalism in housing
involves, and on which we have based our composite historical types.
These are:35
35. We do not include in these processes the fundamental passage to
commodity exchange) monetary relations and control by private owner-sh ip
in the spheres ef land, labour and use-values at the B~~~etatlevel, for
we restrict our discussion to societies that, though they may be under-
deve1oped; are essentially dominated by capitalist r~lations. Such a
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1. The passage to a system of production of housing as a commodity, i.e. as
exchange-value instead of use-value ~uflding for sale and/or renting) t
and the consequent formation of the social categories of capital involved
in the financing and control of housing production: the land
as developer, the builder-entrepreneur, and the rentier-investor.
2. The expansion of wage labour and the concentration of capital in the
construction industry.
3. The concentration of capital in the sph~re of housing production as a
whole (the "residential development" process) and in its financing
(i.e. the growth of medium and large developers and organised finance
to households and Duilding enterprises).
4, The increased division of laoour between the various forms of capital
involved in residential development and the increase in the influence
of modern house-building companies and financial institutions at the
expense of 1andowners and rent ter-tnvestors (which represent an inter-
mediate stage of "mercantile" capitalism}.
The types that follow combine different stages in the above processes
into major composite modes of housing production that, as we have argued,
are theoretically and empirically relevant for the historical analysis
of capitalist cities,
a. Precapitalist Mode I: Petty Owner-building
In this mode,housing is not produced as a commodity to be exchanged
in the market, but in order to be used by the immediate producer. The
"producers" here are households that own land plots and control the
resources invested in residential development as well as the pro-
duction process itself. In many respects then, this mode resembles
a peasant subsistence household economy. In contrast to the latter,
however, in urban contexts at least, the material process of produ-
ction, i.e. construction,is mainly carried out by wage labour or by
independent (self-employed) labour. Though extensive use of family
labour may be found in underdeveloped societies, this is not a neces-
sary aspect of this mode. The overall character of the corresponding
passage, therefore, has either permeated the whole of the society or
takes place automatically with the move to cities.
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economy of construction, however, 1S essentially precapi:talist, since
it consti tutes a form of "simple commodity production": construction
is kept at a petty scale and is carried out by independent labourers
or very small work groups in exchange for wages or, more usually, a
price for the product. With respect to land, we should expect a fully
developed system of ownership and market exchange, since we are talking
about capitalist societies: but landowners as a class distinct from
household-users are not determinant participants in the process of
production, neither should we expect to find a developed system of
ground rents and land values as important considerations in the form-
ation of production decisions.
b. Precapitalist Mode II: Petty Commodity Production.
Thi'smode results from the predominance of commodity exchange relationships
- a "housing market" - over the productive. infrastructure of the previous
one. Housing is produced as a commodity to Elesold or rented. The locus of
capital and production control is a combination of small speculative builders,
small rentiers, landowners that participate in the development process, and
small contractors. Land acquires a major role in Duilding and finance and
there is a development of a system of ground rents and land development
values as integral aspects of the dynamic of residential development. The
economy of construction, however, remains one of "simple commodity
production" with minimal differentiation between 'labour and capital and
the scale of each separate "business" undertaking is hardly larger than
the one in the previous mode: a handful of houses compared to the one or
two usually bun t by househol ds outside the market. It is in these respects
that this mode is essentially a precapitalist one. It could be argued,
However, that this form constitutes in essence an intermediate case
between precapitalist owner-building and speculative building proper and
therefore, should not be treated as a separate mode at all. The argument
is valid, but under conditions of capitalist urbanisation at low levels of
economic development, thfs form of housing economy will most probably be
quite widespread or even predominant. There arE:very real reasons, there-
fore, for considering it a distinct category ..In same cases, on the other
hand, it may be more practical to incorporate this form as a whole or in
part into either a broad precapitalist sector or a speculative one. The
57
decision depends on the emphasis of the analysis: in this study, where the
demarcation between modes mainly rests on the existence of market relation-
ships, we usually i'ncorporate petty commodity forms into a broader specu..
lative sector.
c. The Speculative Mode "
Though the concept of "speculative building" as used in Britain and America
refers generally to the production of housing as a commodity for an unknown
market, we rcstr tct here thts concept to its original (and theoretically
more consistent) historical referent: an economlc form that is more akin
to a merchants t and landowners I, capital ism Ulan more advanced forms that
follow the lines of modern industrial and financi'al capitalist organisatton
and rules of operation •.In te.rmsof elementary components, the "speculative"
mode resembles the previous one. rt differs radtcally, however, in that,
f irst , the capital'ist di.vision of labour between capt tal and labour and
between production, distribution and use is far more advanced and, second,
the concentration of capital and th.esi'zeof economi.c operations is far
greater. These. differences from petty commodity production concern all
main aspects of the residential development process: construction, th.e
organisation of capital and production as a whole, and the role of landed
capital. On tfleoth.er hand, the process of concentration of capital and
division of labour in the construction industry, the business of buildi.ng
and selling houses, and in finance, have reached only a medium level. This
produces a fragmented, localised and competitive economy heavily dependent
on the classes of landowners and small rentiers, and thus a rather primitive
commercial form of capitalism.
d. The Modern Capitalist Mode
In contrast to the above, this mode, famtl tar to us from postwar conditions
in the advanced countries of the West, 'is.dominated by the large, organised
and supra ...local capital of housebutlding compani.es and financial institu-
tions. rt is these agencies that have control over capital resources and
the decisions involved in housing product ion, while the classes of land-
owners and rentiers-investors h.ave bee.n separated from housing production
and thei.r influence has decreased. Thus, in terms of scale of operations,
extent of the division of labour, concentration and rationalisation of
capital, and the determinants of housing production decisions, this mode
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differs substantially from the "speculative" mode found in early cities
and should be clearly distinguished.
Typically, the question of the development of capitalism in housing
should involve either one of the two following transitions, depending on
the particular context: the transition from a dominance of precapitalist
modes to the speculative, or a combination of speculative and modern-
capitalist modes, or the transition from a system dominated by "primitive"
capitalist modes (types band c above) to a system dominated by the modern-
capitalist mode. In this study we will be concerned with the first type of
transition: the expansion of speculative housebuilding in both relative and
absolute terms and the determinants of this expansion.
2· The Dual Economyof Housing in GreekCities: Structure, Extent, and Distribution
of Speculative and Precapitalist Building
This chapter concerns the sectoral composition and social relations
of housing production in postwar Greece. The main argument will be that
the system of residential production was not of a homogenous character,
but was composed of two essentially different modes. These can be chara-
cterised as an early speculative mode and a precapitalist one, the lat-
ter based on non-commodity household production by petty owner-builders.
The analysis will be limited to the aggregate level and its aim will be
the narrow but necessary one of establishing the extent and relative
role of each mode of urban housebuilding and its social and geographical
corollaries. A statistical description seems essential at this stage of
the argument in the light of the prevailing misconceptions and lack of
real tst tc assessments of the nature of Greek postwar housing, particular-
ly with regard to the extent and significance of precapitalist housing.
I will leave for the next chapter the examination of the controversial
issues of the origins and functions of petty owner-building, legal or
illegal, and of the "dual" housing economy in general.
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first I will advance de-
finitions of speculative and non-speculative private building that seem
appropriate for Greek conditions and the available statistical material
will be given. With the help of these, the share of each mode of housing
production in urban housebuilding will be estimated for a number of years
during the 1950-1974 period. Thus, we can have a systematic demonstra-
tion of both the extent of "dualism" in Greek housing and the trend
towards the predominance of the speculative mode. In the second part
the existence of systematic relationships between each building mode
and the socioeconomic and spatial structure of Greek cities will be
shown, namely, the association of modes with sQcial classes, tenure
patterns and the socia-spatial structure of cities (in this last case
with reference to Athens where the necessary data are available). We
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shall thus establish a strong case for analysing the Greek housing
system not only in terms of modes of housing production, but also in
terms of broad housing sectors: components of the housing system where
social classes, modes of housing production and distribution, types of
land allocation, social institutions and values are interconnected into
a meaningful whole.
Besides its analytical value, the concept of a "dual" sectoral system
is essential for two reasons: first, most accounts and current concept-
ions about Greek non-capitalist housing and, at that, about similar
forms in developing countries in general, tend to attribute a marginal
and residual character to ..i~ - a conception that follows from the redu-
ction of this sector to the 'category of "squatter" housing and primitive
types of "self-help", that are supposedly the by-product of the insuffi-
cient expansion of house-supply "proper", 1.e. the market sector or publ ic
housing. This certainly provides a biased approach and a distorted pi-
cture in the Greek case; more generally, it forbids the consideration of
significant alternatives in the study of developing cities. Second, a
"strong" thesis of the existence of a "dual" system,i.e. one that in-
volves alternative sectors, is essential for the understanding of the
nature of economic change and institutional modernisation in housing.
For it leads naturally to the legitimacy of viewing these changes in
the light of actual or potential confZicts and relations of domination
and incorporation involved in the process of the expansion of capitalist
relations in housing and land, and in the relationships between social
classes that are connected with different modes of housing production.
Such processes and relationships may be important in varying degrees,
a question which can be settled only empirically. But they are an inte-
gral part of the issues that a study of capitalist deve lotnent and mo-
dernisation must confront.
1. The problem of the operational definition of housino modes
Any effort to estimate the share of speculative activity in the pro-
duction of new housing encounters a series of problems. These stem from
the complexity and institutiona1 particularity of hous inq itsel f. An
additional important problem ;s the lack of appropriate statistics of
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dwelling construction. We must therefore approach the problem in a
pragmatic manner, selecting "minimum" criteria of definition in order
to at~east arrive at a fairly realistic magnitude of the extent of
speculative and non-speculative building.
Given our theoretical definitions (chapter 1), the necessary cri-
teria that distinguish a speculative/capitalist mode of housebuilding
are:
(a) The residential development unit or project must exceed a mini-
mum size. It must certainly exceed one dwelling, but more realistically,
it must also exceed three or four dwellings. Developments of the latter
size should be more properly characterised as building by very small
owners for use or petty-capitalist purposes. In such cases, the role
of capital and commodity production is de faato limited. Depending on
the role of joint housebuilding by members of the extended family,
provision for one's offspring, the rule of dowrles etc., which are
certainly important in Greece, even substantial multi-family units may
be built outside market relations, that is,without any aim at selling
or renting the property or parts of it.
(b) We must establish the existence of private agents in the control
of the production process. These must be the owners of the main part of
the necessary capital (working capital at least), and mainly aim at the
exchange of the product in the market: rent it to users or sell it to
owner-occupiers or rentier-investors. This may not be as easy as it
appears. As we said before (first chapter), housing by its very nature
tends to be built to order during periods of underdevelopment in housing
finance and in the concentration of capital, with the help of install-
ments advanced by the prospective owner to the builder before completion.
Thus, even in cases of multi-family developments some association of
users/owners may be the agent of production. In fact, in an early capi-
taltst housing economy such a component is bound to exist and playa
significant role. This was the case with the first building societies
and housing co-ops in Britain and the U.S. and is also partly the case
with Greek speculative apartment buildings, particularly those of smaller
size and lower quality. In order to establish the character of production,
therefore, and more specifically the role of commodity exchange and pri-
vate business capital in medium and large-sized projects, we must necessa-
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riiy'examine the extent of involvement of user-oriented, non-profit,
public or private agents and associational and cooperative arrange-
ments. Greek ~ous';:ngand building statistics are of little help in this
point. Problems are added by the fact that from a legal viewpoint apart-
ment buildings in Greece have some affinities with English housing asso-
ciaHons, though members may freely dispose of tfteirshare of the pro-
perty (the nearest example of a similar Anglosaxon institution would be
condominiums in the U.S.).The criterion of size, however, is of great
help here, since we know that such non-speculative components are very
limited in larger developments with.in urban areas.
It is evident from the above that we do not consider the social
relations of land allocation and the mode of the construction process
as necessary elements in'a mi~.fmum.definition of speculative (and thus
non-speculative) housing product}on. This is partly true for any strict
specification of tenure relations, too. A few points elaborating on the
analysis of the first chapter will maKe clear why this is so.
Let us restrict ourselves to private forms of housing economy. No
particular type of tenure is necessarily associated with speculative
building. In the case of precapitalist small owner-building for use,
tenure follows from the definition itself: it is owner-occupation. If
we use a more general concept of small-owner petty-production, oriented
mainly to use, we can allow for a certain extent of petty-speculation.
But we still deal with precapitalist modes of housi"ng production (pre-
capitalist types r and II in the typology of the first chapter). More-
over some renting, especially in older structures, is not inconsistent
with a fundamentally petty-owner family economy. Thus tenure is important
only in non-speculative housing and even there not in a very strict sense.
With regard to the process of production, commodity exchange in land and
labour (wage labour),mayor may not be generalised without altering the
essentia1 character of housing production. After all, in cities where
capitalist relations, private property and wage labour are fairly advanced
in the social structure as a whole, they should be expected to involve the
productive factors ef the residential economy, too. In capitalist societies,
any definition of pre-capitalist production (in housing at least) based on
user-labour and soci~Z arrangements of land allocation would have been
extremely limiting and of little analytical importance.
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On the other hand, particular modes of land allocation and organisa-
tion, though not strictly necessary for the definition of the precapita-
list mode, are historically associated with and follow logically from
the existence and expanded reproduction of precapitalist housing in a
given urban system. Certain characteristics can be shown to be either
corollaries of such a mode or its historical preconditions; first, a
"petty mode of production" in construction, i.e. independent small work-
groups, a small size of operations, simple methods, a limited separation
of capital from the direct producers etc.; second, a particular land
economy, namely a diffused pattern of landownership, limited public
controls on development,and a limited spatial expansion of speculative/
capitalist production of housing. To include such aspects, however, in
an operational definition of modes would amount to assuming beforehand
what has to be demonstrated empirically in a concrete historical situa-
tion. Thus, most of these issues will be left to be examined in the next
chapter where the problem of tne origins and social foundations of pre-
capitalist Greek urban housing is examined.
We may argue in the same vein with regard to the speculative mode.
There certainly exists a number of distinct aspects and economic roles
that can be distinguished within the speculative development process.
Landed capital, which mayor may not participate effectively in control
and finance; the role of the merchant-capitalist and that of the capital-
ist-producer (the building contractor} differentiated along the finance -
production - distrieution phases; these mayor may not coincide,and each
one of these may control the capital necessary for production. Lastly,
the produced stock will be distributed either to investors in property,
or to owners-occupiers, or be kept by the producer and rented to tenants.
Normally, we will have some combination of types of owners. The particular
structure or allocation is a matter of concrete historical conditions.
Some aspects may be deduoed from the more general characteristics of the
level of capitalist development in housing finance and the construction
"industry". It is in these relations that we find the basis to distinguish
further between speculative and capitalist modes in housing systems as we
argued in the first chapter. To delineate the component of modern capital-
ist housing production in Greek. housing, however, even if such a task was
.meaningful given the notoriously primitive character of Greek market hous-
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ing production as a who le , is not of immediate interest. 'A rough esti-
mate of the extent of commodity production based on a distinct - if
primitive - category of capital and that aT non-capitalist housing modes
concerns us here. For the first: the two general definitional criteria
we gave above, i.e. the size of the residential development unit and the
lack of control by the final users, will suffice. Since we know that the
business character of medium and large developments in Greek cities can
be considered as a matter of fact, true criterion of size becomes all-
important.
2. Composition of housebuilding activity by mode
Given our concept and definition of speculative housebu ildlnq , the
task of measuring its extent in Greek cities appears simple. In fact, it
is rather complicated since the relevant Greek statistics have serious
limitations. Although permits for new dwellings are available (actually
finished structures are not recorded}, and there are some official sour-
ces with estimates of public and unauthorised housing activitY,they are
of little help for our problem. Permits for new buiUiings, (number and
volume}, which are more relevant, are only available since 1961. These,
however, are not broken down into residential and other uses, though
there exist separate time-series of permits for business premises
(number and volume). This is only partly to be blamed on the Statistical
Service: residential and other uses are usually mixed within the same
building, thu~ making an exact definition rather difficult. The only
period for which we have information about the structure of actually
built stock in cities, both legal and illegal, is 1951-1958 (more pre-
cisely, 7.4.1951 to the middle of' 1958). This material was gathered by
a specially commissioned survey of urban building and, unfortunately,
remains the only one of its kind.1 Residential and other uses are again
not separated.
A particuiar characteristic, however, of speculative building in
Greek cities makes our task easier; such residential developments take
1. Construction and Housing in Urbdn Areas - Sample Survey 1958,
(Athens, 1962) National Statistical Service of Greece (N.S.S.G.~in
Greek and English).
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always the form of singLe apartment buildings.2 Speculative developments
consisting of more than one building are extremely rare. The phenomenon
of speculative projects consisting of a number of single-family detached
or semi-detached houses, so common in Anglosaxon countries, is simply
nonexistent in Greek cities. The size of individual buildings, therefore,
measured in volume and number of dwellings provides an accurate index
of the size of speculative projects. Irrespective of the particular
housing mode, one building, be it large or small, signifies one resident-
ial development project in Greek conditions. Thus, small buildings, say
of one to three dwellings, signify non-speculative activity. Residential
developments consisting of a number of detached or even side-by-side
buildings, on·the rare occasions they occur, are either the product of
the public sector and the few semi-public housing cooperatives, or summer
vacation housing outside urban areas. Housing cooperatives aiming at
peripheral residential development, though limited in numbers and role,
are not rare in urban Greece; their history goes back to 1915. They are
formed, however, with the exclusive purpose of appropriating and distri-
buting urban land-plots to their members.S Actual housing production
takes place in the form of independent building on these plots.
2. This is taken as a matter of course to such a degree that we can
hardly find any explicit reference to it in Greek sources or, worse, any
evidence to corroborate it! It has been observed, however, as one of the
important peculiarities of the Greek housing market in G.F. Break and
R. Turvey, Studies in Greek Taxation· (Athens, 1964), references to the
Greek translation (Athens, 1966), p. 246.
S. There are very few recorded cases of cooperatives actually going
beyond the land-distribution stage and building houses for their members.
See, D.T. Panos & A.N. Klemes, Housing and Building Cooperatives,
(Athens, 1970), p. 69 (in Greek).
A general point on sources and documentation: since there ;s a notice-
able lack of published studies on the organisation and institutional fea-
tures of Greek housebuilding, I often had to turn to informal sources;
first, my own knowledge of these matters as one professionally involved
in building and housing affairs, and, second, material gathered in a
series of informal interviews with building entrepreneurs, civil engi-
neers active as developers (a most widespread phenomenon), and realtors and
lawyers specialising in building and property law, carried out during
1974-1976. Whenever possible, however, I have tried to supply references
to official sources or other relatively authoritative opinion.
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Thus the problem of the extent of the speculative sector boils down
to an estimation of tfteextent of apartment-bufldi.ng and its share in
the total of new (private) housing production of all types. We will
examine three periods in some detail, in order to arrive at some
idea of postwar trends; 1951-58, 1964-66 and 1970-72.4 The first period
presents few problems given the suitability of the statistical material.
We have, however, to separate the substantial volume of non-residential
uses from new building as a whole. Now, at first glance, it might appear
more plausible to allocate this non-residential activity disproportion-
ately to higher buildings. There is, however, a strong case against such
an assumption if we take into account the extreme fragmentation (i.e. the
predominance of small units} of Greek commercial and industrial activity.
Moreover, the first assumption may introduce a bias in favour of the argu-
ment we are trying to advance,namely that, contrary to widespread beliefs,
the share of the speculative sector has been rather limited in the post-
war residential economy_ r assume therefore that non-residential activity
is more or less equally distributed among the various size-classes of new
bun dings.
Table 2.1 presents the size-distribution of all types of buildings
constructed during the period from 7.4_1951 to the middle of 1958 in the
Greater Athens Area (G.A.A.) and the rest of urban areas (settlements of
more than 10.000 persons). From the same report we know that the average
number of rooms per dwelling was 2.8 and 2.9.for the G.A.A. and the other
cities respectively. It should be noted that the concept of "room"
as used in the report refers to a wider category of built units than
strictly residential rooms; given our assumptions, however, the pattern
of sizes in 2.1 should be viewed as reflecting residential building. It
4. A historical note is in order here. Apartment building as a sub-
stantial category of residential production emerged in the 1930's. It was
during that decade that the architectural, technical and economic formulas
for such buildings were developed. See, K. Biris, Athens from the 19th to
the 20_thCentury (Athens, 1966) (in Greek) and A. Damalas et al. "The
Orban Apartment Building: Athens 1920-1940", Architecture in Greece, 12,
1978, pp. 125-130 (in Greek with English summary). The latter includes
some statistics on the number of new apartment buildings in the 1930's.
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is evident from 2.1 that only size-class 0 exceeded on the average a
size of six dwellings and therefore could be certainly characterised
as one of speculative character. Size~class·C e3-6 dwellings} must be
considered as an intermediate category, with strong elements of petty-
speculation but hardly the object of regular business activity.
Table 2.1: Size distribution of urban building, 1951-1958
Athens Area Rest of Urban Centres
Size-class of Bulldings % Rooms % Buildings % RoomsBuildings
1- Entirell New
A. 1-4 rooms 41,900 e72} 115,100 (3S) 40,000 (73) 106,000 (42)
B. 5-9 II 12,500 e2l} 80,100 (24) 11 ,500 (2l) 70,600 (28)
C. 10-19 II 2,700 (5) 31,600 uo) 2,200 (4) 29,200 (12)
D. 20 & more 1,4QO (2) 101,900 (31) 900 (2) 46,900 (18)
Total 58,500 (100) 328,700 (lOO) 54,600 (100) 252,700 (100)
2. Extensions or
Reconstructlons
aa. 1-9 rooms 16,400 (99) 48,800 (96) 19,500 (99) 44,600 (82)
bb. 10 & more 100 Cl} 2,000 (4) 200 (1) 9,600 (18)
Total 1-2 75.000 (lOa) 379.500 (100) 74,300 (lOa) 306,900 (loa)
Source: N.S.S.G. , Construction and Housing, 1951-58, p. 16, percentagesrounded.
Table 2.1 describes essentially the structure of private activity
(legal and unauthorised); though public construction is also included,
its effect is certainly marginal. New dwellings constructed by various
public agencies - the Ministry of Social Services responsible for slum
clearance and refugee housing, the Workers' Housing Organisation and
the Officers' Building Organisation - were less than a 7% of all the
entirely new dwellings in the G.A.A.; this share was somewhat larger in
other urban centres.S
5. See the series in General Appendix A.S. New dwellings built by
public housing programs in Athens during 1951-58 were small in number
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Tne evidence shows clearly that in the early part of the postwar
period the share of speculative activity in the strict sense of sub-
stantial commodity production did not exceed 30% of the supply of new
housing stock for the Athens Region and 2Q% for other urban centres
(mainly concentrated in Thessalonikil. Even when we include interme-
diate and marginal forms of speculation, these shares do not exceed
35% and 25-30% respectively. Non-speculative building was in small
part public, but predominantly small owner petty-production for family
use and to some extent petty-rentierism (though this latter point must
await the analysis of tenure conditions in the precapitalist sector).
About half of this sector was unauthorised housebuilding, that is new
housing in the urban periphery built by low-income populations, mostly
on owned land, but outside the limits of the official plan for urban
buflding and thus in violation of housebuilding regulations and formal
procedures for the issue of permits, 5uflding taxation etc.6
Few things can be said with the help of the previous statistical
material about the 8t~cture and agents of speculative production in
this early part of the postwar period. A number of basic points about
the primitive and fragmented character of speculative residential busi-
nesses, however, can be immediately established, with indirect evidence.
(6.344) compared to a total for the same period of 98.900 (counting only
entirely new ones - see table 2.1). Public activity was more extensive in
the countryside during these years due to the programs of reconstruction
following the period of German occupation and the civil war (1941-44 and
1946-49) and programs of assistance to victims of earthquake disasters.
Between 1945 and 1953 about 200.000 rural houses were constructed through
various programs of self-help, core-housing etc. This high rate of public
activity in the countryside lasted until 1958 (1951-58: 155.540 new dwel-
lings built by the State in areas outside Athens). Since tren it has fell
to an insignificant level. See, also, Technical Chamber of Greece (T.e.G.),
Housing in Greece, (Athens, 1975): part I (1920-1960), pp. 150-160 (English
Translation), and C.P.E.R., Housing (Athens, 1967) (in Greek).
6. For descriptions of Greek illegal housing and its similarities and
differences with the wal I-known phenomenon of "squatters" in the Third
World, see L. Leontidou and D..Emmanuel, Life Patterns in an Iilegal Hous-
ing Area, (Athens, 1972, mimeo}; A. Romanos, "Illegal Settlements in Athens"
in Shelter and Society, ed. by Paul Oliver, (London, 1969) and his "Unau-
thorlsed Settlements and the Housing Problemll, in Architecture in Greece, 4,
1970, pp. 25-30 (in Greek with English summary); D.A. Fatouros & e. Chadji-
michalis, r:Self-Generated Settlement in the Thessaloniki Area", pp. 138-
158 in 0.0. Doumanis & P. Oliver (eds), Shelter in Greece (Athens, 1974),
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We know that speculative apartment-building was restricted to the two
major cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, where the majority (or rather
the totality, at this period) of established building enterprises was
found. We also know that throughout the postwar period the great majori-
ty of apartment-building has been based on small-scale unincorporated
enterprises that would normally undertake one or two buildings a year.
Even at a later period, the small scale of business operations was
striking; in 1971, the Panhellenic Association of Building and Constru-
ctton Enterprises (PEEKOTE), with a member~hip that was certainly domi-
nated by the more substantial and established businesses, had a total
of six hundred members.? During the same period, as we shall soon see,
the annual number of new buildings of more than four floors for aZl
uses in urban areas was less than 3.000; this means five buildings per
member yearly, whereas a substantial part (most probably a majority) of
small speculative builders were not members. Thus the scale of opera-
tions of individual builders is certainly much lower. In the 1974 Yellow
Pages for the Athens Region, 904 entries came under the heading IIBu~lding
Enterprises"; these did not include contractors or civil engineers who
most often undertake speculative developments. Nevertheless, in 1973, a
year of an unprecedented speculative boom, 2.453 buildings of more than
four floors started in the same region (1976 Statistical Yearbook); this
again implies a yearly scale of 2.7 buildings per enterprise including
non-residential construction. It is more than obvious, therefore, that
even in Athens in the early 1970ts less than two buildings a year has
been the normal scale of individual speculative operations. I have restri-
cted the discussion to buildings of more than four floors that are the nor-
mal object of speculative developers. Even such buildings, however, are
fairly small; in the late 1960's and early 1970's they had an average
volume of 5.000 m3 or the equivalent of 17 medium-sized dwellings (300
m3 per dwelling). Lower buildings were in general smaller.
(in Greek, with English summary); D. Emmanuel, Three Studies on Popular
Housing, (Athens, 1977, mimeo) (in Greek), part ~and the most comprehen-
sive, L. Leontidou Emmanuel, Working Class and Land Allocation: The Urban
History of Athens 1880-1980 (London, 1981), Ph~ Thesis, .
Department of Geography, London School of Economics (ch. 6). See the
General Appendix,A.4 for illegal housing time-series.
7. See, "Study Group", Construction Workers and Building in Greece
(Athens, 1975).p. 29 (in Greek).
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If these observations are valid for the later part of the postwar
period when the concentration of capital in building was more advanced,
they are, a fortiori, true for the decade of the 1950's. Seen from
another angle they point to another interesting aspect of the postwar
speculative economy: a very small share of apartment building could have
been undertaken on an exclusively personal, ad hoc basis - e.g. by the
landowner. Otherwise we must accept that a substantial part of the
numerous building enterprises were operating on less than a building
a year; this is not impossible but rather improbable. The share of
personally initiated and controlled production has been quite probably
larger for smaller buildings and for the earlier part of the postwar
period.
The share of speculative housing production rose during the later
parts of the postwar period. The rising trend started essentially after
the mid-1950's (see General Appendix Table A.l) and in this respect
the decade of the 1950's is somewhat exceptional. To what extent did
the composition of housing production change up to the early 1970's?
In spite of inadequate building statistics we will attempt to give a
roughly realistic answer to this problem. r have chosen two points,
one in the middle and one near the end of the period, in order to make
a rough estimate of the trend of change. The years chosen were ones of
normal conditions, with no abrupt changes or fluctuations. After 1967
illegal housebuilding was reduced to a minimum and speculative building
was strongly encouraged through various policy measures; thus, 1967 and
1968 are somewhat transitional. 1973 and 1974 were years of a severe
building slump and therefore unrepresentative. Given these anomalies
1965 and 1970 have been oicked as suitable points. In order, furthermore,
to reduce the effects of short-term fluctuations we made p.stimates for
the average composition of building (weighted) for three-year periods
at these points in time.
Table 2.2. presents the size-distribution of buildings started during
periods 1964-66 and 1970-72 (based on permits). Since these statistics,
however, do not include illegal housing in general or legal extensions
of existing buildings, they are not directly comparable with those for
1951-1958. They refer more specifically to legal, private construction.
Furthermore, a substantial part of these buildings is intended for non-
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residential uses. The latters' volume for the 1964-66 three-year period
was 17.908 m3 in all urban areas which amounts to a 32.5% of total build-
ing volume (1968 Yearbook). We had to assume again that such building is
found in the same proportion in each size or height class.
Table 2.2: Size-distribution of private building activity in urban areas,
1964-1966 and 1970-1972 {building ~ermits}
1964-1966 Greater Athens Area Thessaloniki Other Urban Centres
No of storeys Buildings Volume I Buildings Volume : Buildings Volume I
1-2 storeys 17,559 10,260 (31.6) 1.185 1.562 (15.0) 17.047 9,101 (75.0)
3-4 storeys ,1,735 5,188 (16.1) 1.n93 2.955 (28.3) 891 2.155 (17.7j
5 and more 2.818 16.998 (52.3) 1.033 5.910 (56.7) 163 885 (7.3)
Total 22,112 32.446 (100.0) 3.981 10,427 (100.0) 18,101 12,141 (100.0)
1970-1972
1-2 storeys 16.804 13,797 (23.8) 1,125 1,284 (10.4) 26,842 14,990 (60.7)
3-4 storeys 3,626 10,714 . (18.5) 1.521 3,675 (29.9) 1,776 4,405 (17.8)
5 and more 6,184 33,479 (57.7) 1,482 7,333 (59.7) 924 5,314 (21.5)
Total 26,614 57,990 (100.0) 4,128 '12.292 (100.0) 29,542 24,709 (100.0) .
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Greece, 1968 and 1973 and General Appendix, A.I.
volume in thousands of .3. .
Assuming that table 2.2 depicts the structure of private, legal
residential production, what is the share of speculative activity c;..'
according to our simple criterion of size? This calls for some examina-
tion of the relation between size and number of storeys during these
periods. In addition, in order to arrive at the overall structure of
private building, we have to add illegal residential activity and the
substantial volume of new housing produced by extensions on existing
buildings. We may thus arrive at a fairly realistic picture, comparable
to the evidence for the 1951-1958 period. Let us proceed by steps~.
The characteristics of new dwellings for the two periods we study
(based on separate statistical series), were the following (table 2.3):
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of new dwellings built privately, 1964-66
and 1970-72 (building permits)
1964-66
New Dwell ings Greater Athens Thessaloniki Other Urban
Area Centres
1. No of Dwe1lings 114,006 34,914 32,444
2. No of Rooms 329,520 103,735 116,027
3. Volume (000 m3) 33,195 8,449 10,277
4. Average size of
Dwelling (m3) 291 242 317
5. Average number of
Rooms per Dwelling 2.9 3.0 3.6
1970-72
1. No of D\</el1ings 192,493 36,076 67,865
2. No of Rooms 557,814 118,443 223,795
3. Volume (000 m3) 55,601 10,530 20,819
4. Average size of
Dwe 11 ing (m3) 289 292 317
5. Average number of
Rooms per Dwelling 2.9 3.3 3.3
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Greece, 1968 and 1973. Averages are
rounded. The figures include dwellings formed by extensions of
existing buildings. The enumeration of rooms follows the defini-
tion of "habitable Qr regular room" as set by the N.S.S.G.: a
minimum area of 4 m2 and a height of 2 m, lighting from a window
or a glass door, and intended for residential purposes. wes,
storage rooms and kitchenettes smaller than 7 m3 are not
counted as "rooms".
On the basis of table 2.3 we can examine the relationship between
the height of buildings (in terms of storeys) and their size (in terms
of volume and rooms) on the average. Since no significant changes took
place between 1964-66 and 1970-72 in this respect, table 2.4. giving
the average sizes for the first period may suffice.
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Table 2.4: Average size of buildings by number of storeys, 1964-66
Greater Athens Area Thessaloniki Other Urban Centres
No of storeys Average Average No Volume Rooms Volume Roomsvolume of rooms
1-2 storeys 586.3m3 6 842.0m3 10.5 533.8m3 6
3-4 " 2,990.2 30 2,703.5 33.5 2,418.6 27.5
5 and more 6,301.9 60 5,721.2 71 5,429.4 62
Source: Tables 2.2 and 2.3
It is obvious from the previous tables that only buildings of three
storeys or more should be properly considered as belonging to speculative
builders' activity. These correspond to size-class D in our analysis of
the 1951-58 data (that is, sizes of more than 20 rooms or 6 dwellings).
It is also obvious that such buildings of three or four storeys, given
the small size of urban plots, are really very small: a fact that goes
a long way in explaining the widely known reluctance of building enter-
prises to venture into areas where building of such a limited height is
only permitted. An average size of ten dwellings, given the various
fixed overhead costs and time-consuming procedures of apartment build-
ing, makes for significant diseconomies of scale. Such developments
are thus usually left to the mar~inal speculator and the interested
landowner to undertake, unless the extreme landownership fragmentation
in Greek urban areas (which limits building sizes in cases of restricted
building height) can be somehow overcome and some consolidation of
larger plots be effected (which is seldom the case). (For the piecemeal
character of Greek speculative developments and the role of landowner-
ship fragmentation, see chapter 3, appendix 3.1).
We must examine now the extent of illegal hous~uflding which should
be added, of course, to the lowest size-class. Official estimates of its
magnitude, however, differ widely. A time-series of illegal building sup-
plied by the Ministry of Public Works in 1971 gives an estimate of 34.777
new dwellings for the G.A.A. for the period 1964-66 (see General Appen-
dix, Table A.4). Later Gov~rnment reports (1973) give figures that are
much lower: the share of illegal new housing has been estimated as 10%
of total new dwellings in Athens and Thessaloniki during 1961-66, a 3%
for the 1967-68 period and 'a negligible" share for the 1968-1974 period
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(due to strict police control).8 The latter estimates are not in dispute;
a share of 10% for the earlier part, however, would mean that the 1971
official estimate for 1964-66 must be lowered to a level of 16.500-17.000
units for the G.A.A. This is obviously unrealistic, since years 1964-66
were peak ones of illegal activity compared to the ones immediately pre-
ceding them.9 Furthermore, the later (1973) estimate of the share of
illegal housing seems of a rather qualitative sort and in contradiction
to data from the very same sources. During 1964-66 a total of 165.960
dwellings were reported as having been built in G.A.A. (General Appendix,
Table A.3); this, subtracting private legal activity, leaves a figure
of more than 50.000 dwellings of which a very small part were the product
of the public sector.10 In addition, a certain underestimation of illegal
housing might be more or less naturally expected from official qualita-
tive estimates; mostly because unauthorised housing is often of a rudi-
mentary nature and the longer-term formation of housing stock in illegal
areas is hampered by demolitions by the authorities, fast depreciation
of housing capital and a large rate of abandonment of the poor and extre-
mely small dwellings. Thus, the higher estimates ~f the 1971 time-series
data should be chosen as the more realistic ones for illegal new housing
activity. These give a figure for G.A.A. for the 1964-1966 period of
34.777 units that, added to total legal private dwelling construction
.(extensions included) for the same years (114.006, 1968 Yearbook),
makes for a share of illegal housing of 23% - substantially larger
than 10%. For the rest of urban areas exact figures are lacking; there
8. See, United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Housing,
Building and Planning Problems and Policies in the Less Developed
Countries of Southern Europe: Greece. 1973. National Monograph, (Athens,
1973) p. 211 and p. 101 (henceforth U.N., E.C.E., "National Monograph").
It is worth stressing that it should be considered as an unquestion-
able fact that illegal building activity in urban areas and Athens in
particular was not taking place to any significant extent during the
military dictatorship; this includes any form of building in illegal
residential areas (extensions, improvements, etc.). Quite a few students
of Greek housing are not aware of this important fact. The official evi-
dence, however (which was received with certain scepticism during these
years), is corroborated by direct local research in a number of munici-
palities and communes in the western fringe of Athens. See, Leontidou
and Emmanuel, Life Patterns, paSSim.
9. For the time-series of illegal and public dwelling construction,
see, General Appendix, Tables A.4, A.S.
10. U.N., E.C.E., National Monograph, p. 101 and General Appendix, A.3.
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are not, however, any particular reasons for assuming any great differ-
ence in this respect. Since the greatest part of unauthorised dwelling
construction is located in urban areas, the extent of illegal activity
outside Athens in comparison to legal dwelling-building in other urban
centres is a reasonable indication of the share of the former. The
relevant figures for 1964-66 point to a share in the order of 20% or
an equivalent of a quarter of legal private dwelling construction for
cities other than Athens (see General Appendix, Tables A.2, A.4). With
regard to the 1970-72 period, illegal building was at most marginal in
extent and can be safely disregarded.
\~hereas the above may suffice for an idea of the magnitude of illegal
housing in terms of new dwelling units, it is a different problem alto-
gether to make an estimate of its real share in the production of re-
sidential capital even in the simple terms of physical volume we examine
here. Needless to say, statistical material is completely lacking. There
are, moreover, significant variations in the size and quality of dwelling
units among illegal housing areas and, quite often, within a single area.
We know, of course, that on the whole illegal houses are small, sometimes
.extremely so in comparison to "normalll private housing. On the basis of
experience with such areas, descriptions and ground-plans of a number
of units in a few fairly representative neighborhoods,11 we may say that
a more or less realistic (though conservative) figure for the average
size of such houses should be in the order of 150 m3; this amounts to .
about half the size of the average dwelling unit built legally (300 m3).
Thus the share of illegal housing in residential production is in effect
substantially reduced if we consider its volume in physical terms.
Lastly, the substantial volume of .additions to existing· buildings
should be added to the residential product ion taking place outside the
speculative sector. This form of private (legal) activity consists al-
most in its entirety of works of very small size; the average volume
of an extension work in urban areas during 1964-66 and 1970-72 was
364 m3 and 428 m3 respectively (1968, 1973 Yearbooks). They constitute,
moreover, a form of residential production of major proportions. It is
11. Layouts of illegal residential areas and a number of ground-plans
of houses built there can be found in the works on Greek unauthorised
housing cited in note 6.
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a well-known fact that in Greece the addition of rooms or complete
dwelling units to existing structures (usually to single or two-storey
houses) is a normal and widespread method of expansion of popular re-
sidential capital. The real extent of this activity, however, has sel-
dom been realised. Attention to the more sensational unauthorised housing
activity has hidden the fact that the regular and legal process of resi-
dential growth through extensions is usually more important in terms of
volume even in periods of peak growth of illegal building (as, for in-
stance, during the 1964-66 period};12 this is obviously so during periods
of limited illegal growth and most certainly for the post-1967 years. Of
course, the illegal development of residential areas and the process of
incremental growth of housing through extensions are organically connect-
ed, though the latter is not restricted to such areas only. After all,
probably a majority of low-income peripheral areas in cities have ini-
tially grown through illegal house-building and have developed more
fully after their incorporation into the City Plan and regulation by
building codes. Thus a proper recognition of the major role of resi-
dential extensions in non-speculative petty-building is in order.
Unfortunately, the Greek Statistical Service distinguishes only between
"entirely new buildings" and "extensions on buildings" in general; the
distinction is not made for the series on new dWeZZings built privately
which are given in aggregate form. Thus some assumptions must be made
about the role of extensions in residential and other uses. The clearly
more realistic one would be to assume that extensions are more heavily
concentrated in building for residential purposes. Extensions are usually
additions of storeys to existing buildings; commercial premises and work-
shops, though commonly incorporated in mainly residential buildings, are
restricted to the ground floor at street level. Still, there is no evi-
dence whatsoever by ...thich we could arrive at some corroborated estimate.
We are thus 'forced to assume that at the 'least the share of extensions
in the volume of residential production is equal to their share in
building as a whole.
12. A major exceptio~ is the 1949-54 upswing in illegal building
where almost half of new d,,:ellingswere illegal. See General Appendix,
A.2, A.4.
•
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Based on these assumptions I have constructed table 2.5 representing
the distribution of private legal residential production (based on per-
mits) among entirely new structures and extensions for years 1964-66 and
1970-72. I have added the volume of illegal housing to which we arrived
in the previous discussion in order to provide the structure of private
activity as a whole and, furthermore, illustrate the relative role of
the latter in comparison to extensions.
Table 2.5: The role of entil'ely new structures, extensions and unauthorised buildings
in private dwelling construction, 1964-66 and 1970-72
Volume in thousand m3
1964-1966
Urban Areas Entirely new Legalextensions Illegal Totalbuilding % Extensions % Illegal
Greater Athens 24,963
Thessaloniki 7,596
Other cities 7.739
1970-1972
Greater Athens 44,426
Thessaloniki 9,256
Other cities 16,302
8,232
853
2,538
5,216
1,309
1,216
38,411
9,758
11,493
21.4
8.7
22.0
13.6
13.4
10.6
11.175
1,274
4,517
.55,601
10,530
20.819
20.1
12.1
21.7
Source: General Appendix, Tables A.l, A.2. A.4 and text; the shares of extensions in totalbuilding used in the breakdown' of authorised activity are calculated from the
figures of new buildings and extensions in the Statistical Yearbooks of Greece
1968 and 1973.
Though the previous statistical detour may have been somewhat tire-
some, it offers a more or less realistic description of the structure
of residential production by private agents in the postwar period. With
the help of this material we can construct a comprehensive picture of
the relative role of residential building by speculative builders for
the market (apartment-building in this case) and marginal speculative
individual developments of small size, as well as the role of precapi-
talist private petty-production.
Table 2.6. summarises the previous analysis. It distinguishes three
categories (modes) of private residential building, mainly based on
building size, which, as we pointed before, is equivalent under Greek
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conditions to projeat size. Size is measured by the number of storeys
and physical volume. The shares in table 2.6 include residential deve-
lopment by illegal building and residential extensions. The modes of
residential production which the categories distinguished in table 2.6
represent are precapitalist housing production or small owner-building
and a broad capitalist/speculative building mode; the latter is divided
into an intermediate category of housing production with marginal ele-
ments of rentierism and speculation (a size-class of 3-4 storeys or 5-10
dwellings) and apartment buildings of relatively more substantial size
and height (in the context, of course, of the spectrum of sizes found in
the Greek housing economy). A number of assumptions were made in the pro-
cess of estimating the shares presented in table 2.6. Non-residential
building was assumed to be distributed in similar proportion in each
height-class.13 We-have also assumed that the share of extensions in
total built volume was similar in residential and non-residential con-
struction. Lastly, we had to introduce some assump~ions about the chara-
cteristics and distribution of illegal housebuilding. The latter was
not necessary for the 1951-1958 data, but had we added illegal housing
in the way we did for the later periods, it is probable that the share
of non-speculative petty-production would have been somewhat larger. We
have already examined the reasons that justify these assumptions, and
though it is clearly unfortunate that we lack exact information on these
matters, it is also clear that a further refinement of data would not
change the patterns and trends presented in taole 2.6 in any important
sense.
To return to our initial thesis in the light of these results: urban
residential production in the postwar period shows the twin characteri-
stics of an early capitalist "dual" structure: the persistence, on the
one hand, of a substantial volume of pre-capitalist petty-production, and
on the other hand a pronounced trend of structural change, that is, an
13. The realism of this assumptio~ as we pointed before, is based on
the well-documented ff':lgmentatiortof economic acti'Jity in postwar Greece
and the predominance of units of extremely small size in commerce and in-
dustry. For English-language accounts of the size-distribution of establish-
ments in industry and trade, see, respectively, G. Coutsoumaris, The Mor-
pholoay of Sreek Industl~, (Athens, 1963): ch. 2 and L. Preston, Consumer
Goods Marketinq in a Developinc Economy, (Athens, 1968), pp. 83-87 and
passim. For Athens see L. Leontidou Emmanuel, Working Class and Land
All oca tion.
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Table 2.6. Sectoral composition of private urban residential buildinq ,
1951-72
Sector/Urban Area 1951-1958 1964-1966 1970-1972
Greater Athens
1- Small Owner-Building 67% 56% 39%(1-2 storeys, extensions,
ill ega1 house bui1ding} .
2. Speculative Building 33% 44% 61%2.a. Intermediate, Small-
Scale (3-4 storeys) ( - ) (lOX) (15%)
2.b. Speculative Apartment
Building (5 storeys
and more) ( - ) (34%) (46%)
Rest of Urban Areas
1. Small Owner-Building
2. Speculative Building
2.a. Intermediate
2.b. Apartment
Of wh;ch:
Thessaloniki
1. Small Owner-Building
2. Speculative Building
2.a. Intermediate
2.b. Apartment
Other Cities
1. Small Owner-Building
2. Speculative Building
2.a. Intermediate
2.b. Apartment
81%
19%
( - )(- )
61%
39%
(16%)
(23%)
53%
47%
(18%)
(29%)
34% 21%
66% 79%
(22%) (26%)
(44%) (53%)
83% 69%
17% 31%
(12%) (14%)
( 5%) (17%)
Source: See text. Per cent composition in terms of building volumes in m3.
Percentages rounded.
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expansion of commodity production based on capital, mainly in the form
of speculative apartment-building. Intermediate, smaller-scale forms of
housing production show stability or slow growth in relative terms. Though
the relative gro\'1thof larger-scale building does not in itself signify
the parallel expansion of commodity exchange in housing, such a trend can
be easily corroborated by an inspection of the rising volume of apartment
property transfers (recorded in a different series for taxation purposes),
especially when the latter are compared to the number of total new dwel-
lings of all types built annually (see General Appendix, Table A.6). In
Greater Athens their ratio rose from 0.31 for 1958-60 to 0.34 for 1964-66
and, in a much faster pace, to 0.52 for 1970-72. This fastly growing
volume of apartment sales relative to housing production as a whole
should be viewed as an integral part of the processes described in 2.6.
The composition of housing production and the trends of change differ
according to the place in the urban system; whereas the speculative se-
ctor is mor~ concentrated in the Capital and the next major city, Thessa-
loniki (population in 1971 2.540.241 and 557.360 respectively), small
owner-building clearly predominates in the smaller urban centres, al-
though there is an evident trend of "diffusion" of speculative forms.14
It is interesting that Thessaloniki, though a smaller city than Athens,
shows throughout the period a stronger speculative component than the
latter, apparently based on a more rapid speculative expansion during
the 1950's, as well as a more 1imited and weak sector of independent
popular petty-production "in those years.
In the smaller urban centres and for the major part of the postwar
period the role of speculative housebuilding has been minimal. As much
is evident from the trends we reviewed in the previous part of this
chapter. This is also appar~nt in the composition of building stock,
mainly formed during this period, as table 2.7 based on the 1970
census of buildings demonstrates. It is unfortunate that the buildings
of five storeys are p1aced within the intermediate category by the
14. Urban centres other than Greater Athens and Thessaloniki are
substantially smaller than the first two in the urban hierarchy: Patra
and Volos which fo lIow as the third and fourth in size had a 1971 popu-
lation of 120.847 and 88.096 respectively. The rest had in 1971 an ave-
rage size of 26.170 (52 cities with a total population of 1.360.945).
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statistical authorities, but this has little effect on the general
pattern, since such buildings are usually of a limited number. Higher
buildings, which form the core of speculative activity, are almost
wholly concentrated in Athens and Thessaloniki - the two largest
cities. A certain amount of higher buildings can be seen in the larger
regional centres. In the largest part, however, they are aimed to non-
residential uses. The intermediate category of building sizes, on the
other hand, is more evenly distributed in the hierarchy of cities.
Though adequate information is lacking we know that new buildings of
this type, when residential, are usually aimed at or are controlled
by local middle-class strata. Their share in the 1970 stock, however,
does not necessarily signify the emergence and expansion of n~ semi-
speculative activity: non-residential buildings and houses of three and
even four storeys have been a regular feature of the central areas of
smaller Greek cities since the nineteenth century, especially in the
case of sea ports and towns in the islands.
Table 2.7: The distribution of medium and higher buildings within the
hierarchy of Greek cities, 197Q
Urban Areas Population % 3-5 Storeys % 6 and more %
(1971)
Greater Athens 2,540,241 54.4 31,008 53.5 11 ,423 70.4
Thessaloniki 557.360 11.9 8,117 14.0 3,528 21.7
50.000 to
120.847 (5 cities) 419,015 8.9 4,723 8.1 704 4.3
20-50.000 (25 ") 754,965 16.1 10,543 18.2 523 3.2
10-20.000 (24 ") 395,908 8.4 3,518 6.0 31 0.2
Total (56 cities) 4,667,489 100.0 57,909 100.0 16,209 100.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook' of Greece 1976. Data for individual cities;
my aggregations.
Thus, for medium and smaller urban centres we can safely say that
small-scale building outside the market was the predominant source of
supply of new residential capital throughout the postwar period. Such
petty production must have been the exclusive form of private housing
development for "popular" strata, i.e. that broad social category of
B2
peasant small-holders, workers in industry, transport, handicrafts,
construction and services, as well as self-employed of small income
in trade, handicrafts and the service sector. Such a category is parti-
cularly extensive in Greece, a fact that, in turn, makes "popular strata"
a meaningful and useful concept in social analysis.
3. The sectoral structure of the housing system: social classes, modes
Of housing production and the socia-spatial structure of the city
The mechanism and corollaries of the change in the structure of the
postwar housing system shown in Table 2.6 will occupy us for the rest
of this study. In order, however , to establish the full significance
Of the different housing IImodes" as parts of a social and spatial system
and thus the character of postwar cflange, we must inquire into their
relations with social classes, tenure patterns and the spatial structure
Of cities. Although, for instance, the institutional and economic chara-
cter of speculative apartment-building is more or less homogeneous and
relatively known, its social distribution and tenure structure is less
so. This problem is compounded by the fact that this mode is in a state
of rapid expansion and change. Even less is known about the specific
structure and social distribution of non-capitalist petty-production;
the latter flasreceived, surprisingly, limited attention, certainly
not equal to its significance as a means of popular housing - the
attention paid to "problem areas" like illegal housing notwithstanding.
It seems necessary, therefore, to further explore the hypothesis of
the operation of a precapitalist seator of popular housing as a
distinct economic, spatial and social system. By using this parti-
cular sector as a vantage point, we may acquire a picture of the
overall sectoral structure, thus also establishing the social cha-
racter and role of speculative housing production and distribution.
It is in the context of the two largest urban centres that the
qutstion of the social character of housing sectors raises more complex
problems. It is there, after all, that the process of capitalist trans-
formation in housing and the dynamic and antagonistic relationships
of housing sectors are more advanced. We will spend some time, there-
fore, examining the social structure of different housing situations
in the Greater Athens Area. As it happens, it is only for the Athens
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area that sufficient analytical information relevant to this question
exists. Still, with a population of 2.540.241 in 1971, the G.A.A. com-
prised more than half the urban population (54%); together with Thessa-
loniki, the two thirds (66%). Whenever possible, references to the whole
spectrum of urban areas will be made. The conclusions arrived at for
Athens, however, should be always qualified with regard to their appli-
cability to other cities in the light of the different sectoral composi-
tion prevailing there as described in the previous discussion. Thessalo-
niki present; the opposite case: the share of speculative building in
the housing economy has been greater compared to that for G.A.A.
In summary form, the points we will try to establish with material
from the Athens Area are the following: residential petty-production in
Athens during the postwar period was predominantly connected with popular
strata and their areas in the inner and outer suburbs of the city; it has
generally been based on building for use by small holders of land and
older housing stock; areas formed by this process are mainly populated
by owner-occupiers, though a marginal market for rent also exists (the
incidence of lower-income rental markets, however, increases in concentra-
tions of older housing stock). Thus, we may justifiably conceptualise the
petty-production housing mode as precapitalist petty owner-building and
as part of a housing socioeconomi:c sector with a distinct character with-
in the housing system.15 In contrast, speculative apartment buildings
are mai:nly associ:ated with more central areas, and middle-class and
higher-income groups; though,with regard to tenure, owner-occupation
forms a substanti:al share of the apartment market, the·rental sub-market
is of equal if not greater importance and most certainly an integral part
of the speculative economy. Intermediate forms of housing economy (defined
in terms of si:ze) take a place between these two extremes in matters of
soci:al and spatial character and tenure type. This last point, however,
is more difficult to substantiate, since new buildings of intermediate
15. Since, as will become more clear with further analysis of non-spe-
culative petty-building, this mode is a mixture of "simple commodity pro-
ductionll and a much larger component of non-commodity household-controlled
production, we are justified to employ the concept of a preaapitaUst mode
(see the theoretical framework in chapter 1). It should be remembered (ch.l)
that such a theoretical description does not necessarily imply that the
wider soc iety and economy is preca pita1ist or "dua111, thoug h thismay very
well be the case. It specifically refers to the economic and social organi-
sation of housing as a relatively autonomous social sphere.
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size are usually intermingled with older stock of similar physical type
which generally shows higher concentrations of rental housing and low-
income groups. Though the previous picture of the Greek housing system
is realistic in broad terms, a qualification must be made: a certain
share of residential petty-production in the inner and outer suburbs
consists of more substantial houses for owner-occupation by middle-
class and higher-income groups in more expensive and better-served
areas. This is certainly owner-building outside the speculative sector,
though some elements of business-organised, contract-building are involved
(which must be seen as an incipient form of speculative economy).
This category of residential development is limited in quantitative
terms; its distinct social, spatial and institutional character, how-
ever, and its disproportionate social and ideological importance and
influence within urban society makes necessary some qualifications in
the broad correlations of social structure and the physical and eco-
nomic forms of housing we have just introduced. It necessitates, more-
over, its separate treatment in a schema of the housing system; less
so in economic terms than in terms of the spectrum of effective housing
sectors. In other words, this higher-income residential sub-system must
take the place of a third significant sector in new housing formation
in postwar Athens (and to a smaller extent in the other large urban
centres). let us now examine the evidence in relation to the schema we
have just advanced.
Most information about the relationship between housing types, social
classes, and the socio-spatial structure of citi~s is usually of a cross-
sectional nature. Thus, the necessary distinction between the allocation
of new housing and that of the existing stock as a whole cannot be
easily made. Still, cross-sectional information sheds somp. light both
on the pattern of past accumulation and the context within which new
building takes place. Change, after all, in the pattern of use of hous-
ing types and their location is gradual in the longer term. We can place,
moreover, cross-sectional material 1n the context of the long-term trends
we have been reviewing, thus deriving by implication some conclusions
about the pattern of growth of residential capital.
The role and social character of housing modes in Athens for the
greatest part of th~ period we study can be established with the help
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of a number of studies of the mid-1960's. A survey conducted during
1967 found that only 27.5% of households lived in apartment buildings.
What is more important, only 9.1% of the sample chose apartments as
their desired form of accomodation.16 This shows clearly the limited
extent of the speculative sector but also points to the largely "object-
ive" and imposed character of its subsequent growth. The "dual" stru-
ctureof the housing system at the time was closely connected with social
class differentiation: a 1964 study of employees in industry (from a
sample of es~ablishments employing more than 50 persons in Greater Athens)
found that managerial and higher-paid white-collar staff were more con-
centrated in apartment housing (about half of the sample) than in single-
family houses (under 30%). In contrast, workers, regardless of skill,
mainly resided in single-family houses (50-60%); only a very small part
of them lived in apartment housing (less than 10%). The concentration in
single-family housing was even greater for higher-paid workers of super-
visory and technical capacity. Intermediate social strata like clerical
workers occupied a place somewhere between these extremes: small shares
resided in either single-family units or apartments (both under 30%).
Their largest part, as well as the remaining shares of the higher and
lower social strata, occupied intermediate housing types in relatively
low-rise, higher-density, continuously built areas.1?
Direct and detailed evidence describing these relations for the whole
of the city and for a number of successive periods is not available. How-
ever, a comprehensive and dynamic conception of the social structure of
housing growth and distribution by different modes can be gained through
an ecological analysis of the Greater Athens Area for the period under
study. We will classify the communes and municipalities of the Athens
agglomeration accordin~ first, to their social character in terms of
the socioeconomic class of residents and, second, according to the pre-
dominant mode of housing production as reflected in the composition of
buildings in the area in terms of size. As we have pointed above, the
number of storeys of buildings is a good index for distinguishing
16. N.C.S.R. Sociological Study of the Athens Master Plan, vol. 2,
(Athens, 1973), Table 47 (study undertaken by the National Centre of
Social Research for the Athens Master Plan Service, Ministry of Public
Works) .
17. Guy Burgel, La Condition Industrielle a Ath~nes (Athens, 1970)vol. 1, p. 152.
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between speculative housing and petty owner-building. This double classi-
fication will provide a first rough correlation between modes of building
and social class, albeit in static terms, and laden with the influence
>. of tne old housing stock which reflects poorly the structure of housing
production. This cross-classification of areas, however, offers a meaning-
ful framework for the analysis of the socia-spatial structure of urban
growth in the postwar period: the pattern of growth shows decisively
the operation of two distinct housing sectors as well as the change
towards the increased role of speculative building in the 1960's.
In Appendix 2.1 we present data on the spatial distribution of
occupational categories in the Greater Athens Area in 1971. The occu-
pational category of heads of households offers a sufficient index
for a broad division of households into socioeconomic classes. For
our purposes, we can take as an index of the socioeconomic class-
situation of a certain category the level of total consumption expen-
diture per household member. This is directly determined by the level
of "normal" income (as opposed to transitory income) or the level of
structurally determined resources over the life of a household and
hence can serve as a composite index of e~onomic class level.18 The
levels of consumption per household member for each occupational cate-
gory found in a survey of all urban areas in 1974 are shown in the
following table.
Table 2.8: Total consumption expenditure per household member by occu-
*pation of the head of household. all urban areas, 1974.
Occupation of head of
household
Monthly consumption expenditure
per household member in drs.
1. Professions, Managers
Higher Administrative
2. Clerical Occupations
6,216
3. Tradesmen and Sales Workers
4.
5.
*Service Workers
Workers in Industry and
Transport
4,431
3,903
31320
3,175
Source; Calculated from N.S.S.G., Household ExpeRditure Survey, 1974,
(Athens, 1977). *: Categor~ncludes t e non-cfc!sslfiable and
workers in Agricul ture. .
18. This ;s a fundamental proposition of modern theories of hou~ehold
behaviour. For this argument and the relationship between "norMal" 1ncome,
consumption and occupational classes, see chapters 4 and 5.
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For the purposes of this analysis a simple schema of socioeconomic
classes based on the data in table 2.8 will suffice. Our schema is mainly
based on the occupational category of the heads of households. The differ-
entialS in" per capita consumr>tion levels shown in 2.8 taken as reflect-
ions of the differentials in normal income and the life-chances of given
categories, provide the objective ground for the grouping and hierarchical
ordering of occupational categories.19 We will distinguish three broad
socioeconomic classes: an upper class/upper middle class, a middle class,
and a working class. These correspond rou~hly to categories 1, 2-3, and
4-5 in Table 2.8 though a small part of 2-3 consisting of low-skill
employees belongs more properly to 4-5.
Appendix 2.1 shows the occupational composition of the resident
labour force in the communes and municipalities of Greater Athens in
1971. Assuming that heads of households by occupation are distributed
similarly and that the consumption differentials observed for all urban
areas apply to the Capital also (though absolute levels are higher),
we have calculated the average consumption level per household member
for each area. With the help of this composite index we have classified
the areas of Athens in terms of predominant social character. The
resultant spatial pattern is shown in Figure 2.1. In the construction
of this socia-spatial model of Athens the consumption index supplies
only the basic guideline. The choice of the specific dividing lines
between categories of areas had, of course, to be based on more com-
prehensive information about the social character of areas. Thus, we
also took into account a number of social-geographical studies of
Athens for the same period.20 It must be stressed that in some areas
there is less homogeneity and greater internal differentiation than
19. Our concept of economic class mainly derives from Weber's de-
finition stressing market-situation. See H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, (eds)
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London, 1948,1970): 181-183. See,
also Chapter 4 in this study.
20. See, L. Leontidou Emmanuel, Working Class and Land Allocation,
Chapter 6; E. Crueger, "Sociogeographic Study of the Greater Athens Area ",
in Sociological Study of the Greater !'.thensArea, Report by the National
Centre of Social Research to the Ministry of Public Works, Housing Ser-
vice, vol. 2 (Athens, 1973): 208-310, 0n Greek) and the accompanying
series of maps with the distributions of socio-economic characteristics
held in the Library of the N.C.S.R.; O. Zarnari et al. "Socio-Ecological
Study of the Capitalts Area", in Sociological Study,vol. 1 (Athens, 1973),
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desirable. To a large extent this is natural for a city in flux like
Athens during this period. After all, areas of mixed use and mixed
social and physical character are an endemic aspect of Greek urban
structure.21 For these reasons, areas with particularly mixed social
character were explicitly recognised as such and in terms of the ordering
of socia-spatial areas were placed between categories B (middle-class
areas) and 0 (working-class areas). While far from being satisfactory,
such a rough division of the city area is sufficient for the under-
standing of the broad outlines of the housing system. The reader should
keep in mind, moreover, that the central zones of Athens and Piraeus
comprise the older section of the city, i.e. the built-up area formed
in the years before the 1920's and the influx of the Asia Minor refugees;
these zones have reached high densities even before the war and conse-
quently contain concentrations of old building stock, older industrial
areas, working-class neighbourhoods and elements of what geographers
call the "transition" zone - wholesale commerce, warehouses, transport
stations, workshops, transient and cheap rental housing and enclaves
of prestige housing, government and professions. Added to the two busi-
ness centres of the conurbation, these elements make for significant
contrasts in social and physical terms. Though most of these aspects of
the urban structure are not relevant to our classification of social areas,
which is based on occupational and income criteria, they are factors that
influence to a large extent the latter and should be kept in mind in view
of our rather crude characterisation of the two central zones.
and more specifically Table 37; Guy Burgel, La Condition Industrielle
A Athenes, vols 1 & 2, (Athens, 1972) (in French), and in particular
pp. 112-118 and map 11.72 in the second volume, and his "Aspects de la
Structure de 1'Agg1omeration Athenienne", Sociological Thought (2, 1966)
(1n Greek and French), pp. 177-239; P. Mandikas, Economic ~ysis of the
Athens Master Plan, Report to the Ministry of Publ,c Works, Housing Ser-
vice, vol. 2 (Athens, 1972) and vol. 4 (Athens, 1973), (in Greek), in
particular the Appendices of the two vols.
21. The prevalence of mixed uses and physical heterogeneity in Greek
cities are factors that, in turn, create conditions favouring certain
social and income-class heterogeneity, particularly in more central urban
areas. For the low degree of spatial specialisation, see, N. Georgulas
and A. Markopoul au. "Mixed Uses in Athens Urban Area ", Bui1t [nvironment ,
March 1977: pp. 73-78 and Liia Leontidou Emmanuel, "On Urban Structure
and the Role of Planning in Contemporary Greece", Architecture in Greece,
(11, 1977): 94-101 (in Greek with English summary).
Figure 2.1. Socioeconomic class character of Municipal Hies and Communes in
Greater Athens, 1971
Average monthly consumption expendi ;" '"
ture per capita in drachmas
'114,200 and more .I (upper class/upper middle class)
.114,199-3,800m (middle class)
~<:miili::'::::::hl:::1 r~;;;d;i~;~r middle class) .
~ less than 3,650
LJ1Jljj (working class/lower income)
o· s . IOkm
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The predominant character of the Greater Athens areas in terms of
the height/size composition of the 1970 building stock is presented in
Figure 2~2. This may also serve as an approximate description of
the structure of residential stock. Areas have been distinguished
according to the share of residential capital produced by the non-
speculative petty production sector in the total physical volume of
the local built stock, and more specifically, the share of buildings
of one or two storeys.22 This variable signifies at the same time the
ranking of zones according to the relative concentration of apartment
buildings; these opposite types of building form (low-rise and apart-
ment) show a clear-cut negative spatial association mainly because
apartment buildings are concentrated in the more central zones of the
city, whereas low-rise ones in the inner and outer urban periphery (see
Appendix 2.1. to thjs chapter).
The differentiation of urban areas presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2
forms a two-dimensional matrix based on th.e socioeconomic. character and
the residential structure of an area. The cityrs population for 1971 has
been distributed within this matrix in Table 2.9. The distribution illu-
strates clearly the relation between social class and type of residential
building we have suggested (the largest part of the urban population ;s
distributed along the diagonal). From another viewpoint, it also deli-
neates the main significant housing "sub-markets" within the overall
housing system where the bulk of the urban population finds accomodation.
Such supply categories or "housing situations II are related to certain
22. The shares of buildings of a particular number of storeys in total
built stock (residential and other) have been based on the 1970 census of
buildings (see 1976 Yearbooks and Appendix 2.1). As these figures refer
to the number of buildings, an estimate of the correspon1ing volumes was
necessary. We used the more comprehensive statistics of building permits
for a number of years in the mid-1960's to arrive at a relationship between
the average volumes in m3 of the various classes of buildings: buildings
of 3-5 storeys were found to be roughly five times larger than those of
1-2 storeys, whereas those of 6 storeys and more, ten times larger. Bearing
in mind the possible differences of size between existing stock and new
buildings, the composition of stock used in the classification of Athens
areas should be viewed more as a \'/eightedindex than an exact figure. It is
my opinion, however , that they diverge marginally from real conditions; we
may have, perhaps, a certain overestimation of the shares of smaller
buildings due to the substantial differences in size between legal sing1e-
family dwellings and illegally-built ones.
Figure 2.2. Greater Athens Area, Municipalities and Communes: Composition
of the building stock, 1970
\
Buildings of 1-2 storeys measured
in m3, as percent:of stock
24.7 - 56.9 %
57.0 - 69.9 %
70.0 - 79.9 %
o 5 1DIan
.
80.0 -100.0 %
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modes of housing production and particular social classes to form what
we have termed housing sectors. The pattern of housing sectors from the
point of the distribution of existing residential stock can be clearly
seen in table 2.9 where the relevant cells have been underlined and
enclosed in rectangles. The Athens housing system is structured around
two main sectors: a popular strata/low-rise sector and a middle-stratal
higher rise one which are connected to the precapitalist and the specu-
lative residential production modes respectively. The upper left part of
the 2.9 matrix (AI, Bl) may be said to form a distinct, socially signi-
ficant housing sector: this consists of low-rise housing in the inner
and outer urban periphery built by middle-and upper-strata households.
This sector, however, is extremely limited in quantitative te~s.
Table 2.9: Distribution of urban population by type of social
residential area, Greater Athens, 1971
Predominant Socio- A B C 0
economic Strata: Upper class/Middle Mixed/lower Working Total
upper mid- class middle class class A-Ddle class
Structure of build-
ing stock (1970)
1. More than 80% low-
rise (1-2 storeys) 9,375 67 ;112 81,395 536,875 694,757
(0.4%) (2.6%) (3 2%) (21.1%) (27.3%)
2. 70-79.9% 5,575 14,904 62,932 2502289 333,700
(0.2%) (0.6%) (2.6%) (9.8%) (13.2%)
3. 57.0-69.9% 4,087 17,907 307,997 60,595 39C,586
(0.2%) (0.7%) (12 1%) (2.4%) (15.4%)
4. 24.7-56.9% 9,053 12083,761 28,384 1.121,198(0.4%) C42.7%} (1.0%) (44.1%)
Total 1-4 28,090 1,183,684 480,708 847,759 2,540,241
(1.2%) (46.6%) (18.9% ) (33.3%) (100.0%)
Source: Based on the data for Municipalities and Communes in Appendix
2.1. Population figures from the Statistical Yearbook of Greece,
1970.
Note: 24.7% is the lowest share of low-rise buildings in G.A.A. (that of
the Athens Municipality); 57.0% is the average for G.A.A. as a
whole.
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The pattern described in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and in Table 2.9 refers
to the whole of the existing stock and is based on cross-sectional data
(1970-71). To what degree are these sectors (enclosed in rectangles on table
2.1) a realistic schema of the.housing system in a dynamic sense?
In other words, do they represent the foci of the structuration of re-
sidential growth? To an important extent, even such cross-sectional data
shed light on the dynamic pattern. For one thing, the population of
Greater Athens almost doubled between 1951 and 1971 (1951: 1.378.586,
1961: 1.852.709, 1971: 2.540.241). Thus the 1971 pattern is mainly the
product of postwar growth. Therefore the physical and economic character
of existing buildings in extensive urban areas will reflect to a sub-
stantial degree the form of n~ building. This is true, of course, only
to the extent that no dramatic shifts of the structure of building and
its geographical distribution have taken place. Fast urban growth and
change in the role of sectors has indeed effected significant changes in
the spatial structure of Athens, but these have followed the lines of
incremental expansion along a more or less "concentric" Model with the
additional complexity created by a second centre in Piraeus. Apartment
buildings have mushroomed in the central zones of the city whereas low-
rise development has taken place in the periphery, both forms expanding
outwardS with the process of urban growth. The relative regularity in
the spatial pattern of growth has been reproduced by a number of factors:
the tendencies of the housing economy for spatial specialisation in the
medium term; the segregation of radically different housing modes/sectors;
and, most of all, the stabilising effect of building regulations, parti-
cularly the rules controlling density of development and height of
buildings. The official division of the city area into zones with differ-
ent regulations and limits on building height and land exploitation has
not changed since the mid-1950's; height limits were increased in 1968,
but the change was applied universally though it was greater for low-
rise areas. Thus the ranking of Athens areas by the predominant type
and height of actual building is strongly correlated with the pattern
set by regulations which certainly constitute the most important deter-
minant of the form of building in a given area.23
23. For this correlation, compare Fig. 2.2 with the relevant maps of
building regulations shown in Ministry of Public Works, The Master Plan
of Athens (Athens, 1965). See, also, Mandikas, Economic Analysis of the
Athens Master Plan, vol. 4, Appendices.
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Thus we may use the proposed matrix allocating Athens areas in
different housing sectors in a dynamic way, if perhaps less so for
the earliest part of the postwar period. Table 2.10 presents the
distribution of population increase in the social/residential areas
of the city for 1951-61 and 1961-71 (the figures corresponding to the
main Significant housing sectors are again underlined and enclosed in
rectangles). The pattern that emerges demonstrates in a clear-cut man-
ner the operational value of the sectoral schema we advanced: the bulk
of growth in low-rise, non-speculative housing is associated with working-
class,'low-income strata. Seen from the point of social class, table 2.10
shows that the largest part of the growth of residential capital of popular
strata has been geared to the precapitalist housing mode. The share of
population growth allocated to such areas was in itself high: 52.0%
for 1951-61 and 33.5% for 1961-71 (cells 01, 02). It is apparent, how-
ever·, that significant changes in the sectoral structure of the housing
syst~~ have taken place during the 1960'5. The relative role of the
popular precapitalist sector in residential growth has diminished,
whereas the opposite is true for the speculative apartment sector in
higher-density middle-class areas. The more central areas where the
speculative sector is concentrated doubZed their share in the total
population increase.
Since this last point may easily give a wrong impression about the
nature of our propositions on sectoral change during the 1960's, some
additional clarification is needed. The apparent substantial incorpo-
ration of lower-class population growth into the speculative sub-system
in the 1960's in comparison to the 1950's does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that such incorporation was in the nature of a direct
shift to apartment housing. The evidence reviewed so far, particularly
that establishing the limited extent of the speculative apartment
sector even during the sixties, points rather to the conclusion that
such direct shift to the apartment market must have concerned a very
small share of popular strata. We will return to this issue later.
Less disputable is the conclusion that in the 1960's we had a greater
integration of popular strata into the older and lOWer-value housing
stock of areas where growth has been increasingly dominated by spe-
culative and petty-speculative building and where a "filtering" mecha-
nism of some form has most probab1y operated.
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Table 2.10: Distribution'of population increase by type of social
residential areas, Greater Athens 1951-1971.
1951-1961 (Population increase: 474.100)
A
1. '*5,240
(1.1)
1,758
(0.4)
1,550
(0.3)
3,502
(0.7)
2.
3.
4.
B
14,207
(3.0)
*5,862
(1.2)
7,446
(1.6)
110,836
{23.4%}
C
18,821
(4.0)
22,811
(4.8)
23,686
(5.0)
1,587
(0.3)
D
190,129
(40.1%)
56,366
(11. 9%)
10,322
(2.2%)
1961-1971 (Population increase: 687.S00l
1. 2,318 19,651 26,880 1842975(0.3) (2.9%) (3.9%) (26.9)
2. 1,711 7,267 23.101 451685(0.2) (1.0) (3A%) (6.6)
3. 999 3,652 26,865 20,465(O.l) (0.5%) (3.9%) (3.0)
4. 1,844 319,279 3,030
(0.3) (46.4%) (0.4%)
Source: See Appendix 2.1 and text. Population change figures adapted from
the Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1976, based on the figures'
for individual municipalities and communes. For categories A-O
and 1-4 see Table 2.9.
The two polar opposites of the dual structure of the postwar housing
system shared between them the greatest part of population growth: more
than two-thirds of the latter is found in either low-rise, lower-class
areas of precapitalist housing economy or in areas of high concentration
of middle-strata and high-rise market housing, (cells 01, 02 and 84
respectively). The third significant (though numerically limited) housing
sector we have tentatively distinguished, tnat of low-rise, independent
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house-building by upper/middle strata (cells Al, A2, B1, B2) has showed
a relative decrease from a share of 5.7% in the 195015 to 4.4% in the
1960'5.24
4. Socioeconomic class, mode of housing production and tenure
Thus far we have utilised data about the physiCaZ characteristics
of the residential structure in Athens. As a result we have felt the
need to use somewhat narrow definitions for the different housing modes
and sectors. We will conclude our analysis with an examination of tenure
patterns. We will thus substantiate our original thesis that the non-
speculative popular housing sector is based on small owner-building for
use; the operation of this sector, in turn, has reproduced the high
incidence of m-mer-occupation among Greek popular strata. The specula-
tive mode is also associated with a substantial category of owner-occu-
piers, a fact that reflects the high incidence of house-ownership
throughout the social-class spectrum. In contrast, however, an exten-
sive rental housing market is an integral and important part of the
speculative system.
The relatively high rate of owner-occupation has been a well-known
feature of Greek urban housing in the postwar period. This rate is
lower in Greater Athens and in Thessaloniki. The share of rental housing,
24. Since the variation in the composition of built stock along the
low-rise/higher-rise axis corresponds in general to variations in densi-
ties and land values, the classification of areas and their relation to
the distribution of social classes in our schema of Athens amoun~ to
a particular "model II of the distribution of social classes in the city
in relation to the concentric pattern of densities. It can be easily
seen that it stands in sharp contrast to the well-known model of the
"Western City" following the original schema of Burgess derived from
Chicago. It is not that the Athens pattern is an "inversion" of the
Burgess model or even something in-between (Leo Schnore's thesis on
the structure of Latin American cities in his liOn the Spatial Structure
of Cities in the Two Americas" in P.M. Hauser - L.F. Schnore (eds}, The
Study of Urbanization, New York, 1565; 347-401). In a simple "inverse"
model,50cioeconomic status should be negatively related with distance
from the centre and positively with density and land vaiue. In fact,
middle strata are found in the areas with highe'r densities and closer to
the centre. No clear-cut linear relationship holds. As it happens, the
same pattern has been documented for a number of Latin American cities
by P. Amato) in his "A Comparison: Population Densities, Land Values and
Socioeconomi c Class in Four Latin American Cities", Land Econom; cs,
(XLVI, 4, 1970): 447-455.
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however. has been steadily increasing during the 1960's. As table
2.11 shows, the share of rental accomodation feZZ during the 1950's
to less than one-third of households in urban areas as a whole (at
least up to early 1958); it rose fast, however, to 40% in 1971.
Table 2.11: Share of urban households in rental accomodation, 1951-1971
Year All urban areas Greater Athens Rest of cities
~951 (1)
1958(2)
1971 (3)
0.34
0.32
0.39
0.40
0.38
0.45
0.28
0.27
0.32
Source: Adapted from: (1) Statistical Yearbook of Greece. 1959;
(2) "Construction and Housing in Urean Areas" N.S.S.G.:
28-29; (3) "Sociological Study", N.C.S. R., 1973, vol. 1,
p. 273, "National Monographll, p. 123.
The main vehicle for the reproduction of high rates of owner-occu-
pation has been the building of single-family houses by households
owning a small land plot, as well as the other forms of small-scale
family-controlled building aimed for owner-occupation: extensions,
additions of storeys, small low-rise buildings. Residential production
of this type was predominant during the earlier part of the postwar
period; hence the decrease of the snare of rental accomodation between
1951 and 1958. The degree to which new dwellings built during 1951-58
in Greater Athens were occupied by owners-users.is impressive: the
share of owner-occupation in new dwellings was 71%, and reached 75%
if accomodation free of rent was added. In contrast, the share of owner-
occupation in older stock (built before 1951) was only 52% (and 75% if
we add rent-free housing).25 A high concentration of rental housing
has been in general a feature of intermediate types of residential
stock which are usually older and depreciated buildings in medium and
low-rise high-density areas. Speculative blocks of flats, on the other
hand, stand somewhere in-between: though systematic statistical mate-
25. N.S.S.G., Construction and Housing, p. 28
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rial is not available, the existing evidence suggests that such housing
is roughly divided between owner-occupiers and renters.26
Owner-occupation is an especially strong norm in Greek society. It is
the IIpopularllcharacter, however, of the precapitalist residential economy
that made possible the impreSSively egalitarian distribution of urban
housing property in Greece. Lower strata, i.e. workers in secondary
activities, services and transport as well as lower middle strata
(petty proprietors, supervisory staff), have a rate of owner-occupation
at least as high as the average for urban areas and most probably (on
the grounds of available statistics) higher than the average for the
largest part of the postwar period.27 This is also true for Athens.
A larger than average rate of owner-occupation is certainly evident
in working-cl ass areas of singl e-family housing in the urban periphery,
which usually show heavy concentration of illegal housing. A study
of three such areas in the western fringe of Athens, carried out in
1964 (Kipoupolis, Petroupolis and Aghia Varvara) found that the share
of owner-occupation exceeded 85%.28 The highly egalitarian distribution
26. The 1964 study of employees in industry cited before, found that
about half (45%) of the residents of blocks of flats were in rental
accomodation. The share of renters rose to 63% for those living in
intermediate types of stock. In contrast, only 30% of those found in
single-family detached houses were renting; G. Burgel, La Condition
Industrielle, vol. 1, p. 151.
27. For Greater Athens, see, Burgel, La Condition Industrielle
vol. 1, p. 150. For urban areas as a whole, see the flgures for rental
accomodation and owner-occupation given analytically for different
occupational categories, income classes and by employment status
(employers, employees, self-employed and unpaid family members) in
Household Expenditure Surveys, Urban Areas (Athens, 1972) (N.S.S.G.).
These figures covering a number of years between 1957-58 and 1968-69,
though showing clearly the broad outlines of the social distribution
of tenure forms,are based on too small a sample and are of limited
use for any detailed class and income analysis or an exact estimation
of changes in these matters.
28. Data from the Human Community Research Project, Re ort No 7,
Athens Center of Ekistics (Athens, 1967 Table 16. A detailed analysis
of the spatial distribution of tenure patterns in Greater Athens based
on the 1971 cencus material (Sociological Study, vol. A, pp. 271-275)
reports similar conditions: the shares of owner-occupation in occupied
dwelling units in the lower-strata areas in the western and north-
western periphery (mostly formed in the postwar) varied between 65-80%
these are certainly among the higher for G.A.A. We might add, however,
that these figures show that the trend of a decrease in the rate of
o\'iTlershipis strongiy evidenced in such areas.
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of owner-occupation rates is shown clearly in table 2.12. The same table,
however, indicates clearly a change towards a decrease in the rates of
owner-occupation among low-income strata. This change took place during
the 1960's.29
Table 2.12: Rates of owner-occupation by occupational class of the head
of household - urban areas, 1957.'58and 1974
Occupation of the 1957/58 1974head of household % owner-occupiers % owner-occupiers
A. Professional, Technical, Admi-
nistrative and Managerial 60% 58%
B. Clerical 54% 55%
C. Corrunerceand Sales 65% 64%
D. Industrial, Transport andConstruction Workers 69% 56%
E. Service Workers 63% 55%
F. Agricultural 89% 83%
G. Not gainfully employed 66% 65%
All households 67% 60%
Source: D. Emmanuel, Study of Categories of Households Outside the
Existing System of Housing Assistance, Table 0.4 derived from
the 1957/58 and 1974 Household Surveys. Categories A to Fare
ranked according to average household income. "Owner-occupiers"
include a small category of rent-free accomodation.
There are strong grounds for viewing the decrease of the rate of
owner-occupation during the 1960's as a corollary of the major structural
transformation of the economy of residential production, namely, the
expansion of the speculative mode and the decline of the significance
of the popular precapitalist housing sector in urban growth. For one,
29. A point corroborated by the data in N.S.S.G., Household Expendi-
ture Surveys (1972) though the reservations pointed in note 27 above
should be kept in mind.
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a number of policies introduc~d during the military regime (1967-74)
have drastically restricted the growth of illegal areas and popular
petty-production of new housing in general; we will return to these
issues in later chapters. We will also show that though construction
costs moved throughout the postwar period in a favourable way, the growth
of speculative building created scarcities and inflation in land
and other inputs to an increasing degree; this, combined with the afore-
mentioned restrictions and stricter "modernising" controls on land and
small-scale building, added to the capital costs and difficulties
encountered by non-speculative p~use-builders. It is ironic that the
alleged main goal of housing policy during 1967-1974 was the spread of
new housing and owner-occupation among the "peopl e": hence the increase
of mortgage credit and the encouragement of high rates of bui 1ding.
The actual outcome, as it turned out, was a dramatic increase in the
significance of speculative activities in Greek urban housing. Given
the class-character and economic structure of the IIdualll housing
system as we described it, the fall of the rate of owner-occupation
should, therefore, come as no surprise.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this chapter has been twofold. First, to substantiate
our thesis about the IIdual" structure of Greek urban housing in the. .
postwar period, the existence, that is, of two major and greatly differ-
ing housing sub-systems, evident at the level of modes of residential
production as well as the level of social and spatial relationships.
And second, to examine empirically the relative extent of these sectors
- precapitalist petty owner-building and speculative building - within
the overall supply of housing, as well as outline the trends of change
of this sectoral structure
We also made clear that few things can be advanced against an approach
to the postwar housing situation that stresses the significance of a
broad precapitalist housing mode which is certainly more broad and more
complex than simplistic concepts of "marginal" illegal housing. The
existence of systematic relationships between modes, social classes
and tenure patterns has been equally well demonstrated (though import-
ant complexities caused by change trends and the mixed chardcter of
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older stock are present). These relationships suffice to show the opposed
class nature of the precapitalist and speculative modes and the articula-
tion of these into distinct social systems, i.e. housing "sectors".
To what degree this productive and sectoral dualism implies the
existence of radically divergent values and social institutions in
relation to housing, or perhaps even antagoni8tic ones, can not be
decided at this stage. A positive answer to this question is a very
reasonable one in the light of the evidence on housing choices and
the historical significance of the popular residential household eco-
nomy; theoretical arguments may also commend it (see the previous chap-
ter). It is surely more plausible than the commonly accepted theories
about housing values which stress the universal acceptance of market
housing as the norm, public housing as a second best, and thus view
the majority of popular "irregularll accomodation as the unhappy product
of necessity and poverty.
Still, it could be pointed that.there are strong elements of inci-
pient speculative character within the precapitalist economy, and that
the pace of speculative expansion has been fast: both of which might
point to the contrary case. We will leave the question of the extent
of antagonisms and conflicts (latent or manifest) or, alternatively,
the extent of easy "assimilation" during the process of capitalist
transformation in housing to be examined again in later chapters. A
related problem, bearing on the origins, functions, and determinants
of precapitalist popular housing ·will be discussed in the next chapter.
3· Socioeconomic Foundations ofthe Precapltaiist Housing Sector
Accounting for the existence and systematic reproduction of pre-
capitalist urban housing in Greece ;s of strategic importance for the
analysis of postwar developments in the housing economy. First, it
sheds light on the historical conditions of the "dual" housing system
as a whole. It would be mistaken to assume that a limited social and
spatial expansion of speculative production necessarily implies a dual
housing economy, although it is certainly an important aspect of one:
sufficient conditions for the extended reproduction of precapital;st
housebuilding must also exist. Second, an examination of the socio-
economic foundations of precapitalist housing adds to our understand-
ing of this particular housing form as a distinct social system with
a major significance in the history of cities. Lastly, such an examina-
tion is crucial in pointing to the factors and mechanisms that determine
the growth or decline of the precapitalist housing sector, illuminating
thus the nature of the process of capitalist development in housing.
In this chapter we will be occupied with a number of fundamental
characteristics of popular petty owner-building in postwar sreace that
may be viewed as the socioeconomic conditions for its postwar repro-
duction. These furnish by implication a theory of the factor.s that
most probably account for its relative decline in the later part of
the period. Before this, however, we will shortly review a number of
explanations of the phenomenon of widespread non-speculative popular
petty-building on the urban .ieriphery and, in particular, of illegal
housing. The majority of these explanations are either inadequate or
heavily obscured by ideological and biased approaches. In addition,
they seldom place the question of the foundations or functions of
popular petty-building within a more general conceptual scheme as is
done in this study: in terms, that is, of the significance of the
wider precapitalist housing mode and the related popular housing
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sector in the context of an early capitalist urban economy.l Our review,
thus, will be both a critique and an effort to point to a theoretically
more relevant way of posing these questions.
1. Clearing the ground: Illegal housing and the precapitalist sector
as a whole
There are no comprehensive studies of the postwar· housing system tn
Greece aimed explicitly at the problem of its nature and peculia-
rities. The few Government reports and the small number of articles
and pamphlets on housing published by individuals or professional
bodies are almost universally concerned with the IIHousing Problem"
and prescriptions about public housing policies. They thus tend to
start from a rather biased view of the character and functions of
the housing system and consequently provide inadequate accounts of
its determinant factors. Not unexpectedly, the State and its policies
figure as the most prominent among these.
An older generation of architects, planners and public officials
approached the problem of the "peculiarityll of Greek popular housing
in the urban periphery (which forms the core of what we termed the
IIprecapitalist sector"), solely from the perspective of administrative
norms on housebuilding and the values of the Town Planning profession.
Such housing forms were simply defined as a probZem since they were the
product of "uncontrolledll residential development, diverged sharply
from the norms of postwar European organised hOUSing estates, and
required extensive planning action and public works to attain an
acceptable environmental standard. Popular housing in most peripheral
areas was judged, furthermore, to be below acceptable housing standards
and thus was summarily condemned as IIslums", "shacksll, etc.2
1. I have put forward some of the ideas about the precapitalist
character of popular petty building advanced in the present worK in
an earlier small article on Greek illegal housing: "Anticapitalism
and Autonomy in the Postwar History of Unauthorised Housing", Bulletin
of the Architects' Association (1, 1975}: pp. 11-14, (in Greek).
2. See the Conclusion and, more generally, -the proceedings of the
Second Panhellenic Con ress of Architects held in 1962 on "Popular
Houslng - Town P ann1ng"; for t e pu 11S ed proceedings, see Technical
Chronicles, Special Issue, (248, 1962, in Greek]. Similar lIofficia1"
1Q4
Since the mid-1960's and in the light of the growing literature on
squatter settlements, the problem has come to be largely defined as that
of unauthorized housing in Greek cities. This was certainly an improvement
in that it increasingly led to the recognition of the wider socioeconomic
determinants of low-income urban housing in a developing and rapidly
urbanising country. Little progress has been made, however , towards a
systematic understanding of the character of popular petty housebuilding
as a whole, its origins and its functions.
Two widespread misunderstandings may account for this state of
affairs. The first and more important stems from the mistaken equation
of non-speCUlative, low-income peripheral housebuilding in general,
with "illegal" housing.
This equation runs against both the statistical facts and the
nature of the case. We have been at some pains to show that illegal
housebuilding forms only a part - if a very important one - of popular
petty production and for certain periods no part at all (see chapter 2).
Furthermore, what may start as illegal settlement will usually develop
in a strictly legal context after incorporation into the city plan. For
the greatest part of the pqstwar period the substantial volume of
authorised petty building and additions to existing structures formed
a larger- part of popular peripheral petty housing production than
illegal activity. After ali, a large number of municipalities and
communes in Athens and Thessaloniki have been established and incorpo-
rated into the city plan through the Asia Minor Refugee Settlement,
and not with the usual postwar process of incremental unauthorised
urbanisation. Thus, defining petty building by urban low-income strata
as predominantly "illegal" building is a gross empirical mistake."
attitudes. towards. "unccntrol led" low-income urban
hous t ng have been qu He common among the observers of the hous inq
situation in underdeveloped countries after the war. See, Lila Leonti-
dou Emmanuel, "Squatter Settlements: A Bibliography on Controversies
on the Nature of an Urban Mass Movement".
J. To mention two cases: in contrast to the numerous official
estimates and independent field research reporting that i11egal building
has been successfully suppressed dur'ing the period from 1968 to 1974, we
read in the otherwise serious article by Z. Demathas & C. Courtis,
"Pol itical Economy and State Activity in the House-building Sector ,of
Gr~ecell, i~ _Questi~n~ of ,?reek HOllsin9.!Chair of Architectural Des tqn ,
Unlv. of Tnessalonlkl (1976): 83-120 (In Greek), that the latter
cont-inued to thrive undisturbed by the measures int.roduced by the
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The second misconception stems in part from this mistaken view of
the composition of popular petty production. That is, an undue empha-
sis is devoted to the particularities of the illegal housing process
with the consequent disregard of the more important and general cha-
racteristics of precapitalist household production and distribution
as an economic form sui generis. What is worse, the conceptualisation
in terms of relative legality of the development process relates more
to ideological and official definitions imposed upon a historical form
of economy. After all, the meaning of illegality in the case of Greek
unauthorised housing should not be confused with the patterns in other
developing countries where the violation of laws - in this case laws
on property - is an all-important aspect of the squatter settlement
process. Squatting on non-owned land is hardly relevant to the Greek
case: the illegality aspect refers to a violation of building by-laws,
and thus involves the clash between two different concepts of rights
over one's property, a traditional one of a smallholders society and
that of a modern, urban society.
Since the IIhousing problemll aspect and illegality have commonly
been defined as the essential aspects of the popular mode of periphe-
ral housebuilding, it is not surprising that the factors proposed as
the determinants of such housing are equally distorted and ideological.
We are generally told that since the limited supply and/or the high
costs of IInormalllspeculative market and public housing are such that
these sectors are lIunable to solve the proolem" of accomodating the
rapidly growing low-income population, the latter is IIforcedll to seek
a solution in i.llegalactivity. The State, in turn granted its ina-
bility (or unwillingness) to solve the emerging problem, gives in
essence its tacit approval, tolerating the vice of illegal urban
growth.4 Some left critics of the State's policies have argued that
this relatively passive attitude towards illegal housing has been
Military; in a study of Greek housing by a group of architects
connected to the C.P. of Greece, we learn that private housing
activity as a whole is mainly composed by two parts: speculative
building and illegal housing! See, SPADA, The Housing Question, pp. 30-40.
4. SPADA, The Housing Ouestion, p. 39; Aristides Romanos, "Housing
Outside the Plan: Problem or Solution?", Bulletin of the Architects'
Association, 1, 1975 (in Greek) and his "Illeqal Settlements", (l969).
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intentional, aiming at the creation of an urban reserve army of labour
useful to the demand of the industrial bourgeoisie for cheap labour.5
Some go even further in this argument to claim that in essence a
bourgeoisie-dominated State has been using a general policy of easy
access to urban land through illegal housing in order to lower the
cost of labour power by reducing what Marxists call absolute urban
rents, namely the ground rents imposed on peripheral land which are
a major factor in the cost of living of the working class. Indeed,
they would perceive such a conscious policy going back to the middle
of the last century.6
As most functionalist explanations, these arguments have certain
elements of truth as well as an arresting simplicity. A moment IS
reflection, however, makes apparent their limited explanatory power
and the lack of realism in their premises. To begin with, on what
grounds should we expect a capitalist State and a speculative housing
market to "solve" the "housing problemll unless some very special
historical conditions and social struggles are present? Neither
institution is inclined by nature or is morally obliged to seek
solutions to the housing problem. Therefore, the lack of some IInormalll
solution to the problem in Greece does not imply that public and
private elites had promoted, as an alternative, the "squatter" solu-
tion. After all, there was no serious housing problem in the postwar
period, let alone an explosive one, that would force the ruling
strata to formulate a specific policy. On the contrary, there was
a clear-cut, unprecedented improvement in the housing conditions of
the lower strata, even though urbanisation rates were rather high and
a tremendous housing shortage has accumulated in the 19401s. If "inabi-
lity" to solve the housing problem, benign neglect and Zaissez-fail'e
attitudes are indeed the crucial factors explaining the role of illegal
housing, England in the nineteenth century should be swarming with
some form of squatter housing, whereas, as far as r know, nothing
of the sort took place.
5. See, SPADA, The Housino Question, p. 39 and G. Arachovitis,
liThe Nostalgia of Imperfect Commodity Production or Let's Have Another
Look at Unauthorised Housing", Bulletin of the Architects' Association,
(1,1975): 15-17, (in Greek).
6. Z. Demathas - C. Courtis, "Pol itical Economy and State ~.ctivity".
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Neither the argument about the economic functions of illegal housing
for the industrial bourgeoisie offers much in the way of explanat ton.
Industrial concern for the supply of cheap labour was certainly great
in the context of nineteenth-century English industrial urbanisation.
Despite the fact, however, that industrial capitalism reigned supreme,
no "strategy" analogous to illegal housing emerged. Even if such
bourgeois strategies were common, it is certainly far-fetched to
view Greek urban policies as dominated by an articulated industrial
bourgeoisie, especially during earlier periods, in view of the capital
city's weak industrial base. The last point applies a fortiori to tne
general case of the Third Horld city, hardly an industry-dominated
social formation, though surely not lacking in low-income squatter
housing. One could counter to the previous argument that although
there were no dysf~nctions in illegal housing, as far as industrial
capital was concerned, there were important positive functions to
make the latter accept such a state of affairs and that, furthermore,
there was no articulated and strong urban landed bourgeoisie imposing
restrictive, high-rent policies, as was the case in European capitals
in the previous century (see chapter 1). But this takes us a'l/ayfrom
simple functionalist explanations and into the realm of historically
specific patterns of class structure and class power, and relationships
of urban Iandownershtp and its economic ut'ilisation.
We may find post facto quite a number of positive functions for any
particular social phenomenon; but these in no way point to a determinant
mechanism for its historic formation on a significant scale. The argu- .
ments about the "latent" functions of illegal housing for the Greek
State and Industry, simply state the more or less obvious fact that no
strong negative policies seemed necessary, which teaches us little about
the historical genesis and reproduction of illegal housing or, more
important, about the wider case of precapitalist urban housing petty
production. As for the theses about the inability of State or the market
to solve the "problem", though they mi.ght be important in illuminating
the rationale, again, of the lack of strong negative measures in the ..
postwar era, they offer little as positive historical factors; if taken
seriously as a theory of the genesis of illegal housing, they simply
turn hjstory on its head. The State and the speculative market as regular
suppliers or popular housing are exceptional and recent phenomena in the
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history of Greek housing, particularly in the postwar period. (The
extensive programs for refugee housing in the interwar period should
be considered as an exceptional case). The main source of popular
. . . .
housing has been, of course, precapitalist petty-building. Illegal
housing has formed a part of this wider sector. As we will argue in
the following, it has played a major role in the precapitalist sector's
growth and must be properly viewed as an integral part of the system
of social and political relations and institutions that historically
characterised this sector. Thus any argument that explains illegal
housing as a residual, necessary third alternative to the IInormalll
forms of public and market housing, should logically apply to the
precapitalist sector as a whole. But this is patently absurd since the
latter has clearly been, till at least the end of the 1950's, the
dominant form of new popular housing in urban areas as a whole, while
being a near-exclusive one in smaller urban centres.
In conclusion, the problem of explaining the existence and role of
precapitalist housing should be sharply distinguished from that of
explaining lIillegalll housing. The explanations that have been advanced
for the latter in Greece are inadequate and distorting as accounts for
the broader phenomenon. However , they are equally inadequate as
accounts of illegal housing as such. It is our contention that a proper
understanding of Greek illegal building can be only gained when this 'is
placed in the wider context of the characteristics and determinants of
popular precapital ist housing as a whole. The rest of this chapter will
be occupied with these issues.
2. The conditions for the existence of the precapitalist sector
Contrary to the widely held views referred to previously, the
relevant empirical possibil ities with regard to the mode of production
of Iow-tncome housing in early capitalist cities are not the pair
speculative and/or public new housing vs. precapitalist housing. Even
a cursory knowledge of the history of capitalist cities and present-
day developing countries shows that the most relevant pair of alterna-
tives is precapitalist production or no new low-income housing at atl.
It is pertinent therefore to pose the question: how has it been possible
for precapitalist housing production to exist and be reproduced at su~h
a substantial scale in postwar Greece? What are the particular conditions
that have been essential for its functioning and growth?
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In the short historical and comparative analysis of chapter 1 we
have pointed out that both theoretical argument and historical evidence
show a necessary association between the existence of an extensive
sector of low-income, precapitalist housing and widespread access to
the ownership of land and other means of production along with the
institutional structures legitimising and reproducing such a pattern.
To this crucial precondition we may add the more obvious one of the
level of economic development of a country: unless incomes per capita
and thus savings and, more specifically, economic resources per low-
income household do not exceed a certain level, extensive popular
owner-building, especially in large urban centres, should not be
expected. The existence of these two major preconditions makes for
a strong possibility for the operation of an extensive precapitalist
urban housing sector. Both of these general preconditions and their
economic and political correlates were present in Greece in the early
1950's. The most relevant elements can be summed up as follows:
a. The economic development of the country in terms of income
per capita placed Greece among the "middle-income" category in the
international scale of development. This, in itself, does not
signify much; but, given the pattern of income distribution in the
country and the international economk context of the early postwar
period, it implies a level of low-income household resources that
was sufficient for the accumulation.of substantial residential capital.
This point is developed more fully in chapter 5.
b. There was a strongly diffused pattern of ownership of land and
sma11 capital.
c. There.was an extensive small-holder family economy. This was
dominant in the countryside but also of major importance in the cities
especially in relation to low-income strata.
d. The system of values, social institutions and legal-political
practices prevailing in Greek society had a strong component that
expressed the interests and ideologies of the social stratum of small
proprietors. This was expressed in the legal rights of small property
owners, in the clientelist and populist attitudes and practices of
politicians and administrators vis-a-vis the "people"(most notably
in small towns and rural areas}, and in the legitimacy given to small
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property both by conservative rhetoric and the liberal-democratic
tradition established during the land reform and the dissolution of
large estates in the first quarter of the ce~tury.
This is not the place to substantiate these arguments or expand
on these societal structures of twentieth-century Greece.? It suffices
to point out that. given their validity in the context of historical-
international comparisons, they make for a very strong tendency towards
the existence of an extensive precapitalist housing sector, in objective
terms, as well as in terms of values. In paint of fact, their influence
in Greece extends well beyond this and determines to a large degree
the character of the building economy as a whole: as a significant
Marxist study of postwar building notes, the structure of Greek house-
building as well as its social significance can be largely derived from
the strong "petty bourgeois" elements in the class structure of Greek
society.8 The latter involves the diffused pattern of property ownership.
but it also signifies the institutional significance of small property
and the limited development of modern capitalist relations.
Instead of analysing the aforementioned socio-structural patterns
at the level of the society as a whole, we will examine the specific
form these patterns acquire in the context of the urban-residential
political economy. More specifically, we will examine the conditions
making for widespread popular access to urban land since this certainly
? There are very few systematic studies on twentieth-eentury
Greek society elaborating on the social and political aspects we have
listed. On class structure and politics, see B. Sweet-Escott
Greece: A Political and Economic Survey 1939-1953 (London,' 1954~;
A.P. Alexander, Greek Industrialists (Athens, 1964); C. Tsoucalas.
The Greek Tragedy (London, 1969); N. Mouzelis, Modern Greece: Facets
Q_f UnderdevelQP_llJent (London, 1978). For a wealth of material on the same
issues in the case of Athens, see L. Leontidou Emmanuel, Working Class
and Land Allocation: the Urban History of Athens 1880-1980, Ph. D.
Thesis, l.S.E. (1981). In relation to agrarian politics and property
relations, see C. Vergopoul os, The Agrarian Quest ion in GY'eece,
(Athens, 1975, in Greek). Lastly, in relation to populism and cliente-
lism in Greece see, Mouzelis,. Modern Greece, K. Legg, Politics in
tlodern Greece (Stanford, 1969) and the articles in G. Kontogheorghis
1€{l.}, Social and Political Forces in Greece (Athens, 1977, in Greek).
8. Study Group, Construction l~orkers and BuilcU..!!g_,pp. 16-17.
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constitutes the most important precondition for the existence of the
precapitalist housing sector. Though this factor, however, with its
attendant social values may be a necessary condition, it is not a
sufficient one. We will therefore pay equal attention to a number
of factors that make for a lack of negative pressures or constraints
on the operation of popular precapitalist housing. Thus, our discussion
will be organised into two main sections with regard to the conditions
that the social strata involved in the precapitalist sector faced:
access to la~d and relative autonomy or lack of negative pressures
and constraints due to middle-class/capitalist influence over urban
land, and access to and relative autonomy in the utilisation of
economic resources other than land, namely savings, labour and building
capital. The first of these refers to the formation of widespread land-
ownership among popular strata through the post-1920's "waves" of
"colonisation" of peripheral land, the creation of extensive lower-
income and working-class areas, and the lack of middle-class/specu-
lative control over such land either in the form of substantial landed
property or through any diffusion of competitive pressures for such
land by speculative enterprises. Capitalist rent, thus, either in the
form of "absolute" ground rent based on the monopoly power of a class
of large landowners, or "differential" ground rent and high.
"developnent values", has not been a prohibitive factor for non-
speculative growth.9 Although the increased application of "modern"
9. Since the recent literature on ground rent in urban land - mostly
efforts to apply Marxian and Ricardian concepts in an urban context - is
notorious for its anarchy of definitions and interpretations, we might
as well make clear our own use of these concepts. "Absolute qround zoent"
is theoretically defined as the rent demanded by the ownerS of the best
plots of peripheral ("marginal") land not yet incorporated in the process
of supply of urban services - in this case housing. Naturally, under
market conditions all plots already integrated in the urban sphere
enjoy this rent. "Differentia'l" rent, on the other hand, is attached
to specific classes of land or even individual plots and it is the out-
come of the differences in "productivity" of these plots compared to the
uoret: plots included within the urban market - specifically, the differ-
ence in costs of production of urban services between a given plot and
the "worst" one. This, given a uniform pattern of prices asked on services
and a uniform rate of profit on capital, accrues to the landowner. Thus,
in general, differential rents are produced by market prices and the
inherent advantages of various plots, whereas absolute rents are based
in part on the possible remuneration of non-urban uses but mostly on the
monopoly power of the class of landowners. Thus, absolute rents may bethought of as transfer prices asked in the process of turning land from one.
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public regulations over the right to build and the form and size of
the residential development are not always, or necessarily, a mere
reflection of the norms prevalent in the middle-class/capitalist
sector of the housing economy, they certainly tend to conform more
with the "normal" private market and middle-class standards of housing.
The relative autonomy of peripheral areas and petty-building from such
norms and controls has been historically an additional important factor
in its reproduction and growth. This particular condition was also
important in permitting the best utilisation of popular economic re-
sources, at least from a short-term point of view. But the informal
and adaptive "rationality" of petty building in the precapitalist
family economy would not have been possible were it not for the
existence of a personal and uncontrolled system of savings accumulation
and finance and the avail abil ity of a pool of non-capital ist petty-
construction groups and independent labourers, the relative autonomy,
that is, from capitalist relations and formal pu5lic controls over
the important "inputs" of the housing process.
Before we go into these points, however, a note about the so-called
"technologi.cal PI factors that may have been instrumental in facil itating
the reproduction of peripheral petty building is in order. A relatively
modern technology of road-transport and cheap public transportation
services must surely be a significant contributing factor permitting
a more decentralised urban pattern. This is doubly important for the
use to another; but the class-power component is also essential. It
explains the fact that even land turned to urban uses but not yet
developed can command rents \'/e11 above the transfer price and differ-
ential rent. We may have, then,absolute rent, in addition to the first
mentioned case, even in the case of the "worst" or marginal land
transferred to the urban mar~et. These conceptualisations fo11ow
in general lines the ones advanced by Arghiri Emmanuel, in his
ynegual E~change (London, 1972, translated from the French, 1969),
pp. 216-26. For a useful review of various approaches to urban ground-
rents, see, Allen J. Scott, "Land and Land Rent: an Interpretative
Review of the French L t terature", Progress in Geoaraphy (9, 1976~: .
1Q3-145. The IIdevelopment valuell of a plot results from the multlpll-
cation of botn absolute and differential rent per unit of housing
services in the area by the density of development permitted on this
plot. For a more detailed discussion of the theory of urban ground
rents and the proble~5 of its application in the Greek context, see
Chapter 6, Appendix 6.1.
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urban working class, for a peripheral and dispersed, IIpeasant-type"
housing process is greatly facilitated by easier access to employment
through public transport and by the spatial decentralisation of industry
itself. These arrangements would hardly be possible under an older
transport technology in a city of the size and complexity of Athens.10
Of equal importance are most probably the improvements in the "technoIoqy"
(which includes public capital and personnel) of electricity, sewage
and water supply. These factors, however, together with other techno-
logical improvements in building materials and infrastructure construct-
ion, are of a more long-term character in-relation to the urban pattern
and therefore of secondary interest for the analysis of developments in
the period we study. Thus we will not pay any systematic attention to
them. Never.theless, from the point of view of the historical-comparative
argument on the foundations of precapitalist housing in the early post-
war period, the availability of a relatively advanced level of urban
IItechnologyllin Greek cities is an important contributing condition
and must be kept in mind.
3. Foundations of the precapitalist housing sector: Access to urban
land and autonomy from middle-class/capitalist controls and pressures
The existence and growth of the precapitalist popular housing sector
in Greece has been based to a determinate extent on the relative lack of
control over land in the urban periphery by middle-class/capitalist
owners, or control effected through the "fnteqrat ion" of such land into
the speculative housebuilding economy. Since the 1920's and until the
mid-196Q' s the social strata associated with petty owner-bui1ding faced
a system that offered access to urban land as well as autonomy
from the negative pressures and controls that the middle-class/capitalist
system of economic and political relations over land normally imposes.
We can distinguish three major aspects in this overall pattern:
a. The peripheral land into which the city expanded during the
postwar years, has not been held by larger owners belonging to the
10. This point is stressed in Leo Shnore, liOnthe Spatial Structure
of Cities in the Two Americas", Hill iam Alonso, "The Form of Cities
in Developing Countries", Regional Science Association Papers (13, 1964),
and Lila Leontidou Emmanuel, Working Class and Land Allocation.
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bourgeois class or older "aristocratic" families; on the contrary, the
great majority of landholdings were of a very small size and were them-
selves further fragmented, a feature that can be said to apply for agri-
cultural and urban real property in Greece in general.
b. Land in the tnner and outer suburbs of the city has been for
most of the postwar period outside the sphere of speculative residential
development. Although a market of land properties has been a generalised
and established institution since the last century, and therefore commo-
dity exchange involved peripheral land plots, such land and its value
have not been integrated into the spatial competition process of
speculative building and the resultant system of development values.
c. The reproduction of precapitalist petty owner-building, either
in older areas or in newly urbanised ones, has been based on an extensive
"infrastructure" of urban holdings held by popular strata and accumulated
through past "waves" of bull ding and 1and acqui sition in the urban peri-
phery. Such "colonisation" processes have mainly been of extra-economic
nature ("illegal II housing is the more well-known form), and were rooted
in the class structure and politics of post-1920's Greek society.
Despite their crucial significance, these patterns have never
been studied adequately. We will spend some time then in documenting
them far the case of Athens for which relevant material is available.
3.a. Tne lack of bourgeois landed estates and the diffusion of land-
ownership
The extremely small size of land holdings in Greek agriculture
is a wellpKnown fact. It derives from the extensive redistribution of
land undertaken during the agrarian reform of the early 1920's. The
latter was one of the most radical in Europe and coupled with the
agricu1tural settlement of the Asia Minor Refugees (1922) determined
the presentpday small-holding peasant economy.l1 In 1961 the average
size of agricultural land holdings was as small as 31.77 strernmas
(3.17 Ha): in 1971, it was 34,5 stremmas (3.45 Ha). This pattern was
11. Far an account of the Greek Agrarian Reform, see Kostas
Vergopoulos, The AQrQrian Question in Greece, (Athens, 1975) eh, 3,
(in Greek). For comparative data, see Wilbert E. Moore, Economic
-Oemogr?phy of Eastern and Southern Euroce (Geneva,1945) App. III.
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even more pronounced in the agricultural land found in the fringe of
the Greater Athens administrative area (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1.: Size distribution of agricultural land holdings in the
Greater Athens administrative area, 1961 and 1971
1961 1971
Size Class No of Holdings Area No of Holdings Area
1 - 9 Strerrmas 7,642 31,638 6,520 26,460
10 - 29 II 4,918 63,074 4,000 62.660
30 - 49 II 951 34,484 1,020 36,720
50 - 99 II 651 38,800 760 49,080
100 ..199 II 263 34,088 280 33,700
200 and more II 203 73,562 240 73,640
<,
Total 13,627 275,646 12,820 282,260
Average Size of Holding 20.22 Stretmlas 22.01 Stremmas
Source: Agricultural Censuses, 1961 & 1971: 1968 and 1976 Yearbooks.
N.S.S.G.
It might be pointed with regard to the data in Table 3.1 that
whereas diffusion of ownership is higft,there is a Significantly high
degree of concentration in the pattern since the few holdings exceeding
100 str. control nearly 40% of peripheral land. This concentration'
is higher than the national average: such.relatively .substantial
'. ,
holdings (i.nterms of Greek standards, that is), controlled in 1971
in the country as a whole a share of agricultural land that was just
under 25% of the total. This extent of concentration, however, does not
contradict the point we are making: a holding between 150 and 250
stremmas is admittedly modest by international standards; and the
overwhelming majority of holdings as well as the greatest part of
peripheral land were certainly owned by a class of very small owners.
The degree of fragmentation is even more striking if we take into
account the fact that each holding was split on the average into 3.21
parcels, each of an average size of 7.07 str. (0.7 Ha) (1971). This
peripheral cultivated land was not wholly held by families actively
engaged in agriculture; a substantial part was held in 1971 by people
totally unconnected with primary production (4.980 heads of holdings
out of a total of 13.360). We may reasonably assume that this parti-
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cular part of peripheral land was to a large extent held for speculative
purposes and thus is representative of the type of land turned to urban
uses as the city is growing; these holdings were much smaller (67.220
strs for 4.980 holdings or an average size of 13.4 str:s per holding).12
Predominance of large landed estates in the urban fringe will in
general lead to land-withholding and monopoly power over supply terms
and prices. Substantial owners of peripheral land will tend to transfer
their properties to speculative developers and middle-class housing
cooperatives and certaiRly take a longer-term perspective of specu-
lative opportunities than petty-holders who will be governed by short-
tenn financial needs, compete strongly with adjacent owners and have
less power over the market as a whole. More importantly, if peripheral
land was dominated by bourgeois landed estates, the poZitics of urban
growth would have been radically different: we would have stronger
pressures in favour of middle-class suburban housing and stricter
controls against low~income subdivisions and illegal building (for
this point see chapter 1).
The final transfer of peripheral plots to households aiming at
their own housing, particularly low-income ones, is usually mediated
by real estate business who also carry out the necessary land subdi-
vision.13 Needless to say, a number of small fortunes have been made
in the process. Most probably, the largest part of peripheral land-
transfers outside those allocated tfwough the State or housing coope-
ratives (of which later) must have gone through such real estate, semi-
regular operators. However, these land speculators are mainly inter-
mediaries and not a group of landowners themselves. They are usually,
moreover, a marginal business form, hardly one of great power or status:
during tne 1950's and early 1960's, when they achieved some notoriety,
they were considered of limited respectability, not surprisingly given
the social status of their clientele and their complicity in illegal
building. rn all, they hardly qualify as a class of bourgeois landowners.
12. All data for the 1971 distribution of land holdings are from
the 1976 Statistical Yearbook,N.S.S.G.
13. See, Romanos, "Illegal Settlements in Athens" and K. Buzemberg,
"Land, the State and Urban Development", Architecture in G~
(1.1967): 78-93 (in Greek).
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The limited role of substantial landed wealth in Greek cities is not
confined to peripheral land. In an Appendix to this chapter (3.1) we
present in some detail the extreme degree of real estate ownership
fragmentation in a central area of Athens. Data of general urban land-
ownership patterns are unfortunately lacking. We have on the other hand
rather detailed information about the incomes from building property.
Table 3.2 presents the size-distribution of the latter for the upper
stratum of households that paid personal income tax in that particular
year. Since incomes below a certain minimu~ do not have to submit income
tax forms, only a small share of households do so - 15.3% of all house-
holds in 1967 of whom the great majority lived in cities.
Keeping in mind that most significant buil t-property assets are
concentrated in corrmercial and office buildings in central city areas
(where also the few incorporated real estate businesses, banks and
insurance companies hold assets and which are not included in Table 3.2),
the lack of large residentiaZ landlords is apparent. Even in the case
of the "elitell segment of built-asset owners, which we reasonably expect
to hold the best commercial and office property, and which formed less
than 1% of taxed owners, the average monthly income from buildings
hardly exceeds tile 30,000 drachmas range (in 1967, 1,000 U.S. dollars) .14.
14. To acquire an idea of the l.imited size of such urban buil t-
property holdings we may estimate the size of an urban Zand estate of
similar worth given the land values in 1967 .tn Greater Athens. The ave-
rage price of a square meter of urban land in G.A.A. was 1,050 drachmas
in 1964 and 2,750 drs in 1972 (Mandikas, Economic Analysis, vol. 4,
p. 45); assuming a linear trend of price rises, and a capitalisation
rate of 6%, property incomesof 400,000 drs a year would roughly
correspond, in 1967, to 3.7 stremmas of such average land in Athens
(0.37 Ha).
For "elite" landowners this is admittedly very small. It suffices
to mention, as a comparison, the case of Rome, where in 1965 the seven
largest urban land holders (five of whom were individual families)
held each an average of 556.3 Ha - the largest one owning 2.208 acres
or 893.5 Ha! Cl acre = 4.047 m2 = 0.4047 Ha). See, R. Fried, Planning
the Eternal Cit: Plannin and Politics in Postwar Rome (New Haven,
1972 , p. 116, table 5.6. Compare, also, with the sizes of large landed
property found in central London in Counter Information Services, The
Recurrent Crisis of London (London, 1973), p. 22, and the data in---
D. Massey and A. Catalano, Capital and Land: Landownership by Capital
in Great Britan (London, 1978).
The legacy of the Agrarian Reform and the significance of petty-bourgeois,
small-holding elements in Greek history has established a general insti-
tutional bias against big landlordism. For instance, a 1951 Law prohibits
the long-term leasing'or renting of land larger than 25 stremmas: L. Kama-
rinou, Agriculture and the Development Process in Greece (Athens, 1977),
p. 54 (in Greek).
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Table 3.2.: Size distribution of personal incomes from building property,
Total of Greece, 1967 (as decl~red to the Taxation Authorities).
Size-Class No of Owners % Income % Average annual
income in Drs
1. Less than 28.000 162)748 78.5 1 560,030 32.6 9,585
2. 28.000 - 60.000 31,379 15.0 1 266,082 26.5 40,348
3. 60.000 - 200.000 11,680 5.6 1 148,124 24.0 98,298
4. 200.000 & more 2,038 0.9 804,249 16.9 394,626
Total _207,845 100.0 4j778,485 100.0
Source: Statistics of Declared Personal Income and its Taxation for the
Economic Year 1967, H.S.S.G. 1969~ £1=82 Drachmas, 1967 rate.
3.b. The limited spatial expansion of speculative building
While the absence of a dominant class of bourgeois owners capable
of exercising relative monopoly power over pricing and land allocation has
been an important factor making for access to 1and by the \,/orkingclass
and extensive non-speculative production of hous;-ng, it is not a
suffioient one. Capitalist competition and control over land antago-
nising autonomous, non-speculative production may very well be realised
through the "impersonal" process of the market. We may thus say that it
is more important for our case that during the largest part of the
postwar period, land in the inner and outer periphery of Athens was
outside the scope of speculative enterprises. Speculative b~ilding
in this period was confined to the inner and central zones of the
largest Greek cities. Neither multi-family buildings in the periphery
and the older lower-income suburbs, nor suburban low-rise or single-
family housing developments "'ere considered as economically attractive
speculative activities. Alongside the examination of the implications
of this for the operation o~ the precapitalist housing mode, we will
also suggest the main reasons for this spatial limitation.
Speculative building tends to cater predominantly for the higher-
class and upper middle-class markets: this has always been the case
in the history of capitalist cities. This social limitation, inherent
in a housing market without any system of housing subsidies for
lower incomes, has been reinforced in the Greek case, especially in
the 1950's, by the low level of incomes and the late emergence of
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speculative apartment building. The latter has emerged as a major
housing form only as late as the early 1930's when the necessary
legal framework has been institutionalised: this included height
regulations in the major Greek cities and the introduction of the
so-called "horizontal" or floor property (1929). which arranged for
the ownership of individual flats alongside a certain share of the
building's land and its common spaces. As late as 1955" building
regulations essential for the regular activity of speculativ.e-J)llj,lders
have not yet crystallised: that was the year when the General Building
Code was introduced in the form that held for the rest of the period.15
Furthermore, the rebuilding of central areas in Athens and Thessaloniki
after the war has been strongly encouraged through a number of public
measures.l~ Given the fact that central areas in Greek large cities
were still relatively undeveloped in comparison to the permitted
tntens tt tes of development, it is not surprising that apartment and
office building grew rapidly in central areas and then moved gradually
to the inner residential areas of higher densities. The historical
genesis of such a form of central redevelopment created its own spe-
cialised techniques, a standardised building technology and subsequent
,"economies" in production and management that reinforced the concentra-
tion of activity on the "normal" speculative building types,i.e.apart-
ments in central areas. In a long-run perspective, however, the reasons
for the limitation of speculators to apartment-building in central areas
in the first part of the postwar period were financial in the wider sense
of the term. Lack of business capital or savings accumulated by associa-
tions specialised in housing, combined with the lack of mortgage credit
15. In the same year, Royal Decree 30.8.1955 introduced a new set of
so-called "terms of building" (height and coverage regulations) for the
• various zones of Greater Athens, abolishing thus the regulations applying
since Presidential Decree 14.5.1934; D.A. Papadimitriou, Rules and
Restrictions of Building on Plots of the City of Athens, (Athens, 1972).
p. 4 (in Greek).
16. Notably legislation passed in 1947 ("KH' Psiphisma") aimed at
the support of the private rebuilding of central urban areas by way of
taxation benefits (effective up to 1955 and, in part, up to 1960) and
a framework facilitating redevelopment and arrangements with tenants
of older structures under rent control, These measures proved successful,
especially in the case of central Athens, as it was admitted in a congress
of urban property owners held in 1950. See, Kostas Kitsikis: Fifty Years
of Activity, 1913-1963 (Athens, 1965), p. 97 (in Greek). For the parti-
culars of "KH' Psiphisma" see, 1. Michael The Management of the Land
Factor in the Athens Master Plan, Ministry of PLiblicWorks (Athens,
1973), p. 269 (in Greek).
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up to 1967. created a ~ighly adverse financial environment for any shift
away from building in height into projects with greater outlays on land
and infrastructure and hence expansion into peripheral areas of lower
density. Such a state of affairs necessitated a heavy reliance on areas
of high investment demand, that is rental and commercial markets, which
are in general located centrally and which. with their high solvency,
can help in the rapid turnover of capital and the shortening of the
IIproduction period!l and thus reduce the need for capital resources. The
financial weakness of speculative builders led to a dependence on land-
owners and the increased power of the latter; landowners. of course,
always prefer the IIhighest and best usell of their plot, which, given
the particular conditions of landownership fragmentation in urban areas
and prevailing financial arrangements, led to high-density, central
development. Lack of substantial capital necessary for more peripheral
development was evident also in the public sphere: the capacity and
willingness of public authorities to supply, extensively and regularly,
infrastructure in the periphery was extremely limited. Central areas,
on the other hand, offered readypmade i.nfrastructure at a minimal cost.
Since no taxation on development gains was in operation, the speculative
opportunities in such areas were too strong to ignore. These economic
considerations were tacitly, and quite often openly, recognised by the
authorities and were given expression in the highly favourable land
use controls offered to central areas in the 1930ts and 1950's.
With the institutionalisation of the political-economic !lbasell of
Greek urban development into a definite pattern of public controls, the
latter became crucial detenninants of the reproduction of small-scale
owner-building in so far as this depended on the relative social and
spatial limitations of the speculative sector. If different conditions
prevailed,if, that is, there was active competition by the speculative
mode for peripheral land, even under the conditions of fra9mented and
small-scale land ownership, land values and the volume of land supply
would certainly be much less suited to the personal petty builder. This,
most probably, would not be caused by the differentiaZ or the monopoZy
ground-rents created by the expanded speculative market; these two
types of ground-rents are determined, the first by the differential
accessibility to employment and services of urban locations, and the
second by a particularly high demand for specific neighbourhoods with
valued character, housing types, facilities etc. Areas considered very
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attractive on the basis of these criteria and belonging to the sphere
of popular petty ownership and the precapitalist building mode, would
be immediately affected by any expansion of the speculative market:
prices of land will rise and small owners will turn speculators. It
is doubtful, however, whether such cases will amount to anything but
exceptions. Most attractive areas are allocated to suburban middle-class
housing to begin with; a fact of the class character of urban land
allocation that is independent of the pattern of modes of housing
production.
The more radical negative effects of an expanded speculative market
would be caused by higher deveZopment values - the land prices created
by the expectations or actual offers for higher densities and utili-
sation of tne ground through speculative building in comparison to
petty owner-building. For these reasons, and from the point of view of
competition over land, the limited spatial diffusion of apartment
building with its high development densities was of greater significance
for the growth of popular petty building in urban Greece - and parti-
cularly in Athens - than the lack of speculative interest in low-
density, single-family housing in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of suburban
development. Given sufficient demand,development values in Greek cities
are determined by the officially set "build tnq coeff tc lent" or floor
area ratios. With the prevailing small size of plots, speculative build-
ing cauld successfully compete with petty owner-buil ding only in areas
with coefficients equal or higher than 2.0,Table 3.3 (see next section)
shows the socia-spatial distribution of coefficients in 1972 i.e. after
the substantial rise effected in 1968 (thiS, for the areas with a previous
coefficient of 1ess than 3..0, was 40%). Thus in most suburban areas before
1968, building controls were proh.ibitive for speculative building. With
the restrictions on densities in peripheral areas prevailing up to 1968,
speculative building could hardly expand spatially given the economic
characteristics of petty owner-building for use. The piecemeal bying
of land by families for their own housing is governed, on the one hand,
by family resources and, on the other, by family needs, including assist-
ance to newly-wed members of the family, provision for bequests,etc. The
balance of resources and needs as a governing principle of economic
action differs radically from any accounting calculation of costs and
returns from property. This IInon-economic" mechanism with its emphasis
on needs, which in this case means mostly needs for land, makes for a
higher valuation of land than lIeconomic rationalityll dictates. This fact,
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combined with the relatively high densities achieved in popular low-rise
areas due to smallish plots, limited garden if any, compact continuous
building, and two-storey or even three-storey houses,17 may lead to land
values that are higher than the capitalist calculation of ground rent
and development values would determine, unless officially permitted
densities were much higher.l8
We should lastly refer to two additional factors making for a compara-
tive disadvantage of speculative building vis-a-vis low-rise owner-build-
ing in the competition for land. First, the Greek taxation system specifies
a high rate of property transfer tax imposed on sales of land and struc-
tures. This creates a cost-advantage for non-commodity residential product-
ion and distribution. Whereas buyers of apartments pay as high as 15%
of the sales price in transfer tax owners building on an individual plot
for their own use avoid this substantial additional cost.19 Second, high
densities of speculative development tend in general to follow points of
concentration of urban economic activity and incomes - arteries with
commercial developments, secondary centres,etc. Another reason, therefore,
that made for a low degree of speculative competition over peripheral
areas of intermediate and 10\'4-er-statuscharacter in the first part of
our period, has been the low level of economic and infrastructural
development of those areas, and, indeed, of urban areas as a whole: with
the exception of the middle and upper class suburbs of the 1950's and
early 1960's even ,street paving and water sewage facil Hies were lacking
17. In areas that have been created by the nlegal housing process
and later incorporation in the city plan, the size of plots is generally
very small, a fact that accounts for the prevalent high densities in
more developed such areas: most plots range between 150 and 200 m2. Quite
a few are as small as 100-120 m2 (estimated from ground-plans of houses
and Figure 7.1 in Leontidou and Emmanuel, Life Patterns).
18. A similar phenomenon has been noted in the case of Greek agri-
culture. The imperatives of the family network and the relatively high
densities of population in the peasant economy drive land values up to
the point that the peasant units are placed in a stronger competitive
position in relation to land, compared to capitalist enterprise - unless
the latter can achieve particularly high land-productivity, which is rare.
See, Vergopoulos, Th~rarian Ouestion, p. 202.
19. This point has been stressed by Break & Turvey, Studies in Greek
Taxation, p. 246.
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from extensive areas.20 Higher-income residential nuclei and retail and
service centres could hardly flourish under such conditions.
3.c. The political process of "colonisation" of urban land by popular strata
While the "economic" fact of the limited control over or competitive
pressures for peripheral land either by speculative groups or other competing
uses has been an important positive factor for the accumulation of new
urban capital within the precapitalist sector, the latter could not be
solely based on such "economic" processes. New urban land can be utilised
as a factor in housing production only if some Pights to buiZd are attached
to it, institutionalised in legal arrangements or in informal social rules.
Even the very transformation of agricultural land into urban plots
involves specific institutional processes - the so-called "sub-division"
process. Thus in general the allocation of peripheral urban land has a
strong "political" aspect, that is, it is regulated by certain State
institutions. It is only when such institutional arrangements have been
stable over a long period that land aquisition for housing appears as
an "economic" process. In a long-run view such periods are non-existent:
even in Western advanced countries most subdivision, Iarrd use. and
building controls have been instituted after 1900. The political character
of urban growth is even more transparent in Greece where State policies
and institutional arrangements over peripheral land have fluctuated
substantially durfng this century.
This brings us to the third of the analytical factors determining the
access of tftepopular precapitalist sector to land and its autonomy from
capitalist relations: the pronounced role of "extra-economic", political
processes reflected in the historical IIwavesli of accumulation of land
by the lower strata of cities (as well as by a significant part of the
middle class). Greek Law does not prescribe public control of the sub-
division of peripheral urban land.21 Agricultural land can be subdivided
and sold as urban plots as long as the latter are considered in essence
20. For Athens in the early 1960's see, Athens Center of Ekistics.
liTheCapital of Greecell, Ekistics (22, 11, 1965): 53-82.
2Z. This has been true at least up to 1976 when a legislative program
aiming at a fundamental revision of the framework regulating peripheral
urban expansion has started to be effected.
124
agri~ur~r land parcels and therefore outside the scope of regulations
over the size and use of plots indended for urban building which are normai-
ly included in the official city plan. Building outside the city plan
area for residential purposes is not forbiden: but it is so regulated
that whereas requirements for land and development controls within the
authorised plan permit sufficiently high densities, residential develop-
ment outside the plan is limited drastically. The legal framework
concerning city plans and building regulations in Greek cities is based
on two major acts: Legislative Decree 17.7.1923 concerning the regula-
tions of building in cities and the formation of city plans, and
Presidential Decree 23.10.1928 on restrictions of building outside
authorised city plans.22 The latter prescribed that all building in such
peripheral areas required land of at least four. stremmas (0,4 Ha);
residential buildings should not cover more than 300 square meters of
ground area and should not exceed a very small number of storeys: even
under the more liberal post-1968 height regulations, the latter were set
at the maximum of three, which implied a "building coefficient" or floor
area ratio (the ratio of total floorspace to the plot area) of 0,225
at best.23 These were heavily 1imiting control s compared to the require-
ments for land and the development coefficients permitted in areas
within city plans. As 'lIe report in the Appendix to this chapter (3.1),
in a fairly representative central area the average size of building
plots was just above 0,02 Ha; even in the case of apartment buildings,
where some measure of land consolidation should be expected, plot size
barely exceeded 0 03 Ha on the average. The prohibitive requirements of
22. See, G. Economou, Elements of Town Planning Law (Athens, 1970),
eh. 3 (in Greek).
23. Economou, Elements. p. 213. The restrictions specifying 300 m2
and 3 storeys have been introduced by Royal Decrees 14.9.1960 and 12.6.1968
respectively. The control ef building in the periphery of cities has a long
history, reaching back to 1836 when the Decree on the Plan of Athens was
passed (Demathas & Courtis, "Political Economy", p. 107). In fact, during
the rule of King Otto and the Bavarian administration (1833-1843) quite a
few advanced pieces of legislation on urban planning and building control
were put in effect: Decree 19.5.1835 on town hygiene, 9.4.1836 on the
city plan of Athens , 5.6.1842 generalising the Athens plan regulations
to the rest of Greek cities. To all effects these were highly tnconqruent
with nineteenth-century Greek society both in terms of political culture
and economic practice (Derrathas & Court is, IIPo1itica1 Economyll). The
practices of directly implanting European legislation on urban matters
(German or French) in response to Greek problems has continued in the
present century.
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land imposed on peripheral areas can be better appreciated in a comparison
with the conditions prevailing in low-income residential suburbs, most of
which were formed initially by illegal activity and gradually legalised:
in such areas a single-family plot of 150-175 square meters (0,15-0,175
). t . 1 24str. 1S yplca .
The differences in terms of permitted development coefficients are
equally striking; whereas regulations over the minimum size of plots
are significant in themselves, the building coefficient provides a more
composite picture of land requirements per unit of floorspace produced
as well as the opportunities for intensive exploitation of the ground.
Table 3.3 presents the socia-spatial distribution of building coefficients
within the city plan in Greater Athens in 1972. The Table shows clearly
that for the largest part of the urban area and the city's population,
official building coefficients exceeded 1.0. Coefficients were sub-
stantially lower before 1968, but still the levels for the lower-income
zones, as can be derived from the Table, were above 1.0. It is evident,
moreover, that even in upper and middle-strata suburbs where land require-
ments are the highest, governed by a concern for "villa"-type housing
and exclusion of lower-income resi"dents, tne permitted development
coefficients are well above those prescribed for the outer urban periphery.
Land in the urban periphery has been essential for the growth of the
popular precapitalist residential economy_ Given the official controls
over such land, had there not been for the de facto establishment of
lower norms over land-requirements and densities, popular strata and
independent petty housing producers could not have possibly competed
successfully over land. Hence the essential role of the political factor
in residential land accumulation.
Land redistribution as a means for popular agrarian policies by
government is well-ingrained in the political culture of twentieth-
century Greece. Pressure for land and its significance for the small-
holder household economy of the countryside - even the implicit right
to appropriate land from large estates forcefully (by squatting) -
are fundamental aspects of the social structure of rural areas. Given
the predominantly rural character of Greek society for most of this
24. See note 17.
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century, it is not surprlslng that these aspects have influenced legal
and political institutions as a whole and have also been important within
the urban context where small ownership and petty, non-capitalist economic
activity is widespread. Distribution of land through quasi-political means,
however, has a history also in the case of urban housing: this, in con-
junction with the former broader aspects, has made it an integral part
of the political culture surrounding the housing question in cities.
Table 3.3: Building controls in Greater Athens: Average incomes, land
values and maximum permitted development intensity
("Building Coefficients") 1971-72
Zones by Socio- Population Building Plot Average in- Land value Average-build-
economic rank (1971) area (str.) come per (1972) ing coefficient
capita(1972) (1972)
A.Upper Class &
Upper Middle
1. NE! 26,088 18,200 7.382 1.085 1.13
2. NE3 98,348 15,900 5,293 2,149 1.40
B.Middle-Class
3. CI-C2 637,205 20,500 4,831 13,107 5.01
4. E3 42,123 19,000 4,220 1,387 0.64
5. NE4 79,147 9,800 4,076 1,564 1.34
6. C3 210,034 13,200 4,054 3,329 2.16
C.Mixed/lnter-
mediate
7. El 111,251 14,300 3,733 2,452 1.87
8. NW2 236,844 14,700 3,674 2,318 2.46
9. NE2 64,791 29,800 3,609 1,074 0.93
10. E2 143,840 11,200 3,502 2,028 1.95
D.Working Class/
Low income
11. P2 203,359 13,400 3,189 2,995 (2.85)
12. WI 328,093 26,000 2,948 1,940 1.84
13. PI 193,441 10,700 2,938 2,307 (2.85)
14. ~12 167,771 11,500 2,645 2,794 1.84
Source: Adapted from Mandicas, Economic Analys_~ vols 2 and 4, Appendi~es.
Zones 1-14 are the 1965 Master Plan zones (See Appe~dix 2.1, Flg.
2.1.1'. The capital letters signify each zone's place in the agglo-
mer2.t~on with IIC"referring to central zones and "p" to Pirdeus
and its suburbs. Land values are in drachmas per square meter.
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Public policies for urban housing during the interwar period mainly
involved the promotion of housing cooperatives and the urban settlement
program for the Asia Minor refugees (1922 and onwards). In the case of
the latter, direct public building of housing was supplemented by extensive
distribution of peripheral urban land to refugee recipients.25 Most of the
working-class municipalities around Piraeus were established during that
period. As the urban area of the capital expanded to abnormal levels by
the creation of new communities in the periphery, vast amounts of urban
land became part of the lower-income residential zones and formed the basis
for the subsequent growth of the precapitalist housing economy. This process
was an outgrowth of political relations in more than one sense: during
the time, refugees were mostly supporters of the Liberal Party and their
settlement in cities, particularly in the capital, en masse, may have
created resentments among the landowner interests or local conservative
elites but such reactions were disregarded since it also helped boost
the Liberal vote.26
Housing cooperatives as a vehicle of public assistance for urban
housing go back to the First World War. As we noted before, they aimed
exclusively at the acquisition of land-plots by members and in this they
provided the only means for privately-tntttated, legal peripheral resi-
dential development. The relevant legal framework provided the rules
for the formation of a cooperative under the oversight of State autho-
rities, the due process for the acquisition and subdivision of land,
the latter's incorporation into the official city plan, and finally, the
distribution of plots to the members who then could dispose of them
independently. As a means for the distribution of urban land, cooperatives
were highly beneficial for those groups carrying out successfully the
various arrangements with.the authorities; in addition, they were
supported by a number of tax allowances, the right to import building
materials without payment of import duties, and for certain periods, by
the direct involvement of the State in the compulsory purchase of land
25. See "Part I" (covering the period up to 1960) in Technical Chamber
of Greece, Housing in Greece: Government Activity, (Athens, 1975), pp.
150-160 (the English text),and for a more comprehensive discussion
Leontidou Emmanuel, Working Class and Land Allocation.
26. G. Daphnis, Greece Between the Wars. vol. 2 (Athens. 1955), (in
Greek), p. 97 and J. Meynaud, Political Forces in Greece, (Athens, 1966),(in Greek), p. 46.
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needed by the cooperative. This latter measure, when in force, gave the
opportunity for rushes of extensive appropriation of land by numerous
groups of public employees. During the short time of two years (1923-
1924) more than sixty Decrees for the compulsory purchase of urban land
in benefit of cooperatives were passed! During 1951-1952, when compulsory
purchase powers were used for the same purpose, a further twenty Decrees
were passed.27 Such processes were quite openly cases of use of political
power for land-appropl'iation by middle-class groups; they were publicly
". .recognised as such, hence the widespread criticism they provoked for most
of the years after 1923. In general, the institution of housing cooperatives
has benefited almost exclusively public employees and to a lesser
degree a number of categories among the urban petty-bourgeois strata.
For middle-class peripheral landownership and the related housing mode
of substantial, non-speculative owner-building, the legal and political
framework. of hous inq cooperatives has been most probably the backbone of
the land accumulation process.
For most of the lower ...income and working-class strata, on the other
hand, the instituti.onal basis. of peripheral expansion after the officially
sanctioned IIcolonisation" process of the 1920ls has certainly been the
more informal relations of "illegal" residential development: the essence
of the process is best captured by the more commonly used expression
"building outside the Plan" - buying subdivided land legally but lacking
building rights and then trying to secure somt;de faoto rights of house-
owner-ship by prolonged efforts of building (illegally) and occupation of
the structure. The time-series of house-building activity in Figure 3.1
show clearly two significant "waves" (or peak-periods) of illegal activity
in the postwar period: 1949-1953 and 1963-1966. Both coincide with periods
of important political changes and government instability. The first,
1949-1953, covers the years of the civil war aftermath and a weak liberal
government. Elections in the end of 1952 brought into power the conservative
Right under General Papaqos ' National Rally. The General himself was a
figure of strong IIgaudillist" elements, a populist leader prone to an
attitude of paternalist tolerance towards the desire of urban masses for'
27. See the chronological list of relevant legislation in Panos &
Klimis, Housing and Building Cooperatives. For the role of housing coope-
ratives in the mid-war period, see Y. Polyzos, Processus dlUrbanisation
en Gr~ce 1920-1940, These pour le Doctorat de Spec ialite , Univer5it~de
toulouse~LE!1~irail (Toulouse, 1978).
Figure 3.1: Dwelling Construction in Greater Athens 1945-1975: Total
Activity (1) (Legal Private, Illegal and Public), IllegalZy
Built (2), and Private LegaZ (based on permits) (3).
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a house: illegal builders always hope for such free-handing attitudes on
the part of the authorities during and after election time. After 1952-
1953, however, strong-government conditions and undisputed conservative
stability was established, to be broken only after 1963 with the Liberal
Centre's return to power and the political instability that ensued. Insta-
bility and a populist political outlook directed to the mobilised under-
privileged "masses" made the period up to 1967 highly favourable for
illegal housing: the 1967 Mil itary Coup and its strong-arm pol icies towards
illegal builders changed the scene drastically.28
Political factors, to be sure, were not the only ones at play: these
periods were characterised by rising building activity in general. Whereas,
however, legal dwell'ing construction continued to rise at the same or even
higher rates during 1953-1961 and 1967-1974, this was not the case with
illegal activity: it is fairly obvious that, in the last analysis, illegal
urban growth has been politically determined.
Periods of upswings in illegal activity were also ones of land-accumu-
lation expansi.on taking place in the periphery of "urban" areas, that is
outside the limits of the city plan: a~ much is evident in the development
of sales of agricultural land parcels in relatfon to tFie sales of "urban"
building plots and residential building as a whole in Greater Athens
presented in Table 3.4:
Table 3.4: Sales of eerieheral land and urban plots in Greater Athens, 1958-70
Years No of Agr.Land Urban Plots Dwelling (1):(2) (1):(3) (2):(3)
Parcels Sold sold construction(l} (2) {3)
1958-60 13,715 59,319 82,770 0.23 0.16 0.71
1961-63 10,675 70,885 l18,799 0.15 0.09 0.59
1964-66 31 ,172 84,618 165,960 0.3f 0.18 0.50
1968-70 9,245 82.995 168,164 0.11 0.05 0.49
Source: General Appendix A3, A6
28. For the best concise account of the political developments after
the war, see, C. Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (London, 1969): chs 8-14.
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Whereas exchange and accumulation of "urban" building plots shows
a relatively stable volume of activity, and a trend of declining signi-
ficance when compared with dwelling construction (a fact explained by
the decline of the role of non-speculative, legal owner-building and
especially single-family houses), the accumulation of peripheral agri-
cultural land shows a clear upswing during 1964-66. The decline of
similar activities after 1968 signifies quite clearly the negative
effects of the strict controls on illegal housing areas introduced
during the period.
The previous discussion aimed at showing the 'significance and the
essentially institutional an~ political nature of the processes that
sustained landownership and land accumulation within the orbit of the
popular precapitalist housing sector. Either through the mid-war
refugee settlement, or through the piecemeal acquisition of peripheral
land, illegal building and the gradual incorporation into the city
plan and provision of public services, and to a marginal degree with
the help of housing cooperatfves. extensive residential areas of
lower-strata social character flavebeen formed. Their extent can be seen
in the successive expansions of the Athens city plan after 1920 in the
western and north-western working-class suburbs (Figure 3.2). Such areas
provided toe ground for the owner-user economy of popular housing. Along-
side the other more "economic" aspects examined in the previous section,
these land control and accumulation processes form what we have defined
as the pattern of access to land and relative autonomy of the precapitalist
housing mode from the middle-class/capitalist system of relations over land;
by now, it must have become clear that such a relative autonomy has been
an integral part of the operation of the precapitalist sector in the history
of Greek cities.
It should be added that the process of accumulation of land within
the precapitalist sector determined by the above pattern, goes beyond the
level of the individual household: it is essentially a aoZtective process
of formation of areas in terms of soctal class and predominant mode of
housing production. When peripheral land is urbanised through the petty
owner-building mode, growth proceeds in an individualised, piecemeal way;
a large degree of sprawl and low densities are naturally to be expected
in the initial stages. Once this expansion becomes established as part of
the wider areas of.the non-speculative family economy, it serves as the
Figure 3.2. .Expans ron fo the City Pl an of Athens , 1920-1971
Expansion of the Ci ty Pl an between:'- r t ,
1834-1920
1921-1940
1941-1960
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Source: ~n1b: ~~--.------. --------
ur Srn it h &of Publ . ., AssorlC I'nrk ~.,
city plans~''-' 5, 1963;
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infrastructure for further growth in unbuilt plots, by additions on older
structures, improvements or higher-density redevelopment. sustained by
the growth of existing families and the influx of new population. Thus,
a moving "frontier" of peripheral urbanisation has been essential for the
growth of urban capital resources of the popular classes as a whole.
4. Foundations of the precapitalist housing sector: underdevelopment of
modern-capitalist relations in the supply of factors of production
other than land
4.a. Personal vs. Institutional finance
A United Nations specialist noted in 1955 that perhaps the most
important peculiarity of the economy of private nousebuilding in Greece
was the high degree of reliance on a personaZ system of savings and
finance. At the time, the financial resources of families were to a
large degree held outside even ordinary bank accounts, hoarded in money
form or 1n gold sovereigns; in general, self-help and family assistance
in house finance were of far greater importance than any formal financial
institutions and the normal capital market.2g The operation of a personal
"marketll of savings has not been limited to the sphere of the popular
petty owner-building sector: it has been an integral aspect of the
speculative residential economy as well. As a study of the Greek capital
market observed,
lithemarket works as follows: the financing of lots or sites within
inhabited areas, especially in large towns, takes place by
exchanqe axrranqemenie between construction companies and owners
of the site, the latter agreeing to permit the erection of an
apartment house in exchange for one or more potentially finished
apartments depending upon the value of the site. Then, the
construction is financed by selling the remaining potential housing
units or apartments to third parties against an agreed down
paymentll•30
29. Jacob L. Crane, "National Housing Policy in Greecell, Technical
Chronicles, (105-106, 1955): 50-54.
30. Diomedes D. Psilos, The Capital Market in Greece, (Athens, 1964),
p. 212.
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The volume of institutional finance for housing has been increasing
steadily in the postwar period. It has risen sharply during years of
expansionary monetary policy - notably in 1968-1973 (see Table 3.5).
The expansion of mortgage credit for housing, however, has scarcely
affected the non-speculative populat economy: such funds have been
concentrated mostly to middle-class recipients - publ ic employees being
again the more favoured social group - and have been directed to the
apartment market and perhaps to a less extent to more peripheral building
of middle-class houses (partly speculative, partly user-oriented).Jl
Table 3.5: Mortgage loans to households in relation to private residential
investment, 1958-1975
Annual averages in million drachmas, current prices
(1) (2) (3)
Private Mortgage Loans (2}:(1)
Residential Investment Funds %
1958-1962 5698.6 297.4 5.2
1963..,'}967 10548.4 1043.2 9.9
1968-1972 22345.0 5148.8 23.0
1973-1974 34254.5 4625.5 13.5
1975-1976 42118.5 7324.5 17.4
IINational Monograph", pp: 133-134; National accounts 1958-1972,
1973-1977; National Mortgage Bank, Annual ~eport 1979: C.P.E.R.
Housinn (1976), p. 12; See also General Appendix A.9.Bank financing
for hoGsing during 1948-1957 was insignificant.
Even after 1972 when the funds controlled by the limited public housing
programs (Workers Housing and the programs of the Ministry of Social
Services) were turned alttayfrom direct building and into a pol icy of
assistance based on personal loans, the role of credit to the working
class and other lower-tncone groups formed a very small part of insti-
tutional finance for housing. Whereas the latter as a whole (excluding
agricultural housing loans) amounted to 99,344 million drlchni3s for 1971-
1975, loans distributed through the so-called" programs for Social Housing"
32did not exceed 4,115 millions or a mere 4.1%.
31. For a description ef the various housing finance agencies and the
term5 under which mortgage credit has been supplied to different categories
of recipients up to 1972, see, "Nat iona l Monograph" (U.N., Le.E., 1973A),ch.4.
32. Center of Planning and Economic Research, Development Plan f0r
1976-80: Housi!l9..L_Reportof_ the Work Team (Athens, 1,976, in Greek),
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Thus, a personal system of housing finance has been a constant back-
ground condition of popular non-speculative building throughout the period
we study. The same held true for the housing system as a whole up to the
late 1960's. From 1968 onwards mortgage loans to middle-class households
have played an important role. To complete the picture bank financing
to speculative builders has been insignificant throughout the postwar
period due to monetary policy restrictions (see chapter 5).
Given these conditions, how was the precapitalist sector's operation
and growth afiected? Would a larger involvement of institutional financing
have been a positive or a negative factor? The answer to this question
depends on the nature of the housing finance system. In the case where. the
expansion of institutional finance has taken place earlier in the post-
war period in the form that prevailed after 1968, the effects would have
certainly been negative. The reason is simple: the past-1968 loans
system was strongly skewed in favor of middle-class groups and thus
funds were mainly channelled into the apartment market. The 1968-1973
building boom offers an obvious demonstration of the close association
between bank credit expansion and speculative activity.33 Such an increased
flow of funds into the speculative sector would not only imply a diminution
of non-speculative housing in relative terms: even if the distribution
of housing demand between sectors remained unaffected (which is unlikely),
the higher relative solvency in the speculative sector would certainly
cause an increase in the prices of land, materials and labour as well
as drain part of productive resources away from non-speculative areas -
an effect that would most probably include the more marginal category
of speculative capital that is normally part of the precapitalist sector.
Therefore the limited expansion of a system of institutional housing
finance of the kind observed in the 1968-74 period has certainly been
a positive factor vis-a-vis the precapitalist sector. We can say that
this limited expansion can be understood as an instant of a wider pattern
pp. 18-19. It should be noted,however, that the role of Worker's loans grew
in relative volume after 1975. See, National Mortgage Bank, Annual Report
1979 (Athens, 1980). An additional factor making for the limited diffusion
of credit is the fact that the role of insurance companies, institutions
that are major suppliers of housing credit in advanced countries, has been
extremely limited in Greece. See, Psilos, The Capital Market, pp. 204-209.
33. For a more detailed econometric examination of the effects of
credit, see chapter 6.
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of relative autonomy of the precapitalist sector's resources from the
middle-class/capitalist system of relations which was essential for its
operation. This autonomy or lack of negative controls and pressures was
not evidenced in this case at the level of the immediately involved factor,
i.e. popular savings: these would have been left outside a middle-class -
oriented system of finance anyway. The effects of first the lack and then
the presence of institutional finance were felt through its influence on
speculative activity.
Let us consider, however, the more interesting case where institu-
tional finance of housing does cover a substantial part of the social
strata traditionally housed within the precapitalist sector. Had such a
system - say, a combination of State-supported credit and popular
savings and loans institutions - existed in postwar urban areas, what
would its effects be in comparison to the prevailing system of
autonomous personal financing? Popular savings and loans associations
of the type, for instance, that has been promoted by international agen-
cies in Latin America during the 1960's, are not necessarily inconsistent
with self-help, non-speculative housing production.34 The spontaneous
growth of building societies in the late eighteenth and the first half of
the nineteenth century in England as part of the cooperative movement
shows, in addition, that some form of such savings associations answers
real needs fo~ collective self-help among the urban working class.35
Popular savings institutions coupled with a low-incorne-oriented appli-
cation of the Greek legal framework for building cooperatives may have
had effected a badly needed rationalisation and achieved substantial
economies of scale in Greek popular owner-building. Moreover, widespread
organisation of savings and easier su~ply of credit would most probably
increase th~ elasticity of non~speculative building in relation to popular
owner-occupation demand.
34. See, Abrams, Manis Struggle for Shelter, pp. 151-154
35. These early "terminating" builcing societies. however, did not
survive the financial context of the late nineteenth centul-Y. They were
replaced by "permanentll societies which increasingly resembled banks
rathzr than cooper~tive institutions and which catered more for the
middle classes. The story is well-known. For short accounts, see,
M. Boddy, The Building Societies (London, 1980), ch. 1 and Adela Adam
Nevitt, Housing Taxation and Subsidies (London, 1966): chapters 2 and 3.
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Thus, under the right conditions, widespread institutional finance of
popular housing may have had enhanced the role of non-speculative building,
though it would have certainly transformed its character. The emergence
of such a pattern, however, is very unlikely. Even in unregulated capital
markets, initially popular savings and loans institutions tend to be
transformed or integrated into the capitalist banking system. This implies
a trend towards concentration of building finance capital and a bias in
favour of commodity relations (most notably through an emphasis on the
marketability of the mortgaged property) that is conducive to the expansion
of the speculative housing mode. Such tendenc~es would certainly be
stronger in a highly organised oligopolistic financial system and a policy
context with an emphasis on capitalist modernisation such as the one
prevail ing in postwar Greece. From areal istic comparative and historical
viewpoint then, the lack of institutional financing has most probably
been a positive factor for the existence and growth of a widespread .
precapitalist sector. It is ironic that this state of affairs is largely
the effect of the very oligopolistic character of the Greek banking
system. The need for new popular savings and loans institutions has
been repeatedly stressed by economists concerned with the modernisation
of the capital market.56 The large commercial banks, however, have
always shown a strong resistance to any policy that might drain away
a significant part of the savings usually deposited there.5?
4.b. Requirements for capital in housing production and the limited
modernisation of land and building controls
For the precapita 1ist mode, however, the ava ilable choices between
forms of finance are less important than the relative autonomy from
the requirements of capital itself. And this is linked with the very
structure of the residential production process. The autonomy of pre-
capitalist o~mer-building from the requirements of accumulated money-
capital is based, in the last analysis, on the fact that the production
36. Crane, "Nattonal Housing PolIcy", and Psilos, The Capital
Market, p. 214.
37. This explanation is advanced by Abrams for the case of Latin
American countries (Man's Struggle for Shelter, p. 152).Psilos (The
Capital Market, p. 215) argues along similar lines in relation to the
same phenomenon in postwar Greece.
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of housing is organised lIinformallyll, piecemeal, and on a small-scale
way. Capital costs for single-family houses - for construction or land -
are distributed over a number of years: the houses are formed in stages,
on land that has been bought much earlier at a price substantially
lower than the development value it would have acquired were the area
more developed. Of equal importance is the fact that in most cases of
low-income areas the development of public infrastructure and services
is gradual and foll~s residential growth. If such peripheral development
was more organised, proceeding by the building of whole clusters of units
fully supplied with services, the need for initial capital would obviously
be much higher. An analogous argument can be made for the economic advanta-
ges, in terms of the need for capital, in the case of the incremental
building of houses themselves: these advantages are amplified when the
end-product involves more than one dwelling as is commonly the case
in popular areas where building on an owned plot is aimed at the needs
of extended families, the construction of a worKshop or even of a few
rooms to let.
These IIpeculiarities" of the precapitalist housing process are more
a matter of the role of public controls over residential development than
ones of simple economic choices. When some variant of urban modernisation
policies imposes strict modern norms on residential production, more
specifically ones necessitating planned development and houses conforming
to relatively high standards, the need and cost of capital becomes
prohibitive for most law and middle-income households. In addition, such
modernisation will certainly increase tne share of overheads and payments
for professional services. Total avoidance of such costs ;s found, of course
only in the more primitive forms of urban housebuilding: even simple
cases of single-family housing in Greek cities necessarily involve some
payments for professional services, taxation, social insurance etc.,
though it is important to remember that even these have been avoided
by illegal building which forms a substantial part of the precapitalist
sector.
It could be countered that to the degree that modern planning controls
imply an increase in the scale and organisation of residential developments,
they would be beneficial in offering an improvement in productivity, ratio-
nalisation and economies of scale. More planned development would also
reduce costs in the long term, and certa inly the cost of urban services
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from the public viewpoint. Although the first point is valid, it is not
as important as it is commonly thought. The few relevant systematic economic
studies point to the fact that economies of scale in housing are limited;
more importantly, they are mainly effective within a aapitaZist framework
since most of the economies concern managerial and financial costs.58 The
second point is wholly justified but largely irrelevant from the viewpoint
of the narrow and short-term interests of individual households with limited
resources and immediate needs. The pressing concern of the latter is to
reduce their dependence on the need for f inar.ce inherent in the nature
of housebuilding. Regardless of more long-term and public-minded evaluations~
the fact is that the lack of modern public controls - aimed towards urban
planning or modernisation of housing - is the basis for an autonomy from
capital and thus organically related to the reproduction of the precapf taltst
housing economy. Incremental, uncontrolled, and "informal" ways of resi-
dential development are clearly more suited to the personal and family
'1· t' l' t t 59resource utl lsa lon among OW-lncome s ra a.
Thus, a limited social and geographical range of public control over
financial resources and/or the organisation of residential development
should be considered as an essential aspect of the socia-economic founda-
tions of precapitalist housing. Such conditions are in the last analysis
a further case of the relative autonomy or isolation from modern-capitalist
relations. In this we assume than an increased application of "modern"
rules, planning processes and administrative controls, would follow the
norms established by capitalist institutions, the market and the middle
class, thus promoting the spread of speculative or modern-capitalist enter-
prises and analogous social relations. Such an assumption is only reasonable:
58. See, G.T. Jones, Increasing Returns (Cambridge, 1933), Maised.
Housebuilding in Transition, Grebler, Large Scale Housing and Real Estate
Firms.
59. This fact has been recognised by students of squatter housing. We
should add as similarly important the avoidance by squatters of rent-
payments achieved through the decision (and opportunity) to stay for long
periods in an undeveloped property. See, J.F.C. Turner, "The Squatter
Settlement: Architecture that Works", Architectural Design,(3D,1963) :355-60
and "Barriers and Channels for Housing Development in Modernising Countries",
Journal of the American Institute of Planners (23, 1967): 167-181. It should
be added, however, that it is highly objectionable to limit such economic
facts to "squatter" housing which is after all a legal category: they
concern low-income owner-building in general. The point needs stressing,
since these purely economic issues have been obscured by an ideological
emphasis on the virtues of "self-help" and thus the (very questionable)
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After all, this was the secular trend in the housing systems of most
capitalist countries: application of even the more socially-minded measures
for urban planning and the control of residential development, has led,
together with other factors, to the extinction of the more marginal fonns
of simple housing economy (including petty-speculation) and their replace-
ment by more organised speculative production and modern-capitalist
enterprises, as well as integration into the capital market proper.
4.c. Construction labour and 'the structure of the labour market
The operation of the precapitalist housing mode is obviously associated
in Greek cities with the extensive availability of labour outside the orbit
of the organised capitalist economy. A relatively large supply of inde-
pendent labourers and the prevalence of marginal, small-scale productive
units has been a permanent characteristic of the postwar urban economy
as a whole - though a trend towards full employment and increasing inte-
gration of labour into capitalist wage relations could also be observed
after the mid-1960's.40 In the case of the construction "industry" these
relations were manifested in the elastic supply of independent construction
labourers and the prevalence of marginal petty contractors. To what degree
did this fact constitute an essential precondition of the extensive
reproduction of the precapital ist mode of housing production?
virtues of direct user's labour, and a liberal critique of Public Housing.
For balanced assessments of the economic value of IIself-help" see, Abrams,
Manis Struggle, pp. 173-74, and D.J. Dwyer, People and Housing in Third
World Cities (London, 1975): ch. 6.
40. This last point about the growth of capitalist relations in the
Greek (and more specifically in the Athens) urban economy requires some
clarification. It can be said that the capitalist sector - larger economic
units employing wage-labour, incorporated enterprises etc. - has grown
fastly in absolute size, modernity and social and economic influence.
Moreover, the capitalist sector in indust~d has exerted a determinant
influence on the urban labour market (most notably on the movements of
wages) through the effects of a number of "leadingll large industrial
units, in plastics, chemicals, basic metals, electrical machinery and
appliances, petroleum refining and non-metalic mineral products (of ~h;ch
the cement industries are highly significant in Greece). See, T.P. L1anos
and K.P. Prodromidis, Aspects of Income D;strib~tion in Greece (Athens.
1975), p. 86. .On the other hand, the indices of underdevelopment of capitalist relatlons
in the structure of urban employment as .1 iahale have shown a surpris~ngly
strong tendency to persist throughout the posh/or period. L11a L.eontldou
Emmanuel has shown that the share of the tiny economic un~ts (less than
10 employed) in the Athens economy as a whole, and the sr.are of self-
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Let us first dispense with an erroneous approach to the problem common
among students of squatter settlements. It is quite often said that such
forms of housebuilding are based on the user's own labour and that of his
family - they are "self-buil t" in the narrow sense of the term. By impli-
cation we are left with the impression that such labour relations are a
systematic aspect of squatting and similar types of petty housing production.
It is undoubtedly often true that most of the construction labour involved
is of this kind. Reproduction of this particular pattern depends on the
labour abundance characteristic of labour markets with high open or
disguised unemployment and extensive family labour. These conditions are
common in underdeveloped, peasant economies and quite often are a part
of their urban economy in the form of extensive "informal" sectors -
sectors of unstable employment, petty scale of production, low-income
personal services etc. Simple construction work is in general within the
range of skills of both peasants and poor urban migrants. Direct user-
labour, then, is qui.tenatural in such situations described by economists
as "dual" labour markets. The latter refers in short to the existence
of sharp differences in labour relations and wages sustained by the divi-
sion of the urban economy into an organised capitalist sector with rela-
tively high.wages and generalised wage labour organised into larger-scale
units, and a more "traditional" or "informal" sector of a petty-scale of
production, elements of household production, with consistently lower wages
reproduced by the continuous accomodation of labour surpluses available
at subsistence wages,41
employed labour, has remained in general stable, a fact that is also true
for the various economic sectors in particular. The same can:be'said for
more intermediate employment units(lO-50 employed). Though there are some
exceptions to this pattern they go both ways (see, Leontidou Emmanuel,
Working Class and Land Allocation). Thus, a case in favour of a thesis
that there has been in general a reproduction of a pattern of "polarisation"
in the modes of employment in Greek cities (as it is argued in the afore-
mentioned work) can be certainly made. Still, we cculd say with a fair
degree of certainty (and this is not the place to amass qualitative
evidence) that in the sense specified previously, the determinant influence
of capitalist relations on urban labour has been fastly increasing - more so
since the industrialisation and modernisation drives of the 1960's.
41. For a lucid statement of the concept of IIdualIIlabour markets and
the peculiarities of the supply and price of labour in non-capitalist modes,
see, Amartya Sen, Employment, Technology and Development (London, 1975).
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A "dual", primitive organisation of the urban labour market is neces-
sary for the extensive use of direct labour by the settlers themselves.
But this under no conditions can serve as a general point about the
essential foundations of the precapitalist mode of housing, mainly
because it would be extremely restrictive, as we argued in previous
chapters, to define the precapitalist mode as "production for use" in
the narrow sense of production involving the direct labour of the users.
Such a component may be significant for certain categories of housing
or periods; but it can not serve as a theoretical basis for a realistic
historical analysis. A precapitalist economy of "simple cOlTlT1oditypro-
duction" should not be understood as necessarily implying a so-called
natural economy, i.e. one where production serves the needs of the
immediate producers: it refers to an economy where capitalists as an
important class and generalised wage-labour have not yet emerged.
Exchange of labour services, contrary to the approach of most studies
of squatters, is consistent with the precapitalist mode. It is, moreover,
necessary since in housing construction tne need for specialised work
is essential.
Conditions in postwar Greek cities are an illustration. Direct
experience testifies that although they do some of the work themselves,
owner-builders have extensively employed and contracted others even in
illegal building which calls for maximum personal involvement.42 More-
over, the observed participation of users in construction work is more
circumstantial than systematic: it is a by-product of the fact that a large
part of the urban working class· especially rural migrants - is anyway
engaged, or has been engaged, in construction employment.43 Lastly, what-
ever the extent of direct user-labour in nousing petty-production during
the 1950's, the steady increase in incomes, labour demand and, signi-
ficantly, the changes in the value, modernity and complexity of the houses
of the popular strata, has undoubtedly diminished it. Thus, the role of
direct user-labour is rather secondary to the problem tnat concerns us here.
42. Romanos ("Illegal Settlements") reports incidences where construct-
ion workers imposed higher-than-usual wages and contract prices on illegal
settlers taking advantage of the need for secrecy and speed in construction.
43. ~;hereas in 1951 11.3% of non-migrants were employed in construction,
a share of 18.3% of employed recent urban migrants were occupied in the
same sector. B. Kayser, Human Geography of Greece (Athens, 1968. in
Greek), p. 116.
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What mainly matters for the precapitalist housing sector is the supply
of cheap, petty-construction labour in generaZ. In Greek cities, the
increasing approach to full employment and the growth of wages - for
which the high demand of labour caused by speculative building booms
played a part of equal importance with that of the industrial expansion
after the mid-1960's - has antagonised directly the needs of the pre-
capitalist housing sector for petty-construction labour, especially in
Athens and Thessaloniki.44 The negative effects of such developments have
been manifested both in labour scarcities and higher costs. Conversely,
and in answer to our initial question, we may say that the extensive
operation of the petty owner-building economy in the 1950's and early
1960's has been founded to an important degree on the relative surplus
of low-wage, fragmented construction labour characteristic of the "dual"
labour market and the less-than-full employment of the period.
Conclusion
The outline of the socioeconomic foundations of urban precapitalist
housing advanced in this chapter points to a number of historical forces
that, by their increased influence, may lead to the decline of the role
of such forms of residential production and distribution and the enlarged
dominance of the speculative mode, These are:
- Imposition of political controls that limit access to land and the
right to build; such negative pressures might also be effected through
a direct expropriation of land and built property situated within the
social and geographical sphere of the popular precapitalist housing
sector.
- Effective policies of "modernisation" over housebuilding and the process
of development of residential areas that cause a higher dependence on
capital and increased building costs and which, directly or indirectly,
44. A situation of near-full employment seems to have been reached by
1969-1970. This may have been true of even earlier years since the latter
time has seen the first signs of acute labour scarcities in a number of
economic sectors. See, R.E. Fakiolas, Labour Market and the Structure
of ~4ages in Greek Industry, (Athens, 1974, in Greek), p. 21. Wages and
the demand for labour were rising even faster in the construction industry
due to the 1969-1973 building boom. See, P. Cassimatis, The Construction
Industry in Greece, Center of Planning and Economic Research, Research
Study No 5, (Athens, 1976) p. 43.
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promote more organised forms of residential economy, beyond the capacities
of the popular socioeconomic system as determined ~y historical and
institutional conditions.
~ Increasing competition over labour and mater-ial inputs from sectors of
the modern-capitalist economy in general and speculative building in
particular; increased "formalisation" of labour relations and expansion
of larger-scale wage-employment; advances in the concentration of
capital in the construction industry and significant improvements in the
product ivity advantages of capitalist/speculative bui 1ding.
- Diffusion of speculative market relations over land and small property,
either in the form of a diffusion of higher development values and
invasion of capital in the social and geographical sphere of the
popular precapitalist sector, and/or increasing socioeconomic differ-
entiation among petty property owners. This process may involve either
a process of urban economic development in general and thus the spatial
spread of "nucleations" of high incomes, services and trade, or an
~
expansion of the speculative opportunities offered to small property
by policies of the State.
_.Diffusion of speculative value orientations among petty owners of urban'
capital and increased integration of the social strata that have tradi-
tionally formed part of the precapitalist housing sector into the
consumption patterns of the "normaltl market.
The issues raised by the last point, namely the role of values. prefer-
ences and behaviour patterns in the operation of the precapitalist sector,
have not been examined expl icitly in this chapter. We take it that
stability or change in these aspects should be understood more in the
sense of the formation in the ideological sphere of relations that are
essentially "fought aver" in economic and political processes and conflicts,
rather than as the resul t of processes of "cultural aeeimi lat-ion": In this
sense, these facters are an organic part of all the processes of change
outl ined above. "Still, they ehcul.d be treated as analytically separate,
since we certainly can not exclude the :mportant possibility of a determi-
nant role played by the cultural "hegemony" of the capitalist/speculative
system over the population at large. Thus, though we have mainly emphasized
in this chapter the role of objective conditions in the form of
constraints determined at the higher levels of the socioeconomic system '
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- the State and the capitalist/speculative sector - we should not under-
rate the ambivalent role that may be played in these social changes by
small property itself even when it is a part of a precapitalist social
.system of use-values and a family economy.
The existence of widespread petty ownership can cut both ways. As the
basis for the expanded reproduction of autonomous housing supply, extensive
land control (with the help of quasi-political mechanisms), and the
sustainance of widespread non-commodity relations, antagonises directly
the social system of the capitalist/speculdtive market. On the other hand,
every petty owner is a potential speculator and a probably investor in the
housing market in the specific sense of the latter as a system of commodity
exchange. The same way a small peasant may turn into a "kulak" and the
latter into an enerqet lc capitalist, social differentiation among small
urban owners may effect exten~ive spontaneous transformations within the
popular economy of housing. Thus, alongside the listed theoretical
conclusions and working hypotheses, we must also keep in mind that the
historically given system of petty proprietorship and simple commodity
production in Greek cities, in addition to having provided the basis
for a housing sector outside the rule of capital and class-biased
public policies, has quite probably been an important factor accounting
for the dynamism of Greek smaller-scale speculative building itself.
Given thiscontradiction, inherent in the conditions of Greek precapitalist
housing, and the fact that modern and improved housing conditions have
been associated with the speculative sector, it could be argued that with
rising incomes and consumption standards, an increasing share of popular
resources would tend to be spontaneousZy incorporated in the speculative
system. In the same line of reasoning, th~ major factor behind the
existence of precapitalist housing in the first half of the postwar
period has simply been the low level of economic development.
In this chapter we have implicitly rejected this argument: fisrt,
by'our critique of the dominant conceptualisation of illegal housing as
a residual phenomenon contingent on the inability to enter the IInonnalll
housing market: second, by establishing the importance of crucial lIobjective"
factors, namely access to resources - especially land - and relative
autonomy from constraining systems of relations; third, by arguing that
the existence of an extensive precapitalist housing sector is ultimately
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based on a broader complex of institutions, values and political
relations that favour a small-holderts family economy. In the next
chapter we will examine ·the validity of these alternative arguments
more explicitly in relation to the question of the factors accounting
ior the decline of the precapitalist sector in the 1950's and the
expansion of speculative building.
Expansion of the Speculative Sector,
1950-1974: Determinants of
the Structure of Housebuilding
We have seen in the second chapter that the share of speculative
building in urban residential production as a whole rose sharply in the
postwar period. Whereas, according to our calculations, petty owner-
building (one and two-storey houses, illegal building and extensions)
amounted to 67% of the volume of residential building in Greater Athens
in the 1950ls{1951-1958), its share fell to 56% in the mid-1960's and
39% in the beginning of the 1970's (see Table 2.6). Similar trends
were evidenced in the rest of the urban areas. Figures 4.1 and 4.2
(see next page) showing time..series of the volume of building by height
categories during the 1961-1977 period, make evident the extent of changes
in the sectoral composition of housing production especially in Athens.
They highlight, in addition, the fact that the really massive shift to-
wards the predominance of the speculative (apartment) sector took place
in the 196Qts - especially In the second half of the decade. It is under-
standable, therefore, that we should focus our analysis on the 1960's.
What was the mechanism of sectoral change in the housing system? What
were the determinants of the increase in the role of speculative building
in the postwar period and more particularly during the 1960's? A compre-
hensive answer to these questions involves a large number of aspects of
the postwar housing system at various analytical levels: social, political
and economic. These will occupy us in the present as well as in the next
chapters. In the present one we will examine certain accounts of the
transformation of the housing system that are based on the growth and
sectoral allocation of housing demand; the expansion of the speculative
sector, in these views, can be understood as the "natural" coro11ary of
the rise in household incomes and the diffusion of modern housing standards
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Figure 4.1: Private building activity by categories of building height,
Urban areas, 1961-1977
(permits for new buildings, volume in thousand m3)
s.eee
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Source: See General Appendix, Table A.I.
Figure 4.2: Private building activity by categories of building height,
Greater Athens, 1961-1977
(permits for new buildings, volume in thousand m3)
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Source: See General Appendix. Table A.l.
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that took place in postwar Greece.1 Our analysis will start from a critical
revision of such theories and will proceed in two stages: we shall show,
first, that an "integrated" model of housing preferences that channels, as
incomes grow, increasing numbers of urban households into the speculative
sector in a process of gradual "assimilation" cannot account for the pattern
of sectoral changes observed; we will argue, then, that a "dual" or "segre-
gated" model of demand allocation prevailed, and sectoral changes cannot
be explained without an emphasiS on the political and economic aonstraints
imposed on housing production and their differ~ntial distribution in
relation to modes of housing production and the social classes associated
with these. We will arrive thus at a balanced account of the determinants
of the sectoral change of the housing system in the 1960's, among which
the "extraneous" political-economic constraints imposed on popular pre-
capitalist housing have been crucial. As a result, the high rates of
economic development in the 1960ts and early 1970's have mainly favoured
speculative building and contributed to its increased dominance over the
Greek housing system. The latter point prepares the ground for the discussion
of residenttal capital accumulation and public policies in the wider context
of Greek postwar society in later chapters.
1. The trend of changes in sectoral structure'
The systematic analysis of the determinants of the sectoral composition
of housebuilding requires a careful breakdown of the postwar period into a
number of distinct sub-periods. The components of housing demand - demographic
and income variables - showed, in general, varying rates of change. Moreover,
the rise in the share of speculative building has not shown a uniform trend.
Table 4.1 presents the share of different "modes" of housing pro.duction in
the 1960's and early 1970's for the case of Greater" Athens. The share of
speculative building shows a small deaZine from the beginning of the period
to the middle of the 1960's Ca greater decline would have been observed
had we included 1967 with its pronounced slump in speculative building).
From 1968 onwards this share rises sharply. Even if our methods of measuring
1. This thesis has acquired the nature of a tacit assumption in most
discussions of Greek housing to such a degree that it is virtually impossible
to find an explicit formulation. It is most frequently found, of course , in
official accounts of the improvement and modernisation of housing conditions.
For a similar viewpoint from a far-left stand. see Arachovi tf s, "The
Nasta 1gia of Imperfect CorrnnodityProduction".
150
the volume of illegal activity and extensions on existing buildings (see
chapter 2) lead to a certain overestimation of speculative building in 1961,
these are similarly applied in the case of the mid-1960's and, therefore,
the fact of the stagnation or even fall of the share of speculative
building between 1961 and 1967 cannot be questioned.2
This deviation from the broader postwar pattern of speculative expansion
took place despite the fast exponential growth of speculative building from
the early 1950's to the early 1970's (save short-term fluctuations). It
thus reflects changing patterns in the housing system as a whole or the
effects of forces applied specifically on the non-speculative sector.
By breaking down the two main types of building presented in Table 4.1
into their significant components, a more complex pattern is revealed:
though the suppression of illegal building after 1968 is the major factor
behind the stagnation of petty owner-building during 1965-1971, there is
a drastic drop in the rate of growth of authorised owner-building, too.
The latter, in contrast, grew during 1961-1965 at rates similar to those
of speculative building. In the case of speculative building, it is clearly
evident that the relatively slow growtn during 1961-65 reflects the trends
in apartment Duilding: the intermediate, small-scale sub-sector grew at
record rates. It slowed down, however, to half of these rates during 1965-71,
whereas apartment bull ding took an upswing. We can not make a simil arly
detailed analysis. for the 1950's. We Knows however, that one-third of
residenti.al building in Athens during 1951-58 was speculative production
(see Table 2.6, Chapter 2}. The snare of the speculative sector, thus,
has rfsen fastly in the second half of the 1950's and after 1967; in the
intermediate years precapitalist nousing production advanced at similar
or higher rates,
Having specified the complex pattern of changes that t10k place in the
postwar period, we may turn to the problem of explanation. We will restrict
our analysis to the case of Athens , This is necessary mainly for reasons
of data avat labil ity: the formulation of a systematic rr.odelof the mechanism
of sectoral change requires a multitude of variables that can be constructed
only in the case of Athens. We have already utilised the rich material
2. It should be remembered that our estimates of illegal activity in
Chapter 2 were based on the number of illegal dwellings built annually. This
neglects the probably substantial amount of illegal additioY.3 to exiS1.:ing
unauthorised structures. In this respect, our estimates of the volu~e
of precapitalist housing production are conservative.
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available for the capital to explore the social and spatial corollaries of
the different modes of housing production (see chapter 2). We will return
to these aspects in the following discussion.
Table 4.1: Sectoral composition of private residential building: Athens,
1961-1971
"Mode" of housing
production
1961 *.'1965 1971*
(volume in thousands m3)
Annual growth rates
1961-65 1965-71
1. Petty Owner-
Building
One, two-storey,
extensions, ille-
gal housing, of
which, 1ega1:
2. Speculative
Building
of which
- Intermediate,
Small-scale
(three, four-
storey)
- Apartment Building 3,256
(five-storey and (39%)
·higher)
4,543
(54%)
3,712
3,838
(46%)
.582
(7%)
7,112
(56%)
5,373
5,692
(44%)
1 340
(1Q%1
4,352
(34%) .
7,249
(39%)
11,285
(61%)
2 740
(15%1
8,545
(46%)
11.8% 0.3%
10.3% 12.1%
23.2% 12.6%
7.5% 11.9%
Total of which,
legal building
8,381
7.550
(90%)
12,804
11,065
(86%)
18.534
18,534
(100%)
11.2% 6.3%
Source: Tables 2.2, 2.5, Chapter 2, 1964 Yearbook, NSSG, General Appendix
A.l, A.4. For the method of estimation, see Chapter 2. (*): The
estimates for the years 1965 and 1971 are averages of three-year
periods: 1964-66 and 1970-72. Since no significant fluctuations
occurred in the beginning of the decade (see Figure 4.1) no such
average was used for 1961.
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2. Formulation of the problem
In the effort to explain the pattern of postwar changes in the housing
system - particularly those that took place in the 1960's - a purely
"political" argument suggests itself immediately: the parallel occurrenCE!
of fast growth in speculative building and a stagnation of precapitalist
forms seems to be the product of specific policies of differentially
applied control and encouragement. The suppression of illegal building
after 1967 with its wider effects in diminishing popular access to land,
coupled with building codes and credit policies that boosted speculative
developments, make this argument highly attractive. There is, as we will
show, a great deal of truth in this. However, as a matter of methodolo-
gical principle such an argument should be counterposed to a second alterna-
tive hypothesis: namely that the pattern of housing change can be explained
by factors lIendogenousll to the housing system when the latter is conceived
as a semi -closed system with equil ibrium of supply and demand in the medium
and long run. The first, "non-equ+l ibr-tum" hypothesis, however appealing
at first glance, could be effectively refuted or drastically diminished
in importance, if we show tnat the standard socioeconomic and demographic
determi'nants of housing demand can account for tfle largest part of changes,
leaving only an i.nsigni:ficant residuum of "unexplained" variation attribut-
able presumably to ad hoc factors such as "politics". In the following we
wi.ll check the validity of these two tfieoretical al terna t ives , We have to
examine, therefore, the extent to \a/hichthe postwar changes in the structure
of housing production can De explained oy a simple model of the interplay
of demographic growth. income cflange, and the pattern of income distribu-
tion; a model, that is, of the growtfi and allocation of housing demand.
\-[eknow that the differentiation of the system of housing production
into speculative apartment building and precapitalist petty owner-building
with intermediate forms in-between, is correlated directly with the social
class structure (see.chapter 2J. The apartment market is mainly associated
wtth middle and upper occupational strata. What is the nature of this
association? The answer that is most commonly offered stresses the import-
ance of household income levels measured in absolute terms: the extent
of speculative building depends on the size of the market of houses having
a price (or rental value} that exceeds a certain level. The tendency, after
all, of speculative builders to be concerned almost exclus-ively with higher-
income demand is a commonplace in the history of cap-italist cities. We have
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thus the general hypothesis that the share of the speculative sector is
determined by the share of the "substantial incomes" sub-market in total
housing demand. Fast urban growth and economic development, therefore, will
lead to a steady expansion of speculative building in absolute as well as
in relative terms. The bench-mark of minimum "substantial income" that
permits lIentry" to this sub-market depends, obviously, on the socially
defined standard of "nonnal" housing in this particular sector and the
trend of housing costs: rising relative costs (that overshoot, that is,
the general inflation rate) will act negati1ely on the expansion of this
sub-market. As a matter of fact, both of these "exogenous" parameters
remained fairly stable for the period we examine: the standards of the
average apartment unit have not changed significantly and house rents
and construction costs moved in step with the general price index, at
least for the most relevant part of the period: 1958-1971 (see Appendix
6.!). Starting, thus, from a case year and observing the movement of the
income-level (or rent-level) that determines the range of the speculative
sub-mark.et and estimating the growth in the number of households with such
incomes we may arrfve, presumably, at a systematic "prediction" of the
sectoral composition of housebuilding and, more specifically, of the
expansion of the'speculative sector. This then can be checked against
the observed trends.
Although such a theory appears self~evident, however, it involves
a number of complex and questionable assumptions witb regard to the
prevailing pattern of,allocation of housing demand and the system of
housing production. It assumes an integrated system of housing preferences
as well as an integrated system of housing production. "Integrated" in
these two senses means shortly the following: firs~all socioeconomic
groups have a common scale of preferences that places a high value on
the housing situations (areas and types of housing) associated with
the more comfortable middle class; second, such improved housing situations
are supplied exclusively by the speculative mode. As a result, with the
growth in real incomes an increasing spectrum of socioeconomic groups is
assimilated into the more highly valued and "modern" sector \t/hichis the'
speculative one. In the preceeding chapters, however, we have offered ample
.evidence that makes the val idity of such an "integrated" model highly
questionable. The "dual" system of housing production and its relationship
with the class structure and the urban spatial structure suggest strongly
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that there might be considerable lack of "integration" both in the system
of the flow of household reso~rces, as well as in the'system of values
and preferences. Thus, an alternative "dual-segregated" model of the allo-
cation of housing demand must also be considered in order to arrive at a
valid understanding of the role of income and population growth in sectoral
change. This complicates substantially the formulation of the problem we are
examining. We must answer the following set of interconnected questions:
a. To what extent has the expansion of the speculative sector been the
result of "exogenous" factors (mainly political) that encouraged speculative
building and hindered precap1talist building? This requires an examination of:
b. To what extent does tne growth and allocation of housing demand,
assuming supply-demand equilibrium, account for the postwar changes in
sectoral composition? This, in turn, requires examination of:
c. What ;s the cftaracter of the system of allocation of housing demand
between different Ilhousing situations" in tne postwar period, what changes
took place in this respect, and how have these affected the rate of
speculative sector expansion:
In tha following 5ections we will De occupied with the construction of
a model that can help answer questions (b) and (c).
3. A model of ~n integrated housing system
The analysis of the growth and allocation of housing demand as a
determinant of the structure of housing supply can be approached with the
help of a simple model presented graphically in Figure 4.3. let us assume
a pyramidal pattern of stratification described in Figure 4.3 by triangle
TUB where ~~ ;s the number of households in income bracket dY~ Y
is household income and N is the total number of households. Since we are
dealing with a model of housing deman~the concept of "income" employed is
the one relevant for the determination of housing expenditure. Most theor'ies
of household behaviour stress the fact that current income should be rejected
as a determinant in favour of some concept of "normal" income er the stru-
cturally determined resources of a household which abstracts from transitory
or random influences 011 income.3"Normal"income is determined by differentials
3. Muth has consistently argued in favour of Milton Friedman's concept
of "permanent" or "expected" ir.come. This is measured by the we iqhted
average of the cut'rent disposable income of previous years, the most
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recent receiving greatest weight (Muth, "The Demand for Non-Fann Housing"
in A.C. Harberger (ed). The Demand for Durable Goods (Chicago, 1960). See
also, M. Reid, Housing and Income (Chicago, 1962). An alternative operation-
alisation of structurally determined household·income frequently used in the
analysis of consumption is the total of a household's expenditures. See,
for instance, J. Crocket, Co~sumption Expenditures and Incomes in Greece
(Athens, 1970, in Greek). A theory of the consumption function opting
·for total-household resources (current disposable income plus personal
wealth) as a theoretically preferable alternative can be found in M.B.
Johnson, Household Behaviour: Consumption, Income and Wealth (London, 1971):
Chapter 6. See also note 1 in Chapter 6.
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between occupational categories, differentials in skill and education and
the distribution of wealth and ownership of means of production. These
factors divide the population into a number of class-categories according
to their "market situation", to use the well-known Weberian concept, which
determines their life-chances in economic terms.4 Let us assume then that
the stratification pattern in Fig. 4.3 is composed by an hierarchical
arrangement of such "classes". This implies that we abstract from varia-
tions caused by factors such as size of family or the stage in the life-
cycle of a household, which operate within a certain economic class. In
operational terms, the stratification pattern is mainly based on the
hierarchical ordering of detailed occupational categories according
to average earnings and the income from other sources (e.g. property)
that is typically associated with each category. "Normal" income or
structurally determined resources thus understood determine in turn
consumption expenditure for each household category. Given this assumption,
tha level of total consumption expenditure of each occupational category
defines its place in the stratification hierarchy in an objective manner
(which must be distinguished from a use of consumption levels as indices
of "status" stratification}. Let us assume for the sake of simpl icity
that pent expenditures - either in direct payment or in terms of imputed
rent in the case of owner-occupiers - are proportional to "income" as
previously conceptuai tsed , The pattern of "income" distribution then,
represents the d"istribution of households among rent-cZasses, and income-
level y in Fig. 3 denotes a corresponding rent level. Point B on the
X~axis denoted by Y is defined by the intersection of the incomemax
distrtbution line with tlie X-axis, whereas point T (1 . ) denotes them7-n
lowest income level. The area TUB measures tne total number of households
at any given time. Assuming supply-demand equilibrium and an insignificant
4. For Max Heberts concept 'of "market-situationll as the economic
determinant of "class-situation", see H.H. Gerth & C. Hright Mills (eds)
From Max Weber (London, 1970), pp. 181-183. See also the discussion in
Emrys Jones and John Eyles, An Introduction to Social Geography (London, 1977):
145-149, which is explicitly related to housing, N. Wiley "America's Unique
Class Politics: The Interplay of the Labor, Credit and Commodity ~~arkets",
in H.P. Dreitzel (ed) Recent Sociology, vall (London, 1969): 188-213, and
chJpter 6 in this study. I have not come across any study pointing out the
strong affinity between Weberts "market situation" and "life changes" and the
modern economic concept of "normal income" and household "resources". This
obvious affinity opens up Hays for integrating urban class-structure analysis
with the enormous amount of research and theory on the income, savings,
consumption and wealth of households.
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amount of dwelling-sharing among households, the number of households equals
the number of dwellings comprising the housing stock. We have also assumed
that the pattern of distribution is described by a simple linear function
of the type ~ = a - bY (1) where ~ is the number of households (dwellings)
per rent-class. We may complete the formal description of the pattern of
distribution by defining Y. = kY where k is a constant. By integrat-m"l-n ma:x:
ing (I) and with the help of some simple geometry we ha.ve:
Total number of households = N c
aYma:x:
2
2C1-k)
a = 2N b = 2N
Thus the variable Ymax(henceforth signified by Ym) and the constant k
describe the system sufficiently at any given time. Let us assume that,
first, incomes grow annually by g per cent, a rate applied similarly to
all classes so as income differentials remain unchanged,and that second,
population (number of households) grows by_a rate n similarly applied in
a uniform manner. Assume, -furthermore, that all catecor ies of the housing
stock depreciate annually by d. The composite effect of these changes after
a year's time is presented in Figure 4.3..-Demograpbic change effects a
shift of the demand line AB to AI 'B. The effect of income change can be
described in either of two ways: points on the x-axis shift to the right
to points measured by Y(Z+g) and the intersection of the demand line with
the y-axis shifts to (l~g) , or, alternatively, the demand triangle
remains in the initial position TUB and the effect of income change is
registered on the position and shape of suppZy. Let us choose the second
alternative. The combined effect of income change and depreciation by a
rate d results in the shift of the supply triangle TUB (which at time
t equals demand) to a new position T'UI8'. The supply line intersectso
now the y-axis at point At where OAt = a i~~. The composite effect of
these changes can be easily inspected in Figure 4.3. Whereas demand at
time tl is described by TU'IB, available housing stock is described by
T'U'8'. The rise of incomes and depreciation make so that a part of stock
moves below the lowest rent-class of demand and is therefore abandoned:
this is measured by area TtU'IT. In the case when the new demand and supply
lines have an intersection that lies to the right of the lowest rent-class
of demand (paint kYm on the x-axis), we will have a surplus of supply at
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the lower class levels (area IGU" shaded in Figure 4.3). Thus effective
supply at time tl is measured by TU' 'GB' and the addition to the housing
stock necessary for supply-demand equilibrium by B'GB. This mechanism can
be generalised, of course, in order to provide the amount of building over
a period greater than a year given the initial number of households, the
increase in incomes and households and the depreciation rate over the same
period plus the assumption that the coefficient '~" of income differentials
remains stable. Assuming a constant ''k'' and a constant rate of demographic
growth "11." we can derive with the help of simple geometry on Figure 4.3
or with the formulas of integration for a linear function, the following
general expressions:
Total Demand for Dwellings ~ Dt = No Cl+n.)t (2)
Effective Supply = St = No Ct+n) t-l 2(l-d-k-kg)
9o-ar - Sq
(3).,
{1-k1"
N
New Building = Dt-St = Bt = 0 2(1-7<.1
In equations (2), (3) and (4) Dt, St and Bt are measured in dwelling
units; N is the number of households at the base year and g, d are annualo
rates observed for year t. Sq is area ru' 'G in Figure 4.3 and will be
zero or positive depending on the combination of g, d and n. Let us define
the coordinate on the x-axis of point G (the intersection of the new demand
and supply lines) as qY. S ,measuring the surplus of supply at the lowerm q
income 1evel s , will be positive when q ts greater that the constant k . The
values of q and Sq are given by the following equations:
q = Ct-d) (1+g) - (l-d) (1+11.)
{1+g)2 -(]+n) (1.-dJ2
2(1-dJ (1+gJ-(q+kJ (1+q)2
{q-k1 - - - - (1+11.)(2-q-k)
{1-dJ2
(5 )
NoS ;: -~-
q (1_k12
(6)
Let us approach the problem of sectoral structure by considering the
implications of the hypothesis that the range of the speculative market is
determined by a certain fixed value of a d\IJellingunit that is considered
as the lower standard, defined socially and economically, to which specula-
tive builders wi11 respond. This standard determines at any given time a
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certain range of income classes that lie above it and therefore a part of
the population that obviously expands as incomes grow and the standard
remains fixed. Assume that this income range is defined for the base year
by income (or rent) level Yo shown in Figure 4.3. by point C on the
x-axis and that Y = pY. Parameter P changes, of course, with theo m
change of incomes, i.e. Pt = Po/l+g)t. Triangle DCB describes the housing
sub-market relevant for speculative building at time t; this expandsoto 0' 'C"B at time t1• During the same period the housing stock previously
used by this submarket shifts to D'CtB'. In effect, only part of this
stock is currently available (area C' 'FB') and the rest (area C'D'FC"
shaded in Figure 4.3) is passed to lower classes of housing demand. Thus
the necessary addition to stock for the case of the speculative sector
is measured by area FD' 'BB'. This mecnanism is expressed in the following
equations:
N
(1 +n) t (1+g_p)2Speculative Sector Demand =D 0.=
a" t Cl_k}2 (1+g) 2
N
(l+.n) t-l
2Speculative Sector Supply = S t = 0 (l-d-p)Cl" (1_kJ2 (1_dJ2
Speculative Building
(7)
(8)
(9)
Powhere P = Pt-l = t 1
l+g) -
Given equations (9) and (4), the share of speculative building in total
building is provided directly by the ratio Gt = BC.J~Bt (la)
The simple model we have introduced shows that the sectoral structure
of housing production is determined in a complex manner by the combined
influence of a number of variables. Let us examine the particular influence
of each of these variables. In Table 4.2 we present a rough sensitivity
analysis showing the effect on G of a 50% change in each of the variables
and parameters of the system when the rest are kept constant. We start from
an initial case defined by .g = 0.03, d = 0.02, n : 0.04, p = 0.6, k = 0.2,
a configuration of values that,as we will see later, represents conditions
in Athens in the beginning of the 1960's. It is apparent from Table 4.2
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that p has the strongest effect on G. Thus, given the rates of demographic
and economic growth, the role of speculative building should be expected
to rise steadily with a speed that varies positively with the rate of
income growth since p" po/U·1-g;t-l. This influence of p is stronger
at the upper levels of the income hierarchy and diminishes as the
range of the speculative sector reaches lower income strata (an effect
that derives from the greater absolute change caused on higher incomes by
a uniformly applied rate of income growth). As it should be expected
theoretically, G ;s affected negatively by n and positively by g and d
in this order of importance with respect to the magnitude of the effect.
It is interesting that the income distribution parameter khas a positive
but insignificant effect. All the elasticities of G with respect to the
corresponding variable vary greatly according to the range of values
of the variable, a fact that signifies the complexity of the mechanism
that determines G in periods of change.
The model that leads to expression (10) has been based on a number
of assumptions. Most of them have been introduced in order to simplify
the formal structure of the model and have limited theoretical signi-
ficance. Certain assumptions, however, concern strategic aspects of the
structure of the housing system as a whole. First, we have assumed that
residential investment follows an equilibrium growth path determined by
the exponential (compounded) growth of demand. Since we aim at an empirical
check of the model, we must examine the realism of such a claim for
postwar building. This amounts to arguing that after smoothing-out
short-term fluctuations (say, by three-year averages), the long-term
path of building is not the product of a disequilibrium mechanism that
may have generated a "long wave" of building deviating from the growth
path of incor.1esand population. Such semi-autonomous "long waves" (build-
ing cycles of a duration between ten and twenty years) may be generaged
by protracted lags in the reaction of investment to changes in demand.
Long lags are frequently found in the analysis of residential invest-
ment and some studies have suggested that the familiar phenomenon of
long-waves (or long swings) of building may be explained by the mathematical
properties of certain investment functions with lags that generate endo-
genously an expl os iva oscillation5 (in the terminology of 'loSlarithimic
S. See J.B.D. Derksen, "Long Cycles of Residential Building: An,
Explanation", Eco10m~trica (8,2,1940): 97-116. The tradition nf studlesexplaining tne-cycli~fluctuation of investffi2nt on the basis of er.do-
~enous mechanism f'ormed by the structure o f t ime-Iaqs , goes back to the
inf luenti a 1 wcrk of J. iir.1bergenbetween the wars.
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functions) instead of regular short-term fluctuations. Exogenous changes
in incomes and population, then, serve as mere disturbances that set a long
wave of building going until the increasing di;screpancy between supply and
demand checks the process.
Table 4.2. Sensitivity analysis of the share of the speculative sector
in the growth of housing stock
1. Initial Case
g=0.03, n=0.04
d=O.02, p=0.6, k=0.2
Share of Speculative
Sector "G'
0.73B
Elesticity of G
dG/dV*
2. g=O.045 (+50%)
g=0.015 (..50%)
3. n=0.06 (+50%)
n=O.02 (..50%)
4. d=O.03 (+50%)
d=O.OI (-50%)
5. k=O.3** (+50%)
k=O.l (-50%)
0.B19
0.635
+0.22
+O.2B
0.629
0.89B
-0.30
-0.43
0.790
0.667
-o .14
+{).19
0.757
0.737
+0.05
+0.003
6. p=O.B (+50%)
p=O.4 (-50%)
0.433
0.92B
-0.B2
-0.51
Source: Our calculations from equations (4), (9) and (10).* The elasti-
city of G with respect to the corresponding variable is defined
as the ratio of the percent change in G to the percent change in
the variable.** For the estimation of G with a varying ,~" we have
assumed, of course, a constant "N" (number of households).
There are strong empirical grounds, however, for dismissing the
importance of major endogenously created fluctuations as determinants
of the path of postwar building. To begin with, petty owner-building,
as should be expected, does not show any significant cyclical behaviour.
Strong fluctuations are evidently an attribute of speculative building
(see Figures 4.1 and 4.2)." Speculative building, however, mostly responds
to demand for owner-occupation rather than to "business" demand for rent-
producing assets, We shall see in the next chapter that genuine rentier
investment in residential property which is by nature very sensitive to
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fluctuations in house-rents, is of extremely limited importance in Greek
cities. The main basis of new housing demand is the growing flow of small
household savings. The lack, thus, of a strong influence on investment
by the level of rents eliminates a possible important lag between demand
and supply. Moreover, the small size of speculative developments, the
short period of production observed in such building, and the direct
relationship between household savings and building expressed in the
sale of properties before completion, make for very short lags in general.
If we exclude the exceptional years 1967 and 1974 which were ones of major
political changes (the military coup and the fall of the dictatorship)
and were, furthermore, preceded by strong restrictions on building
(especially the latter), we can easily observe in Figures 4.1,4.2 the
existence of a very short speculative building cycle of three-year duration.
Permits for apartment buildings rise for two years and then either their
growth is checked or we have an a5s01ute fall. These short-term cycles
are easily discernible: 1957·60, 1960-63, 1963-66, 1967-70, 1970-73.
In conclusion. we may constder the trend in building from the mid-1950's
onward as toe expression of a gro~th path.
The second major assumption of the model we have presented concerns
the structure of the "housing market", The reader may have noticed
that the mechanism of allocation of demand and stock works in the
following manner. Income strata shift to the right C'Upll} as income
rises and the categories of housing stock mOve to the left ("down") due
to depreciation. As each stratum (or economic class category) moves up-
wards to hiqher rent ..classes of stock, 'it abandons housing which serves
as part of the supply for lower strata. Such a mechanism of housing
d~nand allocation may be called an hierarahiaaZZy integrated one in that
it impl tes a unified seale of housing preferences adhered to by all classes
and a corresponding hierarchical ordering of categories of housing stock
expressed in a spectrum of monetary v~1ues. The pattern of stock a11oca-
tion follows dtrectly from these principles, given generalised economic
cOmpetition and the rule of the criterion of rent-payinq abiiity in
determining who gets what. These principles of allocation have been
widely adopted as basic assumptions in models of the IIhousing market"
and they form the backbone of the wel I-known "filtering-down" model s.6
6. Certain ingenious models of the housing market centred on the
concept of the 'fi1ter inq-down" process can be found in L.H. Klaasen ,
"Some Theor2tical Considerations for the Structure ef the Housing Market",
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The latter, however, mainly refer to housing systems where the building
of new housing is concentrated in the middle and higher income markets,
with the impl ication that the stock that "f flters" down forms the pre-
dominant source of supply for lower-income demand. This amounts to a
system characterised by a hierarchically inteorated allocation of demand
pLus the operation of a one-sector system of housing production, namely
a speculative one. A pure IIfiltering"model, however, violates by its
nature the requirement of-eq·t.iil·fbriumbetween supply and demand and thus
differs in an important way from the model we have introduced. Unless
the socioeconomic range of speculative supply is very broad (in our model
the ratio p. y /y is very small or Y approaches Y . ), and the ratesa max e tmm
of population growth and depreciation are low relative to the rate of
income growth, the "filteringllmodel produces a shortage of housing for
lower incomes.? This is exactly wliat took place during the fast growth
of capitalist cities in the nineteenth century and is reproduced in the
exploding Third World cities of the postwar period unless a sufficiently
large precapitalist housing sector fills the.gap. Our model, therefore,
rests on a third major assumption, namely the existence of a IIdualli
system of "housing production with an important precapital ist sector ~ '.
capable of sustaining the equflforium growtli of housing stock. The
existence of a dual economy in Greek urban housing has been amply document-
ed in previous chapters and no insistence on this point is needed.
The operation of a dual housing system, however, has implications
that go beyond the mere fact of an adequate supply at the lower income
levels: it puts into question the whole rationale of the model we have
been describing up to now. This is evident on two levels: that of housing
production, and that of the distribution of housing demand. With regard
to the level of distribution we have assumed that lower-class demand will
IImoveup" in order to occupy the housing stock abandoned by higher-
in Essays in Urban land Economics in Honor of leo Grebler (Berkeley,
1966): 68-75, W.F. Smith, liThe Income Level of New Housing Demand",
pp. 143-78 in the same volume and W.G. Grigsby, Housing·Markets and
Public Policy (Philadelphia, 1963).
7. A similar point to the effect that the supply of housing for lower-
income strata created through the "filtering-down" process can suffice
only under certain favourable conditions, has been demontrated by Klaasen
in his "Some Theoretical Remarks". Klaasen's formal model of the housing
market has served as an important source of ideas for the one advanced
here. However, we have arrived at similar results regarding "filtering"
and the significance of the various variables, with a much simpler mathe-
matical formulation and one more suited to the problem of the determinantsof sectoral structure and change.
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income strata, following, that is, the rules of a system of IIhierarchical
integration" of housing demand. To the -degree that social strata are
segregated in the city this implies a substantial amount of intra-urban
mobility. The existence, however, of a widespread system of non-specula-
tive owner-building geared to specific areas and social classes and cha-
racterised by the economic relationships and values of household control
over land and housing production, will most certainly vitiate against
the undisturbeel operation of such geographical "integration". To this
we must add the primary influence of the social forces reproducing
segregation along class lines in urban space irrespective of the dictates
of the housing economy. Similar points can be made with regard to the
system of housing production. The model we have outlined assumed the
operation of a process of gradual diffusion of the speculative sector as
economic development advances, or seen from another point, a process of
swift assimilation of lower-class petty-owners of capital into the
speculative economy, the counterpart of which is the readiness of specu-
lative developers to expand the range of their activities accordingly.
In chapters 2 and 3 we have stressed the point that such hypotheses of
a process of "natural" assimilation of the socioeconomic resources of
the precapitalist housing sector should be viewed with scepticism. It is
imperative, therefo~e, that we formulate some alternative hypotheses
about the structure of the housing system before embarking on the empi-
rical analysis of trends in the sectoral pattern of housing production.
5. Alternative models
The formal model we have introduced permits a very easy consideration
of significant alternatives. In TaDle 4.3 we present a four-fold conceptual
scheme which determines four alternative theoreticai models of the housing
system. These models are, of course, "pure" types: the character of the
actual system may lay somewhere in-between two or more than two of these.
Th.e scheme is defined by two dimensions: integration at the level of demand
and integration at the level of production. Let us start from the second
one. When we have a case of "integration" at the level of production, which
we may call the "assimilationll case, the mechanism we have described
earlier applies and we have an expanding range for the speculative market,
i.e. a diminishing r~~ as incomes grow. The logical alternative is a case
where the range of the speculative market is fixed with respect to the
income distribution. in other words it is confined to certain soclal
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classes whatever the level of economic development. In this case, which
we may call the "dualism" case, "p" has a fixed value. Similarly, "inte-
gration" at the level of demand implies the operation of the mechanism
of allocation of income groups to the available housing stock in the
manner we have already described.
Table 4.3: A conceptual scheme of types of housing systems
Integration at the 1evel of distribution
of housing demand
(+) (- )
Integration Segregation
Integration at (+) Assimi- l.Model "A-I" 3.Model "A-S"
the level of lation B(AI)c B(AS)c = B(AI)c
housing B(Ar) B(AS}
production
(-) Dualism 2.Model "0-1" 4.Model "0-5"
B(OI)c = B(DS)c B(DS)c
BCDI) = BCAI) B(DS)
.
Lack of integration of demand, whtcn may ne called the case of
"segragation", can be defined as follows. Assume that there exist two
distinct sub-markets of housing stock that are assocfated with the
socioeconomic groups delimited by "p" (the boundary of the speculative
market) in a way that although the mechanism of hierarchically integrated
allocation of demand to stock operates within these markets, there is no
interrelationship between the two, as if they formed different urban areas.
The result is that the amoung of housing that "moves below" the boundary
of the speculative market is not available as supply for lower-income
demand and is effectively abandoned or demolished. This does not affect
speculative building; non-speculative building, however, (and total
building) must necessarily increase in comparison to the integrated
case and, therefore, the ratio "G" must fall. The amount of the necessary
additional building can be inspected in Figure 4.3: in the case of a
fixed "p" (model "D-S") it is measured by CKO'C' whereas in the case of a
diminishing "t" (model "A-S") by C"FD'C·. The combination of these
alternative cases at the levels of demand distribution and production
structure generate the four models in table 4.3. These stand in definite
relationships to each other. Model IIA-I" is described by equations (4), .
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(91 and (l0). Model "O-S" is its polar opposite. Model s "A-S" and "D-L"
are of intermediate nature having elements that are common to one or the
other of the polar opposites as we show in ta5le 4,3.
Having presented the equations that provide total and speculative
building for the case of the "asslmilation-integration" ("A-I"l model,
we may give the formal expressions of the alternative models with the
following equations that can De easily derived from Figure 4.3.
For the case of "dua11sm-integration" (model "0-1" 1.
B(DI) = No. (l+n)t-l [(l+n) (1_p)2 _ (1_d_p_pg)2] (11) and
a (1._k)2. (1_d)2 J
B(DI) = B(AI) where B(AI) is given by equation (4).
B(DI)
aG(DI) = ---
-p--p
B(DIJ
For the case of "assimilation-segregation" (model "A-S")
B(AS) a = B{AI) a where B{AI) a is given by equation (9).
B{AS) = No 2 (1+nlt-1 [u+n) Cl_k)2 _ (1-d-k-kgJ2 +
Cl-k) (l_d)2
+ pd [{1-dJ(2-PJ-pll,s
(1-d)2 JJ q
Powhere S is given by equation (6) and p = t l'
q (1~)-
(12)
B{AS) aThen GrAS) B{AS)
Lastly, for the case of "dualism-segregation" (model "D-S")
B{DS) = B(DI) where B{DI) is given by (II).a a a
B(DSJ= No2 Ll+n) t-l [(l+n) Cl-kJ2 _ (l-d-k-kq )2 +
Cl-kJ Cl-d) 2
+ p(g+dJ 2 [Cl-d) (2-p)-p(1+g l]+ S (13)
(l-d) J q
B(DS)
where p=p and Sq is given by equation (6). Then G(DS) = B(DSJa
Some additional clarifying points with regard to the hypothesis of
"dual t sm" in the formation of housing production are r.ecessary at this
point. The assumption of a fixed point in the income distribution that
operates as an effective boundary beyond which speculative production does
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not expand has real significance only after the margin of the speculative
market, moving "downwards" due to economic growth and incorporating an
expanding share of the middle classes, has reached this fixed socio-
economic boundary. This point has certain theoretical implications.
It would seem at first glance that under conditions of steady economic
and demographic growth, evidence of a rising share of speculative building
implies the operation of an "assimilation" model. As the previous argument
shows this is not always the case. Such a change may very well take place
for a period because of speculative expansion within upper incomes and then
stop because the overaz:L structure conforms to a "dualistll model. On the
other hand, evidence of stability or fall of the speculative share
irrvnediatelysuggests the possibil ity of strong forces making for a "dual"
housing system where modes of housing production have definite relation-
ships with specific classes and geographical areas within the city unless,
of course, there has been an important shift in the configuration of demo-
graphic and income variables that could account for the pattern observed
in the ratio "G" (as indicated by the previous sensitivity analysis). We
would, thus, distinguish in applying models 110_111 and "D-S", that value
of parameter "p" which refers to the segregation pattern (and which is
fixed) from that which refers to the boundary of the speculative market -
say 'p Ft: the latter is not fixed for the range that lies above income
cB·1eve1 pYmazo
Models 1 to 4 in Table 4.3 provide a means by which \ole may study
systematically the actual trends in tne ratio ,~,~in a way that evaluates
both the influence of economic and demographic variables and the structure
of the housing system or important transfonnations in the latter. Equipped
with these analytically determined theoretical possibilities as alterna-
tive hypotheses for the explanation of trends in the sectoral composition
of housing growth, we may turn no~ to the empirical investigation of
.postwar developments in Athens.
8. The reader may have noticed that the equations for speculative
building are in a sense incomplete. It is possible that '~" (denoting
the boundary of the speculative market) has a value at some time that is
smaller than "q" - the x-axis coordinate of the intersection of the demand
and supply 1ines given by.equation (5). In that case speculative building
should be increased by an amount provided by equation (6) for "Sq" when in
place of "k" we put '~". We have omitted this since such an occurrence
will be rather rare in a two-sector housihg economy. Still, the point
is necessary for the formal completeness of our analysis.
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5. The case of Athens in the postwar period
In an Appendix to this chapter (Appendix 4.1) we review the empirical
evidence of demographic and secioeconomic changes in Athens in order to
determine the trends in the variables relevant to the study of sectoral
structure, name1y the rate of growth in the number of households "n". ,
the rate of depreciation of the housing stock '~", the rate of growth
of rent expenditures "g" (real and imputed) and the values of "k" and
"p" • Such an analysis presents certain problems since it must achieve
a high level of precision for each particular sub-period of the time-
span under analysis: the study of changes over relatively long periods
such as decades does not suffice for the analysis of building over
particular short-term periods and certainly not for specific Years if
rates of growth are not stable. We could only estimate, however, the
rates of change for five-year periods over the two decades from 1951
to 1971: particular years were characterised according to the period
they belong to. We snould expect, thus, a certain degree of imperfection
in the data.
The parameter' for the pattern of "income distribution" (more preci-
sely, the rent distribution) "k", and that for the boundary between
different sub-markets "p" (which, depending on the model we use, may
be considered a variable) presented more difficult problems. It is
obvious that if we arrange groups of "structura 11y determined resources II
in a hierarchy, the resulting pattern may very well deviate from the
assumed pattern of a pyramidal distribution. By aggregating Iower income
strata we may approach more closely a pyramidal shape but significant
imperfections remain. In the case of Athens we found that by adopting
the simple triangular presentation we underestimate the number of lower-
class households and overestimate that of higher-class ones. Moreover,
the rent level of n;gher~class households tends to be larger than the
one determined oy a linear rent function (an exponential line would
be preferable for these higher~class levels). We do not thin~ hcwever,
that these imperfect ions affect the time-pattern of sectoral structure
significantly. The same can be said about the effect of changes in rent-
level differentials. We have estimated a ratio of J • J or '~" equalmen/ max
to 0.2 (a differential of one to five) and have accepted that this remains
constant over the period under study. These are very rcugh approximations:
we know, for instance, that during the ~ostw3r period substantia1 shifts
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in "k" took place (see Appendix 4.1). It appears, furthermore, that the
value of 0.2 is an overestimation as we shall see immediately below. We
have shown, however, in the sensitivity analysis that the influence of
"k" on "G" is insignificant: the distribution parameter is of much
greater importance in the determination of the absolute level of building.
These imperfections, thus, are of little consequence for the analysis of
sectoral structure.
The determination of "p" obviously presents great difficulties. Since,
however, we are interested in "explaining" the broad pattern of changes
in the sectoral structure of building, the exact value of '~" at the base-
year is of secondary importance. A rough approximation of "v?» when this
signifies the effective boundary of the speculative market at the base-
year, provides a sufficient indication of the extent of demand for
speculative building. The amount of building estimated formally with
the help of the model may deviate from actual speculative building. But
in terms of the time-pattern of the sectoral structure, this is imma-
terial as long as predicted demand and actual building develop in the
same proportional relationship. With these observations in mind we have
selected a value for "p" that is roughly consistent with the class stru-
cture of Athens and our observations about the correlation between modes
of housing production and social classes. We have estimated th.at"p"~
determining the boundary of the speculative market for the base-year
- in our case 1960 - has a value of Q.60. Th.is,given the distributional
pattern (k ~ 0.2) lies in the mid-point of the rent level spectrum and
divides households in an upper quarter and a lower three quarters. Since
this boundary also marks the division between the ntddl e and upper social
classes and the working class in the occupational hierarchy, we have
assumed that a '~" ~fO.60 signifies the point at which segregation
occurs in the non-integrated models of the distribution of housing demand.
The values of the parameters and variables we have estimated in
Appendix 4.1. are presented below.
1951-1961 n = 0.037 g = 0.03 - 0.033 d = 0.01
1961-1965
1965-1971
n = 0.051
n = 0.035
g = 0.035
g = 0.06
d = 0.01
d = 0.01
PC1951 = 0.83
pC1960 = 0.60
P"1970 = 0.366
k = 0.15-0.2 (common to all years), p = 0.6 (the parameter of the
pCtosegregation boundary), pc calculated from pCt • when pc1960=O.6.(l+g)v -
Total number of households: 1951: 361,100, 1961: 522,587, 1971:781,140.
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Given these estimates and using the formal models of the previous
section, we have calculated the levels of speculative building, total
building and the ratio '~ff for years 1971, 1965, 1961 and the period
1952-1957. The values "predicted" for these three dependent variables
by each of the four alternative models introduced before are presented
on Table 4.4 (next page) alongside the actual values shown on Table
4.1. Since the sectoral composition of building presented on the latter
table refers to volumes whereas our model-based "predictions" refer to
numbers of dwellings, we adjusted the former by using a volume ratio (for
the whole period) of the average speculative dwelling to the non-speculative
one of 1.25/1.0. This ;s admittedly a rather crude assumption (the ratio
most probably decreased during the period) but it suffices for the broad
comparisons we wish to make.
It is evident from Table 4.4 that the hypothesis of "assimilation" as
a theory of the expansion of the speculative sector cannot account for
the postwar pattern. If the speculative market expanded "downwards" into
an increasing range of socioeconomic strata as a result of income growth
and the diffusion of modern living standards, its share in building would
have changed at rates that are obviously much faster than the observed
ones. A similar point can be made in relation to the level of speculative
building in absolute terms. The housing system in postwar Athens, therefore,
ht'sa strongly "dual" character confining speculative activity within a
certain socia-spatial range, as we have repeatedly argued in this and
previous chapters. It is equally evident that there are very strong
elements of a "segregation" mechanism in the allocation of housing demand.
Indeed, the "dual ism-segrega tion" model appears as the most real istic
in terms of closeness of fit with the actual trends - certainly so for
the time-pattern of "G", less so for the absolute levels of building.
Though in overall terms the comparative validity of the lack of
integration at both the levels of production and distribution cannot be
disputed, the pattern implied from Table 4.4. is certainly more complex
and suggests a number of significant changes in the structure of the
housing system over the postwar period.
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Table 4.4: Trends in the sectoral structure of residential building in
Greater Athens 1952-1971: Predicted and actual values
Period/Year Model IIA-IIIModel "0-111 Model "A-S" Model "0-5" Actual values
1952-1957
n=0.194 (0.03)* G_48,726 G_48•726 G= 43,726 G- 48,726 29,000**-75.020 75.020 111.543 155,713 100,000
9-0.194 (0.O3}
d=0.061 (0.01) -0.65 :0.65 =0.44 =0.31 0.29
keO.lS p=0.6 (0.33)
PC'1951-0.83
~
neO.04 =0.035 G_19,83S G_19,108 G_19,835 G_19,108 15,60028,128 -28,128 31,474 42,785 38,000
d=O.OI =0.15
p=0.6 =0.70 ..0.68 =0.63 -0.44 0.41
paI960=O.6
(Q.46)
1965- G_28,OSS G_23,788 G_28,055 G_23,7BB 21,500n=0.045 -37,066 -37,066 -41,284 -54,796 55,000
g=0.035 d=O.OI
k=0.15 p:0.6 -0.75 =0.64 =0.68 -0.43 0.39
pa1964=O.52
(0.44)
1971 _48,210 _39,233 =48,210 _39,233n-0.035 37,00048,282 48,282 53,141 81,693 66,000
g=0.06 d-0.01
k:O.lS p=0.6 =0.99 =0.81 :0.91 -0.48 0.56
pa1970=0.366
(Q.6I)
q·0.320491
Source: Our estimates based on data from Appendix 4.1 and formulas (1)-(13).
Magnitudes refer to numbers of dwellings built. (*): The rates used
for 1952-1957 concern the 6-year period; the annual ones are given
in parentheses. (**): The estimates for the actual values have been
derived from the volume relationships in Table 4.1 (in the paren-
theses), adjusted with a ratio of the average "speculativell dwelling
unit volume to that of the average for total building, of 1.25/1.0.
The actual number of total new dwellings has been derived from
"National Monographll, p, 101 and the Construction and Housing in
Urban Areas (NSSG, 1962): p. 21. Figures for 1965 and 1971 are
averages for 1964-66 and 1970-72. All actual figures are rounded.
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1. During the 1950's, although the sectoral composition conforms to the
prediction of the "O-SII model, the actual level of building activity in both
sectors is substantially lower. With regard to total building this implies
that the extent of lIintegrationll in the distribution of housing demand over
the stock (and by implication over the geographical areas of the city) was
great in comparison to later periods. The housing system during the 1960's
and most especially during the first half, had evidently a much stronger
"segregation" component. The discrepancy between the predicted and the
actual values for speculative building may be accounted for in either
of two ways (or a combination of the two). First, it is only natural that
the level of speculative apartment building immediately after the war and
the civil war and in the context of a poor economic and institutional
environment, would have "taken off" at a slow rate. He can safely assume that
similar difficulties operated on the supply side for housing construction
as a whole, thus, making for a strong influence towards a greater utilisa-
tion of the available housing stock and, therefore, a greater extent of
"integrationll of demand and the "filtering" of stock. Second, it may
be argued that during the 1950's speculative apartment housing was effecti-
vely antagonised even within the market of middle-class, high-income
strata, by suburban owner-building. It should be remembered that the
upper social strata in Athens are predominantly housed in low-rise sub-
urban areas (see chapter 2); since the share of these strata in the
limited speculative market of the 1950's was large, the effect of such
antagonistic housing types on speculati.ve building should have been greater.
Moreover, the extensive legal "colonisation" of suburban land by the middle
classes during the interwar pedod and immediately after the war (done
mostly through cooperatives - see chapter 3) provided ample land for low-
rise owner-building during the 1950ts.
2. It is evident from T2ble 4.4 that speculative building achieved
predominance within the middle-class market during the 19601s. Even in
the early 1970's it had not expanded into the working-class market to
any significant degree. The level, moreover, of speculative activity
in the 1960's and early 1970's conforms with the magnitude we would have
expected given the nature of its clientelle and the trends in incomes
and population - assuming, of course, an elastic supply in equilibrium
with demand.S Thus, we should search for the factors accounting
9. A cautionary note is necessary here. In the model-based estimate
of speculative activity we made some useful but approximate assu~ptions.
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for the "anomalous" rise in the share of speculative building in the late
1960's - "anomalous", that is, in terms of the "dual" housing system -
a~ong the factors that determined the relative conditions of housing
production. and distribution in the tra~itional sphere of non-speculative
housing. It must be said, however, that the observations about the limi-
tations of speculative building in the 1950's made previously suggest a
strong possibility that even within the middle-class market speculative
expansion did not occur "naturally" but i~PQrtant changes in preferences
and/or conditions of housing production took place.
3. Save for a certain degree of change within the middle-class market,
the analysis summarised on Table 4.4 shows that up to the second half of the
1960's the observed increase in the share of the speculative sector was
the corollary ~f demographic and income changes. If anything, between the
1950's and early 1960's a parallel boost of the precapitalist housing
sector took place. This is an important result of the analysis high-
lighting the crucial role of systematic models as bases for evaluating
trends that may at first glance suggest non-existent major transformations.
It is evident, however, that such a transformation was indeed effected in
the 1ate 1960' s especially in comparison to the immediately preceding'
period. This, of course, comes as no surprise. The inspection of building
series and the drastic changes in policy after 1967 has made us familiar
with the fact of a major shift in the political economy of housing at that
time. The model-based analysis, however, serves as a useful corrective
here. On the one hand it shows the exceptional character of the period.
First, we assumed that the lower boundary of the middle and upper classes is
given roughly by a fixed point in the income distribution equal to 0.60 y
(p=O.60), given the "dditional assumption that k = Ymin/Ymax .,0.20 max
represents realisticaily the overall distribution (assumed pyramidal in
form). Second, we have neglected completely the role of middle- and upper-
class suburban, non-speauZative building - a limited but important form of
housing. The first of these assumptions leads to a certain underestimation
of middle-class speculative demand whereas the second to the opposite. The
fact that the model's predictions are fairly realistic (in the case of the
"dual-segregated" model) is due to some extent to the cancelling-out of the
inaccuracies that these two assumptions introduce. Thus, our formally derived
predictions should be considered as rough indications of levels of activity
and trends. A more detailed analysis with greater realism in relation to
these issues could be easily incorporated in the models. It would increase,
however, their complexity without adding much to the force of the argument.
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On the other, it demonstrates that the change was somewhat less drastic
than simple inspection of trends might have led us believe, or put differ-
ently, that although precapitalist housing production shows a strong rela-
tive decline, something like half of the increase in the share of the
speculative sector ("G") can be accounted for by demographic and income
change (compare the G'S for 1965 and 1971 in the "D-S" model and the actual
trends). An additional point of interest in this respect is that the economic
and demographic conjuncture around 1970 was such that it produced a certain
oversuppZy of housing stock at the lower levels of the income distribution.
This was rather insignificant in absolute terms (given q=0.320491, the
"oversupply" is estimated at 3366 dwellings for approximately the lowest
third of the population of 282,000 households), but points to a relative
supply-demand equilibrium for a substantial part of the non-speculative
housing sector and thus gives additional emphasis to the fact that the
economic and demographic conjuncture was favourable for a change towards
increased "integration" and a reduction of popular precapitalist building.
The fact remains, however , that the amount of precapitalist building
in the late 1960's and early 1970's cannot be understood in "equilibrium"
terms: there was obviously a drastic transformation of the housing system
towards greater "integration" in the socia-spatial process of the allocation
of households. The issue is to what degree such "integrationll came about by
a shift in Hie housing values and social relations of housing production
and distribution among the working class and other popular strata due to
economic deveiopment and "modernisation", or was a forced one produced
by political and economic constraints imposed on the precapitalist sector.
Our thesis is that the latter is mainly the case. We will turn now to an
examination of these issues.
6. The extent of "value-intt.'gration" in the housing system: Theoretical
assumptions
In our analysis so far we have distinguished b!o ways in which we may
speak of the "Inteqrat ton''of the housing system: integration at the level
of housing production and integration at the level of allocation of
demand. With regard to the first, we concluded that a process of substantial
expansion of the speculative apartment housing market into an increasing
number of social groups does not occur as a ccro llary of economic development.
Such a process has only taken place within the middle and upper-class market.
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With regard to the second, however, we found evidence of an important shift
in the pattern of housing allocation to the working class and other lower-
income groups during the late 1960's and early 1970's. This change had a
clear-cut expression in the geographical pattern of urban growth in Athens
as the analysis of the spatial distribution of population growth in the
agglomeration during the 1950's and 1960's presented in chapter 2 demonstrates.
Growth between 1961 and 1971 was definitely more concentrated in central
areas and away from areas of precapitalist housing production. The shift
thus towards greater "integration" seems to imrly a change in the pattern
of residential mobility of households as well as in the pattern of distri-
bution of newcomers to the city. Tne relevant question here is to what
extent such changes have been the product of constraints imposed on the
production of housing in popular areas in the peripheral quarters of the
city, or the outcome of shifts in the structure of preferences that
favoured the increased dominance of the market sector in geographical
and economic terms. In other words, was there a change in the pattern
of vol untary residential mobil ity (as opposed to forced mobil ity) that
signi.fies that the objectively observed increased "tnteqrat tcn'' had a
counterpart at the level of the integration of vaZues among social classes?
In order to answer this question we must examine mora closely the meaning
of "integration" at the level of values and preferences and its implication
for voluntary residential mobility in the context of the postwar housing
system.
We may assume that households distinguish.housing situations according
to the existence or lack of a set of discreet attributes which they value
and that they arrange these housing situations in an hierarchical ordering
of preferences. As incomes increase and households are able to spend an
increasing amount of resources for housing they "move up" along this
hierarchy. Households, moreover, place a certain degree of emphasis on
each of the attributes of a housing situation. As a resul~ they react
in particular ways when objective constraints increase the cost of attain-
ment of a specific valued attribute of a housing situation. We may speak
of "integrztion" of the housing system at the level of values when all
social groups show similar scales of preferences as well as the same
emphasis on particular attributes of housing. Moreover, we may speak of
"integrationll of the housing system from the point of a certain housing
sub-market of increasing dominance~ when the pattern of preferences and
emphasis put on housing attributes by the various social groups leads with
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economic development to an expanding share of this housing sub-market. What
was the extent of "integration" at the level of values from these two view-
points during the period we study? We lack the detailed empirical evidence
necessary fer a definite judgment on this issue. Given, however, the facts
of our broader historical and institutional analysis of the Greek urban
housing system and, more specifically, the pattern of development in Athens,
we may advance some realistic hypotheses. These will be supplemented by
the available empirical evidence on residential mobility and housing
preferences observed among different social classes.
Let us distinguish the attributes of housing situations that households
take into account in arranging the latter into a hierarchy of preference.
Let us , furthermore, advance hypotheses as to the social dt f'ferentt ation
of the emphasis placed on such preferences.
a. Households order housing situations hierarchically in terms of the
use-value of a dwe llinq unit, i.e. its size, physical quality and condi-
tion,and the availability of necessary utilities. We may reasonably
assume that households belonging to different social classes evaluate
this aspect in a uniform manner or that there is relative "integration"
in this respect.
b. Households order housing situations according to the economic or exchange
vaZue of a dwelling, that is in terms of the economic return that can be
realised on the investment that the dwelling represents or the capital
ga.ins that can be realised from a potential sale. We make the hypothesis
that middle and upper social classes place a substantially greater empha-
sis on this aspect or, in other words , that there is no "tnteqra t ion"
with regard to this attribute.
c. Households order nousing situations according to the sociaZ status
of the area within \'Jhich1 dwelling is located. The social status of
an area is determined by the average status of its residents in the
hierarchy of social prestige predominant in the society, as well as
by the existence of local services associated with high-prestige groups.
We make"the hypothesis that there is no integration in this respect, er
that worktnq-c lass and lower-Jncome households do not place significant
emphasis on this attribute compared with middle and upper-class ones.
d. Households order housing situations according to the Zocation of a
dwe lling in relation to the location of the major centres of employment.
We make the hypothesis that there is relative integration in this
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respect, or that there are no significant differences between social
classes in their response to the distance between place of residence
and place of work.10
e. Households order housing situations according to the type of tenUl'e.
All households prefer with equal emphasis owner-occupation in compa-
rison to rented housing. We thus make the hypothesis that there is
relative integration in this respect.
f. Households order housing situations according to the type of residential,
deveZopment within which a dwelling is located. Types refer to physical
attributes such as the height and land-utilisation of buildings. All
households prefer dwellings that approach the detached, single-family
type in contrast to the high-density, high-rise apartment type. We
thus make the hypothesis that there is relative integration in this
respect.
g. Households order housing situations according to the sociaZ l'etations
of controZ over land and residential development found in particular
modes of housing production and di.stribution. We make the hypothesis
that working-class households and other "popular" strata traditionally
associated with the precapitalist housing sector value autonomy and
owner's control especially in relation to legal-bureaucratic systems
and restrictive economic relationshi.ps, with significantly greater
emphasis than the middle class.
10. It is often assumed that the value of leisure time and thus the
subjective cost of the time spent at the journey to work differs among
socioeconomic groups (see, for instance L. Wingo, Transportation and
Urban Land, Washington, D.C. 1961). We rejected this assumption on the
ground that we have here an analogous case with other use-vaZue aspects
of housing for which we assumed common valuat ions, We have found, after
the completion of this study, that the assumption is realistic: in a
calibration of a lowry-type model of spatial allocation with 1971 data
for Athens, the emphasis placed on public transport time between home
and work varied inversely with socioeconomic status. Since the role of
private transportation makes for less actual travel time with increasing
distance in higher status groups we had in effect roughly equal valuations
of actual travel time. (Unpublished data from Research Project 80M03/1/19S0:
"Housing Market and Urban Development in Athens", undertaken by the research
department of the Publ ie Corporation for Housing and Urban Development
and directed by the author).
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To complete this list, we must add the component of economic cost
necessary for the attainment of each particular housing situation
differentiated along these dimensions.11 Cost would represent, in the
economist's jargon, a "negative utility" whereas the other elements
represent hierarchies of positive utilities. When the total of these
elements is combined with their respective weights into a composite
valuation of housing situat ions, we have an overall "pattern of prefer-
ences!! or a complex "utility function" that expresses the orientations
of the average household of a relatively homogeneous social category.
The behaviour of households, following exogenous demographic and income
change, is the product of these patterns of preferences and responses to
costs. The latter are in essence imposed constraints (unless we believe
in the fantasy world of perfect competition and general equilibrium). An
additional class of important constraints, however, are the clear-cut
restrictions in the supply of particular housing types, commonly imposed
by land-use controls. The actual behaviour of households, thus, which
forms the observed pattern of demand allocation and residential mobility
in the city, is the product of all these forces. The nature of the response,
however, to cor.straints in terms of the alternative that will be substituted
in the place of the constrained housing situation, depends on the pattern
of housing values of households and thus is an integral part of the analysis
of the distribution of housing values and of the extent of social integration.
These somewhat abstract arguments were necessary in order to derive
the concrete implications of our hypotheses about the distribution of
housing valuations. Assuming the validity of our hypotheses, we can easily
derive a number of conclusions. First, there was clearly no overall "social
integration" in the Greek postwar housing system. The patterns of values
over housing differed among social classes in significant respects, namely
with regard to the emphasis on o~merts autonomy and control over land and
production, the emphasis on the social prestige of areas and the potential
monetary (exchange) value of property. Given the systematic interrelation-
ship of such issues with the pervasive division of the housing system into
two different sectors, these discontinuities in the systen of va 1ues out-
'r'/eighedthe Significance of aspects where relative "integration" exists.
Second, ..../e can plausibly argue that the increasing domination of the spe-
culative sub-market implies the lack of voluntary integration in the h0using
11, Cases of r-esidential mob ility due to chances in family strccture
and size lie outside the scope of our analysis.
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system. This is obviously true in relation to the lower social strata.
The hypothesis, however, that middle-class households value non-apartment
types of housing as well as situations of higher control over exclusive
land property, leads to the conclusion that the expansion of speculative
apartment housing within the middle-class market was n?t completely con-
sistent with the pattern of housing preferences of these social groups.
This leads us to the third point.
If our hypotheses about the pattern of housing valuations are correct,
and given the fa.;t (to be substantiated further at a later point) that
non-speculative residential development faced increasing amounts of
imposed constraints and relative costs, we should expect that popular
strata would be drawn to a very limited extent fnto areas and housing
situations that were in conflict with their values and preferences. The
objective result would be substantial reduction in the production of their
preferred types of housing coupled with a limited forced "integration"
through reallocation towards areas with concentrations of available
housing stock. We should expect, in contrast, a definitely "easierll
assimilation of the middle class into the expanding speculative apart-
ment market, since such a process, though having in certain respects
the character of a partly forced integration (mainly in the violation of
the IIsuburban ideal"), poses no major conflicts with the middle-class
system of values and housing preferences.
We must immediately point out that this interpretation of the under-
lying mechanism of the observed increase in the lIintegrationll of the housing
system during the late 1960ls and early 1970ls and the concomitant shift
in the sectoral structure, can not be adequately substantiated with
direct evidence. We may say in its favour that it provides a comprehensive
and meaningful account of the developments in the postwar period as a ~hole
and that it advances hypotheses that are consistent with the historical
and socioeconomic characteristics of the "dual" housing system peculiar
to Greek urban areas, certainly for the years up to the midl1960ls (as
presented in chapters 2 and 3). However, some empirical material that has
a bearing on these matters is available and we may utilise it suggestively
in order to strengthen our argument.
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7. The empirical evidence on values and residential mobility behaviour:
Athens in the 1960's
All household surveys conducted during the first half of the 1960's
document a near-exclusive preference among all social classes in Athens
for single-family (and two-family) housing as opposed to apartments. This
attitude was especially prevalent in the case of lower strata. The pre-
dominant hierarchy of values concerning housing types, therefore, clearly
favoured peripheral owner-built housing and not the speculative sector
(see also chapter 2). This was not restricted to preference for a type
of housing in physical terms - though it was certainly related to a complex
of values for "suburban" family living:12 it was connected organically with
the reproduction of owner-occupation which in the context of the popular
household economy and its accumulated historical experience implied the
operation of precapitalist housebuilding and the ownership of a plot.
This can be seen clearly from the effects of the radical decline in the
role of small owner-building after 1967. The share of owner-occupation
among worker and lower-income households in Greek cities between the late
1950's and the mid-1960's has been stable at about two-thirds or more
(see chapter 2, table 2.12 and note 29) - a share that exceeded the
average share for the middle class. During the 1951-1958 period, when
precap t talIst owner-building was clearly the predominant form of resi-
dential development, the rate of owner-occupation was incroeasing despite
the low level of incomes relative to later periods.13 Evidence for 1974,
however , indicates a sharp change away from this impressively "egal itarian
12. It should be said that the term IIsuburban" used in this occasion
is to a great extent an anachronism. The values of living in detached or
semi-detached housing prevalent among popular strata stem directly from
two historical forms of housing environment: the village and the Iow-r ise
urban quarter - the "synoikia" - situated in the more peripheral parts of
the city. The latter can hardly be described as "suburbs" ("proastio")
which are usually areas with substantially greater amounts of organised
open s~ace and greenery, situated at some distance from the city centre
and associated historically with the residences of the affluent middle
class that could afford private carriages or motor cars. Since genuine .
"suburbs" in this sense were rapidly becoming extinct in the postwar per-iod
and the modern European-American concept of suburban housing had scarcely
taken root in Greek urban culture, the term "suburban housing" in this
context should be better understood in terms of location and physical type
rather than a c:ulb!'C4.l form in the m::>dernsense - though the aforerner:tion~d
historical and social patterns peculiar to Greek urban history mus t cer ta tn-
1y add to its mean~ng.
13. NSSG, Construction and Housing in Urban Areas, p. 28.
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pattern" (chapter 2, table 2.12). Thus, in both the objective and sub-
jective senses the high valuation of owner.occupation must have been
strongly interrelated with the valuation of owner-building and detached
housing, most especially by lower-income groups.
Let us now consider the evidence on residential mobility. Intra-urban
geographical mobil tty towards areas of higher status (in terms of social
composition and incidence of quality services) as a response to the
improvement of the economic condition of households may have been an
important fac~or in the growth of the apartment market. The latter is
concentrated in the more central zones of the municipality of Athens
and a small number of adjacent municipalities with a decisively middle-
class character and high levels of services. Such a process,' however,
was obviously restricted mainly within the social sphere of middle-class
and lower..:middle-classgroups. The postwar growth in incomes and the
drive for the modernisation of housing conditions has not produced any
tendency among popular strata to move towards areas of higher status,
save in a strictly local context~ To the extent that inter-generational
or life-time social class (i.e. vertical} mobility exists in Greek
urban society, it may indeed lead to moves to higher-status apartment
areas, though.the strong familistfc ties that are observed among Greek
socia1 strata wauld have most probably hindered even this factor.14
Given, however, the noticeable stability in the occupational distribution'
of households (see Appendix 4.1), a process of vertical social mobility
could not possibly produce any important snift in the geographical and
sectoral structure of housing production.
The available evidence on residential mobility substantiates these
points. Working-class and lower-income households in Athens during the
1960·s showed striking differences in terms of the form and amount of
intra-urban mobility compared to middle-class households. For one, they
showed a very small number of moves, no more than two in most cases.15
14. E. Crueger, after studying the 1971 data on intra-urban residential
mobility in Athens between 1965 and 1971, reports that only few cases of
vertical (social) mobil ity are connected with "horizontal II(geographical)
mobility. "Socio-geographic Study of the Greater Athens Area", Socio-
logical Study, vol. A, p. 283. .
15. A 1964 survey reports that between 60% and 65% of industrial
workers had changed residence throughout their lives only twice or less!
Such an incidence of mobility can be accounted in most cases by the
purely IIdemographicll processes of household formation. In contrast, only
40% - 45% of the administrative personnel in industry showed less than
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Furthermore, internal migrants tended to move directly to the zone of their
pennanent residence. In this they were influenced by the strategic role of
family networks in the move to the city and the fact that these networks
tended to cluster in particular zones. Newcomers to Athens thus did not,
in general, follow a certain path across the city as incomes and employment
conditions improved - in contrast to what is often reported for cities in
developing countries.le A certain centrifugal movement is, of course,
evident, generated by the drive for owner-occupation through the acqui-
sition of a plot in peripheral areas. This was weakened, however, by the
fact that substantial numbers of houses for rent were available even in
peripheral neighbourhoods, especially the older and denser ones, providing
a varied spectrum of housing opportunities. Mobility for reasons of improve-
ment in the form of accomodation could therefore remain within a relatively
limited radius.1? After all, the very character of popular precapitalist
residential development by petty building on an owned plot, especially
in areas urbanised by illegal building, permitted improvement of housing
conditions as incomes increased on the 8pO~ i.e. by additions on or
modernisation of the existing structure.
It must be stressed that these observations are based on evidence
collected by surveys done in Athens during 1964-1966 and on the material
on residential mobility between 1965 and 1971 provided by the 1971 popu-
lation census. They are therefore directly relevant for the period
during which an apparent "integration" occurred. We can say then with
three moves. It is interesting that these shares and the inter-class differ-
entials did not differ between internal migrants to Athens and Athenians
(G. Burgel, Lg_kondition_jLnjustrie~ vol. II, pp. 159-160). Similar
inter-class variations in the rate of residential mobility have been
observed in an Athens-wide survey done in 1966 reported in O. Zarnari
et al., "Sociological-Ecological Study of Greater Athens Areas", Socio-
logical S~udy, vol. A, p. 511.
16. O. Zarnar; et al. report that more than 70% of internal migrants
to Athens moved directly to the area of present residence ("Socio-
Ecological Study", p. 505). For a similar pattern and its interconnection
with the pervasive role of family networks in the migration process, see
L. Leontidou and D. Enmanue l , Life Patterns, Table e.9, p. 107 and Note 59.
For the contrasting pattern observed in Third World Cities, see F. Benninger
"Models of Habitat Mobiliiy in Transitional Economies", Ekistics, (171,1970).
17. Crueger reports t~at intra-urban mobility in Athens is in general
characterised by very short moves: only 17% of households moved over rela-
tively long distances while the rest is divided between those moving within
the sam2 local authority and those moving to adjacent ones (IISocio-geo-
graphical Study", p. 283).
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some certainty that status-orientated and type-orientated intra-urban
mobility across different housing market areas in the case of popular
strata was limited and followed a pattern that did not contribute in
any significant way to a shift of popular resources towards the speculative
market. Residential change aimed at the improvement of material living
standards was also a process that did not lead to inter-sectoral mobility.
This can be seen in the fact that the improvement in housing conditions
enjoyed by the lower-income strata during the 1960's was channelled into
areas of similar social character instead of being "siphoned" in any
significant degree to areas approaching middle-class/speculative market
char-actervBetween 1961 and 1971 substantial fmprovements in housing
conditions took place - relatively greater, in fact, in the case of low-
income and working-class households. A first indication for the latter
point may be found in the reduction of the differentials in average
housing expenditures along the social class spectrum (see Appendix 4.1).
It is also evidenced in the changes of a simpler index of conditions such
as the average number of rooms per person for the households of a given
class presented in the following table.
Table 4.5: Housing conditions (rooms per person) by occupational class
of the head of household - Athens 1961, 1971
Occupation of the 1961 Index of rela- 1971 Index of rela-head of household tive conditions tive conditions
Categories A,S,C 0.83 1.18 1.19 1.12
Categories S,E,F 0.59 0.84 0.91 0.86
Category C 0.77 1.1 1.21 1.14
All households 0.70 1.0 1.06 1.0
Source: See Note 18. For the categories see Table 2.12 in Chapter 2
18. Calculated from the cross-tabulation of Athens households by
occupational category of the head and level of housing conditions
measured by persons per room (1961 Census, Vol. VI and 1971 Census.
Vol. I). The calculation of averages involved some complex procedures:
the average household size by occupational category was taken from
household survey data (1957/58 up to 1974) and adjusted in the light
of the overal l average given by the 1961 and 1971 censuses; the housing
conditions estimates for each category were then calculated and..the-se
were adjusted so as to be consistent with the agregate data from the
censuses.
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If a substantial part of residential mobility for the improvement of
housing conditions had taken the form of geographical mobility towards
areas of higher socioeconomic character, the relative conditions in
working-class apeas would have lagged behind the relative conditions of
the aZass. In fact, the relative index of conditions for a number of
municipalities and communes of working-classllow-income character in
1971 (roughly sectors WI, W2 and PI in Figure 2.1.1, Appendix 2.1) is
very close to the index for the respective social classes: it is 0.84
whereas the class index (from Table 4.5) is 0.86.19
One of the effects of the "segregated" pattern of the allocation of
housing demand and the local placement of household resources in real
wealth as popular incomes grew, is the relatively fast expansion of
intermediate forms of residential production typified by buildings of
three to four storeys. This form of piecemeal residential development
was a vehicle through whtch a process of diffusion of quasi-speculative
relations took place. However, their growth in the more central locations
of popular areas does not necessarily indicate any significant prior
change in the system of social values and institutions that reproduced
precapitalist oMler-building. The relative expansion of the intermediate
sector can be accounted for by the predfctable accumulation of capital
among a part of popular strata and the certain attractiveness of specu-
lative development for small plot-owners given sufficient opportunities
which were bound to occur due to economic development and the rise in
permitted intensities of land use introduced in 1968~ After all, it is
only natural to assume the existence of a certain amount of "labour
aristocracy" fn popular areas as well as some demand for higher-qual ity
19. Data on housing conditions by geographic area were taken from
National Centre of Social Research (NCSR), Housing in Gree~e: SummarJL
Report, (Athens, 1977): Appendix (in Greek). This study utilised the
5% sample of households from the 1971 census. It is surprising, therefore,
that the overall average in the rooms per capita ratio reported by this
study - 0.791 - is substantially lower than the one we derived directly
from the Census data (Vol. 1): 1.06. Accordingly, the average reported
for working-class areas ;s very low - 0.666. I have not been able to find
an explanation for this discrepancy which, moreover, seems to contradict
other official reports which give an overall average in the region of 1.0
(e.g. CPER, tlousinq, 1976). There is no reason to suppose however, that
this difference invalidates the relation between conditions in working-
class areas and the whole of the city. These areas are comprised by
thirteen municipalities and communes: 30, 39, 47, 51, 23, 25, 3,15,27,
20, 13, 50, and 1, as numbe~ed in Figure 2.1.1, Appendix 2.1.
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rental housing for which small apartment houses cater. On the other hand,
the diminishing opportunities for the acquisition of a peripheral plot and
owner-building after 1967 must have surely contributed to a forced boost
of the demand for such petty-speculative housing. The effects of constraints
on peripheral owner-building, however, were expressed to a much greater
extent in the form of the increased concentration of-popular strata in
areas of older housing stock, high density, greater amounts of rental
supply and relatively more "mixed" social character20 - hence the evidence
of a greater "integration" in the allocation of demand noted in our numerical
analysis of alternative models.
It could be argued that a fundamentaly simi.1ar dynamic explains the
increasing predominance of the speculative mode among the middle class,
though we must add the crucial provision that the "preference pattern"
here and the orientations of speculative builders facilitated such a change
to a much greater extent. Undoubtedly, after the mi.d-1960's apartments
became a de facto social norm for the middle class. Apartment housing areas
in Athens by virtue of location (centrality) and social composition display
a very high level of quality services. Tnis fact in conjunction with the
well-corroborated assumption that middle-class households place greater
emphasis on status considerations and luxury consumption as incomes grow,
and the evidence of the higher incidence of intra-urban mobility among
these groups, suggests strongly that the integration of the middle class
into the speculative market was mainly the result of expressed preferences.
On the other hand, our hypotheses about housing values and residential
mobility, especially the universal preference for detached owner-built
housing, point to a significant component of forced "integration" even
in this case. In addition, the availability of quality services and
housing stock of improved standards may be subsumed under the physicaZ
(use-value) attributes of the composite entity "housing services". The
shift to areas providing such services as aspirations increase with growing
incomes may therefore imply a partially forced choice if alternative opportu-
nities, preferred more, are not available. In contrast to sinple forms of
20. Lila leontidou Emmanuel has examined the changes in the distribution
of the industrial working class between 1964 and 1971 and found an increased
:oncentra~ion in.such areas (Working Cla:s and Land Allocation, Chapter 7).
Ihe relatlvely hlgh rates of growth of "1ntermediate areas" during the 1960'shas also been noted in Chapter 2~
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owner-bu ildtnc , the compar.ative cost of building autonomously on owned
land with middle-class standards of detached housing patterned on the
ideal of a "villa" was very high and got higher as construction costs
and access to land changed unfavourably. Thus, whatever preferences
dictated, the largest part of middle-class owner-occupation demand had
to be channelled into the apartment market. Demand for rented housing
was constrained to an even greater extent. More than two fifths of middle-
class households lived during the period we study in rented accomodation.
Supply of rental housing of sufficient quality in mere peripheral, low-
rise areas was limited given the minimal attraction of such areas for
speculative investors due to institutional conditions (see chapter 3).
Rental demand by middle and higher incomes, thus, presented an obvious
target for speculative building in central areas.
The C!ombination~ then, of "subjective" factors, namely the pattern
of housing preferences peculiar to the middle class, and "objective"
factors such as the constraints on peripheral low-rise building and the
attractiveness of central locations for speculative builders (for reasons
outlined in chapters 2 and 3), made for the steady drift of middle-class
households into the speculative sector. This process has been largely
completed by the early 1960's. The exclusive channelling of most middle-
class demand into high-density speculative areas, and to a secondary
degree the aforementioned pressure en "popular" strata to locate in
high-dens ity, 01dar-stock areas after the mid-1960's, accounts adequately
for the impressive growth of the central zone of Atnens between 1961 and
197121 that led to the reversal of a long-term trend. ~/hereas the share
of the Athens municipality in the population of "Greater Athens" has been
steadily declining since the 1920's, as the following table shows, it
increased during the 1960's.
Table 4.6: Share of the Athens Municipalities in the Greater Athens Area
population,1920-1971
1920
64.95%
1928
47.97%
1940
42.8g
1951
40.30%
1961
33.87%
1971
34.88%
Source: D.G. Tsaous is , The Morphology of r~odern Greek Society, p. 223
-e
21. Hence the impressive population growth in the central zone and the
areas to its north and east was not the product of any massive intra-urban
spatial mobility but maihly the expression of spatial concentration in the
growth of certain socia. strata due to internal migration and physical
qrowth , For a simil ar observation, see Crueger, "Socio-Geographic Study",
p. 286.
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This must surely appear as an anomaly to theorists of urban structure
accustomed to unilinear evolutionary models, since it implies a reversal
in the expected falling trend of the density gradient of the city.22 The
fact that such an "anomaly" took place during the period of fastest growth
in incomes when suburbanisation should be on the increase, compounds the
"perversity" of the case. In fact, it strengthens our argument about the
crucial importance of the pattern of relations between modes of housing
production and housing sectors - an aspect that is seldom paid due
attention by simpl~ evolutionary theories of urban structure. However,
let us briefly examine the degree to which the increased concentration
of households - mostly from the middle class - in central, speculative
market areas, could have been produced by forces determining the structure
of Athens from a purely spatial viewpoint independently from the dynamic
of the housing system per se. B.J. Frieden in a well-known study of
apartment building in central areas has pointed to three general factors
that may account for its growth.23
22. Assuming the familiar density function D(x}=Ae-bx where D(x} is
density at a point with x distance from the city centre and A is the
intersection of the y-axis with the density function, the density gradient
is given by b. It is a near-orthodoxy among geographers that the gradient
falls with economic development, urban growth and higher levels of techno-
logy. See, for instance, Berry et al., "Urban Population Densities", C. Clark,
Population and Land Use, chapter 9. Clark has pointed out (p. 347) that the
most appropriate way to measure b is to calculate the average density for
rings of equal width drawn around the city centre at increasing distances.
For the purpose, however, of examining the significance of changes in the
inner c itys share of population, a very simple method proposed by E.S.
t1ills will do. (Studies in the Structure of the Urban Economy, London, 1972,
p. 39). ~Je assume the validity of the exponential function for density and
that, furthermore, the given city can be described by an equivalent of circular
shape. Given the area of the central zone and its share in total population
we can calculate b from the ratio of the integrals giving population for the
centra 1 area and the total for the case of the circul ar city. With the hel p
of this method we found that b equalled 0.341 in 1961 and 0.343 in 1971. Mills
warns that the assumption of zero density at the margin leads to a certain
underestimation. This range for values of b, an~~ay, indicates an urban form
similar to that of 1arge European c t ttes of the Continent between the wars.
Cities in the U.S. and England showed substantially lower bls even at the
turn of the century (Clark, Population and Land Use, pp. 349-350).
23. B.J. Frieden, The Future of Old Neighborhoods, (Cambridge,
Ma ss., 1964).
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a. Expansion of apartment-specific d~mand based on cultural-historical
reasons ~ in short, "preferences".
b. Increased probitability of redevelopment as determined by the comparison
between old and new (potential) densities and the condition of the old
stock.
c. The "centrality" of the urban structure which refers to:
C.l. The technology of urban development, namely the costs of transport
and other such factors that influence the cost of peripheral
location.
c.2. The distribution of employment, mainly non-industrial employment
~ince apartments are mostly related to middle-class demand.
With regard to "preferences" we have already said enough. With regard to
tjleprofitabil ity of redevelopment, we can simply point out that it is
nothing more than a surrogate of the complex configuration of determinants
pf demand and supply as distributed among the different housing sectors in
their spatial and physical manufestation and therefore adds nothing
whatsoever in terms of "explanation", save a consideration of the pattern
of decision-making of developers and the simple fact that areas with multi-
storied buildings are unlikely to be redeveloped. This leaves the third
factor which is purely spatial and has been stressed frequently by students
of urban structure at different levels of economic development. We may
disregard the infrastructure costs of peripheral development since these
have already been stressed as an important factor making for the favourable
comparative advantages of non-peripheral housing (see chapter 3) and will
be commented upon further in leter parts. The relevant question, thus, is
to what degree changes in transportation costs and the distribution of
emplo~nent in Greek cities (in this case Athens) have contributed to
the increased concentration of population in central areas.
In relation to transportation cests we can say that ccnditio~s
between 1961 and 1971 have not worsened so as to justify a significant
rise in "centrality". Though increasing congestion may have led to a rise
in average travel ti~e, the rapid diffusion of car-ownership during the
same period24 has cer-ta inl y compensa ted. Expenses on urban transportation,
24. See the trends in I.M. Frant jeskak is , Transco('tationJ~_aL~~eter-s
Qf Urban_DeveJ.~_2,ent (Athens , 1371} p. 51 (in GrEek).
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moreov~r, playa very limited role in urban household budgets. We know
that in Athens in 1957/58 only 3.2% of total household expenditures was
spent on the average on running a private car, using a taxi or using
city-wide public transport. These expenses have risen in 1974 to a 5.7%
of the household budget but most of this increase was due to the rise in
private-car ownership.25 Since transportation expenditures are income-
elastic this signifies a greater use of cars and taxis for leisure and
prestige purposes rather than an increase in IIfunctionalll transportation
costs.
Similarly, we can not say that changes in the geographical distribution
of employment have been conducive to an increase in the concentration of
middle-class residential demand. In 1960-61 the share of total employment
located in the eBD of Athens was about 31% whereas in 1971 for a larger
eBD area (1.9 sq. kms instead of 1.55) this share fell to 29%.26 It is
true that to a certain extent this was due to the decentralisation of
industriaZ employment between 1~61 and 1971.27 It is probable therefore
that the "centrality" of middle-class employment has not been ,reduced to
.any significant degree." There is no doubt~ either, however, that n9 sub-
stantial increase in "centralityll took place capable of justifying a
major shift in the spatial distribution of middle-class housing.
In conclusion, we can definitely say that" the hypothesis that the
relatively faster rate in the expansion of the speculative sector during
the late 1960's and early 1970's was the product of a major shift in the
preference patterns of households due to economic development and modern-
isation, as these are expressed in housing choices and intra-urban mobil ity,
must be rejected. The spatial and sectoral changes of the 1960's were the
outcom~ of the inherent tendencies of the postwar "dual-segregated"
housing system and its associated social relations and values plus the
effect of easily discerned objective constraints and incentives distributed
unequally among different social class areas and modes of housing production.
Let us now turn to a short' account of these factors.
25. N.S.S.G., Urban Household Surveys for 1957-58 (table 4) and for
1974 (vol. 5.7, table 2).
and ~6. For 1961, see Frantjeskakis, Transportation Parameters, p. 25for 1971 P.K. Mandikas, Economic Analysis, vol. 4, pp. 11,27,51.
27. Lila Leontidou Emmanuel, Working ·Class·and Land Allocation, chapter 6.
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8. Political and economic constraints on petty owner-building, 1967-74
In examining the nature of the constraints on precapitalist building
a question of some interest would be to evaluate the role of purely economic
trend5 such as "exogenous" rises in land and construction costs as opposed
to institutional controls. Such an analysis, however, would require a
sophistication that the available empirical material could not possibly
bear. In addition, it would be of questionable significance: the rises
in the price of materials, construction labour and peripheral land are
not unrelated to the developments in the'wider housing system and more
specifically to the increased predominance of speculative building and the
demand of the latter for productive inputs. After all, between 1968 and
1972 an unprecedented building boom took place; in this, apartment
construction dominated the scene. Our analysis thus will take the form of
simply listing the various economic and institutional developments during
the 1968-1974 period that directly or indirectly generated negative
pressures and comparative negative disadvantages. A more general analysis
of the significance of such factors, given the socioeconomic basis of
precapitalist housing, has been advanced in the previous chapter.
Undoubtedly the most important constraint imposed on popular petty-
building ,on the basis of purely political and administrative decisions
was the control of illegal building af'ter 1967. The effectiveness of this
policy was due to the strict policing of illegal housing areas during the
military dictatorship. The institutional framework concerning the control
of illegal building has also been made more restrictive under the junta,
especially wlth Law 349/20.3.7428 introduced during the last days of the
y·egime. The effects of these restrictions went far' beyond the immediate
reduction of precapitalist housing supply. As we poi~ted out in the
prtvious chapter, a crucial factor in the reproduction of the precapital-
ist sector was the large-scale colonisation of peripheral areas by popular
28. Law 410/1968 lionUnauthorised Building" made the offence a
punishable one and extended the sanctions to those associated witr. the
builder (Goverrrlent Gazette Issue No llOA/15.5.68). Law 349/1974 "On the
DenoLi t ion of Illegally Built Structures and the Employment of Sanctions
Against Those Building Hithout Authorisation" (Gov. Gaz. No 72A/20.3.74)
increased the intensity ~nd range of sanctions drastically and authorised
demolition in all cases, whereas the previous law made some exceptions
for humanitarian reasons.
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strata and the existence of opportunities for small-plot ownership at low
costs to be developed at some later stage in the life of a household. This
process was greatly hindered after 1967 as a result of controls on illegal
building. It is true that between 1968 and 1970 extensive areas of illegal
housing were incorporated into the official City Plan and that most
illegal structures were "Ieqal tsed" after payment of a fine.29 These
measures, however, to a large degree added to the negative pressures on
precapitalist petty-building: the imposition of an official City Plan
and building c~ntrols on illegally built areas according to official
standards involves a long-drawn process of expropriation of land for
public use, the characterisation of a large number of small plots as
sub-standard for building according to the imposed rules, the payment of
fines and checks of the structural adequacy of existing buildings. Moreover,
land values in these areas (for adequate plots) increase drastically. In
the case of areas outside the official Plan, "legalisationll may imply
security against demolition but aZZ development ceases until the incorpo-
ration into the Plan - including the most elementary improvements of
structures necessary for protection against the weather and structural
decay. Given the fact that all illegal houses start as more or less
rudimentary structures and that these restrictions may last for well over
half a decade, whereas families grow, it is hardly surprising that a
substantial part of the existing housing stock in such areas is abandoned.30
Equally significant with the above constraints on precapitalist housing
was the strong encouragement of the expansion of speculative housing in a
manner directly antagonistic to petty-building through Law 395/1968.31 This
raised the permitted ratio of floorspace to plot area by 20% to 40%
throughout Greece. This amounted in effect to a State-sanctioned universal
increase in speculative opportunities and the development value of land.
Areas that presented no prospects for apartment-building under the older
29. Law 410/1968 legalised unauthorised buildings put up before 1968
and imposed as a precondition the payment of a fine. The extensive expansion
of the official City Plan into illegal housing areas during the 1968-70
period is documented in Leontidou and Emmanuel, Life Patterns. The increases
are also evident in Figure 3.2, chapter 3.
30. For these processes in the case of Athens, see Leontidou and
Emmanuel, Life Patterns.
31. Law 395/1968 liOnthe Height of Buildings and the System of Freely-
Arranged Development" {Gov. Gaz. No 95A/4.5.68}.
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rules were incorporated at a stroke into the area of potential speculative
investment, and small landm-mers in such areas realised en masse the
possibility of turning their property over to developers in exchange for
a share in the final product instead of building with independent means.
Since, as we showed, the social and spatial range of the speculative sector
had certain limits, the actual medium-run effect of this increase in spe-
.culative opportunities \'lasnot very radical in terms of a diffusion of
normal-sized apartment buildings. It had more important effects at the
level of small-holder attitudes and the supply price of land.32 The
geographical diffusion of apartment buildings in lower-income areas, even
if it was relatively limited in volume, helped in reinforcing these changes.
Thus, although the control of illegal building and of popular appropriation
of cheap peripheral ·land were more effective in terms of the immediate
reduction of non-speculative housing supply, the diffusion of speculative
opportunities through Law 395/68 had most probably greater significance
with regard to the transformation of the housing system in the long run.
It had also important immediate effects with regard to the expansion of the
intermediate types of building - three-storey and four-storey ones: this
small-scale, semi-speculative form doubled its share of residential
building in Athens between the mid-1960ts and the beginning of the 1970's
(table 4.1).
The increase in land values caused by the blanket rise in the permitted
intensity of land use imposed heavy costs on low-rise bl!ilding in the middle
and 10wer-middle-class suburbs of Athens. The institutional rules and the
social standards governing detached housing in such areas dictated much
high~r amounts of land per unit of floorspace tfian the ones observed in
lower-income areas, and at relatively more developed conditions with
respect to infra3tructure and facilities. The capital cost of non-specula-
tive housing, therefore, must have increasingly appeared prohibitive to
middle-class households. These negative developments were accentuated by
32. The official building (or development) coefficient, i.e. the permitted
maximum ratio of floorspace to plot-area, is the main determinant of land
values in urban areas. All other factors such as location, environmental
qUdlity, or even the rent-class of potential buyers for most cases, are
in comparison ,of secondary importance: See Appendix 6.1 and D. Emmanuel
Three Studies on Popular Housing (Athens, 1977) (mimeo, in Greek): po. 54-55.
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the fact that the supply of land for- peripheral middle-class housing was
held down to insignificant amounts .. Most of middl e-cl ass suburbs have been
created. before the: Wa.r-and dur+nq tha lata 1940's and early 1950's. We can
east ly see in Figu.r-e:l ..2. of the: previous chapter that between 1961 and
1971 no. significant extension£ of the City Plan took place in the eastern,
south-ea.sterrr and north-eastern suburbs, the zones of middle-class lor-rise
housing. 1St large: segment o.f the: extensions that did take place, moreover,
(the one at the eastward limit o.f the west-east axis through the city centre)
concerned exclusiveJy residences: for- the officers' corps: it did not add
to the general supply of land and demonstrates by itsel f both the desirabi-
Ttty of "suburban" housing: among the middle class and the pol.itrioal: nature
of decfstons aver- urban expanston ..
In fact , the: stop of pari'phe.ral land development after the mid-1950's
expressed. spec.ffic poTfcy guidelines to that effect. Law 3275/1955 directed
that no new expans.ions of the: Athens City ·Plan should take place.33 A series
of Taws and administrative: mea.sures after ttie mid-1960's introduced greatly
restrictive: controls aver- the operation of housing cooperatives which until
then have b~ an tmpa:rtant vehicle for'the acquisition of peripheral "legal"
plats by middle: and lower-middle:-class groups.'~4 Thus these strata, unable
to use the expedient of illegal colonisation of peripheral land for obvious
reasons of respectallfTfty,. were: faced with the choice between "suburban"
housing at increasingly denser- and more expensive areas and an apartment
in the: central zane: of the d·ty. Law 395/1968 besides increasing the
permitted intensity. of deveJopment and therefore antagonising directly less
intensTve: types of r-e:stdenti'aT but ldtnq, introduced the system of develop-
ment with free:ly-arranged blocks of flats. As a result of this and the
previously described fQrces~ high-quality, speculative apartment building
in suburban locations has become by the early 1970's a major form of
residential de:ve:lopment in middle-cl ass suburbs.
33. Law 3275/1955 liOn the Prohibition of Extensions fo the City Plan in
the Athens Basin and the Rules of Building Within it" (Gov. Gaz. No 166AI
30.6.55). This law introduced in addition severe measures for the control
of illegal building~
34. See the discussion of the previous chapter and Panos and Klimis,
Housing and Building Cooperatives.
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These arguments make the reasons for the swift integration of middle-
class strata into the speculative sector sufficiently clear. The expansion
of the latter was boosted· further by the fact that these developments in
the 1968-1974 period coincided with an unprecedented increase in the volume
of mortgage credit for housing; most of these loans were directed to the
middle class of large urban areas.35 Such favourable conditions for the
development of the speculative sector when contrasted with the afore-mentioned
constraints on lower-income petty-building and access to land make the trans-
formation of the housing system in the late 1960's easily understandable.
In fact, it is quite surprising that the changes were not more drastic -
a point that testifies to the resist~nce of "traditional" housing relations
and values against the expansion of capitalist relations assisted by State
power.
Developments in the wider economy added to the adverse environment for
non-speculative building. We nave already drawn attention (chapter 3)
to the fact that a stage of relatively full employment has been reached
in the Greek ecoYlOmy by the end of the 1960's. The resultant relative
scarcity of labour in combination with'the building boom and the pecu-
liarities of the construction industry itself made for increasingly higher
wages in construction relative to industrial employment. Since speculative
builders had a clearly better competitive position in attracting labour
at high wage rates and since "formalisation" and regularity of employment
were becoming a norm, construction for petty building faced increased costs
and fiddiculties in production. To this we must add that the limited
opportunities for mechanisation, and thus for capital-labour substitution
available to petty builders relative to speculative ones accentuated the
negative effects of riSing labour costs.
35. See the disc.ussion in D. Emmanuel, Categories of Households Outside
the Existing System of Housina Assistance, DEPOS study Report (Athens, 1979
in Greek), chapter 5.
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Conclusions
We are in the position now to offer a general account of the trans-
formation of the housing system in the 1960's. In this we integrate the
analysis of the present chapter with the concepts introduced in the preceding
ones. The Greek urban housing system was initially (and up to the mid-1960's)
characterised by a "dualll structure of production and distribution correlated
directly with the social class pattern of Greek cities. The reproduction
of this structure entailed the reproduction of a "segregated" pattern of
behaviour and values with regard to housing at the socia-spatial level.
From the institutional and economic standpoint this structure was based
on conditions of a relative autonomy of precapitalist housing production
and the associated urban areas from the mechanisms and controls that
governed land and resource allocation in the "normal" housing sector
associated with the middle class and cOlTDllodityexchange relations. During
the second half of the 1960ts and tne beginning of the 1970's the system
moved towards a structure characterised by speculative sector dominance
and increasfngly hfgher levels of "integration".
IIDominancell here is understood as a condition where the components
of the system function in ways that are not alternative to or in direct·
antagonism with the reproduction and further expansion of the sector
that is associated with higher levels of the socia-economic hierarchy.
This sector, as a result , achieves with economic growth an increasing
influence in urban development. The concept of "dominance" is closely
related to that of "integrationll, though the latter is a more narrow
and specific concept: it refers to the degree that the movement of house-
halds and resources th.roughresidential mobfl ity is directed, with economic
development and urban growth, away from areas of 'precapitalist housing and
into areas of speculative sector growth.or, more commonly, to "intermediate"
areas of mixed social character, older stock and higher densities. Such
areas are connected positively with the functioning of the speculative
economy and the wider system of commodity exchange in housing. In part
directly but mostly indirectly through the mechanism of IIfiltering"and
the interdependence of the rental market. We have shown that through a
systematic evaluation of the implications of alternative models of the
housing system, the expansion of the speculative secter was not the result
of a trend towards a gradual lIassimilation" of social groups, save within
the social and spatial confines of the middle class. Thus the "dual-
segregated" character of the housing system persisted throughout the
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period with clearly negative results on the rates of speculative market
growth. Had there been a shift to an "integration-assimilation" model,
the expansion of speculative housing ~uuld have been much faster.
Thus the sectoral transformation of the system during the postwar
period was the product, first, of the "naturalll effects of the interplay
of rising incomes, housing consumption and the income distribution
tJithin the limits imposed by the prevailing "dua l-seqreqated" model of
demand allocation,and second, of the decline of precapitalist production
as such coupled with a limited extent of "tnteqrat ton" implied by certain
shifts in the pattern of building and the distribution of population.
With regard to this second set of changes, we could not say beforehand
to what degree they were an outcome of voluntary or forced household
behaviour.36
A wider discussion of the postwar pattern in housing preferences,
values and residential mobility as these are differentiated among social
c'l asses has 'led us to the belief that the second is more likely the case.
"The val idity of this thesis was reinforced by a description of certain
political measures that imposed obv ious constraints on popular owner-
building and the acquisition of per-tpheral land, as well as some economic
changes 'that acted in a simt l arly negat-ive wa~ and were themsel ves th.e
product of political measures to -a very large extent. To complete, thus,
the answers to the questions posed -in the beginning of this chapter, the
sectoral transformation of the 196Q's cannot be accounted for by a purely
supply-demand equil ibrium model: 'the "pol f t ica'l " factor has been a
crud a1 determinant.
The argument thus far has been mainly concerned with the question of
the "trend in the share of speculartve nun ding in total housing production.
"In the introduction to this study ~I€ have noted that the more genera-l question
t-f 'the 9rowth of specul a-ti vebui 1ctinginGreece -involves t\'lO analytically
~-i-st; net issues i ri ts share +n the .sys tern and the process ofc.ggregate res i--
.den-t;aLeap! ta', accunu! ationas such. Hav;ng -established the determi nantsof
the first, we may turn now to can ex-amination .of the second issue in the
next two chapters.
36.This question based on a concept of the dialectic between ~aluea,
Dl"efe~"er;cei~ ar.d conetrair.te given so much emphasis in thi 5 chapter may strike
~any ur~an economists as problematic. Within recent social-geogrdphica1
theory, however, it has been established as an indispensable conceptual
approach to the study of social processes in soace. See, for instaryce. Jones
and Evles. An Introduction to Soclal Geography, pp. 62-63 and passlm.- - ---------'_._----------------
5· Postwar Investment in Housing and thePattern of Greek Economic Development
In the previous chapter we examined the growth of speculative building
in relation to the changing sectoral composition of housing production.
Our analysis, moreover, centred on the demand for housing space, though
we found it necessary to incorporate a number of important constraints
impinging on housing production. In this chapter we will shift emphasis
substantially. we will examine the growth of speculative building in
absolute terms and we will pay most attention to aspects of "supply" -
more specifically to the nature and determinants of residential invest-
ment and finance. It is obvious that the process of speculative building
growth is closely related to the wider trends in the pattern of allocation
of national resources. This relationship can be treated to a large extent
as analytically distinct from the more specific issues of the transformation
of the housing system. The aggregate pattern of the flow of savings into"
residential real estate is not, of course, determined independently from
the institutional and "micro-economic" characteristics of the housing
system. On the contrary, we will find ample opportunity to show their
interrelationships. In the following analysis, however, we will relegate
the issue of sectoral composition and more generally that of changes in
the mode of housing production to a secondary place and be concerned pri-
marily with the formation of housing finance and investment in macroeconomic
terms. When finance and investment assume significantly different forms in
different sectors, these will be made clear. Otherwise, most of the following
discussion will be concerned with housing investment in general on the
assumption that the process of change in the sectoral structure has been
sufficiently analysed in the previous chapters and we must turn now to
the problem of the determinants of the level of aggregate housing
investment in postwar Greece.
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It has been repeatedly observed that the Greek economy in the postwar
pet'iod channelled a very high volume of resources towards residential
investment. Accordingly, there has been a widespread belief that Greece
constitutes something of an exceptional case in this respect and there
has been a recurrent controversy over the significance of the high rate
of housing investment for the economic development of the country. Thus,
this persistent "peculiarity" was inextricably connected with the whole
pattern of postwar economic development and the relevant pol ides of the
Greek State. The issue has been most commonly approached in normative
terms: is the high rate of residential investment a "problem"';'Shouldn't
the State adopt aggressive policies for the reallocation of resources
towards more "developmental" economic sectors? Outside the context of
debates over policy, the emphasis was placed on explaining the phenomenon.
Here again most interpretations stressed the strong interrelationship
between the high rate of residential investment and the fundamental attri-
butes of postwar development and economic pol icy. Such approaches,
(developed usually among the Greek Left) considered the latter as given
and argued that the "peculiarity" with. regard to housing was the
systematic corollary of the "model II of development pursued by the Greek
capitalist class and the State. This model of development, they pointed
out, was typical and IInaturalll in that it stemmed from the "dependentll
and "structurally underdeveloped" status of the country in the interna-
tional division of labour and the inherent orientations of dominant
classes in countries of such status.
In the following discussion we will first examine the degree to which
Greece is indeed an exceptional case when viewed in a comparative and
historical perspective. We will show that this ;s not necessarily the
case: capitalist countries at similar levels of economic development
tend to have similarly high rates of residential investment. We will
reject, ho~ever, certain comparative and historical generalisations
that purport to explain these tendencies with reference to simple "demand"
factors 1ike income grm'/th and the rate of urbanisation. Thus the determi-
nant factors lie indeed within the sphere of "supply": the formation of
savings, the costs of residential production and the process of capital
formation. We will then go into a critical analysis of the theories that
consicer these as corollaries of the decisions of the Stute and the capital-'
ist class cf "dependent" and "structurally underdeveloped" countries over
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the division of investment between industrial and non-industrial sectors
(or IIproductivell and "unproduct ive" ones). We will argue that such approaches
are highly unrealistic on theoretical grounds as well as in relation
to the historical evidence. Our own interpretation will lay more emphasis
on the IIhousehold sectorll of the economy and the formation and distribution
of income, consumption and wealth within the latter.
1. Greek housing "over+nvestment" in 'a comparative perspective
The average share of residential investment in the Gross Domestic
Product in Greece approached 6% during the 1950's and 8% during the 1960's
(5.8% and 7.7% respectively). It stood at similarly high levels during the
1970's despite the radical drop in building activity in 1974 when the
economic crisis coincided with severe restrictions on building and the
change in regime: we had a share of 7.36% for 1971-76.1 Thus the volume
of residential construction in the postwar period grew at rates that
surpassed the admittedly remarkable rate of growth of the economy as
a whole. Moreover, even a cursory glance at international statistics
suffices to show that these shares were among the highest observed for
capital tst countries tn the postwar period and up to the beginning of
the 1970ts.2 It appears therefore that Greece is an exceptional case
in this respect. In fact, a number of cross-country statistical studies
of the ratio of investment in housing to the GDP (Ih/GDP) suggest that
the Greek case is not necessarlly an "anoma ly". The Ih/GDP ratio takes
similarly high values in most countries of a "mtddl e level II of economic
development (measured by per capita income) like Greece. It has been
observed that in a sample of capitalist countries at various levels of
economic development this ratio follows either an S-curve or a parabola:
it is low in underdeveloped countries, rises to a peak at middle levels
of development, and then levels~off as we reach the developed nations of
Western Europe and North America and starts to decline in,the most
advanced of them.S
1. Calculated from the series in Ministry of Coordination, National
Accounts of Greece 1958~1975 (Athens, 1976) and the volume for 1970-1976
(Athens, 1978) and 1970, 1973-1977 (Athens, 1979). See also General
Appendix, A.7.
2. See L.S. Burns & L. Grebler, The Housing of Nations (New York, 1977)
pp. 23-24, 32.
3. See Strassman, "Cons truct ion Product tvt ty", U.N. Secretar iat, IInvest-
ment in Dwelling Constructionll and Burns & Grebler, The Housing of Nations,
pp. 29-33.
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These cross-country stat isttcal analyses show that the most important
determinant of the path of the Ih/GDP ratio is per capita income: the
growth of population and the rate of urbanisation do not show any appre-
ciable effects in comparison.4 The determinant role of per capita income
can be easily understood. For one, the rise in the Ih/GDP ratio as we move
from underdeveloped to developed countries signifies simply the increased
capacity for the realisation of high levels of capital formation in general.
A higher income level~ moreover, leads to a greater emphasis on housing
consumption and the modernisation of living standards beyond the mere
satisfaction of basic needs.' rndeed~ cross-country comparisons of the
income elasticity of housing consumpt~on (measured at the macroeconomic
level) show that it varies with income per capita levels according to a
parabol ic curve similar to that observed for the I,/GDP ratio: this curve
starts rising from values substantially lower than +1 in underdeveloped
countries and approaches +1 in developed ones where it tends to level off
(countries of Western Europe) and in some cases to decline with time
(Scandinavia and North Americal.5
Greece showed an elasticity of +0.747 during 1950-1961 and +0.930
during 1962-1973 - a pattern that is broadly consistent with these empi-
rical generalisations. He may reasonably argue then that postwar Greece
being a country at a middle level of economic development with fastly
rising incomes, presents no particular "anomaly" with respect to housing
consumption and investment. This point, however, although an important
corrective of uncritical impressionistic opinions about the exceptionality
of ·the Greek case, can hardly suffice as an expLanation. The reasons for
this derive from questions of method as well as theory. let us discuss
them in turn.
To begin with, it is not legitimate to derive generalisations about
the time-pattern of development on the basis of static cross-sectional
comparisons of countries (assumed to be at different levels of development).
Otherwise, we would have accepted uncritically a rather strong theoretical
assumption, namely that all countries follow a simple evolutionary model,
a trajectory that ends to a "stage" described by the present-day advanced
-----------------------------------------------------------------
4. Burns & Grebler, The HOl,lsingof rlatio~pp. 24-25.
5. See T.R. lakshmanan et al. "Housing Consumption and level of Develop-
ment: A Cross-National Cornpar ison", Economic GeoGraphy, 54, 3 (1978): 222-
223. See also, Burns & Grebler, The Housir.g of Nations. Chapter 3.
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nations of Western Europe and North America. Such a model should not be
rejected a priori (though a case to the contrary can be very plausibly
made on grounds of theory). The fact is, however, that the available
evidence can not support a strong argument in its favour. Most statistical
cross-country comparisons utilise samples with a heavyoverrepresentation
of developed nations: most of the underdeveloped ones lack adequate data.
Furthermore, the patterns derived from postwar data are strongly influenced
by the unique features of the period which was characterised by a worldwide
secular movement of capitalist development and modernisation and cornman
ideological and cultural influences supported by the economic interdependence
of the capitalist world and the action of international agencies. Thus we
should rely more on historical ("longitudinal") evidence in the search for
development patterns. Such evidence for the case of trends in the role of
residential investment is scant and of rather debatable significance.6
A more obvious limitation of the empirical studies of the relationship
between economic development and investment (or consumption) in housing
1ies in the wealrness of the statistical correlations derived from cross-
country data. Regressions of the rr/GDP ratio on income per capita show
rather low correlation coefficients; the same is true for housing consumption.
In other words tflereare numerous and important devi"ations from the "develop-
ment path" described 5y the stati'stica1 curves. As we noted previously, these
devi.ations are not accounted for by simple "universal" factors like population
growth and urbanisation and are, therefore, the result of factors specific
to particular countries or groups of countries. We may reasonably assume
that such factors are of institutional and historical origin and/or derive
from the particular configuration of the urban political economy and social
structure observed for each society. Such factors are, of course, of outmost
importance in the historical-comparative study of housing systems. Thus, the
empirical studies of broad cross-country patterns, although suggestive with
regard to the possible influence of "universal" factors (e.g. income,
urbanisation), are of little help in a more systematic analysis. Moreover,
the concept of "middle-income" countries in the hierarchy of economic
development demands a more exact theoretical specification. We may accept
that cross-country empirical analysis reveals indeed a significant similarity
in the residential investment levels of such countries among which postwar
Greece belongs. But thts category is usually given theoretical content
6. See Introduction, note 5,
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with a rather simplistic reference to the corresponding level of aggregate
demand factors: incomes and the rate of urban growth. The latter hardly
cover the range of sign~ficant factors which belong more to the sphere
of production and capital formation.
2. The limitations of simple "demand" models
The last point needs some stressing. The study of the determinants of
residential investment has been heavily influenced by two traditions of
research: the construction of econometric models which aim more at success-
ful statistical formulations rather than systematic explanation, and the
more historically-minded study of "long waves" of building. Both tradi-
tions place great emphasis on demand factors. This results from the obvious
significance of the latter, their easy operationalisation, and the availa-
bility of data in this area. It is also a result of the theoretical
influence of investment models based on the lIacceleration" principle and
the "stock adjustmentll principle. These well-known models assume that
increases in capital stock are a function of changes in consumption
demand.? Hence the prominent role of income and urban population growth
~ the major determinants of housing demand - in the aforementioned
traditions of research. The importance of the demographic factor has been
more notably stressed in analyses of IIlong waves" of building.8 However,
we have noted already the limited influence of demographic variables on
the Ih/GDP ratio. As ~1ichael Kalecki pointed in his major essay on the
determinants of investment,
"...what matters is not the growth of population but the growth
of purchasing power. For instance, the growth of population does
not necessarily imply a greater demand for dwellings. Without an
increase in purchasing power the result might very well be the
crowding of more people in the existing dwell ing space. "9
7, R.G.D. Allen, ~1acroeconomic Theory (London, 1970): 70-72
8. See the review of the literature on long swings of building in
L Grebler & S.J. t1aisel, "Determinants of Residential Construction: A
Review of Piesent Know1edge" in D.B. Suits et al. Impacts of Monetary
Policy: Studi~s PreQared for the Commission on Money and Credit (New
Jersey, 1963): 475-620. For a more recent general review, see Gotlieb,
Long Swin~. The stress on demographic factors as the most significant
determinants of long swings in building is mostly found in american
studies: see especially B.O. Cambell, Populatioll Change and Building Cycles
(Urbana 111., 1966) and M. Abramovitz, Evidences of Long Swings in Agqreqate
~~~~trllction Sin~~the C_ivil War (Ne\'1York, 1964).
9. Michal Ka1ecki, The Theory of Economic. Dynamics (Greek translation,
Athens, 1975) p. 185 (transl. from the Greek).
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We may immediately add that in the case of housing it is not purchasing
power (effective demand for consumption) in the narrow sense of rental
expenditures that matters: it is the volume and per capita level of house-
hold savings expended on housing. Business investment in rental property
in response to demand forms but a part of the flow of funds into residential
construction, more often than not a small part ~ ai"itis certainly true
in the Greek case. Moreover, the accumulation of a substantial volume of
money capital drawn from household savings and small rentiers that can
sustain an "elastic" supply of finance and permit some concentration of
capital in housing production, is a necessary precondition for the emergence
and expansion of a speculative sector in a large scale, i.e. for the fast
production of housing as a commodity in great numbers in response to
demand.10 As a matter of fact, the American experience of 1I10ng wavesll
of building that has mainly influenced theories stressing the importance
of demographic factors, has been characterised by exactly such positive
conditions: an elastic supply of local savings and/or favourable interna-
tional movements of small-rentier capital.11 We may say that whereas fast
urban population growth is in most cases a necessary condition for a major
expansion of building, it is not a sufficient one. The same can be said
for housing consumption demand in general.'
There are deeper reasons why the study of building cycles can not
provide a convincing theoretical account of the determination of the level
of residential investment. These studies concentrate attention on the
morphology of fluctuations in building and their correlations with
fluctuations in other relevant variables. This emphasis leads away from
the problem of the determination of the absolute level of building and
the structure of resource allocation. For instance, the very concept of
a "long wave", though important in historical analysis, derives its
10. See the arguments in chapter 1.
11. See H.J. Habakkuk, "Fluctuations in House Building". Habakkuk's
admirable essay with its thoughtful interrelation of Britain's building
cycles to changes in the structure and movements of the capital market and
the structure of finance in housing production should serve as a model in
the analysis of long swings. See also A.K. Cairncross, ~ome and Foreign
Investment 1870-1913 (Cambridge, 1953) and B. Thomas, Higration and Urban
Development: A Reaooraisal of British and American Long Cycles (London, 1972).
Both stress the significance of the movements of capital across the Atlantic
for the formation of British and American building cycles. The role of the
exceptionally "elasticll supply of savings in the formation of American long
swings in building has been stressed in Pribram, IIResidual, Differential
and Absolute Ground Rentsll•
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significance from a contrast with the normal cyclical behaviour of business
activity and income: the latter usually follows cycles of much shorter
duration that the fifteen to twenty-year cycles observed in building.12
Though the severity of a cycle has implications for the problem of the
structure of the economy at any given time, the issue of the duration
of cycles is less significant. In simplistic terms postwar building
activity in Greece (and in most countries at that) forms a long wave -
though an exceptionally long one. But unless we have some theory of
a mechanism producing long \'lavespeculiar to building and operating
independently of the cyclical movement of the wider economy, we learn
very little from this. After all, the whole economy followed the path
of a long-term growth upswing. We have rejected in the previous chapter
certain models that base the generation of long waves in building on
instability mechanisms (due to pronounced time lags} peculiar to hOlJsing
. t t 13lnves men .
The statistical analysis of fluctuations might be important for the
study of short-term and medium-term behaviour but tells us little about
the pattern of growth. for the postwar period, it has an additional defect
in that it usually produces spurious explanations based on the predictable
correlation between building and demand variables. This criticism applies
similarly to the majority of econometric "explanations" of housing invest-
ment. They commonly offer statistical formulations of obvious associations
between variables: during the postwar period incomes, urban population,
consumption and hou3ebuilding showed parallel growth trends and therefore
12. The concept of long waves has also been applied to business activity
in general. In this case, however, it refers to the well-known Kondratieff
cycles spanning an the average a period of fifty years. These should not
be confused with long-waves in building often referred to as the "Kuznets
cycle". For a recent review uf the theory of "long waves" in capitalism
which makes some important observations on the nature of the postwar "wave",
"See, E. Mandel ,_Late Capital ism (1972, London, 1978): Chapter 4.
13. S. Parry Lewis in an effort to account for the formation of long
cycles in building suggested that they are the -product of the overlapping
of shorter regional cycles of different timing. See his Building ~les
~nd Britain's Growth (London, 1965). As with other theories that searc~ .
f'or determinant factors located in some specific charac terist tcs of bUlldlng
itself, this has little relevance for the postwar period.
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can easily provide the material for successful - but uninformative -
correlations.14 In conclusion, the various traditions of methodological
and theoretical emphasis on simple "demandllfactors in accounts of the
allocation of resources to housing present serious limitations. It is
necessary to examine the formation of savings and the mechanism of invest-
ment, most especially so in the case of a developing country. Let us then
turn to this issue.
3. Greek economic development and lIover-investmentllin housing
From 1948 to the present there has been a recurrent debate among
Greek econo~ists, policy makers, and the professions involved in building,
over the proper interpretation and evaluation of the alleged over-invest-
ment in housing. The controversy has mainly centred on questions related
to strategies for economic development and the allocation of productive
resources rather than on issues of household behaviour and demand for
housing. Thus, the IIproblemllof the high rate of residential investment
in Greece has been defined in terms of the high share of the latter in total
fixed capital formation (Ih!FCF for brevity). The I;/FCF ratio has been
unquestionably among the highest in international statistics. Before 1954
and after 1958 it has fluctuated between 26% and 32% - usually around the
30% mark (with the exception of 1974 when it hit a record low of 21.3%).
During 1954-1957 it reached unprecedented levels - around 40% - while the
share of industrial investment was very low (see Table 5.1 in the next
page). An average I~FCF ratio in the order of 30% does not in itself
suggest the presence of an lIanomaly": although comparatively high, it is
not uncommon in countries of middle and higher levels Of economic development.
It assumes the character of a major problem when contrasted with the dictates
of certain theories of the preconditions and necessary form of fast and
14. For such cases see P. Pavlopoulos, A Statistical Model for the
Greek Economy 1949-1959 (Amsterdam, 1966): 64-66, 128-134 and P. Kassimatis,
The Construction Industry in Greece, pp. 48-50. Pavlopoulos relates invest-
ment in housing with real disposable income and household formation (indexed
by the number of marriages). Kassimatis prefers (for a longer period: 1951-
1971) a regression of residential investment on per capita National Income
and an index of IIrelativecostsll: the ratio of the price index for rents
to the price index for housing construction. This is more in the nature of
an ad hoC) choice since he found that GNP per capita alone lIexplainsll97%
of the variation in residential investment. The latter IIfinding" suffices
to show the banality of simple econometric analyses of postwar trends.
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"balanced" economic growth. The desirability of the latter with the implied
necessity for the structural transformation of the economy - meaning an
emphasis on the increase of the role of industry - in conjunction with the
worrying experience of the 1954-1957 period15 have influenced strongly
the climate of opinion over this issue in the beginning of the 1960's.
It was during these years that the controversy over the "unproductive"
character of housing and its detrimental role for development took form
as official circles began to advocate the need for a reallocation 6f
resources at the expense of the housing sector. International opinion
on the matter has been an additional influence, of course: the issue and
the associated dilemmas were neither new nor pecul iar to Greece.16
Table 5.1: Annual gross investment in dwellings and manufacturing in relation
to total fixed capital formation in Greece, 1948-1977 (five-year
averages).
Period Total PCP PCP in % PCP in manu- %
dwellings facturing
1948-1952 13,090.6 4,067.8 31.07 2,779.2 21.23
1953-1957 16,620.0 6,791.8 40.86 2,190.4 13.17
1958-1962 28,831.6 8,847.6 30.68 3,468.2 12.02
1963-1967 45,756.2 14,015.8 30.63 5,947.4 12.99
1968--1972 75,249.6 23,200.4 30.83 10,030.2 13.32
1973-1977 83,120.6 23,056.0 27.73 13,665.8 16.44
1948-1977 43,778.1 13,329.9 30.44 6,346.8 14.49average
Source: National Accounts 1958-1975 and 1978 Statistical Yearbook, NSSG.
15. It is interesting that both the Gross Domestic Product and investment
in manufacturing grew at rather high rates during 1954-1958 - a period alleged
to have a strongly non-developmental structure of capital formation. The first
grew by an average annual rate of 6.36% and the second by 16.54% (1954-57,
1970 prices) (data from the 1958-75 National Accounts).
16. For a good review of the issues involved and the relevant literature
see C. Abrams, Man's Struggle, Ch. 8. Fat'more recent material and a comphre-
hensive discussion of the effects of housing investment on economic develop-
ment, see Burns and Grebler, The Hous;nq of Nations, Ch. 8. It should be
remembered, of course, that the first-widely influential systematic study.
of the issue in relation to Greece was by foreign economists. See, H. El115
et al, Ind~tria1 Capital in Greek Development (Athens, 1964): Ch. 8.
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The question of "overinvestment" in housing in relation to capital
formation as a whole and more particularly in relation to industrial invest-
ment can be viewed in either of two ways. The first concerns the evaZuation
of these relations in the light of development strategies. The second is
directed to the theoretical-empirical problem of establishing the determi-
nants of the investment pattern. The relevant question here is to what
degree investment in housing is a systematic consequent of the overall
pattern in the allocation of resources and more specifically of the fact
of "under-investment" in industry. It is the second view of the matter
that will occupy us here,though it will increasingly become apparent
that the two are interrelated. This is so for two reasons: first, because
the view relates to the wider object of this study, namely, the formation
and growth of residential building, its economic and social nature and the
origins of savings channelled into housing; second, certain highly influential
theories should be rejected that purport to explain housing investment in
connection to particular "models" of capitalist development in which indu-
strial and residential investment are negatively related at the level of
investment decisions and processes. Thus the following analysis will be
mainly negative in nature. It will clear the ground, however, for the
more positive task of providing a systematic analysis of the determinants
of residential investment.
The theories in question view the low 1evel of industrial investment
as well as the tendency towards excessive investment in real estate in
Greece as the systematic corollary of the economic relations, the atti-
tudes and the class structure of an essentially underdeveloped society.
This pattern, it is argued, contrasts sharply with the "normal" model of
capitalist development evidenced in the nistory of advanced Western
societies or the one that we should theoretically expect to hold in cases
of "genuine" development. Thus, although development in the narrow sense
of growth in incomes per capita has indeed taken place in Greece, we had
a case of "distorted" development in that the struature of the economy has
been reproduced in a form akin to underdeveloped countries. Admittedly, our
account of these theories is hignly schematic and omits significant
differences among particular theoretical approaches. The latter are
evident in the more specific explanations given for the structure of
capital accumulation and the role of residential investment. But one can
easily confirm that all theories follow arguments that in logical
structure imply similar contrasts of the Greec record with "normal II or
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genuine" development. The specific attributes of the Greek economy and
society that are offered as explanations of the "anomaly" in the structure
of investment are the following:
a) The local bourgeoisie is characterised by a conservative and commercial
outlook. This stems from a tradition of commercial activities during the
formative years of Greek capitalism when capitalists played a role of
intermediaries between the local agricultural economy and the advanced
West: hence the widely accepted concepts of a "comprador bourgeoisiell and
by extension of a "comprador society" applied to the nineteenth and
early twentieth-century Greek society. As a resul~Greek capitalists
show a strong preference for investment in commerce, real estate and
speculative ventures instead of industry.l?
b) There have, in general, been limited opportunities for medium and small
capital to enter industry. This resulted from the constraints imposed
by powerful international competition and the fact that most significant
industrial sectors in Greece are effectively controlled by local and
17. For the characterisation of Greece in the 19th and early 20th century
as a "comprador" society see K. Moskof, National and Social Consceiousness in
Greece 1830-1909 (Thessaloniki, 1972, in Greek), passim. Historical-cultural
explanations of the alleged tendency of Greek capitalists towards economic
conservatism and speculative ventures (and thus investment in commerce, real
estate and tourism) can be found in N. Mouzelis & M. Attalides, "Greece" in
M.S. Archer & S. Giner (eds), Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power
(London, 1973): 162-197, M. Malios, The Current Staqe in the Develo ment
of Capitalism in Greece (Athens, 1975, in Greek, p. 79 and "Economic
Observer II "Greece: A Case of Nee-colonialism", Monthly Rev iew, Dec. 1972,
pp. 23-37. A.P. Alexander in a sociological study of Greek industrialists
found that most could be described as IIcommercial" rather than as "progressive"
entrepreneurs. He rejects, however, the thesis that this orientation is the
product of the commercial tradition in the formation of the modern Greek
bourgeoisie. He argues that the behaviour of Greek industrialists can be
interpreted as the outcome of rational economic choices in the context of
the conditions and limitations prevailing in the Greek economy during the
postwar period. See his Greek Industrialists (Athens, 1964): 120-125.
Theories of the unproductive and speculative tendencies of the local
bourgeois class in underdeveloped countries are commonplace, of course,
in studies of the Third World. To refer to the most influential, see Paul
Baran, The PoliticaJ Eco"o:1'Yof Growth (1957, Pelican edn, 1973): 310-11
and Samir Amin, UneqUal Development (1973, Greek transl. 1976), p. 321. For
similar theories in relation to housing and land, see, A.G.H. Dietz et al.
Housing in Latin America (Cambridge, Mass., 1965): 50-51 and Hans-Dieters
Evers, "Urban-Expansion-and Landownership in Underdeveloped Societies",
Urban Affairs, 11,1 (1975): 117-129.
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international monopolies. Thus, medium and small capital, for lack of
other outlets, had to expand into non-productive sectors and real
. tm t 18estate lnves en.
c} The postwar IImodelllof economic development and official economic
policy reflects the "dependentllstatus of the country and the determinant
influence of "neo-colonial" relations. The bourgeois class and the State
have in general acted in conformity with the political and economic
interests of international centres of power. They more or less opted
deliberately for a long-term strategy of development which chose
agriculture, light industry, and more especially, building as the
leading sectors of the economy. This accorded with the policy directives
of U.s. agencies formulated during and immediately after the years of the
Marshall Plan. Therefore the imbalance between industrial and residential
investment reflects directly such long-term development strategy choices.19
We will argue that these theories are scarcely relevant for an under-
standing of the nature of Greek lIoverinvestmentllin housing and its
determinant mechanisms. To anticipate, we will advance the view that the
structure of capital formation in the postwar period is the product of two
largely distinct phenomena: a chronic tendency for a relatively slow
expansion of industry and a tendency for high rates of accumulation of
personal wealth and more specifically real estate assets in the household
sector of the economy. Thus, industrial underdevelopment is a problem
peculiar to industry itself. Housebuilding, if anything, has acted posi-
tively for industrial growth. Its level and trend has been determined by
the characteristics of the household sector in Greece and the associated
process of personal wealth formation: the historically given distribution
18. This view has been very influential among Greek architects and civil
engineers after 1974, especially those attached to the C.P.G. and the far
Left. See Architects' Association, Committee for the Study of DEPOS (Public
Corporation for Housing and Urban Development), Theses on DEPOS (Athens,
1976, in Greek mtmeo') and All-Scientists Democratic Movement, Branch for
the Technical Professions, (connected with the C.P.G.) The Proposed Law for
DEPOS (Athens, 1976, in Greek mimeo).
19. Such theories refer usually to the famous Varvaressos Report as
the crucial document that expressed the American influence as well as the
tendencies of the Greek elite towards a non-industrialisation "development
model" with the consequent emphasis on building and housing. See, S.P.A.D.A.,
The HousinQ Question, pp. 9-10, G. Burgel, Athens: The Development of a
~'editerr~!lean~1etropolis (Athens, 1978, in Greek): 396-97. See also for the
document in question K. Varvaressos, Report on the Economic Problem(Athens, 1952).
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of personal income and real assets, the character of the "dual" housing
system, and lastly, "exogenous" factors such as the inflow of substantial
personal savings from abroad and the favourable trends in housing production
costs up to the early 1970's.
4. Some questions of theory and method
Some theoretical clarification is at first essential. The validity of
theories (a) - (c) is based on the validity of either of two underlying
general assumptions (or a combination of the two). First, that there is a
systematic functional relationship of determination between the "model" of
economic growth of a country and the composition of capital formation
(and more specifically the share of housing investment in the latter).
The argument must take this form: in a "proper" model of fast economic
growth the share of housing investment will be small; therefore, the very
existence of a "non-proper" model of growth goes a long way in explaining
a high share of residential investment since, whereas in the "proper" case
the latter would have been "dysfunctional", in the "non-proper" case it
is not and it may even be "functional". Second, that there is a determinate
real mechanism that connects investment decisions in industry and housing
in a negative way: an increase in the first causes a decline in the latter
and (for some views) the reverse is also true. I will argue that the first
assumption boils down to one similar to the second and that therefore it
is the second one that deserves critical examination.
Now the arguments about the functional prerequisites of "proper" economic
growth are essentially a mixture of logico-technical presariptions and some
generalisations from the experience of capitalist development in Western
countries in the nineteenth century and the theory and experience of
socia 1ist industrialisation, In thi s context, hous ing belongs more to the
category of consumption rather than to productive capital formation. The
latter, especially in capital goods industries, is from a logical point of
view an obvious priority in the development effort. Even if we include
housebuilding in investment we still have an activity that contributes
comparatively little to the growth of income; the ratio of capital to
income in the case of housing (the "capital coefficient") is often more
than five times larger than the one in industry or agriculture.20 Thus we
20. The average marginal ratio of capital to income in Greece for the
1951-1975 p~riod has been (in constant prices) 15.32 in housing, 2.36 in
industry and 3.88 in agriculture. See National Accounts 1953-1975~ p. 36.
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spend a large volume of resources for a small addition to national income.
Such observations have led to the formation of a body of economic literature
that considers housing a low priority in economic development. It is of
course admitted that some housing must be built in order to achieve a
productive utilisation of labour, especially in view of the fact that better
housing most probably influences positively the productivity of workers. In
the context, however, of a rational approach to the problem of growth under
conditions of scarcity in resources, it is argued, the emphasis must be
placed on the sectors that produce material commodities instead of services,
and capital goods instead of consumption goods. On both counts housing is
a low priority.
It may be easily granted that these arguments are of great value from
a technical-logical and normative point of view. But do they say anything
important in the order of explanation? Are investment patterns in capitalist
countries determined in the context of choices over the preferred "develop-
ment strategy", in which case the aforementioned "rational II model would have
been a powerful tool of comparative analysis? Is there commonly any effective
societal mechanism for such comprehensive "choices"? The answer should be
negative. It is well-known that such mechanisms do not exist in capitalist
countries unless they are extensively managed through State intervention
which is a rather rare occurrence, especially in the more advanced developing
nations (like Greece and some Latin American and South European countries).
In fact, the kind of "rationality" that governs market economies leads to
a radically different set of "priorities" in the process of economic;develop-
mente Thus, from a technical and logical point (i.e. from a planning po'i'nt
of view) the growth of consumption presupposes the expansion of the productive
base. In capitalist economies, however, it is the exactly opposite sequence
that is necessitated for growth: the expansion of productive capacity pre-
supposes the growth of consumption or, more generally, the expansion of
markets. This is simply another way of expressing the well-known 'principle
of effective demand".21 This may sound paradoxical or even irrational (and
in a very real sense it is indeed a fundamental irrationality of capttal tsm}:'
but Keynes, in his provocative manner, has familiarised us with this "irra-
tionality" with his examples of the beneficial role of pyramid-building and
his advise to dig holes in the ground and then fill ·them up in order to
boost the economy.
21. For a concise discussion of the principle of effective demand and
the long tradition of "underconsumption" theories of crises in capitalist
development, see L. Pasinetti, "The Economics of Effective Demand" in hisGrowth and Income Distribution (Cambridge, 1974): 29-53.
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The strategic importance of effective demand for capitalist growth makes
nonsense of abstract models of the rational ordering of priorities according
to the productive significance of each sector. Thus housing may be a low-
priority sector from a planning point of view, but it is essential in
boosting up demand for industrial investment goods as well as consumption
goods through the incomes it generates. It helps, furthermore, in the
mobilisation and spending of money savings which might have otherwise been
hoarded up or held in some other liquid form, in which case they would have
a negative effect on the expansion of employment and income (an argument
made familiar since Keynes' "General Theory"). It has been repeatedly
observed that the small volume of market outlets constitutes an important
limiting factor for the economic growth of low-income countries, especially
ones of a small size like Greece. For a capitaZist path of locally-oriented
development to be realised in such countries the following "scenario" must
take place: (i) a rise in incomes, (ii) an increase in unproductive con-
sumption, (iii) an expansion of light industry to cater for expanding local
demand, (iv) expansion of heavy industry in response to the latter, (v) an
inflow of capital from abroad attracted by the expanding market or secured
by other means (loans, foreign aid), in order to cover the lack in accumu-
lation funds due to excessive "unproductive" consumption, (vi) an increase
in productivity and further rises in incomes, etc. This scenario is radi-
cally different from the one prescribed for a p?anned, quasi-closed economy
where it is necessary in the initial stages to keep unproductive consumption
(and household incomes) at low levels and increase the share of capital
accumulation at the expense of consumption, and where reliance on foreign
capital is ruled out.22
The upshot of this argument is that the explanation of the pattern of
investment with reference to a choice between major alternatives in "develop-
ment strategies" is meaningful when and only when we have a planned, quasi-
autonomous economy. This amounts to saying that if dominant groups in Greece
have opted for a model of development more or less along the lines of
socialist industrialisation, housing investment would have been less and,
therefore, the fact that they did not, explains the "anomalous" structure
of investment. This is obviously absurd given the character of postwar
22. For this contrast of the capitalist and socialist ("planned
econory") models of development see Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchanae,
pp. 130-133.
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Greece. The possible argument that a progressive, puritan and nationalist
bourgeoisie could have effected similar developmental policies is no less
absurd since the historical existence of such a virtuous class is largely
a myth. Anyway, if we accept as historically given the existence of a
liberal-capitalist economy (in the sense of a State sector subordinate
to the private sector with limited planning of investment and production)
the latter alternative is as hypothetical as the socialist one. Thus
theories in terms of choices between "development models" as strategies
have little explanatory value in relation to the issue we examine. More
generally,the concept of a IIdevelopment model II in its strong sense has limited
operational meaning in the analysis of economic trends in capitalist
t. 23coun rles.
Let us consider a possible objection to our argument. Suppose one does
not use the concept of a "development model II or "strategy" in the strong
sense we rejected above as inadmissible for capitalist societies. Assume
that the concept is applied only in a weak sense as a description of the
tendencies of public economic policy, however limited the role of the
latter. Now since housing is one form of investment that is customarily
and rather easily regulated by the State, is it not that a high level of
such investment implies a certain ordering of priorities by dominant groups
vis-a.-vis development policy, and thus explains in turn the phenomenon
itself:' The answer depends on the meaning of "development policy". If by
the latter we mean by definition and implication all relevant Government
policy, the argument is valid,but tauto~ogica1. (as most functionalist
accounts). If "development po.licy"· is defin'ed rigorously, i.e. as pol icy
over the structure of capital formation in the light of long-term growth
objectives, the argument may be valid but only under specific conditions.
Its validity can certainly not be derived from easy assumptions about the
23. A similar point can be made with regard to the usual application of
the categories of "productive" and "unproductive" economic activities in
the analysis of growth. The distinction, as applied, has operational value
only in the context of a rationally. planned economy. As Marx insisted, the
concept of "productive labolJr" must be defined with reference to the spe-
cific economic system involved. In capitalism, the opportunities for the
formation of surplus value are the sole criterion for· judging the degree
to which certain uses of labour and resources are "productive" - if the
concept is to have any explanatory value. See Ian Gough, IIMarx's Theory of
Productive and Unproductive Labour", New Left Review, 76, (1972): 47-72.
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"dysfunctional" character of housing for "proper" development and the
corresponding assumption of its necessary "functionality" for "non-proper"
development. These are .imposed (mostly normative) criteria and do not
constitute arguments about real processes. We have already pointed to
the normally "functional" Significance of housing for short- and medium-
term development (which are the time-spans that concern capitalist States)
through the boost of effective demand and the mobilisation and realisation
of savings. Such an evaluation of the "functions" of housing is of course
absolutely realistic: postwar Greek development can not be understood
without the high rate of housing investment and this fact is widely
perceived.24 Itis thus necessary to demonstrate empirically the actual
functions of housebuilding in terms of the development process, the way
these were perceived and defined by.dominant groups within the State and
the capitalist class, and the extent and real significance of public re-
gulation over the rate of housing investment.
This lengthy digression has been necessary in order to arrive at an
important methodological point: the question of the validity of the theories
that explain housing investment in postwar Greece (listed in section 4 above)
with reference to one or another form of "structural underdevelopment"
reflected in the tendencies of the State and the capitalist class can be
reduced to three much narrower hypotheses:
a) The Greek State has consistently and actively promoted/encouraged
investment in housing.
b) Such positive actions were decided in the context of "d~velopment policy"
decisions and thus antagonised directly industrial investment (to a small
or large degree).
c) There has been a direct or indirect negative relationship between the
levels of industrial and residential investment. These have been based
either on the behaviour of the agents of investment, namely the actual
or potential members of the capitalist class, and/or on the functioning
of the "impersonal" capital market (i.e. the process of allocation of
accumulated savings).
24. This in no way implies that housebuilding was the crucial determi-
nant factor behind postwar growth. The argument in favour of the positive
economic significance of housing has been sometimes carried to extremes by
interest groups associated with the building sector - builders, civil engl-
neers, landowners, and certain finance groups. See, for instance, K.T.
Triandafyllides, "Housing Activity as a Factor in the Development of the
Greek Economy", Techni ka Chroni ka , 6, (l972): 579-588.
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The two conditions added to the third hypothesis have been included
for two reasons: they reflect the content of the views we examine,as well
as exhaust the logical possibilities for such a negative relationship. It
may be argued that the previous list is incomplete without a fourth hypo-
thesis, namely that the State through inaction in the face of an excessive
level of residential investment has "accepted" and/or promoted a pattern of
relative industrial underdevelopment. However, the validity of this hypo-
thesis presupposes the validity of hypothesis Cc). It is therefore super-
fluous. We intend to show that hypotheses Ca) to (c) are ungrounded in the
light of postwar developments and thus reject the relevance of the "structural
underdevelopment" theories of housing investment. After this negative task
we will advance an alternative view of the "societal" factors ("peculia-
rities" of Greek society) that have acted towards the formation of high
levels of residential investment.
5. The role of public economic policy
Let us start with a review of the policies of the Greek State towards
housing as related to the wider economy. Let us define as economic policy
for housing that sub-set of official actions which (a), have demonstrable
dipect effects on the level of residential building and Cb), involve
publ icly procl aimed or circumstantially .tmpl ied considerations (objectives)
as to the effects of the expected change i"nbuilding on economic activity
in general OP (c), instead of (b}, involve demonstrable, direct, and
important effects on sectors of the economy other than housing by virtue
of a necessary connection between State actions towards these sectors and
actions towards the housing sector. This last condition covers cases of
objeotive conflicts in the allocation of publicly controlled resources
irrespective of the particular objectives of housing policy. We take it
for granted, moreover, that the concept of "public policy" does not extend
to the fundamental functions and orientations that are a constituent part
of capital ist States coomitted to a capital ist path of development, relat i-
vely limited State· interve~iion and liberal ideQlogy. These functions and
orientations may shift in'history but for a given period and set of countries
form a general background and set broad limits that determine a common
denominator or more properly a set of "invariants" in pol icy.,.Jt1e-·:litter'
-~.may, from a certain viewpoint, conform to the definitional criteria we
advanced and entail conclusions about the role of the State in the formation
of housing investment. But these conclusions can be justifiably considered
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banal for the purpose of this analysis. Thus, we are interested in signi-
ficant variations ~ithin these broad limits.25 With this proviso in mind
we can say that postwar economic policy towards housing can in no way be
understood as consistently favourable for increasing rates of housebuilding.
On the contrary, it has underwent a number of important shifts one way or
the other. We can roughly distinguish four periods: two effectively favour-
able, 1948-1954 and 1967-1973, and two relatively unfavourable, 1955-1966
and the post-1974 years.26 The latter have been periods characterised by
widely manifested signs of a critical official attitude towards housing
"overinvestment", by restrictions of a monetary and fiscal nature and by
a restrained application of disincentives - "restrained" in the sense that
the essential role of the housing sector in the short and medium-term
functionning of the economy was taKen for granted alongside the assumption
(a right one) that the "problem" lay more in insufficient industrial, growth.
The difference between the 1948-1954 period and subsequent years lay
at a deeper level than a mere conjunctural shift in policy. During that
period the Greek State took, in contrast to later periods, an active part
in capital formation. The main issues involved in this activity were the
reconstruction of the country in the aftermath of the war and the allocation
25. The reader will notice that I am rather brusquely disposing of
some controversial issues in political theory and method. It is well-known
that whereas long-term orientated Marxist analyses of the capitalist State
see fe ....t significant variations in pol icies, those incl ined to "behav toura l"
methods and the short term arrive at the exactly oPPosite conclusion about
the role of the State. There are sharp differences, moreover, as to what
constitutes relevant empirical material. Without wishing to underplay the
important differences in theory and method involved in these controversies,
I would advance the opinion that most of the debate has been fruitless and
distorting with regard to the real issues. This can be avoided if one starts
by specifying the temporal scope of analysis and the range of variation that
will be considered as theor2tically Iisignificant". These desicions will
determine, to a very large extent, the nature of the conclusions.
26. This time-pattern follows quite closely the development of interna-
tional opinion on the issue. As Strassman su~marised
tlOuring the early 50's the heart of development theory was capital
shortage and capital formation. Special attention was given to
construction because this sector seemed able to prcduce capital
without using capital. (Afterwards) ...construction fell out
of favor ... housing appeared as unproductive and inflationary
and causing problems for the balance of payments.1I Later, however.
building regained favor: "unemployment, urban squalor and political
unrest in developing countries led to the reinstatement of con-
struction as a key part in development strategy in the 60's ...
Aid and the Inter-American Development Bank initiated programs
of housing loans and mortgage guarantees". (Strassman, IICon-
struction Productivity").
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of American Aid among the multitude of pressing needs and claims for
priority. The singularity of the period lay in the fact that the State
managed directly substantial funds aimed for investment. Thus a choice
to expand housebuilding antagonised in an immediate sense the growth of
investment in sectors of higher priority from a developmental point of
view. The pressures from foreign agencies on the Government towards the
adoption of a view of the Greek economy as one based mainly on agriculture,
combined with the concern to "stabf lise" the countryside after the end of
the Civil War, made for the allocation of substantial funds for programs
of housing in rural areas.27 As a result, the share of the public sector
in residential investment reached record levels of more than 35% during
1948-1950. As private activity rose and American aid was cut off28 the
share of the public sector in housebuilding fell drastically: during
1951-1958 it fluctuated between 8% and 15%. Similar conditions of active
involvement of the State in the allocation of investment funds were not
repeated; throughout the rest of the postwar period this share has stayed
down at an insignificant level of 3-4% or lower (see General Appendix, A.5,A.7).
During 1948-1955 the State promoted private building activity, too.
The most relevant measure in this respect has been a Law passed in 1947
("KH Psiphisma") aiming explicitly at a boost of the private redevelopment
of central areas in Greek cities granting tax exemptions for income from
dwellings built between 1945 and 1955 and, to a lesser degree, from those
to be built between 1955 and 1960. This has been widely recognised as a
27. For the rural housing programs of the period, see Part 1 in Housing
in Greece: Government Activit pp. 150-160 (English translation of the
Greek text. For a short discussion of the period with references to urban
development policies, see A. Voivonda et al., liTheManagement of Space
in Greece: A Short Historical Account", Architecture in Greece. 11 (1977):
130-51 (in Greek). For information about the American Aid see, C.A. Munkman,
American Aid to Greece: A Re ort on the First Ten Years (New York, 1958),
W.H. McNeil, Greece: American Aid in Action 1947-1956 New York, 1957),
and D. Psilos, IIPostwar Economic Problems in Greecell in Committee for
Economic Development, Economic Develo ment Issues: Greece, Israel, Taiwan
and Thailand (New York, 1968 : 1-77.
28. In the beginning of the 1950ts American Aid funds permitted high
levels of budget deficits, as well as a measure of public finance for
private investment. In the succeeding years the volume of aid diminished
sharply and was mainly directed to military purposes. As a result, the
effort to keep the budget deficit within bounds led to a radical drop in
the volume of public sector investment. See, X. Zolotas, Monetary Equili-
brium and Economic Development (Princeton, 1965), p. 101.
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significant incentive for urban building.29 We may add that the favourable
attitude towards housebuilding has most probably been a significant posi-
tive factor in the formation of the 1948-1954 upswing in illegal building
(see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3).
The favourable attitude towards housebuilding (and building in general)
that informed official policy during the period was based on several argu-
ments. There was a pressing need to reduce unemployment and construction
seemed ideal for this. There was also the need to alleviate the tremendous
housing shortage created by the years of war, the occupation, and the
civil war. Lastly, housebuilding could induce dishoarding and thus inject
some needed energy into the economy.30 The fear of social unrest due to
a widespread housing and unemployment problem coupled with fresh memories
of communist influence must have certainly added weight to the pro-housing
economic argument. This argument was presented in a most comprehensive form
in the famous IIVarvaressos' Repor-t" (1951) with which it is customarily
associated in all later accounts, though it was certainly present in earlier
policy proposals and plans. It is important to say, however, that this
report in no way represented an undisputed majority view even among
official circles,31 This is easily understandable given the exceptional
role of the State at the time, namely its direct involvement in the allo-
cation of investment funds and more notably foreign aid and loan funds.
The appropriation of aid funds required the drawing up of comprehensive
and detailed economic plans for the country as a whole and for particular
sectors. The character and objectives of the plans were hotly debated
both among Greek authorities and between the latter and foreign agencies
(U.N., The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the ~~erican
Mission}. This led naturally to polarised controversies over priorities:
obvious economic and ideological conflicts were involved. One of the issues
was the drain of funds into ;Iousing when the building of a sol id base
29. Ellis et al. Industrial Capital, p. 215.
30. We must keep in mind that during that period, due to a long expe-
rience of hyperinflation, the public's confidence in the banking system was
very limited. Housebuilding was largely based on personal savings outside
financial institutions - literally "kept under the mattress". See J.L.Crane,
"National Housing Policy in Greece", Technika Chronikes.,105-106, (l955}:50-54
31. See vol. 7 of the Review of Economic and Political Science (1952, in
Greek) devoted to a critical revi-el'Jof the Varvaressos Report by a number of
prc~;nent Greek intellectuais. Most of these (Zolotas, Evelpidis, Zigdis,
Koulis, Dertilis, Aghapitidis) held at the time or in the following years.
highly influential posts in the Administration, in political parties and ln
the universities.
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for the industrialisation and electrification of the country required funds
for crucial public works. In fact, the policies of the period were to a
large extent a compromise between the industrialisation priority and the
more conservative alternative stressing immediate palliatives and the role
of the traditional economic structure {e.g. agriculture).32 The formative
period of the postwar pattern, then, though relatively favourable for the
.growth of the housing sector, is much more complex and contradictory
than purported by simplistic accounts which, with easy hindsight, "explain"
later developments with reference to the "choices" made then. A more
important point, however, is that the period was exceptional both in terms
of the role of the State and the structure of housing politics.
After 1955 the nature of economic policy as well as the structure of
relevant political conflicts changed drastically. Up to 1967 the principles
that directed Government policy were the achievement of a relatively
balanced budget, a check of the balance of international payments against
excesses and, in general, monetary conservatism - in short, a cautious
effort to promote expansion with a measure of Keynesian recipes without
risking inflation. Since housebuilding, a major booster of effective demand,
displayed an autonomous dynamism that was deemed excessive, and in view
of the sluggish performance of industry and the obvious possibility that
there existed serious productive bottlenecks in the economy (which would
cause inflation in case of excessive demand), housing was considered as
a very low priority in the context of fiscal and monetary policy. Thus the
provision of bank credit to building enterprises was strictly forbidden.
The fact that speculative housing catered for luxury demand offered an
additional economic argument (and public legitimacy) in support of restri-
ctions, for luxury consumption (and the consequent imports) were deemed
disproportionately high. Similar arguments led to keeping mortgage credit
to households at a minimum. Housing was thus defined as "unproductive"
32. See I. Zigdis, "The Industrialisation of Postwar Greece and the
Essential Role of U.N.N.R.A.", Economicos Tachydromos, 6.1.1972 (in Greek),
and L. Nikolaidis, "The Effort for Industrialization Has Its Foundation in
the 1948 Plan", Economicos Tachydromos. 9.12.1971 & 16.12.1971 (in Greek).
For references to the relevant official documents of this period, see,
D. Emmanuel, "State Action and Policy for the Housing Sector in Greece"
in Technical Chamber of Greece, Housing in Greece (Athens, 1979, in Greek):
34-84.
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among official circles but in a sense that belonged less to the concerns
and rationale of long-term development strategy than to the day-ta-day
management of the economy through monetary and fiscal instruments where
"unproductive" signified "more-inflation-conducive".33 Official policy
and practice conformed closely to the rule that whatever resources and
fiscal incentives the State controlled must be channelled as a priority
to industry, agriculture and infrastructure works. The latter two received
most of public sector investments. In the beginning of the post-1955 period
the housing sector was left to its resources, the dominant attitude being
one of critical Zaissez faire.
This attitude turned increasingly to a strongly negative one.34 The
chronic imbalance in the structure of capital formation (despite the
relatively high rates of industrial growth du~ing 1955-1963), the growing
emphasis on economic planning, and the fast modernisation of the economy
in the early 1960's have led the main agencies responsible for the forma-
tion and implementation of economic policy (the Bank of Greece and the-
Ministry of Coordination) to express open alarm over the alleged "over-
investment" in housing.35 It was recognised. however, that the core of
the problem lay in the slow rates of growth of industry itself rather
than in any conflict over capital resources between the two sectors: it
lay more in the sluggish demand for productive capital rather than in a
scarcity of savings in general. Hence the economic strategy proposed
envisaged a boost of incentives offered to industrial investors, monetary
stability and the modernisation of the capital market, so as to facilitate
a more productive allocation of savings. It was proposed that housing
investment should be reduced less by the use of direct restrictive
measures than by indirect, long-term methods based on institutional
reforms in the process of the mobilisation and allocation of savings.
A measure of restriction by means of increased taxation was considered
33. See Zolotas, Monetary Equilibrium, Chapter 2.
34. Ellis et al. point out that thi~ change in attitude took place
during 1958-1959 (Industrial Capital, p. 215).
35. The association of Greece with the EEC in 1960 has been an important
factor behind the increased emphasis placed on economic planning and ~odern-
isation of the economy. For a short account of postwar economic plannwg up
to the mid-60's see Psilos "Postwar Economic Problems".
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necessary, however, especially in the case of luxury housing for middle
and upper strata in cities.56 A number of restrictive measures along
these lines have indeed been introduced.57 The real effects of this
negative policy context on housebuilding have been insignificant: the
1960-1965 boom in building as a whole and speculative apartment building
in particular testifies to this •.The downturn in building permits observed
in 1966 which was interpreted at the time as a "crisis" in direct result
to the official "victimisationll of building has certainly been in its
greatest part the natural downswing phase of the usual three-year building
cycle characteristic of postwar speculative building. After 1967 - a real
crisis year but for reasons unrelated to housing policy - the start of the
1968-73 boom in housebuilding and the extremely favourable policies of the
military dictatorship put an end to this phase of housing policies.
36. See C.P.E.R., Draft of the Five-Year Economic Oevelo ment Plan for
Greece 1966-1970 (Athens, 1965 : pp. 9-10, 113-114 and C.P.E.R., Housing
(Athens, 1967, in Greek). The basic arguments for a critical stand toward
housing "overinvestment" and the suggestion for a policy of limited
restriction and emphasis on the modernisation of the capital market and the
supply of incentives to industry has been presented in the highly influential
study by Ellis et al. Industrial Capital, Ch. 8. The necessity for institu-
tional changes in the capital market has been also stressed in D.O. Psilos,
Capital Market in Greece, passim. Criticism of the tendency toward over-
investment in unproductive sectors in the Greek economy has been a constant
theme in the writings of X. Zolotas. It is significant that Zolotas has been
throughout the postwar period (excepting the dictatorship years) the Governor
of the Bank of Greece - a post of exceptional power with regard to the forma-
tion of economic policy. See his Reconstruction and Viability (Athens, 1948,
in Greek), Monetar E uilibrium, and Consumption, Investment and Monetary
Equilibrium Athens, 1977 . We must add, however, that Zolotas, though
strongly "developmentalist" in his normative and theoretical pronouncements,
has been, in actual policy-making, mainly concerned with the inflationary
impact of over-investment in "unproductive" sectors.
J7. These measures were: a) Taxation of certain building materials as
luxury imports (1958, 1950 - see Zolotas, Monetary Equilibrium, pp. 109-110).
b) Revision of the tax on built property transfers so that the value of the
property be calculated according to the final form it will have after
completion of building. Since it was a widespread practice to sell apart-
ments at the initial stages of building, previous laws offered an opportu-
nity for a gross undervaluation of the property sold. The new measure (Law
4242:'1962) thus increased substantially the amount of the transfer tax (see
Ellis et al., Industrial Capitall pp. 215-216). c) A raise of the nominalvalue per cubic meter determined administratively for new buildings on the
basis of which certain taxes and social security fees are calculated. d)
Increase of the tax on land value gains due to public works from a rate
of one-third to one-half of the gains (Law 4459/1965). The Law was repealed
in 1967 - one of the first measures of the dictatorship - with Law 82/1967.
See, I. Michael, Management of the Land Factor in the Athens Master Plan
(Athens, 1973, in Greek): 235-237.
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The negative policy climate of the first half of the 1960's and the
official pronouncements about the "unproductive" character of housing had
a lasting and formative impact on the structure of the politics of housing
in Greece. They provoked widespread violent reactions from economic inte-
rests involved in speculative building, as well as the professions asso-
ciated with the building economy (notably civil engineers and to a lesser
extent architects). Such counter~ttacks utilised the stock arguments in
favour of housing: its social significance, its beneficial effects on labour
productivity and its importance as a generator of income and employment.38
These views became official orthodoxy during the military dictatorship
(up to 1973); high rates of housebuilding were promoted through a variety
of measures in urban planning, taxation and credit supply. The immediate
objective of these policies was to "reflate" the economy most especially
in response to the 1967 slump and the need for popular measures felt by
h • 39t e new reglme.
It could be said, however, that this pattern of housing policy was an
integral part of a wider economic and socia-political outlook dominant
during the period. Its principles were easy credit, active promotion of
capitalist relations and encouragement of speculation, and the protection
and enhancement of middle-class property under the guise of "populist"
policies. These were coupled with severe restrictions of non-capitalist
38. See Second Panhellenic Congress of Architects (1962) ,"Conclusions",
pp. 122-127; Technical Chamber of Greece (T. E. E. ), "Contribution of T. E.E.
to the Solution of the Country's Housing Problem", Technika Chronika, 275,
(1964, in Greek). See also the statements of various building entre-
preneurs and professionals on the "building crisis" and the economic and
social significance of housing in A.K. Alexandropoulos (ed.) "Greek
Housing: Present and Future", Economicos Tachydromos, issues 740, 741,
742 (1968, in Greek). E. Kouloumbis, the then president of the Technical
Chamber, expressed aptly the opinions prevalent among professionals asso-
ciated with building when he said of 1963-66: "during the last four years
the State effected pol icies hostile to building activity". See his !lA
Program for Social Housing Must Be Designed", Economicos Tachydromos~
26.10.1967 (in Greek). The reader must keep in mind that civil engineers -
the dominant professional group in the Technical Chamber - are commonly
involved in building both as engineers and as entrepreneurs. Thus the
Technical Chamber has been strongly influenced by business interests
associated with speculative building.
39. See, C.P.E.R., Development Plan of Greece 1968-1972 (Athens, 1968)
and C.P.E.R., Long-term Perspective Plan for the Development of Greece
(Athens, 1972), Vol. 2. Ch. 10 (in Greek), and more especially the
quantitative projections in National Monograph (1973). See, also
Tri andafyll ides, "Housing Activity".
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sectors be them precapitalist low-income building or programs for workers'
housing.40 The sharp reversal of policy in 1973 (i.e. the introduction
of highly restrictive measures) did not signify any serious change in
approach or principles; it expressed orthodox counter-inflation measures
as well as the fear of a major flight of savings away from commercial
banks and into building.41 After the change in regime in 1974, official
policy reverted to a large degree to the pattern of the early 1960's,
monetary conservatism, restrictions on housing credit (though not below
a certain IIfloorllestablished by the previf'us period), introduction of
taxation of real property and a diffused critical attitude towards housing
lIoverinvestment".42
This short review of economic policy towards housebuilding helps
sufficientlY in dispelling any notions that the postwar pattern of
aggregate investment and by implication the level of residential invest-
ment has been the direct result of a IIpro-housinglldevelopment stT'ategy~
or that housebuilding has been consistently favoured by the State. Of
course, in the last analysis, the Greek institutional framework and public
policy have never been restrictive for real estate investments in any
radical or extensive way; this is certainly true for speculative building.
But this, needless to say, does not point to the opposite conclusion,
namely that the State generally promoted housebuilding. In fact, after
the early 1950's, the State did not have any determinant involvement
in the mechanism of capital formation and, if anything, its constant
concern was industrial expansion. Moreover, after the early 1950' s Govern-
ments exercised policies of strict financial austerity: no more than insigni-
ficant amounts of bank credit were allowed to either builders or households,
regardless of the colume of savings accumulated in banks and ostensibly
aimed for this very purpose. A major exception was the 1968-1972 period
40. See chapter 4 and D. Emmanuel, Three Studies of Popular Housing,
pp. 12-23.
41. The measures introduced in this occasion were a'rise in the nominal
unit value of buildings for which permit was asked (and thus a rise in the
rate of taxation and the various fees), as well as a sharp credit squeeze.
For a chronological list of the measures see O.E.C.D., Economic Surveys:
Greece, the 1974 and 1975 volumes.
42. For discussions of the post-1974 period, see A. Romanos, IIAReview
of Housing Policy After July 1974", in Chair of Architectural Design,
Problems of Greek Housing (Thessaloniki, 1976): 133-151 (in Greek), D.
Emmanuel, Three Studiesa pp. 24-38. Post-1974 quasi-official orientationsfor housing policy can be studied in C.P.E.R., 1976-1980 Development Plan:
Housing.
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when bank credit added an important lIexogenousll boosting factor to the
growth of autonomously financed housing investment. But even during this
period credit to developers was extremely limited.43 Thus interpretations
of the postwar pattern that assume an antagonistic relationship between
industrial and residential finance and investment effected through State
policy and in some manner favourable for the housing sector, are certainly
ill~founded. In consequence, hypotheses (a) and (b) as presented in page
214 should be rejected.
6. The relationship between investment in industry and investment in housing
The force of the last point becomes obvious when we consider certain
broader theories about the alleged negative relationship between industrial
and real estate capital formation (hypothesis c in page 214]. Such
theories advance the following thesis: due to cultural and historical
reasons and/or due to local and international economic conditions owners
of capital "prefer" or "have to" mainly invest resources in non-industrial
activities and more specifically in speculative real estate. Hence the
"distortedll structure of capital formation in postwar Greece. We must imme-
diately stress that insofar as these theories pertain to the issue of
inadequate industrial expansion as such, they are of limited interest for
this discussion. Our object of study is not the structure of capital forma-
tion in itself, but only to the degree that it explains (causes through a
determinate mechanism) residential investment. The same holds for the
controversial issue of the relative importance of various factors in the
determination of capitalist investment behaviour, namely the significance
of cultural-sociological factors (derived from historical tradition or
present social structure) as opposed to purely "economtc" ones (t .e,
economic rationality in conjunction with various adverse economic condi-
tions peculiar to Greece}.44 We are only interested in the hypothesis of
43. For the National r10rtgage Bank (the ma in agency for mortgage credi t
and the exclusive supplier of loans to developers) we have:
Total Credit Supply 1945-74 (in mill. drs): 30.654,5
of which, housing loans to households 16.138,1
of which, loans supplied during 1968-74. 12.638,6 (78,3%).
Loans to building enterprises for the whole 1945-74 period (supplied mainly
during 1968-74) amounted only to 1.331,1 mills. See, National Mortage Bank,
Report for 1974 (Athens, 1975, in Greek): Statistical Appendix.
44. As far as I know Alexander's Greek Industriaiists is the only
systematic study addressed to this issue. As we noted eJl'lier, Alexander
rejected the "socia-cultural" hypothesis.
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a determinate negative relationship between the two types of investment;
this, as we noted earlier, can be realised in either one of the following
ways: through the behaviour of capitalists (including small ones) or
through the "impersonal" mechanism of the "capital market". Let us consider
the first case.
The derivation of the trend and level of housing investment from the
investment behaviour of the social category of "capital owners" (rentiers
and active capitalists) obviously implies the existence of business invest-
ment in residential property in a large scale. In the case of postwar
Greece, however, no such investment flow took place. Substantial rentiers,
who may justifiably be considered as potential or actual members of the
social category of capitalists, have played a negligible role in residential
real estate. We have already noted this lack of substantial rentiers in
Chapter 3, but we may add some pertinent facts. In 1967, owners of built
property who received income from buildings of all kinds in excess of
200,000 drs a year (roughly E 2500) constituted a mere 0.9% of the building
owners included in the tax rolls. These received 17% of all the declared
income from buildings. This may appear as a rather large degree of real
wealth concentration but it results from the great diffusion of built
property among a large number of very small owners - mainly owner-occupiers
of housing. In fact, the category of relatively significant rentiers was
composed by very modest units of wealth; the average size of the latter
did not exceed eight million drachmas (corresponding to annual receipts
of 400,000 drs - roughly E 5000 - assuming a 5% capitalisation rate). If
we examine the same category in 1974 as defined by a minimum income from
buildings of 300,000 drs per year (in order to take inflation into account),
the average wealth unit was in the neighbourhood of ten million drs - surely
a very modest sum for purported capitalists.45 The crux of the matter,
however, lies elsewhere: the wealth of this tiny category is concentrated
in its largest part in non-residentiaZ real estate, i.e. offices and
commercial property. We may add to this the small market of luxury housing
in downtown Athens and Thessaloniki. It is these types of real estate that
attract business investment. Moreover, the extensive redevelopment of such
high-return central areas in conjunction with the arrangements of "anti-
45. For 1967 see Table 3.2. Ch. 3 and for 1974, N.S.S.G., Statistics of
Declared Family Income and Its Taxation, 1974 (Athens, 1975, in Greek).
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parochi" (the appropriation of part of the building by the landowner in
exchange for the land) must have certainly created a large part of this
wealth without any need for the investment of funds. With regard to non-
personal rentiers (insurance institutions, incorporated enterprises)
similar points can be made. It is well-known that these channel their
investments into the same limited area of high-rent non-residential
property. It is evident, then, that for the great bulk of residential
investment in the country the role of the capitalist-rentier class is of
no consequence.
It has been said at times that the return on property investment has
been higher than profit rates in industry with the result that funds
are drawn away from the latter. We can dismiss these views as ungrounded
on this basis of the previous observations alone. However, they also run
against direct evidence. Relatively high returns on real property (8.5% -
9.0%) could be observed during the late 1950's and early 1960's.46 These
fell drastically later to a mere 3% - 4%.47 Such rates of return, even
when combined with the capital gains of real property and its security
as an asset, may successfully compete with the current rate of interest
on bank deposits but scarcely with the much higher returns on own capital
in industry.48
The above suffice to show that we may justifiably approach the issue
of the determination of the level and growth of residential finance and
investment for the period under study outside the sphere of business
capital accumulation. The relevant determinants must be searched for in
the sphere of the household sector and the factors that shaped the formation
and distribution of household income and wealth. Was there a mechanism that
46. See Ellis et al., Ind'istrial Capital, p. 213. Alexander in Greek
Industrialists gives a 10% rate (p. 69). It is interesting that with the
current (post-1974) stagnation in industrial investment the thesis of the
draining of capital away from industry due to the alleged high return rate
in real estate, has gained new life (see D.E.C.D., Economic Surveys, 1978
volume). It seems that the radical discontinuity between capitalist industry
and the household economy of residential investment can not be easily grasped
by economists accustomed to the integrated capital markets of advanced
countries.
47. C.P.E.R., Development Plan for 1976-1980: Incomes Policy, Report of
the Study Group, (Athens, 1976, in Greek), p. 81.
48. See the series of profit rates in industry in G. Coutsoumaris,
Finance and nevelopment of Industry (Athens, 1976, in Greek): Chapter 6.
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connected the latter in an antagonistic way with capital formation in
industry through the general "capital market"? We can easily answer in
the negative. Postwar Governments after all were right in treating the
issue of industrial investment as largely separate from that of housing
"overinvestmentll as far as the distribution of savings was concerned.
The reason was that there was slight probability after the early 1950's
for a direct antagonism in the open market between residential and indu-
strial needs for finance. The postwar level and growth of available savings
was such that, in comparison to the finance requirements of industry, no
problem of capital scarcity arose. Were the case different, an antagonism
between industry and housing would have been provoked and this would have
led to an inverse relationship between the two types of investment.
Greece is distinguished from other developing countries by a high level
of savings in relation to national income. In this respect it approaches
the patterns of developed countries.49 A number of influential economic
studies have established that a permanent characteristic of the post-1955
economic scene has been a surpZus of savings in relation to investment
demand - especially in relation to demand from industry.50 Whereas the
volume of savings held in banks increased between 1953 and 1975 by a factor
of 16.4 (in real values), bank credit channelled towards the financing
of industry increased much less - 10.9 times. It is significant that these
funds for industry concerned mostly short-term finance. Bank credit
utilised in the formation of fixed capital in industry rose during this
period by a much smaller factor of 6.8 - surely, a tremendous gap between
the demand for and the availability of funds.51 That this growth in industrial
investment credit refl ected the growth. in the demand for such funds follows
naturally from the fact that throughout the period under study Greek Govern-
ments implemented policies of generous incentives, low interest rates and
easy credit as far as industry was concerned. Orthodox economists, of course,
will always argue that more successful monetary policies and better banking
institutions would have resulted in different and better outcomes (wish-
fully hoping, in effect, for easy solutions to the problem of industrial
Ch.
49. Coutsoumaris, Finance and Development, p. 108.
50. See Ellis et al., Industrial Capital, Ch. 1, Psilos, Capital Market,
2, Coutsoumaris, Finance and Development, passim.
51. Coutsoumaris, Finance and Development, p. 110.
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growth). We know, however, after Keynes, that the really determinant
variable in the growth of a capitalist system is the largely "exogenous II
datum of investment decisions by capitalists. After all, their relation
with savings is not passive: it is determined by the decisions of firms
over the desired "structure of finance.52
Industrial .enterprises in Greece (limited liability companies and
Societes Anonymes) base their investments on "internalll financing (with-
held profits and derpeciation funds) and to a lesser extent on funds from
shareholders and from abroad. Their reliance on the banking system for
fixed capital formation is therefore limited. Only a share of just over
20% of the investment in fixed capital and inventories is covered by
resorting to bank credit. The easily supplied bank loans are used less
for investment in fixed capital and more for the financing of circulating
capital, i.e. in the distribution of industrial products.53 In short,
there is a strong emphasis on financial autonomy and on keeping the control
of the firm within a limited circle. The same motive explains the well-
Known reluctance of Greek industrialists to seek finance in the open
capital market through the issuing of new attractive securities which
could obviously contribute to the much-desired reallocation of small
savings away from real estate and towards industry. The saving public has
repeatedly showed that it is in ready demand for the supply of such secu-
rities as the fast sales of bank and government bonds, whenever these were
'tssued , has proved in the past. 54.
To finish this long discussion, the fact that there was no capital
scarcity and no significant overlap between industrial and residential
investors qua business investors removes the reasons for a necessary
negative relationship between the movements of the two types of investment.55
52. For a most elegant and illuminating formulation of the Neo-Keynesian
~croeconomic model placing emphasis on capitalists' decisions to invest
and the structure of financing, see N. Kaldor, "Marginal Productivity and
Macroeconomic Theories of Distribution", Review of Economic Studies, 33
(1966): 309-319.
53. Coutsoumaris, Finance and Development, p. 84.
54. See Bank of Greece, Report for the Year 1975 (Athens, 1976): 61-63
55. As Richardson and Aldcroft point out "a high level of building
activity need not restrict an economy's capacity for growth except in cases
where there is a fundamental scarcity in investment resources" Building in
the British Economy Between the Wars, pp. 278-279).
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There is, on the other hand (given these conditions), a very strong case
for a positive relationship between the two. Both sectors relate positively
with the movement of incomes and the economy as a whole. Moreover, movements
in building are connected positively with industrial activity (and the
expectations of industrialists) through the demand for material inputs
for building. Postwar movements in investment offer ample evidence for this
argument. A linear regression of private residential investment (Ih) on
private investment in manufacturing rIm) gives the following results:
Ih = 3.3770 + 1.5744 Im (R=0.884) {mill.drs. 1970 prices,1948-77.56
It may be pointed that this strong positive correlation does not say
much since both sectors followed a similar growth path. This is a reasonable
point and a helpful reminder against the all-too common reliance on easily
successful correlations performed on postwar data which in general show
parallel upward trends of growth. Still, the positive relationship is quite
significant seen from a broader historical perspective rather than a short-
and medium-term one. In order to examine interactions at the more short-term
level we have measured the deviations of each type of investment from the
respective trends for 1948-1977. These fluctuations are presented in Figure
5.1. It is immediately evident that there are no grounds for an argument
in favour of a negative correlation between the two types of investment.
Nor is there evidence of a significant positive correlation: linear
regression of the deviations of Ih on the deviations of Im gives us
DIh = 2.9030 + 0.1519 DIm (R=O.0993). ("0" is the per cent
deviation from the 1948-1977 trend},
After a closer inspection of the time-series, however, a clearer pattern
is revealed. We may notice that the shorter duration of the housebuilding
cycle makes obviously for a weak correlation between the two series. If we
smooth out the series by means of moving averages we would certainly get
a stronger correlation. Second, it is evident that the two series relate
in a different way before and after the late 1950's. This accords well
with our analysis of the postwar period: the relatively strong involvement
of the Greek State in capital formation in the earlier part of the postwar
period should be expected to distort the pattern generated by private
investment behaviour in the market system and create an inverse relation-
ship between residential and industrial investment. Indeed, if there was
56. See, National Accounts, 1958-75 and 1970-77 and General Appendix A.7.
Figure 5.1: Gross Investment in manufacturing (1m) and dwellings (Ih) 1948-
1977, per cent deviation from trend (DIm, DIh)
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Source: National Accounts of Greece, 1958-1975, and 1978 Statistical Yearbook.
See also General Appendix, TableA.7.The equations represent the respe-
ctive trends in gross investment which include both private and public
investment in constant 1970 prices.
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a significant relationship between the two sectors in this earlier part
of the period t it was most probably a weak negative.one,
A linear regression for 1948-1958 verifies this hypothesis: we have
DIh = 7.3969 - 0.9873 DIm (R = 0.2905).
This contrasts sharply with the pattern of the 1959-1977 period where we
have a rather strong positive association (especially in view of our pre-
vious point about the different duration of short-term cycles): the
respective regression is
DIh = 0.4380 + 0.3649 DIm (R = 0.4294).
Thus for the largest part of the postwar period and certainly the more
relevant one (at least in relation to this study), the case for an
inverse relationship between residential and industrial investment should
be rejected and the opposite one accepted as a matter of fact. We must
immediately add, however, that this does not necessarily imply a direat
determinant association between the two categories of investment decisions.
More to the point, the evidence of positive association in the short run,
though indicative of definite indirect interrelationships, does not dis-
qualify our argument about the essential autonomy of the residential
investment process vis-a-vis industrial capital formation. The pattern
is simply the result of wider determinants that influence both kinds
of investment similarly, namely the movements of income and effective
demand and the fluctuations in the "expectat.tons"of the broad class
of capital ists (which includes speculative builders),
7. Formation of residential wealth within the household sector
We have shown thus far that the level and growth trend of aggregate
residential investment (Ih) cannot be understood as the corollary of the
structure or "model II of fixed capital formation CFCF) as a whole as this
has developed in the postwar period. In short, the determinant relations
do not lie at the level of the formation of the Ih/FCF ratio. The reasons
are many but the crux of the matter lies in the fact that neither the
State nor the business sector of the economy or the organised capital
market are the determinant spheres for the allocation of funds into resi-
dential wealth. The proper level for the understanding of the structure
and determinants of the accumulation of residential wealth is thus to be
found within the household sector of the economy. More specifically, the
determinant mechanismsare, first, the formation of wealth among households
(including small rentiers), i.e. the division of disposable income between
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consumption and wealth with all the social-structural and institutional-
historical influences involved, and second, the allocation of household
demand for wealth among residential and non-residential forms as well as
the mechanism of the realisation of the former into actual real estate.~7
In more systematic terms we argue that the level and growth trend of
private residential investment in the postwar period can be explained as
the product of the following theoretical framework:
a. Household demand for additions to wealth raw) is a function of available
»eeourcee (R)~ and is mainly determined by the relatively stable pro-
pensities of households to allocate resources among consumption and
wealth as resources change. Resources are composed by previous wealth
(Wt_1) ("historica lly" given at the beginning of the ana 1ysi s), dispo-
sable real income (Yalearned at present (including income transfers
from the State and abroad) and wealth transferred to the household
sector of which the most significant part is that transferred from
abroad {S l.58a
~7. To someone accustomed to the urban economics of developed nations
this may sound as going the long way to arrive at an obvious point. Isn't,
after all, household demand for real assets the first candidate for the
status of a major determinant of building to come to one's mind? The uncri-
tical acceptance of such an assumption, however, woul d simply betray a lack
of comparative and historical perspective. It is hardly obvious in the context
of a developing country that the household sector has the substantial auto-
nomy as well as the capacity for extensive capital accumulation; these
definitely presuppose a certain level of economic development, a lack of
capital scarcity for given investment demand, and a certain "political
economy" (a limited involvement of the State in the process of capital
accumulation). The absence of these preconditions, moreover, would have
important implications for the character of the system of housing production
(see Chapter 1). We would expect a very limited precapita1ist owner-building
sector and the emergence and growth of an extensive speculative sector would
involve predominantly "business" capital (more properly, capital of the
bourgeois class) and thus follow a radically different dynamic from a
sector based on household asset formation. Incidentally, it would also
involve direct antagonisms with investment in industry: hence the deve1op-
mentalist critique of investment in housing. Thus the controversy over the
nature of Greek housing "overinvestment" may have often been misdirected
but was certainly not irrelevant.
58. We take it that normally dW corresponds to annual household savings.
Since, however, the latter is usually defined as the non-consumed part of
disposable income and we wanted to include the effect of shifts in the
asset "por-tfo lio" of households and of capital transfers, we opted for the
mor~ general concept. A more rigorous formulation of the model is given
in the next chapter.
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b) Household demand for additions to housing wealth (dWh) is a function of
(dW) and is mainly determined by the relatively stable propensities of
households to allocate resources among residential and non-residential
wealth.
c) Both the dW-function and the dWh-function (dW in relation to R, and
dWh in relation to dW) take forms characteristic for a given country
and historical period. More specifically they depend on those aspects
of the socia-structural and institutional context that determine the
extent of access to wealth and the benefits attached to wealth. Since
in countries of lower and middle levels of economic development house-
hold savings are mainly channelled into housing wealth, it is access
and benefits (social and economic) with regard to the latter that are
the most' significant component in this relation. The higher the access of
households to housing wealth and the benefits accruing to such wealth,
the higher is the propensity ,to channel resources to investment in
dwellings (Le. the higher is the dWh/R ratio). "Access" in this context
is determined by the cost of land and building, the cost of finance and
the "elasticityllof supply of these inputs of housing production. Both
past conditions of access to wealth and c~rrent conditions exert a
determinate influence on the level and trend of the propensity to
accumulate wealth (and housing) for given levels of resources.
d} The ratio of gross private residential investment in dwellings (Ih) as
measured in National Accounts (Le. net of the value of land) to the
volume of household demand for housing wealth (dWh) is a function of the
structure of social relations of housing production, and more particularly
the share of the land factor in the product (share of land in the full
production price) and the extent of participation of the same factor in
the investment. The lower the share of land in costs and the higher its
participation in investment, the higher the Ih/dWh ratio. This first part
of this proposition is less of a substantive hypothesis and more of a
self-evident accounting formula. The second part involves a more complex
argument: it starts from the observation that in important cases the
payments to landowners will not flow outside the housing sector but will
take the form of a share in the product and that a part of this share will
be kept by the landowner as an addition to his assets. We assume that
such investment is induced and should be added to household demand dwh.
59
59. We expand on this complex relation in chapter 6.
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This is highly relevant in a comparative and historical approach to
housing investment where the system of housing production varies
substantially with regard to the division between landowners and
investors in the process of residential development.
Propositions a-d should be understood as tendencies and pressures
applying in the medium and long term rather than as formulas for the
analysis of short-term fluctuations. They point mostly to certain
relations (mainly "propensities") that are "exogenous" historical and
institutional facts which, in conjunction with the similarly "exogenous"
trends in incomes and capital receipts of the household sector, determine
the level and trend of residential wealth accumulation. They also point
to a number of relevant conditions that are essential in distinguishing
the "pecul iarities" of a given country and period in this regard and will
thus help us shed light over the issue of housing "overinvestment" in
postwar Greece. Still, they do not form a full and coherent model for
the explanation of housing investment; there is no specification of the
structure of relationship and, more importantly, no account of housing
consumption demand or any mechanism for the equilibrium of the latter
with the postulated formation of "supply". A more analytical and compre-
hensive treatment of these processes, however. will be advanced in the
next chapter. In this chapter we only intend to provide the broad out-
lines of a model accounting for housing investment in the postwar period,
specify the conditions making for the phenomenon of "overinvestment", and
thus offer an alternative to the theories reviewed and rejected in the
previous part. Starting from propositions a-d as given, we will examine
the relevant facts and then 1ist the factors making for the "pecu1 iarity",
if any, of the Greek case. Since the matters of costs, access to property
and the structure of housing production are dealt with in other parts of
this study, we wi ll make sumrary references to them; only the formation and
allocation of household savings and therefore the demand and capacity for
accumulation of wealth by the household sector will occupy us in the
following.
Table 5.2. presents the trends in gross private residential investment
(Ih),personal disposable income (YaJ and household savings. The latter, as
is customary, is the difference between disposable income and national
private consumption and thus falls short (in the case of Greece) of savings
in a wider sense which should include savings accumulated abroad and trans-
ferred home (apart from remittanc~s)w Let u~ denote the latter by "5" and
the former by "5,/'.
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Table 5.2: Private investment in dwellings, disposable income and household
savings 1948-1976
Period Personal dispo- Household Gross Private
sable income savings investment in Ih/Yd Sn/Yd Ih/Sn(Yd)* (Sn) dwellings (Ih)
1948-52
1953-57
1958-62
1963-67
1968-72
1973-74
1975-76
27,739 1,203** 1,185 0.042 0.043 0.985
61,829 5,230 3.534 0.039 0.084 0.675
90,566 7,933 5,807 0.064 0.087 0.732
14~,500 18,986 11,025 0.073 0.126 0.580
245,827 39,534 22,345 0.090 0.160 0.565
431,564 90,909 34,254 0.079 0.210 0.376
616,446 (122,000)*** 42,118 0.068 (0.197)(0.345)
Source: National Accounts of Greece, vols 23 & 25 (1958-1975, 1973-1977).
(*): Yd for 1948-57 and 1975-76 includes savings of corporations.
These amount to 4-5% of Yd in the later period but are substantially
smaller in the earlier. (**): Savings estimates for this early part
should be considered unreliable. (***): Our estimate based on the
difference between Yd and national private consumption increased by
9% - the average difference between the direct and the residual
estimate of Sn in National Accounts of previous years. Sn in the
Table is based"on the residual estimates of nati.onal privateconsumption.
Table 5.2. presents also the trends in the Ih/Yd~ Sn/Yd and Ih/Snratios. Before we examine these trends it is necessary to stress an important
limitation of the data. Since we are dealing with National Accounts, the
operational definition of the IIHouseholdll sector (or IIpersonal"sector)
is more inclusive than the one dictated by the theoretical distinction
between IIhouseholds" and "flrms" in a IIpure"capitalist economy. In our
case it also includes unincorporated enterprises which in Greece form a
substantial part of the economy: we may say that roughly between one-
quarter and one~third of the urban product originates in small-scale,
unincorporated units similar to a large extent to household production.60
60. In 1958 industries of the Sociate Anonyme and Limited Liability form
controlled only 42% of total fixed assets in industry: their share, however,
grew fastly to a 90% in 1973 (Coutsoumaris, Finance and Development, p. 13).
Of these, incorporated enterprises proper (Societes Anonymes) formed the
largest part: in 1960 of a total of 447 S.A. and Ltd firms publishing annual
"balance sheets" 409 were of the S.A. form. Ltd-form companies grew fastly
in numbers but their relative economic role remained marginal: in 1970 S.A.
firms, though 755 in a total of 1009 (those publishing "balance sheets"),
held 98% of fixed assets! (See Federation of Greek Industrialists, The State
of Greek Industry in 1971 (Athens, 1972), p. 124, Tables III, VII). Thus
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This is even more pronounced in agriculture (though cooperatives are not
included in the "household" sector). We must keep in mind, therefore, that
these imperfections introduce into the observed pattern of savings elements
that belong less to "household behaviour" and more to the sphere of pro-
ducers' decisions.61 We will neglect at this stage the complexities arising
from this problem. We will assume that the household unit proper (i.e. one
concerned exclusively with decisions over consumption and the accumulation
of "passive" wealth) is the dominant element in the system, and leave
the examination of the significance of such "intermediate" categories
as the self-employed, artisans, peasants and small businesses for a later
stage (in the next chapter).
The data in Table 5.2 present a clear-cut pattern.
a} The savings ratio (S~Yd) increases rapidly throughout the period with
the exception of the last blo years. Either the high rate of inflation
during 1974-1976 or the stagnation in incomes in 1974-75 in itself, or
both, led to an increase in the marginal propensity to consume. For the
period we study (1948-1974), it is evident that Greek households have
attained by the end of the 1950's a remarkably high savings ratio
comparable to that of more developed countries, and showed throughout
the period an impressively high marginal propensity to save.62
during most of the 1960'5 and certainly during the early 1970's the
incorporated sector in industry involved more than three-quarters of
industrial capital. This share was, however, lower in other urban
sectors - especially retail, construction and personal services.
61. By definition, only the distributed part of corporation profits
is included in personal disposable income (Yd)retained profits for
corporation savings and for the depreciation found are excluded. In the
case of unincorporated enterprises, the total of profits is included
in Yd. Therefore, part of "household savings" as recorded in National
Accounts, consists of the savings necessary for the growth of small firms
and the capital of independent producers,and thus lies outside the sphere
of the household unit proper. The distinction, however, is analytical and
extremely difficult to apply in a petty-production, household-centred
economy.
62. In the U.K. and the U.S. during the first half of the 1960's
the average savings ratio in the household sector was 0.069 and 0.103
respectively. See, N. Kaldor, "Marginal Productivity and Macroeconomic
Theories of Distribution". For the comparatively high marginal propensity
to accumulate wealth observed among Greek households, see also chapter 6.
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b) The amount of savings channelled into residential investment has been
very high up to the early 1970's.63 The Ih/Sn ratio, however, in contrast
to the savings ratio, shows a declining trend (with the exception of a
reversal in 1958-62). It is evident that as savings (and wealth) grow,
households devote an increasing share of savings to non-residential
assets. The sharp drop after 1973 partly continues this trend, but is
otherwise exceptional, manifesting the extreme dimensions of the 1974-
1975 building slump.
c) As an implication of our theoretical assumptions about the determinant
role of the Sn/Yd and Ih/Sn ratios (conceived mainly as exogenously
given "propensities"), the Ih/Yd ratio must be simply considered as a
composite product of these relations. Its trend in Table 5.2 reflects
the opposite trends in the other two ratios; it is obvious that the
influence of the high mar9inal propensity to save is much stronger
than the low marginal propensity to accumulate residential wealth,with
the effect that the Ih/Yd ratio shows a fast rise (with the exception
again of the 1974-1976 period).
8. The significance of capital inflow
Current savings out of disposable income do not exhaust the flow of
resources available to householdsfor wealth accumulation. We must also
consider the net inflow of capital from abroad towards the household
sector, an item that is well known to be of exceptional importance in the
case of Greece. The inclusion of the capital inflow from Greeks working
abroad or repatriating (S ) raises substantially the savings-income ratioa
(S/yd).64 The inflow of private non-business capital has remained at high
levels throughout the postwar period. Its composition and origins, however,
have changed substantially in ways that have direct bearing on the social
character and level of residential investment.
63. We may compare this again with the pattern in the U.K. and the
U.S.: the ratio of private investment in dwellings to household savings
during 1960-65 was 0.405 and 0.456 respectively - well under the ratios
observed in Table 5.2 (Kaldor, "Marginal Productivity").
. 64. Thus we assume that S=Sn+Sa' However, we have also assumed that
Sa is part of "resources" R and therefore adds to the demand for wealth
(expressed in s) after the allocation of resources into consumption and
assets. This implies that the propensity to consume out of Sa is zero.
Given the character of Sa (most of which is earmarked for real estate),this is a reasonable assumption.
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During the late 1950's and early 1960's a large number of Greek fami-
lies of the "diaspora" cornnunities - mainly in Egypt and Istanbul - had
to take permanent residence in Greece. This involved a substantial inflow
of capital and a consequent boost of real property demand. During the same
period most of the normal inflow of househoid capital from Greeks living
abroad originated in the United States and Congo. The greatest part of
this inflow of funds concerned the middle-class housing market. Since the
early 1960's the fastly rising number of immigrant workers in Western
Europe (mainly Germany) generated a growing inflow of capital that soon
became a very important new component in the inflow of funds; this was
largely channelled into the working-class and lower middle-class housing
market. Parallel to these inflows dependent on the movements of immigra-
tion and the behaviour of Greek communities, we had the equally significant
inflow of funds from Greeks working in the merchant marine. Most of the
capital inflow from all these sources has been directed towards investment
in housing in urban areas. It has been estimated that between one-fifth
and one-quarter of new dwellings built in Athens in the late 1950ls was
purchased (or directly built) by Greeks living abroad. This share was
probably Tower for the country as a whole. During the first half of the
1970's something like 20-25% of total residential investment could be
accounted for by the inflow of resources transferred from Greeks living
and/or working abroad; thus the importance of external funds has not
diminished.65 This whole phenomenon constitutes a factor of major signi-
ficance in the formation of the comparatively high rates of residential
investment in the postwar period and points to a definite "peculiarity"
that sets Greece apart from other developing countries. Table 5.3 presents
the trends in the inflow of capital and Table 5.4. their relationship to
Ih and Sn.
The figures in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 suffer from a number of imperfections
inherent in the recording of international transactions. Nevertheless, they
provide a fair approximation of the magnitude of "exogenous" savings flowing
into the household sector as well as of the part of these channelled into
real estate directly Ci.e. "earmarked" at the point of entry). The latter
is represented roughly by the figures in column (1) of Table 5.3; it involves
65. For Athens in the late 1950's, see Ellis et al., Industrial
CaRital p. 222. The estimates for the country as a whole for the mid-70's
are from DECO, Greece (1978), p. 35.
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Table 5.3: Net inflow of capital for the household sector, 1953-1976
million drs., current prices
{2} (3) l4)
Foreign Exchange (1}+(2) (1)/(3}
deposits in BanksPeriod
(I)
Net inflow of non-
business capital
1953-57
1958-62
1963-67
1968-72
1973-74
1975-76
(8S0-900)*
(2,335)**
4.533***
17,283
15,477
23,400
(850-900) (1.ODD)
Insignificant for (2,335) (1.000)
1953-67 (4,533) (1.000)
9,390 26.673 0.647
7,200 22,677 0.682
4,644 28,044 0.834
Source: Bank of Greece, Reports for the Years 1970 & 1977 (Athens, 1971 &
1978), and Statistical Yearbooks. Amounts in drs have been derived
from the equivalents in U.S. dollars; the conversion rate was
30 drs for the period up to 1974, 32.3 for 1975, and 36.9 for 1976.
(*): Estimate based on the net inflow of capital in the 1948-70
National Accounts minus capital imported under Law 2687/53 (busi-
ness investments) reported in Ellis et al., Industrial Capital,
p. 287. Since we have not subtracted capital transfers for corpo-
rations, the figure may be an overestimate. (**): The figure refers
only to capital imported for building and land. However, this is
marginally less than the total of category (1). (***): Includes
an estimate for 1963 based on a comparison of Bank of Greece data
with O.E.C.D. data. for 1960-69 (O.E.C.D., Greece, 1978, p. 34).
See also General Appendix, A.8.
Table 5.4: Private investment in dwellings and net capital inflow for the
household sector 1953-1976
(annual averages, million drs, current prices)
Period Net inflow of non- Current household 5c/S +5 Ih/5 +Sbusiness capital and savings plus S n a n a
foreign exchange a
deposits (Sa) (Sn+5a'
1953-57 (180) (5,410) (0.033) (0.653)
1958-62 (467) (8,400) (0.055) (0.691)
1963 ..67 1,625 20,611 0.078 0.534
1968-72 5,335 44,869 0.119 0.498
1973-74 11 ,338 102,247 0.111 0.335
1975-76 14,022 125,836 0.111 0.334
Source: Tables 5.2 and 5.3. "Sa" has been calculated from column {3} of
Table 5.3. Parentheses indicate estimates.
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the greatest share of the incoming funds, though from a share near 100%
it rapidly fell to a level slightly over 50% in 1972. Between 1973
and 1976 this share followed a sharp upswing.66 This pattern of resource
allocation between real estate and other (mostly liquid) assets resembles
the one observed for the I~5n ratio and thus the composite long-term
trend in the relationship of residential investment to total savings
5 +5 ) shown in Table 5.4. expresses clearly the fact that residentialn a .
wealth diminishes in importance as household wealth grows. With respect
to "exogenous" savings, the increasing importance of foreign exchange
deposits in Greek banks as opposed to capital inflow for real estate
should be understood in the light of this tendency. Certain institutional
changes, however, may have been of some importance. After 1968 the Greek
State and the Banks pursued an aggressive policy for attracting foreign
exchange deposits from Greeks abroad. An important element of these
policies and institutional innovations has been the introduction of a
housing savings scheme in the Mortgage Bank of Greece with especially
favourable terms for foreign exchange deposits. It is equally important
that the depositors of the latter category were entitled to a housing
loan proportional to their deposits on demand, thus exempted from the
usual strict limits imposed by the Currency Committee on the annual level
of bank credit for housing.57
66. See the detailed series in General Appendix A.8. Similar estimates
for the share of capital inflow "earmarked" for real estate have been
made in DECO, Greece (1978), pp. 34-35. The following figures are given
(mills of U.S. dollars, annual averages):
1960-69 1970-76
1. Capital Transfers for
Rea1 Esta te from
Greeks Abroad
2. Foreign Exchange
Deposits by Greeks
Abroad
51 90% 210 50%
6 10% 214 50%
57 100% 424 100%
There seems to be a certain discrepancy between these estimates for foreign
exchange deposits and those in Table 5.3. Our series have been based on
the category "Other Deposits" in the Bank of Greece series of capital .
transactions. This category excludes deposits in the Central Bank. forelgnloans and other credit to banks and the deposits coming under L.8. 2687/53- wh ich concerns ~')reign business investments,
67. For the fast growth of foreign currency deposits and the volume of
loans to such depositors, see the graphs in National Mortgage Bank, }nnual
Report for the Year 1975.
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The previous observations suggest tnat the share of savings inflow
finally channelled towards housing may have been substantially larger
than the division between bank deposits and capital earmarked for real
estate presented in Table 5.3 indicates. This increases the importance
of capital inflow for residential investment. It also reflects the social
character of Greek savers abroad: mainly working-class and lower middle-
class strata. It would be wrong, however, to deduce from this that most of
these funds were channelled into the popular non-speculative housing
sector. The sectoral effect of household capital inflow is ambivalent. It
may be argued that it infused into autonomous popular owner-building sub-
stantial economic resources that were of crucial importance for its repro-
duction during the late postwar period. It may also be argued, however,
that it was.mainly directed into the vigorous petty-speculative, inter-
mediate sector fastly expanding in popular areas in the 1960's and early
1970's. After all, contrary to a current misconception, the household
capital inflow during this period was not predominantly composed by the
savings of workers in Germany, though their importance has been certainly
growing in the 1960's. Of equal importance was the inflow of funds
accumulated in U.S. and U.K. banks - presumably from incomes earned in
the merchant marine and by the sizeable Greek community in the United
States. Table 5.5 shows the distribution of the types of net capital
inflow we have been examining by country of origin: "origin" in this
context refers more to the respective banking systems from which the
capital flow originates rather than strictly the place where the savings
were produced. This distinction becomes important in the case of Greece
with her large shipping fleet.
Even by the beginning of the 1970's the savings of workers in Germany,
though certainly substantial, were hardly more than a third of the total.
During the 1960's they were much less. Since the large inflow in U.S.
dollars can hardly be accounted in tts great part by the Greek overseas
community, we must conclude that the largest single part of the inflow
consists of the savings from earnings in the shipping fleet. This assumption
gains credence by the fact of the much higher remuneration of employees in
ships compared to that of manual workers in Europe. The latter, after all,
channel most of their non-consumed earnings in regular remittances to their
families back in Greece; these are not included in the capital transactions
account.
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Table 5.5: Main countries of origin of net capital inflow to the household
sector 1966-1975 (selected ~ears}.
Mill ions of U.~. dollars, current prices.
Country of 1966 1969 1972 1975Origin
LLC.* 11.3 (17.2%j 22.4 (24.4%) 120.3 (35.2%) 156.4 (32.0%)
U.S.A. 31.8 (48.6%) 37.9 (41.4%) 122.3 (35.8%) 154.8 (31.6%)
U. K.** 12.1 (l8.5%) 19.3 (21.0%) 53.8 (l5.7%) 83.1 (17 .0%)
Rest of
World 10.2 {IS.l%} 12.0 (13.2%) 45.5 (13.3%) 94.7 (19.4%)
All areas 65.4 (lOO.O%) 91.6 (lOO.O%) 341.9 (100.0%) 489.0 (100.0%)
Source: 1968, 1970, 1973, 1977 Statistical Yearbooks. "Net Capital Inflow"
includes Non-business Capital Inflow and Foreign Exchange Deposits
in Greek Banks. (*): Excluding the U.K. (**): Including Ireland
and Iceland.
Conclusions: The "peculiarity" of the Greek case and housing "overinvestment"
let us now summarise the argument. The level and trend of residential
investment in the postwar has been the corollary of the growth of house-
hold sector resources {income and wealth}. The pattern of "propensities"
governing the particulars of the structure of consumption and asset
accumulation mediated this relation. These "propensities" reflect on the
one hand certain "universal" behavioural tendencies, and on the other,
infl uences pecul far to the country and period under examination - parameters
determined-.by the sociostructural and institutional context. The distinction
is analytical and obviously difficult to apply; it is nevertheless an
irr.portantone. "Engel's law" on the diminishing role of food in household
consumption as incomes rise and some generally applicable distinctions
between "luxuries" and "necessities" have been fruitful universals in
consumption studies. An income elasticity of saving higher than +1, a
wealth elasticity of housing investment lower than +1, and an S-curve
for the income elasticity of housing consumption are p13usible candidates
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for such universal behavioural tendencies, though even here certain con-
ditions with regard to the relevant range of development levels seem
necessary. Anyway, even a cautionary acceptance of such "universals" in
conjunction with the fundamental uniformities found among a large number
of countries with respect to economic growth, urbanisation and modern-
isation under capitalism, makes the postwar Greek pattern of housing
investment predictable ("natural") to a very large extent.
Still, the Greek rate of housing investment has been high even in terms
of such an approach. This calls for a certain insistence on the relevant
"peculiar" conditions. We have rejected the theories that explain housing
"overinvestmentll as a product of the determinants of the structure of
capital formation as a whole (more specifically as a corollary of industrial
"underinvestment"). We have singled out the following "peculiarities":
a) A relatively high household propensity to save. We noted that this
should not be understood simplistically as a IIpsychological-cultural"
attribute for it may be derived directly from the structure of the
Greek society and economy, namely the persistent reproduction of a
highly diffused distribution of small property which in turn points
to the strong precapitalist and petty-bourgeois component in the eco-
nomy and the class structure.
b) An exceptionally high rate of capital transfers to the household sector
from abroad. This again relates to a structural "invariant" of Greek
society ..the significance of Greek cormwnfties and economic activity
abroad.
c) A relatively high propensity to allocate household savings in housing
wealth. A somewhat high rate should have been expected for a country
in a "middle level" of economic development where substantial household
savings become possible and more necessary assets like housing take
precedence and consume the best part of household resources. However,
it is only reasonable to assume that the exceptionally "democratic"
distribution of land and house ownership in postwar Greece encourages
by itself a high propensity for residential wealth accumulation. After
all, the degree of access to a certain form of wealth and the benefits
historically associated with such wealth are significant determinants
of the propensity to choose this form. Though from a capitalist's view-
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point residential real estate does not offer obvious comparative
advantages, it does so from the viewpoint of households. While rental
rates have been low in the postwar period, property values have kept
abreast of inflation. Housing in the Greek social context, moreover,
satisfied the needs of the household sector for relative autonomy and
security and the needs derived from the emphasis on the transmission
of wealth through dowries and inheritance. On the institutional side
we may note the fact that for most of the period, access to land was
widespread and taxation of landed property and development gains was
virtually non-existent. Thus the socia-structural and institutional
factors that formed part of the "dual" system of housing production
in Greece have also induced high rates of real wealth accumulation
through an influence at the level of behavioural tendencies.
d} Though the favourable trends in housing costs have not been discussed
in this Chapter, they must be certainly added to the factors making
for high investment rates (for a detailed account see Appendix 6.1).
It suffices to say that from the mid-1950's to the beginning of the
1970ts construction costs have increased with rates similar to the
rate of general inflation; in real terms, therefore, they remained
stable. This implies favourable trends both in the "elasticity" of
supply as well as in the rate of productivity growth in construction
and the set of related industries, especially in view of the fast rises
in real construction waqes and the lack of labour surpluses after the
1950's. Similar observations can be made about the cost and the supply
of land. Though land prices increased with fast rates the share of
land in housing prices remained fairly stable. There is evidence,
however, that conditions in this respect got increasingly worse after
the mid-1960's (see Appendix 6.1).
There are certain aspects of the Greek housing system that also merit
attention in any systematic examination of the "peculiarities" making
for high rates of residential investment. One is the high ratio of parti-
cipation of the land factor in the finance of housebuilding, which makes
for a high ratio of actual housing investment to the initial property
demand, Another may be found in the particular form of the supply-demand
relation prevalent in the Greek "dual" housing system that safeguard
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against the crises of over-supply and crashes in market values observed
in more "modern" housing markets. These additional factors, however, will
be discussed in the next Chapter. For the purposes of the present analysis
the former list will suffice.
Having said all this, I would argue that from a theoretical viewpoint
the conceptualisation of these factors as "peculiaritiesll in the sense
of a fortuitous combination of factors is misleading. The whole set of
factors listed above is not only sufficient for a high rate of residential
investment; it is to a very large extent ncoeeearu; too. The presence of
these factors is impZied by the very occurrence of the combination of a
"middle-income" capitalist country and fast economic development. The case
thus becomes to a great extent typical and there is no need to place any
great theoretical weight on the concept of "peculiarities". The reasons
for this become apparent after a simple elaboration of the main prerequi-
sites for fast economic development in the case of an underdeveloped
country under a liberal-capitalist regime. We have stressed already the
crucial role of the expansion of effective demand (mainly consumption)
for fast capitalist growth. Now, this expansion is most likely to take
place under the following conditions: first, a sufficiently high initial
level of national income per capita - hence a "middle-income" country;
second, a relatively non-skewed distribution of personal income which, in
terms of a two-class model, implies comparatively high wages, and in a
less "pure" capitalist economy, high petty-bourgeois incomes so as the
effective demand of the non-capitalist class (within which housing
construction is a major element) may sustain a substantial and growing
local market relative to the capacity of the economy as a whole. These
conditions constitute crucial parameters for a sustained expansion
of effective demand and thus for a long-term mobilisation of capitalist
investment.68 Such a dynamic of growth, however, in the context of an
68. It may be pointed out that this thesis is neither self-evident
nor uncontroversial. (For one, we abstract from the complications that the
possible existence of a major export sector will introduce into the argu-
ment). I will refer the reader to the rich Marxist and Keynesian literature
on "underconsumptionll and the "realisation problem" (in essence the problem
of effective demand) and on the significance of the distribution of income
and property for capitalist growth. The ~assics (Malthus, Marx) first
pointed to the stagnationist tendencies of a "polarised" capitalist economy,
i.e. one with a small bourgeoisie and a mass of wage labour living at
subsistence levels. These tendencies stem from the lack of consumption
markets large enough to effect the IIrealisationll of the expanding
capitalist product. Malthus argued that the extensive consumption of the
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underdeveloped country - i.e. one lacking in productive capacity and capital
resources - requires, in order to succeed, the presence of a third crucial
condition: a substantial net inflow of capital from abroad. For it is
obvious that such a "model" of growth is prone to scarcity of capital and
excessive imports and thus balance of payments crises and an endemic lack
of foreign exchange.69
The effective operation of such a model of growth - which, with the
exception of "anomalous" cases 1ike the oil-producing countries, should be
viewed as the logically typical scenario of capitalist economic development
in the modern world-system - implies precisely the configuration of the
"socia-structural" factors we listed before as "peculiarities" of postwar
Greece. A non-skewed income distribution and relatively high non-capitalist
incomes imply, in the context of early capitalist urbanisation-industrial-
isation, the presence of a relatively diffused property distribution:
landed aristocracy provides the necessary counteracting force. The signi-
ficance of such a class, however, measured by its distinct socioeconomic
identity, consumption patterns and its size, has been limited in advanced
capitalist countries for some time {P.M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist
Development, New York, 1970, pp. 228-229}. This is also true in the case
of developing societies that went through agrarian reform or developed a
thoroughly capitalist agriculture. The expansion of consumption should
therefore come either from wages or from "unproductive" incomes - service
workers, State-employees, the professions etc. Some Marxists, reluctant
to accept the fundamental role of wage-rises for capitalist growth, stressed
the importance of the latter (Sweezy, The Theory, pp. 230-231). Others,
without denying the importance of "unproductive" consumption in general,
lay emphaSis on the autonomous rise of real wages (Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal
Exchang~pp. 372-380). Part of the difference, of course, revolves around
the definition of the "wage-labour" class. It is evident, in the case of
Greece, anyway, that rises in both wages and urban "unproduct+ve" incomes
have been important (and interacting) factors. The idea that cities and
the growth of petty-bourgeois "unproductive" strata may solve the growth
problem of capitalism (the celebrated "realisation" problem) has some
history in Marxism. Struve's theory of the "third persons" was such a case;
it was rev iewed and rejected by Rosa Luxemburg in her Accumulation of Capital
(London, 1963), pp. 292-297. Henri Lefebvre has returned to the potential
value of this idea and has pointed some weaknesses in Luxemburg's critique
(Marxism and the CitX, 1972, Greek Trans1. 1976, Athens, pp. 131-132).
See also the reference to Passineti in note 21.
69. The systematic interrelationship between fast growth and high
capital inflow in the case of developing countries is substantiated in
H. Chenery and M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development 1950-1Q70 (london, 1975),
p. 101. See also Arghiri Emmanuel, "Myths of Development and Myths of
Underdevelopment", New Left Revie\'l,85, (1974): 61-82. Enmanue l stresses,
however, that despite the fashionable myths of "investme:nt imperialism",
developing countries with a high capital inflow and a successful realisation
of the ~odel of fast capitalist growth are very rare - he points to Greece
as such an exceptional case.
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a historical pattern characterised by a strong petty-commodity production
sector, a substantial petty bourgeoisie and widespread access to ownership
of land and means of production. This will also make for high wages in
the capitalist sector. As we argued, however, in the first chapter, these
conditions make highly probable the existence of a "dual" housing system
with a high access to land and widespread house-ownership. This, as well
as the wider pattern of class structure (property distribution), will
induce high propensities to save among households and a high share of
expenditures on real estate. A high capital inflow will either consist
mainly of transfers to the household sector (as in Greece), or will come
in the form of substantial direct foreign investments (a more rare case).
Both will facilitate further borrowing from abroad. In all cases, capital
inflow will reduce the chances of capital or foreign exchange scarcity
and thus permit a rapid expansion of household sector expenditure. The
availability of external finance, furthermore, will make possible a fast
mechanisation of production with imported machinery (made necessary in
the face of rising wages) and thus prevent rising costs and supply ine-
lasticities (bottlenecks). These mechanismsfacilitating fastly rising
expenditures and a check on costs, concern the whole of the economy; they
are especially relevant, however, in the case of housing investment which is
distinguished by its high resource consumption.
There is thus no need to resort to any fortuitous combination of
"cultural-historical" peculiarities in order to account for the Greek
pattern. The "peculiarity" that is suggested by cases like Greece
results from the simple fact that the successful realisation of the
aforementioned "model" of growth is highZy unaorrunon. "Middle-income"
developing countries in the postwar form a small minority in a global
perspective. Few of these, moreover, showed fast rates in the growth of
per capita incomes. This select group tended to present the configuration
of features expected on the basis of the previous argument. From a sample
of 49 capitalist developing countries with a GNP per capita between 67 and
1126 U.S. dollars in 1965 (which leaves out more than 35 very poor countries)
only 15 could be considered of "middle-income" level (having more than 400
dollars GNP/capita - Greece had 587). Of the ten of these for which con-
struction data are available, only four (Greece, Spain, Puerto Rico, Israel)
show both high rates of income growth during the 1960's (around 6%) and
high shares of housing investment in the GOP (between 5% and 8%). In the
other extreme there are four Latin American countries (Venezuela, Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay) that show very low rates on both accounts: income growth
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between 0% and 2.5% and InlGDP ratios lower than 3.5%. The former cases,
with the exception of Puerto Rico, showed distinctly low indices of
inequality in the income distribution, as well as very high rates of
capital inflow (a high index of inequality in the case of Puerto Rico
was balanced by an exceptionally high capital inflow). The exact
opposite, on both accounts, was true for the Latin American countries.
The remaining two cases of IImiddle-incomell countries - Ireland and
South Africa - could not be as easily categorised.70 This pattern is
fairly suggestive of the realism of our argument. It is also obvious
that such a small number of cases cannot support broad generalisations.
The case for the systematic character of the interrelationship between
housing investment and the pattern of economic development in postwar
Greece must be ultimately based on theoretical grounds. Having said
this, we may add that the fact that only three or four cases follow
this pattern (of which the most clear-cut are Greece and Israel -
admittedly very exceptional) justifies indeed the use of the term
"peculiarity".
70. Data for GNP per capita growth rates, income distribution and
capital inflow are from Chenery and Syrquin, Patterns of Deve]opment,
pp. 102-103. Data for the share of residential construction in GOP
from United Nations, Compendium of Housing Statistics 1971 (New York,
1974), Table 16 (shares for 1964 and 1969, averaged). Fo~ Uruguay,
Argentina and South Africa, the share of residential construction in
GOP, being unavailable, has been estimated on the basis of the share
of construction as a whole and the relationship of housing construction
to total construction typical for this group of countries.
6· Structure and Determinantsof Residential Capital Formation
In the previous chapter we have indicated the most important determir~nts
of aggregate residential investment in postwar Greece. The terms adopted
in that context have been highly general and our analysis has advanced no
further than a very broad outline of the more relevant aspects. This
sufficed for our immediate purposes, namely the critique of some widely
accepted but misleading approaches to the issue from the viewpoint of
conflicts over economic development and the pattern of capital accumulation.
It also served in directing attention to the proper objects of analysis,
that is, the pattern of consumption and wealth formation within the house-
hold sector and the institutional and economic context of the housing
system. In essence, that analysis aimed at a clearing of the ground and
the establishment of certain important starting points. It can hardly be
considered a thorough and rigorous explanatory model of the structure
and determinants of residential capital formation in postwar Greece. In
the progress of our analysis we had to brush over certain major issues
that are essential to a logically consistent account. These concern the
relationship of the demand for residential wealth (i.e. savings earmarked
for housing) with the demand for housing consumption, on the one hand, and
actual investment in housing or, more properly, housing production, on the
other. Another important gap in the analysis concerns the specific role
of "exogenous" influences such as the price of urban land, construction
costs, inflation, and the rate of interest on mortgage credit as well as
the volume of the latter. More importantly, in our account of the trends
in residential capital formation during the postwar period we have not
stated in an explicit and, if possible, formal manner the assumptions about
the behavioural and "socia-structural" tendencies governing these trends.
An adequately systematic account must certainly consider these issues.
Given the current lack of theory and empirical research on the economics of
early capitalist IIdual"housing systems such as the one prevailing in Greek
cities, and the immediate relevance of the formation of aggregate residential
capital for an understanding of the growth of speculative building which is
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the object of this study, the necessity of going into the specifics of
a comprehensive model is obvious.
In the present chapter we will be occupied with the elaboration ef such
a model. First, we will set forth a number of theoretical propositions that
appear relevant and realistic in the light of what we know about the Greek
housing system as well as in the light of current economic theory and compa-
rative evidence. Then, we will give a full formal description of the model
thus derived. Last, we will present the "empirical superstructure" of the
model, that is empirical estimates of the parameters involved and checks of
the goodness of fit between the assumed relationships and the patterns found
in the evidence for the period under study.
1. Savings and consumption in the household sector and the formation of
residential wealth
In the previous chapter we presented the postwar trends in household
disposable incomes, savings and investment in dwellings, whereas in the
fourth chapter we examined the trends in housing consumption in relation
to total household consumption and incomes. In both cases certain clear-
cut patterns in the long-term relationships between these magnitudes
have been observed with the implication that these patterns represent
the aggregate manifestation of a set of "propensities" with regard to
consumption and wealth on the part of Greek households. They also reflect,
of course, the influence of factors operating or originating outside the
sphere of household behaviour. Nevertheless, from a logical point of view
and in accordance with our thesis (defended in chapter 5) that the proper
locus of analysis is the behaviour of the household sector, a model of
savings and consumption behaviour is the necessary starting point. In the
following we will advance a number of theoretical propositions constituting
such a model. This will serve as the main building block in the construction
of an explanatory nlodel of the process of residential capital formation as
a whole. In doing this we will be guided by three reference points: certain
well-corroborated theories of household behaviour; the specificities of
the Greek housing system and household economy; and the imolications of
the empirical patterns examined in previous chapters.
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The theoretical assumptions we propose are the following:
a) Total household consumption (C) as well as housing consumption (Ch) are
not determined by (are not a function of) current income but by "normalll
income or lIeconomic resources". The latter, at the level of the house-
hold unit, are of necessity subjective estimates based on (I), past
incomes, (2), current available resources (earnings and assets) and
(3), future prospects for earnings and wealth transfers. We further
assume that at the level of social groups the obvious difficulties
inherent in such a "subject lve" variable are drastically reduced and
that a successful operationalisation of the concept can be effected
in the light of the historically patterned and structurallY determined
distribution of IIlife chances" among groups (Weber's IImarket situations").
The main point is that the traditional Keynesian consumption (and saving)
function et = f(Yd~t)~where Yd is current disposable income, should
be rejected and that other forms of resources (such as wealth) and the
structured pattern of opportunities should be fully considered. This
theoretical argument has been also stressed in previous chapters,
b) The two conceptualisations of "normal" income that are most widely
accepted in current economic theory, namely Friedman's "permanent income"
and the concept of "current resourcesll incorporated in the IIlife-cycle"
hypothesis (Ando, Brunberg and Modigliani) suffer from serious weak-
nesses.1 On the one hand they suggest formulations that are extremely
difficult to apply empirically, and on the other they are based on
the restrictive general assumption that consumption is the soZe object
of household behaviour. Thus in the case of the IIlife-cycle" model where
the matter is considered explicitly, the accumulation of wealth (including,
presumably, housing) serves no other purpose than the planning of the
1. See the excellent review in M. Bruce Johnson, Household Behaviour,
Chapters 4 and 5. "Current resources IIin the "life-cycle" model are defined
as the sum of current and discounted future income earnings over an indi-
vidual's lifetime and his current net worth. See, Ando, A & Mondigliani,
F. "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests",
American Economic Review, 53, 1 (1963). Friedman conceives income as the
sum of a permanent and a transitory component. The former reflects those
factors that a household unit regards as determining its capital value or
wealth. These are nonhuman wealth, the personal attributes of the earners
in the household such as training, ability and personality, and the attri-
butes of the economic activity of the earners, i.e. their occupation, the
location of their activity, etc. See, M. Friedman, A Theory of the Con-
sumption Function (Princeton, 1957).
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consumption stream in a household's life given expected changes in earned
income. tnshor-t , \Olealth does not convey "util ity" as such.2 In contrast
we postulate here that wealth is valued in itself. The reasons may be
diverse - social power, prestige, security or the desire to provide for
one's offspring. Given the significance attributed to dowry and inhe-
ritance especially in the form of real estate in the Greek context, the per-
tinence of the last point shoulc1 be obvious. He may add t~t in conditions
where an economy of the household type (peasant-like) is widespread,
household wealth provides to petty businessmen a hedge against adverse
circumstances and a base for much-valued "autonomy". Here the concepts
of "household" and "business" lose their analytical precision and, in
terms of behaviour, become intermingled. With these points in mind, we
may advance the general proposition that households' decisions over the
accumulation of wealth and current consumption are determined by a
"utility calculus" that balances the utility of wealth as against that
of consumption within the constraints imposed by given "resources"
(accumulated wealth and current income).J
cl In formal terms the previous propositions imply the following:
Ct = q • wb (1) within the constraint of a given Rtt
where Rt = Wt_1 + Yd~t (ll (definition}
and Ct + Wt = Yd~t + Wt_1 (3) (Ident tty)
(C) is total consumption, (Id) is disposable income, CRr "resources", and
(W) is "wealth" or total household assets or in common usage "net worth". We
abstract in this formulation from problems resulting from the presence of
wealth transfers, capital gains or depreciation; all assets are created
2. Both the "life cycle" and the "permanent income" models are based
on the theoretical assumption that
".•. the typical household chooses a consumption stream such that
its utility function defined on present and future consumption is
maximised subject to a long run or lifetime resource constraint".
(Bruce Johnson, Household Behaviour, p. 66).
3. This formulation and the formal model that it implies follow closely
the arguments in Bruce Johnson, Household Behaviour, Chapter 6. We have
added, of course, an explicit treatment of housing wealth and housing
consumption.
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by equivalent savings, i.e. the difference between Yd,t and Ct' This
is stated by expression 3: savings S equal Yd,t-Ct equal increases in
wealth f.'t-Wt_r Depending on the desired levels of consumption and wealth
with given resources, savings may be negative (dissaving) - a common
occurrence in cases of hardship and among pensioners. Although the previous
formulation lends itself more easily to mathematical analysis, most espe-
cially when Yd follows a stable growth path, nothing prevents the incorpo-
ration of exogenous wealth transfers such as the substantial inflow of
capital from abroad in the case of Greek households. The new term (say S)a
would be simply added to the righthand side of expressions 2 and 3.
The significance of this formulation derives from expression 1 which
relates consumption and wealth in an extremely simple manner. The under-
lying rationale is the following. Households have a utility (preference)
function that includes both consumption and wealth; their object is to
maximise utility by achieving the desired relationship between the two
within the constraint of a budget ("resources") which is necessarily the
sum of the two. The preference schedule that determines the relationship
is reflected in the two parameters (q) and (b). An important implication
of these assumptions is that expression 1 signifies a state of equiZibrium:
households consume and save in a way that tends towards the desired
level of wealth. Assuming an initial level of wealth and stable earnings,
the equilibrium state will be reached after some time. But then, presumably,
(if the necessary time is shorter than a life span) savings will be zero
since wealth will be at the desired level.
How is this result reconciled with what we know about household behaviour?
We know, furthermore, that current incomes change constantly both due to
economic development, business fluctuations etc., and during a household's
life-cycle. As a result the notion of a desired relationship between wealth
and consumption as an equilibrium solution for a certain budget, though
probably useful as theory, would seem to present formidable problems in
terms of empirical analysis.
These difficulties are real (though they do not diminish the validity
of the model as a theoretical device). They may be avoided, hO\'/ever,with
an appropriate choice of household categories, namely economic cZasses
defined by criteria other than current income and wealth but such that we
may reasonably assume that for each class the pattern of opportunities and
prospects for consumption and wealth accumulation are well-known and relati-
vely stable. With the use of such categories, the multiplicity of economic
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circumstances due to random factors and transitions in the life cycle
can be collapsed into a composite "typical" household representative of
the class. In this context then expression 1 represents essentially a state
of dynamic (moving) equilibrium, the aggregate composite of the underlying
constant flux of the behaviour of the various sub-types of households in
the context of economic circumstances typical for that class. With the
same logic the argument can be extended to the population of a given city
or country as a whole. It is in this sense that we will apply our theoretical
model since we will restrict our analysis to macroeconomic data for the
household sector as a whole. Since we will be based exclusively on time-
series patterns, the usual difficulties confronting efforts to integrate
both time-series and cross-sectional observations will not arise here. This
formulation implies the neglect of important influences on savings and
consumption, namely inter-class differentials in behaviour, the effects of
the life cycle of households and shifts in the composition of the population.
However, since the aggregate propensities of the household sector are not
in themselves the object of analysis but are taken here as "exogenously"
given parameters, this neglect may be justified.
d) The aggregate data reviewed in the previous chapter show that the ratio of
consumption to household disposable income has been steadily declining
during the postwar period in Greece though consumption increased. This would
at first seem to imply that the exponent in expression 1 (the "eles ttct ty"
of C with respect to w) is positive and less than +1, i.e. that the urgency
of consumption diminishes as resources and wealth rise or, put in another
way, that wealth is a IIluxury" good. As a general assumption about household
behaviour this sounds quite plausible. In fact, both the theory and research
of consumption and saving in the process of development are riddled with
controversies over this issue. First, what may appear as the result of
behavioural tendencies reflecting the effects of rising income, may very
well be the product of strua~~aZ changes, brought about by economic develop-
ment, that increase the role of high savers relative to the role of non-
savers. Second, the empirical study of cross-sectional and time-series
data of saving in relation to economic development has not established
unequivocally the validity of such a general behavioural assumption.4
4. For a short review of the arguments in the literature, see Chenery
and Syrquin, Patterns of Development, pp. 23-24, 122-23.
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Nevertheless, we will accept that this assumption is both relevant and true
in the present context for the following reasons: first, no structural
changes that may sufficiently account for these trends took place in the
case of postwar Greece; second, a similar tendency is common among developing
countries at the intermediate stages of development such as Greece (on the
strength of postwar evidence at least).5
e) We will assume that housing consumption (Ch) is determined in relation to
total consumption (C).
(4)
This follows from the fact that total consumption reflects indirectly
the level of resources of the household, as well as the interdependence
of the level of housing consumption with other categories of consumption
(mainly necessities) at the various levels of household income.
f) With regard to the accumulation of household residential wealth we start
from the hypothesis that pZanned housing wealth Wh* is determined in
the context of household choices between the different forms of assets
constituting household wealth as a whole, and therefore it is a simple
function of total wealth. We write
(5)
The specific nature of this process of "choice between assets" will
be examined later. Household residential wealth may, of course, exceed
the value of owner-occupied housing. Expression 5 in conjunction with the
value of housing wealth at the previous time period will determine the
amount of savings or other available assets intended for housing wealth
accumulation. Disregarding the complexities arising from the time-lags
involved in this process of owned stock adjustment, changes in values
during the transformation of savings into real capital, and assuming an
equality between planned and actual accumulation, we may write
(6) Wh = k • wY where Wh is actual residential wealth.
5. It is a common assumption among economists that recipients of non-
labour income are high savers. A structural change that brings an increase
in their role should therefore have accounted for a rise in the savings ratio.
However, the relative shares of income from wages and property have not
changed significantly in Greece during the period we study. A most important
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g) With regard to the values of y and 5 in functions 4 and 5 we can not say
anything definite beforehand. It would seem that abstracting from the
specifities of class and the historical-institutional context and on the
basis of certain widespread models ordering types of consumption and wealth
according to their relative significance as "luxuries" or "necessities",
both elasticities should be expected to be less than +1. We have seen,
however, in chapter 4 that in a historical and comparative context no such
generalisation holds for housing cons~mption. The same proves true in an
examination of the consumption behaviour of different social classes through
time (Appendix 4.1). We lack suitable empirical material for patterns of
wealth accumulation; it therefore appears risky to advance a general
behavioural assumption. As it happens, the material reviewed in the two
previous chapters suggests that for the postwar period and for the house-
hold sector as a whole the two elasticities are indeed less than +1. With
regard to the present analysis we may consider this as a given datum with
a note that to an important extent it reflects the economic development
level and social structure of postwar Greece.
2. The institutional and socia-structural component of household
"propensities" towards wealth
The last point is directly relevant to the issue of the particularities
of a given country during a given period vis-a-vis residential wealth
accumulation that occupied us in the last chapter. We have observed there
that Greek households show relatively high "propensities" to save in general
and for housing wealth in particular. We accounted for this "particularity"
with reference to certain institutional and socio-structural conditions
concerning the access to and social distribution of household wealth (of
which housing wealth is the most important part). Let us now recapitulate
in a more rigorous manner within the terms of the simple theoretical
model expounded above.
structural change has been, of course, the reduction of the share of
agricultural income. This~ however, should have resulted in a dec'!'~a~e
in the aggregate savings ratio since peasants are notoriously high savers.
Thus we see no reason for a structural explanation of the trends in the
saving ratio. With regard to the relevant comparative evidence, Chenery and
Syrquin had observed that the saving ratio follows a logistic curve
(s-shaped) rising fastly at middle levels of economic development
(Patterns ef Development, pp. 109-111).
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For a given historic stock of household wealth, steadily growing
disposable incomes per household, and certain functions e=qwh and
Wh = k.W
Y, the trend and level of savings in general and savings for housing
in particular can be determined. Assume that the dynamic (time-series)
parameters band Y for the various economic classes (suitably defined to
reflect the pattern of "normal" income and to incorporate "demographic"
variations) are broadly similar and that, furthermore, the differentiation
of e, w, and Wh among these classes (the cross-sectional pattern tends to
follow in terms of household behaviour the Sdme functions. Now, after
a suitably lengthy period of steady growth or over a shorter period but with
suitable initial conditions in the distribution of wealth, the actual
parameters describing the variation of Wand Wh among economic classes
will correspond closely to the dynamic parameters governing behaviour
over time. This correspondence may be vi'ewed in two ways: that under
conditions of "equilibrium" growth (steady rate, constant proportions),
Ibehavioura1" tendencies determine in the long run the pattern of
wealth distribution; or, alternaUvely, that the historically given
distribution of wealth, the current social distribution of wealth
influenced by socia-structural and instttutional factors, and the behavioural
tendencies of liouseho1ds, interact with each other, hence the parameters in
question reflect Doth benavioura1 and nistortcal-institutional-sociostructura1
aspects (the historically given patterns are ncte lterebl e in the real sense,
of course, but in the sense that they can oe interpreted in different ways).
In formal terms, since it is C = q.Wb and thus W = k·e1/b where
"k" a constant parameter, ''b'' reflects both household propensity for weal th
accumulation and the social pattern of wealth distribution in a given country
(a similar point can be made for parameter "y" for housing wealth). This
social pattern involves such matters as access to property (residential
and non-residential), the rights and security of property and its taxation,
among other things. These matters may differ widely among societies, most
especially in relation to real estate wealth. We lack sufficient comparative
material for the corroboration of a systematic correlation between behavioural
parameters towards wealth accumulation, the social distribution of wealth,
and the institutional context governing property acquisition and holding.
The hypothesis, however, has obvious appeal and some known cases suggest
its validity. There is thus a significant difference between the values of
''b'' for households in the U.S. and the U.K. - these are estimated at around
0.4 and 0.3 respectively. This suggests that property is much more widely
distributed in the U.S. than in Britain, despite the fact that the inaome
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distribution among households is similar in the two countries.6 The
difference is consistent with what we know about the historic and insti-
tutional patterns that make the U.S. a country with a much more diffused
distribution of opportunities to acquire wealth - especially land and
housing - and with fewer official impediments on holding wealth compared
to Britain.?
We have repeatedly stressed in this study the widespread access to
property that characterises Greek social structure - hence the frequent
allusions in sociological accounts to a "petty bourgeois" society. This
socia-structural and institutional feature is reflected in the reproduction
of the pronounced "precapitalist" component of the social formation: of
household production in agriculture as well as of the numerous small-scale
units of production and self-employment in the urban sector.8 In the present
context..however, the widespread access to the ownership of urban land and
residential property reflected in the highly "democratic" distribution of
rates of owner·occupation and the persistence of the "dual" housing system
has been of greater importance. These patterns are mainly reflected, of
course, in the actual distribution of households along the spectrum of
wealth differentials. They also have undoubtedly exerted strong influences,
however, on the prevailing attitudes vis-a-vis consumption and wealth. We
may add that taxes on property and capital gains have been especially
insignificant in Greece, particularly in the case of urban land, whereas
6•. See, Bruce Johnson, Household Behaviour, pp. 130-131.
7. In connection to this, see the discussion on the significant differ-
ences between the nineteenth-century urban systems of the two countries in
the first chapter.
8. The reproduction of these patterns in the structure of production and
employment is exhaustively documented for the case of Athens in Lila Leonti-
dou Emmanuel's Working Class dnd Land Allocation. See also her account of the
economic history of modern Athens in the Papyros-Larcusse-Britanica Ency-
clopaedia to be published in 1981 (in Greek). The existence of pronounced
"dualism" in the structure of production and employment should not lead to
the misconception, 'Ilidespreadamong studies of "Third World" cities, that it
also implies a "polarised" pattern in the distribution of incomes and wealth
where the great mass of people living in relative poverty and insecurity face
a small affluent minority. This concept of "polarisation" has been inspired
by the classical Marxian model of the early stages of industrialisation,
though in this case there is no generalised wage labour. On the contrary,
however, as the case of Greece signifies, the reproduction of a "dual" pattern
in the distribution and control of means of production may sustain a large
sector of middle-income groups and a semi-affluent petty bourgeoisie of the
traditional type. As evidence on the non-polarised distribution of urban
household incomes, see the material in Appendix 4.1.
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the institutional protection of property rights and the social value and
security attached to real wealth have been exceptionally strong.9 This
sociostructural and institutional background must be kept in mind in any
account of savings and consumption behaviour regardless of more specific
differences in behaviour between social classes. It will tend to influence
strongly the dynamic parameters of the system towards higher propensities
to accumulate wealth - which in the case of most households consists
of residential wealth (a point already stressed in the previous chapter).
Thus, while systematic data on households' net worth are not recorded in
Greece, estimates based on a somewhat narrower definition of wealth that
considers only residential wealth and liquid assets, give a value for
parameter b that approaches 0.9 in both the cross-sectional and the time-
series dimension. This is certainly impressively high both in terms of the
"equality" in the distribution of household wealth and the behavioural
propensities for wealth accumulation.10
3. Asset-choice and demand for housing wealth: The role of costs, inflation,
rents and interest rates
Whereas the previously acknowledged institutional and sociostructural
background factors may be considered as relatively invariant in the short
and medium term, there are a number of probable determinants of residential
wealth accumulation that fluctuate through time - in other words,
"conjunctural" influences. Standard economic theory suggests in this
context all the variables that influence the economic attractiveness of
residential wealth both in absolute terms and relative to other types
of assets, and more specifically those that determine the rate of return
on residential assets (defined in a way that incorporates capital gains).
These include the level of housing rents, the rate of inflation and the
level and structure of interest rates. (The voZwne of housing credit operates
in a wholly different manner and will be considered later). We will advance
some hypotheses with regard to each in turn.
9. For reviews of the taxation of real property and capital gains in
Greece, see, Break and Turvey, Studies in Greek Taxation; Michael, The
Management of the Land Factor; C.P.E.R., Development Plan 1976-80: HOtJsing;Appendix 3.
10. See also, Emmanuel, Categories of Households, chapter 2 and
section 12 of the present chapter.
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Before we embark on the particulars of this analysis,however, a more
general point is in order. It is seldom stressed with adequate emphasis
that the significance of these "economic" variables is conditional on
the overall character of the housing system and, more precisely, conditional
on the type of economic "ratio~ality" governing the behaviour of households
in this concrete system. Up to now we have not introduced any specific
assumptions with regard to the rationale governing household behaviour
towards the accumulation and allocation of wealth. We may start by stressing
that the model of economically rational behaviour commonly depicted in
household economics should be considered as a highly biased one, appropriate
for special conditions only. For our purposes it is useful to distinguish
patterns of household behaviour according to their place in a continuum
defined by two "ideal types" of rational behaviour conceived as polar
opposites. Let us define the first as the pure rentier type and the second
as the family needs - orientated type. In the case of the first type we
assume that household behaviour towards the acquisition of residential
wealth (including owner-occupied housing) is governed by principles of
strict economic rationality in the sense that savings as well as the
choice between different assets follow the criterion of the assets' average
and relative income-producing and wealth-increasing capacity as this is
determined by the structure of investment costs, rents. interest rates and
capital gains. In the case of the second type. we assume that the accumu-
lation of residential wealth is determined by the needs and long-term
preferences of the family unit for housing space. "Family unit needs"
in this context may involve both the "nuclear" and the "extended" family
as well as the provision for the next generation through dowries and
bequests. "Needs", moreover, should be understood in a social context
involving the historically determined standard of living and such aspects
as social prestige, emphasis 0n owner-occupation, conspicuous consumption etc.
Now, neither of these "idealll types by itself represents adequately
the workings of any concrete housing system,though it is common in modern
housing economics to postulate the existence of the pure rentier-investor
model.11 The degree to which a pure IIrentier" rationality dominates the
behaviour of the system depends on a number of factors: the share of rental
11. Notably in Richard Muth's comprehensive model of the housing system
in his Cities and Housing, chapter 3. See also our comments on this issue
in chapter 1.
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housing in total housebuilding as well as the share of business invest-
ments (as opposed to small household asset placements) in the former; the
involvement of modern financial institutions in household wealth formation
and more specifically in the sphere of housing and land; the development
of the capital market as a whole, i.e. the availability of a variety of
assets and a strong interdependence between the markets for different
assets; lastly, and more generally, the extent of diffusion of market
relations in the housing system as expressed in the levels of speculative
production, property transfers and residential mobility relative to the
whole of the housing stock. We may expect that the increased presence of
such factors will be correlated with a stronger component of rentierist-
speculative behaviour in the system as a whole as well in the behaviour
of households. It is arguable, however, that due to the inherent characte-
ristics of housing as a real asset and its significance for family life,
it is highly improbable that a pure rentierist-speculative framework of
asset choice vis-a-vis housing will obtain in real societies, however
"advanced" these are in terms of the aforementioned structural-institutional
fac tcrs , Thus the "rationality" underlying the behaviour of any housing
system will always be a mix of these general ideal types, though one
or the other may be the predominant one. It is in the latter sense that
the typology may be applied fruitfully in a comparative context. In such
a perspective the housing systems of the advanced capitalist countries
should be expected to contain a very strong component of "economic-rational II
behaviour towards household wealth formation and asset choice. In contrast,
and on the strength of the whole of our previous analysis; the Greek housing
system should be understood as a much more "balanced" mix of these opposed
types of behaviour and even, plausibly, one where "family needs" criteria
predominate. This particular contrast is essential to our analysis since. .
most theory and research in the economics of housing concerns advanced
Western nations: it is necessary therefore that its findings be approached
in a highly critical manner.
In the light of the previous theoretical argument ~nd given the character
of the Greek system of housing production and social distribution of housing
and land property, we will advance the following two general hypotheses:
i) The behavioural substratum of aggregate patterns in household wealth
formation and asset choice involves a plurality of preference schedules
based on radically different crit.eria.of:evaluation. Among these, the
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criteria of the marketable value of housing wealth and the rate of return
on invested capital are of secondary importance though their influence
probably gets stronger with time and as we move up the social class
hierarchy.
ii) There is no marked difference between the behaviour of households that
are exclusively owner-users and the behaviour of households that are
owners of rental housing as well, save in the case of really substantial
rentiers who act in terms of business rationality but who, controlling
a very small part of housing investment in Greece, exert an insigni-
ficant influence on the pattern of aggregate wealth formation.
The stress on the "marketability" aspect is essential in proposition Ci).
By diminishing the importance of the rentierist-specu1ative motive we do not
claim that economic values in general are not important in housing behaviour.
We diminish only the determinate influence of a certain kind of economic
rationality. Consider the case of an owner-builder household accumulating
housing wealth within the context of non-commodity relations. This household
will behave according to non-speculative criteria: it will not "invest" in
housing with an eye to a future sale which would produce an adequate return
to its investment but in order to satisfy housing needs (as these are defined
socially). Nevertheless, this does not imply that housing is not appreciated
aZso as economic wealth in monetary terms measured at current market values.
For one, it would cost as much to a family or its offspring to acquire or
build such a property afresh which would, of course, imply efforts, forsaken
consumption, etc. These are measured in monetary terms. Second, the possi-
bility that the need may arise for the sale of the property in the market
or for the earning of rental income is certainly taken into account. After
all, for most households housing wealth is the main form in which accumulated
savings are held and is therefore directly involved in the "economic"
calculations for present and future arrangement of resources. Thus such
variables as market prices and rents are indeed important but only in a long-
run perspective and as setting broad limits within which accumulation deci-
sions are taken, On the other hand, the capacity of housing to be immediately
marketable , i,e, to belong to a well-patterned exchange system where its
potential value or its yield as an asset may be always realised in response
to short-run considerations, is not an overriding criterion for such a
household.
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As a contrast, envisage a situation where housing wealth is held by
investors managing large portfolios composed of various types of assets,
or a case where a similar role is played by a number of capital market
institutions in the hands of which a multitude of households have placed
their savings. In these cases the demand for and the sale of housing
wealth will respond directly to the short-run fluctuations in the fine
structure of prices and rents relative to other assets. Obviously then,
the marketability of a housing type is an essential prerequisite. No
known housing system is governed wholly by such a purely speculative
mechanism, but the Greek housing system must certainly be ranked among
the more extreme cases on the opposHe side of the spectrum in that it
lacks such "modern" property market mechanisms even in relation to the
middle-class apartment housing sector. This, coupled with the diffused
distribution of housing property among households, suggests that the
behavioural tendencies of the pure type of the owner-builder acting in
the context of non-commodity relations described above, will also apply
to the household sector as a whole to a substantial extent.
Let us now turn to the examination of the influence of the various
"economic" variables on the demand for housing wealth keeping in mind
the previous remarks about the underlying character of the system. Now,
this demand is determined both by the trend and level of household wealth
as a whole (w) and by the pattern of allocation between housing and non-
housing wea.lth expressed in the ratio WiW. In the present context, we are
more interested in the latter and more specifically in the determinants of
the ratio dWh*/dW~ i.e. the ratio of the desired increase in housing
wea lth to the increase in wealth as a whole. We have already advanced the·
general assumption that the relationship Wh*/W (and dWh*idW), is determined
by the pattern of "asset-choice" by households expressed in the simple
formula Wh* = k·W'f. It is obvious now in the light of the previous argu-
ments that this "asset choice" behaviour diverges sharply from the model
of economic-rational behaviour expected in the case of a typical rentier-
speculator. The pattern of "asset choices" in this context reflects more
the relatively stable tendencies resulting from the structure of household
needs and preferences (including the economic considerations as to the
appropriate disposition of accumulated wealth).·A general proposition
follows immediately: we should expect the short-run fluctuation in the
economic variables determining the absolute and relative market value
and rate of return of residential capital to exert a minimal influence
on dWh*/dW.
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Given this general proposition we may examine more closely the role of
particular variables. The interest rate on mortgage credit can be easily
dismissed as unimportant. For one, housing credit concerns a rather small
part of residential investment in Greece: before 1968 an insignificant
part; after 1968 it covered something between a quarter and a fifth of
gross investment in dwellings. Second, its possible influence on the cost
of housing is certainly overshadowed by the fact that the demand for
housing credit has always exceeded supply whatever the level of the interest
rate. Rationing thus has been a constant feature of the mortgage market.
In consequence, the voZume of available credit funds has been a more
important influence than interest rates (this aspect will be examined
later). A fortiori, the relationship of the mortgage rate of interest
to the interest rates on other assets should also be considered as
irrelevant; the possibility of such an influence is precluded anyway
by the hypothesised lack of any strong rentierist motives. We know,
after all, that the mortgage rate of interest does not exert any signi-
ficant influence on residential investment even in countries with a highly
developed system of housing finance, notably in the U.S.A.12 Similar
findings have been reported by an econometric analysis of aggregate
housebuilding in Greece.13
The possible effect of interest rates or yields on other assets
antagonistia to housing is of less clear nature. As we pointed above,for1small
"portfolios", as is the case for the great bulk of investors in housing,
marginal differences in yields do not matter. This, in conjunction with
the lack of a varied spectrum of assets accessible to the small investor
in Greece and the modest level of savings accumulated by most households,
makes that decisions about the composition of household wealth involve
predominantly the choice between housing and liquid assets. In relation
to this, it has been asserted that conditions in the postwar period have
more often than not predisposed households towards inves~ent in housing
as against holding weal th in liquid form, i.e. in bank deposits. More
specifically, it has been argued that the interest rate on bank deposits
was often lower than returns on housing property (rents plus capital gains)
12. See, L. Grebler and S.J. Maisel, ~Determinants of Residential
Construction", in D.S. Suits et al. Impacts of Monetary Policy (New
Jersey, 1963): 475-520.
13. P. Kassimatis, The Construction Industry in Greece, p. 48.
265
and thus induced households to invest in residential property.14 Now, while
the observation about the relationships between the economic attractiveness
of the two assets is to a large degree valid, the conclusion about household
behaviour does not necessarily follow. For it presupposes the predominance
of rentierist-speculative motives and behaviour we have rejected previously.
Take the case of house prices. These are obviously the main factor making
for the alleged advantage of housing wealth vis-a-vis bank deposits,espe-
cially in Greece where house rents offer a very small rate of return on the
value of capital. Rising prices, especially when they rise faster than
general inflation, offer positive capital gains while liquid wealth loses
in value as a result of inflation. The point is valid and it is undoubtedly
taken into account by households. For it to have significant effects on the
aggregate dWh*/dW ratio, however, we must assume that households react
in the short run positively to price rises and negatively to price falls.
This is highly improbable. For most households we should expect the price
of housing to be perceived mainly as cost and thus act negatively in the
case of rising relative prices by limiting access to owner-occupation,
increasing the advantages of rented accomodation and causing delays in
buying or building. Only in the case of owners of substantial wealth will
there be sufficient conditions allowing the easy transfer from one form
of wealth to another and a sufficient predominance of the speculative motive,
for the positive relationship to apply.
Similar remarks.~an be made about the effects of general inflation,on
the dWh*/dW ratio. Inflation affects the real yield of bank deposits
and the value of liquid wealth. In relation ~o this our comments about the
minor importance of relativ€ yields also apply. Moreover, to the degree
that a rise in the general inflation rate is acconpented by f'astly rising
~~, I ..~ _- . .
housing investment costs, the overall effect on the dWh*/dW 'ratio may be
negative for the reasons given above. Still, it has often been said in
Greece that periods of very high inflation, especially when combined with
diminished confidence in the banking system, lead to drastic shifts towards
14. See, J.M. Papadakis, Money and Economic Activity: The Greek
Experience 1950-75 (Athens, 1979, in Greek): 261-63. Papadakis' estimates
of the marginal yield of residential assets, however, are questionable. He
takes as a basis the physical marginal output-cap i-talo-at to of dwell ings
as derived from National Accounts data. Thus, neither the land value component
nor the costs of upkeep, management etc. are taken into account, a fact that
raises substantially the estimated rate of yield relative to actual levels.
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investment in dwellings. Barring really exceptional periods (like the
immediate postwar years up to 1954) the argument does not carry much
weight. First, during such periods excessive investment in housing will
be checked by sharply rising land and construction costs and the credit
squeeze that is sure to follow an inflation crisis. Second, high inflation,
especially when accompanied by a stagnation or fall in real incomes, will
lead most probably to a decrease in the marginal savings ratio in favour
of consumption. This will be reinforced by a shift away from monetary assets
and towards consumer durables, given the limited range of alternatives
offered to Greek small savers. Due to the high cost of housing and the
inflexibility that necessarily characterises most households in the case
of investment in dwellings, the fluctuations in the dWh*ldW ratio should
be expected to be small, coming mostly from the side of wealth formation
as a whole.15 This aspect, however, is of limited interest to the present
discussion.
In conclusion, we would venture the following hypotheses. The level
and structure of interest rates, including the mortgage rate of interest,
should be dismissed as unimportant. We should expect the aggregate rate
of housing wealth formation to react to the cost of housing investment
(land and construction costs) in a non-speculative way, i.e. show a
negative price elasticity on the whole,though most probably a rather
weak one given the contradictory considerations involved and the fact
that substantial fluctuations in housebuilding are mainly caused by the
behaviour of the apartment sector wttich contains the rentierist-speculative
segment of housing wealth owners. Since for the greatest part of the period
under study the inflation rate showed minimal fluctuations and for the
theoretical reasons outlined previously, we should also expect an insigni-
ficant influence of this variable. With regard to the sign of the relation-
ship we can not venture a definite hypothesis. Given the correlation of
15. This seems to be the case with developments during the 1974-77 high-
inflation period. All too often, Greek monetary authorities have mistaken the
combination of the relative inflexibility of investment in housing with sharp
drops in bank deposits as a "fl ight" of savings towards real estate whereas,
in fact, such a reallocation involved more a turn towards consumption,
durables, gold, etc. The whole argument about the alleged strong relation-
ship between housing construction and the fear of inflation has been based
on the 1946~1953 precedent of minimal trust on ba~k deposits and the value
of money and the presumed power of this collective historical memory. See,
for instance, Ellis et al., Industrial Capital, pp. 212-213.
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inflation with rising housing costs and the overriding importance of the
latter, it is most probably negative.16
Rents, which have not been considered thus far, present a more clear-cut
case. Since both from a rentierist viewpoint and from the viewpoint of
family needs and preferences a rise in the level of rents (relative
to the general rate of inflation) will induce in theory a rise in the
marginal rate of aggregate housing wealth formation (the dWh*/dW ratio),
we should expect a positive elasticity of the latter in relation to the
rent level. I~ the non-rentierist case this will be mainly based on an
increased willingness to move away from higher rents and into owner-
occupation. However, due to the same reasons making for a weak element
of "economic-rational" behaviour in the system a-s a whole, this positive
influence should be expected to be of limited significance.
5. The role of the volume of housing credit
Whereas the mortgage rate of interest can be safely disregarded as
a significant determinant of aggregate asset formation and allocation
within the household sector, the same can not be said for the voZume
of housing finance available to households. The latter, being institu-
tionally controlled, shows substantial fluctuations with shifts in
monetary policy. Moreover, during the period \'le study there have been
drastic structural changes in this respect. Up to 1967 the volume of mort-
gage loans has remained at insignificant levels relative to the level
of gross private investment in housing. After that year it has shifted
to a substantial share (upwards of 20%) of private investment regardless
of short-run fluctuations. It is widely believed that both aspects of the
financial framework - the long-run structural change and the short-run
fluctuations - have been important determinants of housing investment. Let
us examine their role in relation to the demand for housing wealth relative
to household wealth formation as a whole.
16. Christine V1hitehead has found in her econo"letric analysis of housing
investment in the U.K. that the ~ate of inflation exerts a negative but
very weak influence on private housing completions per head. This conforms
with our hypothesis, though such a formulation does not distinguish between
the effects of inflation on the demand for housing wealth and those on
savings as a whole. It is interesting that the same study found, contrary
to our hypothesis, that housing wealth formation behaves in a speculative
manner vis-a-vis house prices, i.e. it shows a positive price elasticity.
See, The U.K. Housing Market: An Econometric Model, (London, 1974), p. 89.
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The rerevant "dependent" variable here is the dWh*ldW ratio. Therefore,
the appropriate formulation of the "independent" varfable in this case is
not the absolute level of mortgage"lending but the ratio of this flow of
funds to household savings during the same time period or FhldW where
Fh signifies the funds for housing loans advanced by financial institu-
tions to households. An alternative index for the same variable, much
easier to apply operationally, would be FhlS where "s" signifies house-
hold savings (including capital inflow from abroad).l? An increase in these
ratios will probably affect both the savings-consumption pattern and the
allocation of wealth to residential capital. With regard to the first,
i.e. its effects on the propensity to consume (or, inversely, on the
propensity to save) we can say little beside some speculative conjectures.
For the short~term, we see no reason for not adopting the usual Keynesian
assumption that the savings ratio can be treated as an exogenously given
datum. An increase then in credit funds may lead to an increase in housing
investment but it will also lead to tncreases in income and savings \tlith
the effect that the savings ratio is kept constant. Certain complexities
due to time lags will be involved in this relationship, of course, but
this rough formulation suffices here.
The effect of a long-term expansion of mortgage credit is a more complex
matter. If credit expansion is realised through a diffusion of credit
availability to social groups with limited access to property and/or
with the introduction of "cheaper" and "easy" credit, the most probable
effect will be an increase of the propensity to accumul ate wealth. On the
other hand, if credit expansion is based on the relaxation of rationing
for loans that are both expensive and restricted to the more well-off
social strata, the effect will be more in the direction of an increase in
the propensity to aonsume since these strata will be then able to divert
funds that would have gone to housing investment towards increased
consumption instead. These two alternative patterns will influence the
C = h.vJ function in drastically different ways. Credit expansion in
Greece followed more the second pattern; we should therefore expect
the marginal propensity to consume relative to wealth (parameter ''b'')
to increase after 1968.
1? It should be added, however, that since from an operational point
it is not feasible to examine directly the dWh*ldW ratio, the credit variable
must be expressed in terms of absolute levels. See the following formal
expression of the model and the attendant empirical analysis.
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More important in the context of this study are the effects of an
increased credit supply on the allocation of assets - the dWh*/dW
ratio. We must again distinguish between long-run and short and medium-run
effects or more properly, given the existence of long-cycles in building,
between trend effects and ayaZiaal effects. In terms of cyclical fluctua-
tions, an expansion or contraction in housing credit relative to changes in
household wealth and savings will induce similar movements or residential
capital formation relative to the latter. The truth of this relationship
is widely acceptp.d and forms the basis of decisions by speculative builders
as well as governments pursuing a counter-cyclical policy. Speculative
builders are particularly sensitive to credit fluctuations,as a simple
inspection of the time-series of apartment building and credit fluctuations
in Greece testifies. This short-term relation has been instrumental in
forming the bel ief that there is a general strong positive association
between housing credit and residential investment. However, this is not
necessarily true. The expansion of mortgage credit is effective mostly
by acting through and enhancing the speculative component of the housing
system.
The latter takes place in two ways. First, by the introduction of
"speculative" criteri.a (In the corrunonuse of th.e term} in the decisions
of households to tnvest since the latter are increasingly based on expeated
savings rather than real ones and on expected decisions by the authorities
and banks. Second, it facilitates the expansion of the role of speculative
builders in the system as a whole by increasing the size of the market
relevant to them as well as by supplying favourable conditions of finance
in a context characterised by capital scarcity for the production of housing
as a commodity. The combined effect is an increase in the cyclical character
of housebuilding and in the severity of short and medium-term fluctuations.18
The pronounced severity of fluctuations in speculative apartment building
relative to non-speculative building, especially after 1967, is easily
observed in time-series (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Moreover, an "elastic"
credit supply, when available for a sufficient period, is a crucial precondi-
tion for the formation of the familiar "long-cycles" of housebuildinp, though
18. See the discussion of the relationship between the growth of mort-
gage credit and speculation in housing production and the severity of building
fluctuations in C. Long, Building Cycles, pp. 187-89. See also the comments
on thi.s issue with regard to the capitalist-speculative transformation of
the housing economy in chapter 1.
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the latter may be trigered-off and sustained by other factors.19 This
last point is of limited relevance to the Greek case but it shows that
the positive association between a credit expansion and an increase in
the ratio of residential investment to savings may be observed even for
periods longer than the short and medium-term. Nevertheless, these effects
are restricted to cyclical phenomena. More importantly, they mainly concern
the formation of housebuilding or actuaZ residential investment Ih in
response to property demand dWh*: in short, they belong to the analysis
of the Ih = f(dWh*J relation rather than the dWh*ldW pattern. To
disentangle the effects of credit on each of these aspects empirically
may be difficult but from the point of the dWh*ldW pattern there is no
reason to assume a similarly positive association. In fact, the effect
of credit expansion on the allocation of household assets to housing,
especially in terms of long-run trends, will most probably be negative~
expressed in lower values for the constant and the elasticity parameter
in the Wh = k.WY function.20 Such an effect will take place if households
substitute the savings earmarked for housing with borrowed funds and
divert the former to consumption or other assets. Let it be noted that it
is sufficient for this response to be realised at the level of the relevant
aggregates of households in order to have the assumed negative effect.
These, as we argued, are economic classes: it is immaterial, therefore,
if shifts in wealth allocation towards housing take place within the
"life-cycle" of households.
Now, the occurrence of this "divertion" effect in the system as a whole
wi.ll depend on the social distribution of housing credit, a point we already
made with regard to the cost of credit. If credit opportunities were made
available to low-income social classes in a manner that increased their
aggregate life-chances for the acquisition of residential property, the
previous case will not apply. In view, however, of the pronounced middle-
class bias of the institutional and political framework of housing credit
supply in Greece during the 1968-1974 period, the argument for a negative
19. See, Pribram, "Residual, Differential and Absolute Ground Rents"
and the discussion in chapter 1.
20. A well-documented case of a long-term fall in the propensity to
invest in housing while, during the same period, the extent of institutional
housing finance increased fastly, is the U.S. for the period from the
beginning of this century up to the early fifties. See, Grebler et al.,
Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate.
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long-run effect seems more plausible. This, combined with the limited role
of bank and State financing in the system as a whole, will most probably also
make for a substantially reduced strength of the positive association between
housebui1ding and the flow of credit observed in the short run.21
6. The response to the demand for property: conditions of production of
residential capital and the role of input costs
Given the demand for residential wealth rawh*) at any given time which
for all pract tca; purposes may be thought of as an eannarked vol ume of
funds, what is the level of the generated actual residential investment
in money as well as in real terms? Let us define the latter variable (Ih)
in the usual manner of the National Accounts as equivalent to "Gross
Capital Formation in Dwellings", thus excluding the role of depreciation,
the value of land,and capital gains. A consideration of this relationship
involves a rather complex set of factors: the short- and medium-term
behaviour of housing "producers"; both the short-run and long-run condi-
tions in the supply of the "factors" of production, namely land and those
partaking in building (regardless of the accounting convention excluding
land from the value of "output"); it involves, lastly, certain aspects
of the prevailing "relations of production" in housing mainly with regard
to the size, distribution and utilisation of the share of land in the value of
the product. Let us concentrate first on the more "material" issue of
the supply of structures.
We take it as self-evident that the nature and significance of the
above factors are contingent on the specific character of the system of
housing production and that of the wider economy. Our hypotheses, therefore,
will include as conditions the pertinent attributes of the postwar Greek
urban system understood as a particular type of an early capitalist urban
economy. We have referred at length in previous chapters to the relevant
aspects of such a system. The most important from the point of the present
analysis are surely the existence of a substantial precapitalist owner-
building mode of housing production and the specific morphology of the
21. It has been observed that in the U.K. the flow of mortgage funds
exerts a positive but relatively weak influence on housing capital formation,
despite the major role of institutional housing finance in the owner-occupied
market. (Whitehead, The U.K. Housing ·Market, p. 96). This is probably explained
by the relative flexibility of Building Societies in the U.K. vis-a-vis
Government controls of the funds available to them.
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relatively "primitive" speculative mode. To the extent that the first
determines the relation between housing savings and residential capital
production, we should expect such relation to be direct, influenced only
by the trends in the cost of land and construction and by exogenous poli-
tical-institutional tntervent ions , No endogenous mechanism creating
fluctuations and disequilibria is relevant here. This, of course, does
not apply to the case of speculative production. We have already referred
to the strong component of short-term instability that is introduced by
the expanded role of speculative building; in the last part we also noted
that the introduction of a substantial volume of housing credit accentuates
the severity of fluctuations and. thus the extent of disequilibria. The more
drastic effects of credit, however, have been mainly exogenous, due to sharp
reversals of monetary policy. We can say then that the systematic, endogenous
tendencies for disequilibrium between household property demand and specu-
lative supply are, comparatively speaking, limited in size and restricted
to very short time periods. Thus we have here a similar relatively direct
relationship between savings and the supply of structures. This derives
from the very morphology of the "primitive" character of the speculative
economy: the fragmentation of speculative builders into small units as well
as the small size of projects; the competitive and "easy entry" conditions
prevailing in this sector; the cooperative character of the production
process that draws upon the easily mobilisable resources of a multitude
of small firms and contractors, professionals and small landowners; the
limited requirements for large amounts of capital sustained by the small
size of projects and land holdings Ca largely institutional fact) and
the participation of landowners in the finance of development. These make
for a very "elastic" supply of building in response to property demand and
for very short time-lags. Though they also make for violent short-term
fluctuations due to "easy entry" (as well as easy exit) in the business,
there is a direct dependence of the finance of projects on household
savings that safeguards equilibrium over the medium and long term.
This elastic supply of short-term finance and of what economists \'Jou1d
call "entrepreneurial services II is coupled with conditions of elastic supply
of the factors of production.22 This derives, of course, from the background
22. The hypothesis that under the conditions of an early speculati~e
housing economy and a wider context of fast urban moderrisation there 1S,.
in general, an elastic supply of structures as well as of factors of hOu~lng
production, is corroborated by analyses of housebuilding in the U.S. betw~en
the Wars. See, r~uth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Hous inq". In relation to this ,
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conditions implied by the existence of a "dualll system of housing production
and a developing economy undergoing rapid capitalist modernisation. These
are a relatively diffused pattern of landownership and widespread access
to land, certain unemployment and underemployment, and fastly rising
productivity in the economy as a whole. The latter includes t~e production
of construction materials. Such conditions prevailed in Greece at least
up to the beginning of the 1970's. The implication· of such a state of affairs
is that both a short-term and a long-term expansion of building in response
to growing property demand will not encounter "bottlenecks" of production,
neither generate prohibitive rises in the cost of the factors in housing
production. As we argued before with regard to the "feedback" of input costs
on building, limited fluctuations in housing costs (relative to the overall
rate of inflation) will most probably affect the aggregate pattern of asset
allocation by households but to a 1imited extent. This issue can be settled
decisively by empirical enquiry only. We can say with more certainty, however,
that fluctuations in costs will not exert a strong influence on the deci-
sions of speculative builders.23 Speculative builders operate with very
wide margins and imperfect cost calculation, especially so in Greece where
the size of projects and reliance on institutional finance are extremely
limited. As long as there is a sufficient rate of flow of household funds
and the price range acceptable to these small investors is broadly consistent,
given construction costs, with the established expectations of landowners
with regard to the development value of land, there are ample speculative
building opportunities. It is possible, of course, that landowners will have
excessive expectations and thus undercut expansion. However, with conpet tt+ve
conditions and relative oversupply in land for high-density building we should
expect landowners to be in general satisfied with the rise in development
values that the inflation of construction costs brings automatically. We will
return to this argument later.
Costs will emerge as important long-run determinants of the real value
of new residential capital for a given volume of household savings channelled
see the informative account of urban change and modernisation in the U.S.A.
during the 1920's and 1930's, in C. Glaab & T.A. Brown, A History of Urban
America (New York, 1967}, chapter 7.
23. For the very weak response of speculative building to fluctuations
in construction costs, see Grabler and Maisel, "Determinants of Residential
Construction" and Long, Building Cycles, p. 110.
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to housing, in the following two cases. First, in the transition to condi-
tions of relative factor-scarcity and near-full employment which, when
accentuated by income-distribution conflicts, will lead with every major
expansion in investment expenditure to an inflation spiral. Second, in the
case of a long-term trend of rises in relative construction costs due to a
systematic lag in the productivity of labour in construction and in industries
producing construction materials. Both of these conditions are more relevant
to advanced capitalist economies than to developing countries that, having
established a modern industrial base and a capacity for fast capital
accumulation, can still draw on unused supplies of labour and on widely
available productivity-enhancing innovations (we abstract from the case
of less-developed countries which face more severe cost problems due to
fundamental bottlenecks in the production and import of capital goods).
Still, with fast economic development these problems are bound to arise
some time. Greece started to face such problems in an acute form after
the early 1970's. Thus in a truly long-run perspective of the economics
of postwar building the supply of inputs and costs must certainly be
included as an essential aspect. For the greatest part of the period we
study, however, such. "structural" mechanisms of cost fonnation have been
unimportant. Trends i"ncosts may be considered "exogenous" data. Moreover,
they have in general been very favourable; they have followed with limited
fluctuations the general trend of price changes in the postwar period. For
these reasons, the substantiation of the above arguments and the empirical
examination of construction costs, especially in the light of our points
about thei.r limited role in the dynamic of housing production, will be
given in an appendix to this chapter (Appendix 6.1).
7. The role of the "social relations" of housing production: the share
of land and landowners' behaviour
In contrast to the issue of construction inputs which depend more
on conditions in the wider economy, the role of non-labour shares in the
price of housing must be systematically considered. In the context of a
housing economy in the process of capitalist transformation their role
will change according to definite trends and thus the relationship between
housing savings and real housing product will vary significantly in the
long-run depending on the extent of changes in the underlying "social
relations" of housing production.
275
The expansion of the role of speculative production in the housing
system as a whole will in general bring a rise in the aggregate share of
non-labour costs. The obvious case here is, of course, developers' profits.
The latter as well as institutionally fixed overheads and indirect taxes
(in the Greek case the transfer tax) form well over a third of the
production price of speculative housing whereas they are insignificant
in tredf t tcnal petty owner-building.24 Most probably, these differential s
in full normal prices between the two modes are reduced to a large extent
by differences in mechanisation. In a context of fastly rising construction
wages and an integrated labour market - conditions that applied for the
greatest part of the postwar period - the extensive mechanisation of specu-
lative building will provide a comparative advantage vis-a-vis simple
methods of production in the precapitalist housing mode. More important
for a gradual reduction in the efficiency of household savings in terms
of real product will be the broader concomitants of speculative expansion,
namely, the reduction of popular access to cheap, non-urbanised land and
the decline of non-modern, flexible and gradual methods of urban development
including "installment" building. The significance of these processes has
been discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
This brings us to the issue of land. This factor is relevant in two
senses: first, as cost in the formation of normal production prices and
second, in relation to its share in the product in the process of resi-
dential development as a whole and, more specifically, with respect to the
role, the social distribution of this share and its utilisation. Modern
urban economics, being notoriously ahistorical, have conspicuously neglected
this latter aspect. The role of land as a factor-cost, on the other hand,
is certainly familiar and will not occupy us much in this discussion. The
trend of land costs and their determinants are considered at some length
in Appendix 6.1. It suffices here to accept a very general and simple
hypothesis for land costs, namely that they are determined as monopolistic
mark-ups on the average construction cost per square meter of the housing
normally built in any particular urban area.25 We assume, moreover, that
24. See the discussion in chapter 3 and the data on price formation in
housing (particularly apartment housing) in D. Emmanuel, Three Studies,
pp. 78-80 and P. Mandikas, "Costs, Fees and Taxes in Housing", Epiloghi, 8,
(1972): 593-600.
25. OUl4 concepts are analogous to Kalecki·s model of price formation
where profits are conceived as monopolistic mark-ups on costs. See his
Theory of Economic Dynamics (Greek translation), pp. 26-31.
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the ratio of land costs to construction costs per floorspace unit tends in
the long run and under conditions of lIequilibriumll urban growth to remain
constant, unless the price of agricultural land increases disproportionately.
Given a constant share of land in housing costs, changes in the average
value of land are determined by the development values of an area and thus
vary according to the average construction value of the residential
floorspace built in the area and the average permitted intensity of
development. We abstract in this from intra-urban differentials in the
share of land costs which, as we argue in Appendix 6.1, are the product
of spatial differentials in the degree of monopoly of landowners relative
to the average degree of monopoly in the city as a whole and thus do not
affect the main point of our argument. This hypothesis is based on a number
of assumptions: a generalised and integrated land market (this, as we
argued in chapter l,is not inconsistent with the lack of a generalised and
integrated housing market); a diffused distribution of landownership and
thus a tendency for the stability of the degree of monopoly of landowners
vis-a-vis household demand for housing wealth; lastly, a certain pattern
of relationship between urban spatial structure, housing preferences, and
transport costs that make for insignificant IIdifferential" ground rents.
These assumptions seem appropriate for the type of housing system we study
but their validity can be also argued on general grounds (see Appendix
6.1). The provi so for "equil ibrium" in urban growth refers to alack of
major fluctuations in household property demand and major shifts in the
pattern of institutional controls over the supply of urban land relative to
the former. These conditions have been to a certain extent violated in
postwar Greece. There are indications, moreover, that the price of agri-
cultural land has risen faster than the price of housing. As a result
there is evidence that the share of land in housing cost has increased
during the 1960's (see Appendix 6.1). For analytical purposes, however,
we will accept here the simple assumption of a fixed land-cost ratio.
In current economic thinking the universal implicit assumption concerning
the distribution and utilisation of the share of land in costs is that the
latter is transferred to a distinct class of landowners that consume the
proceeds or add to their other assets and thus functionsas a purely extra-
neous factor, similar, say, to taxes, without having any determining role
in the finance and production of housing. We have already argued (in
chapter 1) that this model of a full division of labour between the various
owners of capital involved in residential production is historically inaccu-
rate. It certainly does not apply in the Greek housing system both in the
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case of speculative building and that of precapita1ist owner-building,
though for different reasons. Having rejected the full division-of-
labour model we must now explore the implications of alternative
patterns in the "social relations" of production.
Let us view the housing production process from the landowner's point.
We will call ,~" the ratio of the full production price of new residential
capital (Vh) to its investment cost without land (I~. Since v = Vh/Ihthe expression V.Ih -Ih provides us with the share of land in the product
and the latters' ratio to unit price is v-1/v. Let us call by "i" the part
of investment costs (Ih) that the landowne.r·does not finance with his
funds. Then the increase in the value of his housing wealth (C) due to
investment Ih, is obviously
Let us conceive relationship (I') as applying for the aggregate
annual activity in a whole housing seato~, i.e. a relatively separate
housing sub-system characterised by uniform relations of production,
certain geographical boundaries, and a distinct class of households-
investors. During each time-period the group of owners of currently
developed land finance part of their consumption or the accumulation
of non-housing assets by selling part of their housing wealth. We will
define by "a" the ratio of the net flow of these sales in the property
market to the increase i"nlandowners' housing wealth (C). It can be
easily seen then that the total net supply of new housing properties
offered in the market during any time period is given by the sum
(a C + i·Ih). This, in equilibrium, must equal the demand for new housing
assets, i.e. the net flow of savings for an increase of the housing assets
of households that are not owners of currently developed land. If these
are defined as SHh
SHh = a G + i.Ih (2')
From (I') and (2') we derive SHh = i.Ih + a(v~i).Ih (3') and finally
(4' )
i+o(v-£1
If the funds invested by landowners in currently built stock are SHo
we also have the definition Ih = SHo .) (5')
(1-1,
278
If we disregard the role of transfers of land assets and land gains,
the volume of invested savings SH = SHh + SHo constitutes the effective
demand for new residential capital and may be considered proportional to
dWh*. The previous formulation26 shows that residential investment as
measured in usual economic practice net of land values will in general be
substantially smaller than this flow of economic resources and, as we will
show, will decrease relative to the savings flow the greater the value of
parameters "a" and "o" and of variable "i:", We know that with the growth
in the share of speculative housing production in the system as a whole,
the aggregate values of "a" and "i" will indeed increase. Therefore, even
with constant land costs (and thus a constant "v") the "efficiency" of
household savings in terms of real housing product will tend to decrease.
let us demonstrate this thesis.
All cases of residential development car. be conceived analytically
as composed by a combination in various proportions of four "pure" types
of the division of labour between the roles of landowner, developer-producer,
and final owner of the product (see in this connection the theoretical
discussion in chapter I). Consider first the case with full division of
labour and generalised commodity relations. The speculative developer,
in such a case, sells the whole of the built property to households (and
businesses, though as we argued their role is limited in the housing sphere
in Greece), thus i = 1. In addition, the cost of land is paid out to a
separate class of landowners who allocate it to consumption or non-housing
assets. Thus we nave SHo = 0, SH = SHh and a = v_l!v.27 From these
conditions and equations C2'} - (5') we easily derive that with regard
to this part of the system Cor in a IIpurell system of this type) residential
investment will be a fraction of savings depending on the value of land:
Cby ~efinition v) 11
26. The formulation presented in equations (I') - (5') has been developed
as an analogy to a model advanced by Nicholas Kaldor for business investment
in general, incorporating expl icitly a market in shares. See his "Marginal
Productivity and Macroeconomic Theories of Distribution". It should be added
that in terms of the causal mechanism, the analogy is not sustained. Kaldor,
as all members of the "Post-Keynesian" school, takes capital ist invest-
ment as the independent variable; savings are determined endogenously. The
mechanism in the case of housing works the other way around. of course.
27. If v = 1. the value of a will at maximum equal the share of the
fully-priced product appropr-iated by 1andowners. This, given the def int t.ion
of v, is v-l/v.
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More relevant to the social relations prevailing in "early capitalist"
speculative building,is an arrangement where the landowner takes part in
finance and development by exchanging his land for part of the developed
property. In terms of a "pure" case again, he will "invest" the iohole
of the development value of land in the housing capital generated in the
process and we will have a = 0. In consequence, regardless of the amount
of funds invested by the landowner in addition to this, i.e. irrespective
of the value of "t", rh will equal SH.28 We see immediately that this
pattern results in a substantially higher volume of housing construction
for given levels of savings directed to this purpose, compared with the
former case of a pure capitalist division of labour (in Greek speculative
building. "v" has been roughly 1.35 - 1.40, hence Ih in a pure case
of the second type would have been 28% - 33% higher than Ih in the former
case). As a matter of .fact, speculative apartment building in postwar
Greece has followed in its largest part this latter "cooperative" form
of speculative production, a pattern that goes a long way in explaining
the swift manner of speculative sector expansion as well as the high
levels of aggregate residential capital formation relative to incomes
and savings.
In both of the above cases we have a system of clmmodity production. If
there is no division between the builder-developer and the final owner (who
in most cases is also the user), Le. in "owner-building", we can envisage
two opposite types depending on the role of land. These are determined by
the time land has been appropriated relative to the ttme of building. When, :
the relevant time~lag is long enough, tne owner-builder assumes effectively
the role of the landowner, too. We have then a case where i = 0, a = 0,
SH = Slfo and SHh = O. But then. of course, the division between landowners
and households demanding housing property breaks down and SE represents theo
savings of nouseholds. In such a pure case of owner-building with owned land,
i.e. a total lack of commodity exchange relations and the attendant division
of labour (disregarding the sphere of construction), we will have Ih = SH.
Thus the aggregate effect is similar to the more "primitive" case of specu-
lative housing production. In terms of the distribution of the housing
product between landowners and households, the effect is, of course,
radically different.
28. When c = 0 housing investment Ih will always equal SH irre-
spective of the value of i. This is obvious since in the case that 0 < i < 1
and thus Ih = SHh/i~ savings invested by owner-developers are SHo = (l-iJIh.
Therefore, SH= U-ilIh + i·rh = rh'
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At the other extreme, we have a case of complete division of labour
(and divi sion of the product) between the owner of 1and and the owner-
builder. The latter buys land at fuZZ cost at the moment of development,
and the lando~!ner utilises the proceeds in consumption and non-housing
assets (relative at least to this housing s~ctor). We therefore have a
case where i = 0 and c = v-l/v and the net effect of savings directed
to housing is reduced in proportion to land costs, i.e. Ih = SHiv and
SH = SHh similar to the aggregate pattern of the pure capitalist division
of labour.
Greek precapitalist owner-building has been en the whole situated
somewhere between these two extreme cases of Ih = S8 and Ih = SHiv.
Although a great part of land has been, from a long-run perspective,
owned by popular households or bought at substantially earlier dates than
the date of residential development, a certain amount of resources has
always been transferred to a distinct class of landowners (peasants
owning agricultural land in the periphery of cities and petty speculators).
On the whole, however, perhaps the largest part of land gains due to
urbanisation has been "internalised" in the fonn of asset fonnation
within the precapitalist owner-building sector. Additions to existing
structures which form a very large part of Greek precapitalist building
are, of course, a pure case of a complete "internalisation" of the
development value of land Ca pure case of i = 0 and c = 0). In this
respect, and disregarding distributional aspects, there is a certain
symmetry between the precapitalist mode and the "primitive" speculative
mode prevailing in Greek urban housing production. "Internalisation" of
land values has been extensive in apartment building also and, as a
result, the expansion of the speculative sector has most probably not
brought any drastic fall in the aggregate In/dWh* ratio.
Nevertheless, the trend of change has been towards the expansion of
the role of commodity exchange relations and an increased division of
labour between landowners, builders and final owners. This has been
effected by the expansion of speculative building in itself as well as
the imposition of controls on petty owner-building and the restrictions
of access to peripheral urban land (see chapter 4). With the capitalist
tr-ansf'ormaton of the housing system, therefore, there has been a gradual
shift away from the "pure" owner-builder case (i:;:: 0" 0 :;::0) to the other
three cases we examined, which either in the distributional or in the
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aggregate sense diminish the volume of real housing product relative to
the level of household funds in demand for residential wealth.
8. The rate of the depreciation of residential capital
With given residential investment rh in current prices, the "valuation
ratio" (v), and the increase in the prfce of a composite unit of construction
output representative of the material character of the housing stock, we
can determine the value of total residential capital or housing wealth
incrementally in relation to previous year's stock. We must also take
into account, however, the effects of depreciation and capital loss. In
formal terms we have the following identity:
where (dpJh is the change in the appropriate construction price indexand "d" a composite depreciation rate. This formulation implies, of course,
that we define the value of buildings by their replacement cost, that the
"valuation ratio" due to the value of land is constant, and that the value
of undeveloped land is not included in housing wealth (neither the excess
of the development value of a given plot over the value determined by the
product of "v" and the replacement value of existing structures).
The important element in the previous relationship is the depreciation
rate; whereas changes in replacement costs are basically "exogenous" to
the housing system, depreciation is influenced by dynamic interrelation-
ships within the latter. The annual rate of losses in residential wealth
is, of course, mainly determined by the physical decay of buildings and
the incidence of obsolescence which in turn depend on the age of stock and
the quality of construction. It also depends, however, on factors that
go beyond simple technical matters. For one, it is influenced by the
pattern of social preferences with regard to modern as against non-modern
housing. r~oreover, the structure of urban development specific to a housing
system during a given period influences "d" by impinging on the demol ition
rate. Decisions for demolition and rebuilding are less a matter of physical
obsolescence and more a matter of the distribution of opportunities for
"higher and better" development. The massive wave of piecemeal speculative
redevelopment of central areas in Greek cities in the postwar period has
caused the extensive demolition of a large number of otherwise viable
structures. Thus a high rate of housebuildinq relative to the volume of
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the housing stock as a whole, and most especially, high shares of specula-
tive developments, will raise the rate of capital loss by increasing the
rate of demolition and lowering the obsolescence age of dwe lltnqs , The
latter will take place to the degree that the "object tve" obsolescence
age of old stock determined by demolition - say when 70% or 80% of a given
IIvintage" has been demolished - influences, in turn, subjective evaluations
about the life of buildings.2g
More important lIendogenous" fluctuations in the aggregate depreciation
rate will result from the influence of changes in housing rents (the latter,
as \-/e will see immediately below, are also determined to a large extent
"endogenously"). In the more obvious sense this will be effected through'
the decisions of owners of rented stock regarding the level of maintainance
expenditures that are economic for given levels of gross rental income.
The rate of vacancies is also relevant to tnese economic calculations. It
is widely believed that the deterioration of structures is not a simple
linear function of decreases in maintainance expenditures but accelerates
when the latter reaches low levels. Thus, witfl falling rents and increasing
vacancies, the net effect will De an increase in the rate of depreciation
~ncluding abandonment). Falling rents, however, will also cause an increase
in the growth rate of real housing consumption per household and through
the mechanism of housing allocation will effect an increase in the aggre-
gate rate of abandonment. This can be easily demonstrated with the help
of the model of housing allocation advanced in chapter 4. It should be
noted that the concept of the "depreciation ratell adopted there differs
from the one used here in that the former did not include capital losses
in the form of demolition and abandonment of stock. The volume of abandoned
stock, which is incorporated in the. present concept of aggregate depre-
ciation, was found in that analysis to depend on rate. "g", the qrowth
rate of real housing consumption per household, as we.ll as on a series
of other, "exogenous" factors (including "depreciation IIin the narrow
sense). Therefore, depending on the elasticity of '~" with respect to
fluctuations in rents relative to the general price index (and more
particularly to that of housing construction costs), the aggregate
depreciation rate (especially the part commonly called the "replacement
rate") wi ll be influenced by fluctuations in the relative index of rents.
29. For this arcument on the "objec t ive" determination of the
obsolescence age of-housing by the rates of growth and demolition,
see Needl eman , The Economics of 1I0us~, pp. 40-41.
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We can summarise the previous points by treating the aggregate
depreciation rate as composed of two components. A permanent component
(d ) determined by the structural characteristics of the housing system
inPquestion and the age composition and physical attributes of the housing
stock, and a transitory component (d )determined by the gross rate ofn
growth of residential capital in real tenns (Ih:tIWh:tt_2)' and by
fluctuations in the price index of rents relative to general inflation and
the price index of construction costs. Assuming that the latter is more
important in this particular relationship, and neglecting time lags, we
write:
dt=d + d tP n:t
9. The equilibrium between housing supply and housing consumption demand:
the role of housing rents and vacancies
It can be easily observed that according to the hypotheses advanced
thus far, residential capital (Wh) and aggregate housing consumption (Ch)
are determined at any given time by independent mechanisms: the first in
the context of wealth accumulation and the dynamics of housing production.
and the latter as a function of total houseftold consumption. We therefore
have a built-in tendency for disequiZibrium between the supply of housing
stock and housing consumption demand. What are the mechanisms that restore
equilibrium in the system as a whole? Current theories of the economics
of housing assume perfect competition and generalised market relations
in both the housing market and the market of production factors and thus
suggest two complementary equilibrium mechanisms. The first operates
through housing rents and the rate of vacancies. Undersupply will be
reflected in low vacancy rates, high rents and high house prices after
a certain time lag, whereas the tendency of speculative building to over-
shoot demand will result in high vacancy rates and a fall in house prices
and rents. These will lead, respectively, to a rise or a fall in resi-
dential investment thus restoring equilibrium. The whole process will take
the form of the so-called "housing cycle".,'W In the production sphere
30. See, Needleman, The Economics of Housing, pp. 154-56. For an
elegant model of the interdependence of rents, vacancies and housing
investment in the process of the "housing cycle" see, J.S. Dusenberry,
Business Cycles and Economic Growth (New York, 1968), chapter 7.
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a similar equilibrium mechanism should be expected to operate under
competitive conditions: excessive construction activity will produce
scarcities in productive factors and price rises, thus resulting in a
reduction of profit margins and a check of further expansion.
We have noted, however, that in the conditions of a IIdua111 housing
system with a "primitive" speculative sector and a limited capita1ist-
rational rentier component, the dynamic interrelationships between the
accumulation of residential wealth and the rental returns and capital costs
of property are very weak if significant at all. Construction costs may
influence residential investment but the reverse, i.e. the systematic
influence of building activity on factor costs, is not true. This situation
may change only in the extreme case when we have an exhaustion of the
productive capacity of the economy as a whole, full employment, and a
general inflation crisis. Thus, the feedback mechanisms necessary for
equilibrium are not normally based on the interrelation between housing
investment, rental returns and production costs, save in the case of
really great changes in the latter that would act as broad Limits for
further household wealth accumulation.
Similarly, the rate of vacancies, though certainly significant in
the long run in the previously mentioned sense of setting broad limits,
appears in the short and medium run to be very flexible and might reach
surprisingly high levels under conditions of fast growth in the housing
stOCK. Even in the developed housing market of the U.S. in the 1950's
the interconnection between vacancies in the various local sub-markets
was weak and the time~lags for the realisation of their effects very long.
As Maisel has pointed in his important study of the housing cycle, "macro-
disequilibria may last for long periods before any adjustment by alteration
in the number of starts".31 In addition to this inherent i~perfecticn of
the housing market as a whole, it has been observed that when rising
incomes are associated with a long-term shift towards a preference for
owner.occupation, we should expect higher vacancy rates and a slower
31. S.J. Maisel, "A Theory of Fluctuations in Residential Construction
Starts", American Economic Review, June, (1963): 359-83. The strategic
importance of vacancies in the formation of building fluctuations has
been argued in the classic study of A.K. Cairncross, Home and Foreign
Investment 1870-1913 (Cambridge, 1953), chapter 2.
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response of house-rents in the rental market of apartment buildings.32
Though the share of owner-occupation has shown a falling trend in postwar
Greece, this was more the effect of objective constraints rather than
a reflection of any weakening in the emphasis placed on the achievement
of owner-occupation as household resources rise in the long run and within
the life-cycle of households. Thus, the above point is highly relevant,
adding to the lack of short-term feedbacks .operating in investment.
If the short- and medium-term behaviour of residential investment (Ih)
does not supply the mechanism for the equilibrium of residential capital
supply (Wh) and housing consumption demand (Ch) how is the latter maintained?
Our hypothesis is that the necessary adjustments take place on the side
of housing consumption and, secondarily, in the housing stock as a whole
through changes in the depreciation rate. Over-investment or under-invest-
ment relative to consumption demand will result in changes in rents and
vacancies. We have already argued that the latter will affect the "transi-
tory" component of depreciation, notably in a direction compensating for
over- or under-supply. Higher rents and lower vacancies (under-supply)
will lower the depreciation rate, and thus increase the net growth rate
of the stock as a whole for a given gross investment. The opposite
process will taKe place in the case .ofover-investment.
A similar theugh mere effective mechanism will operate in relation
to housing consumption. We have assumed (in equatien 4) that the latter
is a simple power function of tetal household consumptien. We may add now
that the price level of housing rents relative to the general price
level is also a relevant determinant (since rents and vacancies are
interrelated the latter need not be included explicitly in the heusing
censumption function). An increase in rents and a lowering of the vacancy
rate due to underinvestment wlll effect a decrease in real housing con-
sumptien, thus reducing the disequilibrium in the Ch!Wh ratio within
the acceptable limits of gress rental returns. The opposite case (over-
investment) will include higher consumption both in terms of space and
expenditure and thus help towards the occupation of the oversupplied
housing stock. The effectiveness of this mechanism will depend on the
elasticity of housing consumption with respect to the relative level of
rents. It should be added that this process need not be confined te the
32. See) r'a;se.l,IIA Theory of Fluctuations"; Needleman, The Economics
of Housing, p. 157,
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rental market. Owner-occupiers will also react. This does not require
any strong assumptions about a high rate of mobility among owner-occupier
households (which is usually - and most especially in Greece - limited).
A response to changing rents and vacancies requires simply that owners
of housing wealth occupy ("consume") more or less of the stock they oum,
Admittedly, only a limited part of property holders own more than one
housing unit. This substratum, however, is sufficiently elastic in their
behaviour vis-a-vis rents and vacancies, and amplifies substantially
the inherently elastic behaviour of renters.
10. Formal structure of the model
The formal structure of the theoretical model developed in the previous
sections can be presented as follows (we neglect complexities in the time-
1ag structure):
(1) C = q.~ . (dpJb't t t
where C is national private consumption, W total household sector wealth
(this is mainly composed by housing wealth and liquid assets and in oper-
ational terms may be measured by their SWl):(dp) t is the rate of change
in the general price index (the GDP deflator).
(2)
where Yd is disposable income, g its growth rate and Yd,to its value at
some arbitrary starting point t .o
(3) Ct+Wt=Yd,t+Sa,t+Ws,t_l+Wh,t_l· (l-dtJ· (dpJh,t
where Sa is capital inflow to the household sector from ~broad, Wh is
housing wealth, Ws is household sector liquid assets, (dp)h,t is the
rate of change of housing construction costs and dt the depreciation rate
of residential capital. This formulation implies that the model is expressed
in current prices. It also implies that we may effectively disregard certain
non-housing and non-liquid assets and thus write:
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We also have:
( 5)
where Wh6/ is desired residential wealth. More generally, we may write:
(S')
v , , ,
w. * = k: WI • (p ./p )Y • (p Jp)Y
h6 t t h6 tf' t 1'6 tf' t
where Pt' Ph,~ and P1',t are the general price index and those for housing
construction and rents respectively. We assume, however, that their effect
in (5') will be relatively minor: y will be very small and negative and
y I very small and positive. We also have as an accounting identity:
where dWh,t* is the desired change in housing wealth. With respect to
depreciation, we have assumed that:
(7) dt=d +d tP n6
where d is the "permanent" component of the aggregate
p
(the constant rate of residential capital devaluation)
"transitory"
depreciation rate
and d t then6
component. We have also advanced the hypothesis that:
Given dWh,t~ the equilibrium level of actual residential investment
(net of land costs) Ih,t is a simple proportional function of the volume
of funds representing dWh,t*
Ih,t = a • dWh,t*
where "a" is a parameter ranging from +1 to llv, depending on the aggregate
pattern of the "social relations of production",namely the composition
of residential production with respect to the four extreme analytical
types distinguished in section 8 above according to the role of landowners
in residential development and the distribution of land gains. Thus
parameter '~" will not be in general a constant but will change in value
as the overall character of housing production (hanges. Under conditions
of an expanding role of the speculative-capitalist sector, ,~" will shift
downwards from values near +1 to values approximating llv ("vilis the
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"valuation ratio" expressing the mark-up on Ih due to land costs; if land
values are positive "v" is always greater than +1).
In the short run, Ih~t will diverge from its equilibrium value due to
the effect of fluctuations in the flow of housing credit on speculative
building (we assume a constant pattern in the social distribution of
credit vis-a-vis the differentiation of households according to capacity
for housing wealth accumulation). Thus we will have
(9' ) zI = a' • dWh *. CFh, t}h, t ,t
where Fh,t is the flow of funds for housing loans.
Actual residential wealth at time et} will be the sum of this invest-
ment adjusted by th.e IIvaluation ratio" and residential wealth in the
previous period adjusted for the effects of depreciation and the change
in replacement costs.
uc: Wh,t = Wh,e-t . Cl-dt}' CdpJh, t + Ih, e:"
It should be noted that equations (6), (9) and (ID) imply that, even
in the long run, there is a systematic difference between Wh~t* and Wh~t
unless a = llv. This results from the assumption tnat the investment
of part of the land gains realised by landowners in-housing w~alth does
not form part of housing wealth demand but is a conjunctural induced
effect of the volume of residential development depending on the structure
of finance (i.e. the "relations of housing production").
Housing consumption Ch,t will be a function of household consumption
expenditure as a whole and the price level of housing rents P t relative
1',
to the level of the general price index Pt.
The elasticity of Ch with regard to the price of rents when the first
is measured in constant prices is expected to be negative. However, our
model is expressed in current prices, and thus the elasticity 6' in equation
(1l) need not be negative. It can be easily seen from equation (11) that if
the elasticity of Ch (in
n = 6'-1 and therefore,r
will be positive.
real terms) with regard to rents is n,
l'
unless n is greater or equal to -1, 0'
l'
then
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To finish the formal expression of our model, we have argued that
the general index of prices Pt and the index of construction prices Ph,t
exogenously given. Thus, Ph,t will not be.significantly affected
by fluctuations in the level of residential investment. In contrast,
we have assumed that the level of housing rents wi~Z be affected by the
latter as it relates to changes in housing consumption (dCh) as well as
follow the changes in the general price level {dp}. Thus we have:
r {de Ip ](12) (dp] = f (dp) h, t'. '1', t
'1', t L ~ Ih, t/Ph, t
In the system of equations (1) to (12) there are twelve inknowns:
are
et' Yd,t' W~ Wh,t*' dWh,t*' Ch,~ Wh,t' Ih,~ Ws,~ dt' dn,t' {dpJ'1',t'
All other elements are, or can be derived from, parameters, exogenous
variables and initial values. Thus the system is mathematically determinate.
Its solution, however, for any year must be arrived at inc'1'ementaZZy, by
proceeding from initial values. A general formal solution would require
the knowledge of growth functions for the exogenous variables as well as
initial values consistent with an equilibrium path. These rather formal
issues will not be pursued here, Our concern is more limited, namely
the supply of a comprehensive, if general, theoretical substructure for
the understanding of the process of residential capital formation as a
whole under conditions similar to those of postwar Greece. It remains
to measure empirically the value of the parameters in the model as well
as check the consistency of the econometric relationships implied against
the available evidence.
11. The empirical superstructure of the model
Any empirical analysis along the lines suggested by our theoretical
model will by necessity be inconclusive due to the limitations of
available data. These are most pronounced in the case of household
wealth as a whole and housing wealth in particular. In addition, the
various parameters involved in the formation of residential investment
can not be directly estimated; their role can only be discerned with the
help of their indirect effects and certain broad qualitative assumptions.
A more general limitation results from the necessary use of aggregate
macroeconomic data which are the product of the behaviour of a non-homo-
geneous housing system comprised by radically different modes of housing
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production. Aggregate national data, moreover, reflect the composite
outcome of local fluctuations that may differ significantly between
regions and along the urban-rural continuum. These complexities will most
probably be restricted to the short run, save for those differences in
dynamic behavio~r resulting from the systematic discontinuities in the
mode of housing production, and their effects will be mitigated by the
fact that the household character of the economics of housing investment
to a large extent cuts across different modes and sectors. Nevertheless,
we should expect a certain smoothing-out that will make aggregate
patterns less indicative of the actual dynamic interrelationships as
these function in particular regions and "sub-markets". These imperfections
are compounded by the notoriously bad quality of housing investment sta-
tistics in Greece which are based on building permits data, crude price
indices and are, in addition, hampered by the non-monetary character of
a substantial part of the housing economy.53 ihe long-term structural
orientation of our model reduces to a large extent the distorting effect
of these imperfections. By necessity, however, certain aspects will not
be examined at all (most importantly the role of depreciation and of
"relations of production" in the investment function) and throughout
the following analysis we must keep in mind these limitations of the
material as important qualifications.
55. The National Accounts Service of the Ministry of Coordination
estimates the value of gross investment in dwellings by a rather crude
method. The volume of residential building permits is taken as the measure
of actuaL construction. This ;s raised by a certain percentage in order
to incorporate illegal building estimated roughly on the basis of official
impressions. The building volume then is multiplied by two aggregate
indices of the value of construction per cubic meter - one for Athens and
one for the rest of the country. The latter are supplied by the Ministry
of Public Works and the National Statistical Service. It ~s significant
that only after 1971 was a systematic price index for residential con-
struction constructed and this concerned material inputs only. The index,
furthermore, is based on a model of a "representative" building; given
the variety of building types and modes of housing production and the
different patterns of fluctuations observed for these, it must be obvious
that this highly aggregated approach produces crude estimates. (Our
information about the methodology employed by the National Accounts
Service is based on an inspection of the methodology manuals issued by
the Service for internal use and interviews with staff).
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In the formulation of our model we have defined household sector
wealth as composed,for all practical purposes, by housing assets Wh and
liquid assets WS' The latter is operationalised here as the sum of currency
in circulation, and sight, savings and time deposits by individuals and
private enterprises in banks (excepting the Bank of Greece) and special
financial institutions (see series in General Appendix A.9). An obvious
problem with such a measure of household sector liquid assets is the
inclusion of private enterprise deposits. We can only assume that the
latter may serve as an index of the volume of non-liquid assets other
than housing and land, held by households, namely securities and the
equivalent of rentier wealth in the case of non-incorporated enterprises.
The measurement of residential wealth presents even greater problems.
It is customary to measure real wealth by capitalising rental income. All
too often this method is conceived as a definition, a representation of
the actual thing,whereas it is only anhypothesis, valid under certain
conditions i.nthe real estate market. The value of residential capital,
as all values in a market society, is determined, of course, in exchange.
Disregarding local and temporal fluctuations in market values, the exchange
value of new housing corresponds to its current "production price"
(including the cost of land and indirect taxes). In that part of the
existing stock where properties are saleable and competitive with new
structures (i.e. where dwellings can be feasibly compared with new stock
as alternatives regardless of their condition), values are determined by
current replacement costs and the prevaillng mark-up on construction costs
due to the land factor. Development values of land where a "higher and
better" development is feasible are an additional element that must be
taken into account in this latter case. Thus in a housing system dominated
by a rapidly expanding market of new structures, even under generalised
market conditions, the relationship between the market value of housing
and the "values" given by the capitalisation of rents with the ruling
rate of interest is an empirical question depending on the conformity
of investors' behaviour with rentier-capitalist rationality. We have
repeatedly stressed tnat the prevalence of such.rationality under the
conditions of an early capitalist, "dual" housing system is questionable
to say the least. As a result, the exact relationship between the value
of housing wealth and gross rental yields can not be determined beforehand
but is, within very broad limits, an "endogenous II variable. We do not have
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sufficient information for this relationship - save for a few rough
estimates for various periods - and, therefore, the customary capitalisation
method is unfeasible for empirical reason~ too. Nevertheless, given the
limitations of data and our interest in long-term patterns, we will use
in the following analysis an estimate of wh based on the capitalisation
of gross rents (paid and imputed) with an average rate for the whole period
of 6.5%. This is slightly greater than the average interest rate on bank
deposits for the period under study.34 We believe that a more realistic
average rate would have been 5.0%; this, however, would have given
extremely large amounts of wh relative to disposable income and liquid
assets, thus obscuring the process of asset allocation within the household
sector.
We will limit the time-span of the analysis to the 1955-1976 period.
The choice of 1955 was dictated by two considerations. First, 1955 has
been a major turning-point in Greek financial and monetary affairs:
it was toe beginning of a long period of relative monetary stability
as well as the beginning of a series of important changes in credit and
monetary policies. As a result, household attitudes towards bank deposits
changed considerably in comparison to the lack..of confidence prevalent
in the previous years when gold hoarding has been an important form of
asset accumulation.35 Second, whereas up to 1954 Government investment
in hOLising has formed a significant part of the total, thus influencing
aggregate relations between housing demand and investment, from 1955
onwards private building can be safely regarded as the near-exclusive form
of residential capital formation.
The extension of the study period to 1976 was based on a different
rationale. Though this study has been in general restricted to the years
up to 1974, in terms of econometric analysis this dividing point creates
some problems. Housing investment reached unprecedented heights in 1972-73
while it fell to extremely low levels in 19.74. By 1976, however , it had
reached "norma1" levels again in the light of the postwar growth trend.
Thus for the study of growth patterns the tnclus ion of 1975-1976 seemed
34. The arithmetic mean of the annual weighted average return on bank
deposits of all types has been 6.22 for 1955-1975. See, Papadakis, Money
and Economic Activity, p. 263.
35. See, Zolotas, ~1onetary Equilibrium, pp. 39-~2 and chapter 2, and
D.J. Ha1ikias, ~lon~L9_~Credit in a Developing Economv: The Greek Case
(Ne", York, 1978); chapter 2.
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advisable. In addition, the 1970-1976 fluctuations in building were
associated with major fluctuations in prices, incomes and savings, thus
affording a better chance for the statistical analysis of dynamic
interrelationships, especially in view of the fact that up to 1971 short-
term fluctuations in these variables at the macroeconomic level have been
minimal.
Let us now turn to the empirical analysis of the relationships
suggested by our model. The fundamental determinant relationships in
the system are, of course, those between consumption and wealth, the
allocation of the latter in residential and non-residential forms, and
that between housing consumption and total housenold consumption (the
variables refer throughout this analysis to the corresponding aggregate
macroeconomic magnitudes according to the definitions given previously).
We have assumed that these relationships follow, in general, power
functions for reasons of simplicity as well as in conformity with the
fact of changing marginal propensities easily verified from a simple
inspection of the trends (see chapter 5). Thus we nave used throughout
the analysis double-log regressions. The relevant time-series of the data
are supplied in the General Appendix, Tables A.7-A.l1. All variables are
measured in current prices. We have:
(i) Ct = 1.0534 WtO.938 (R = 0.997)
(i i) C~ t = Q.5405 Ct0.861 CR = Q. 997}
(1954-76)
(l954-76)
Since we measure housing wealth Wh by a capitalisation of gross rents (Ch)
with a 6.5% rate we have Wh = ChI0.065. This in conjunction with (i)
and (ii) implies that
(iii) Wh,t = 8.6953 w~·8076 (1954-76)
A more direct expression of the pattern of household wealth allocation
can be derived from the relationship between residential investment Ih
and the increase in liquid assets (aW)
8
(Iv) Ih, t = 17 .8813 (aws)~,6997 (R = O.963) (1955-76)
("Rn is throughout the correlation coefficient) ..3G
36, Tests of significance and the associated statistics have been
neglected as irrelevant. The time-span considered in the regressions is
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We have advanced the hypothesis that the rate of inflation affects
negatively the savings ratio. This issue is peripheral to the present
analysis but must be considered as a check against the influence of more
relevant variables, mainly the volume of housing credit. \Hth regard to
the latter we advanced the tentative hypothesis that its effect on savings
will be similarly negative, though such an influence will most probably
be of a long-run character. Both factors will tend to raise the exponent
in relation (i). At first sight this appears to be indeed the case with
the changes in the consumption-wealth function in the later part of the
period when, of course, both the volume of housing credit and inflation
rates have increased. We have:
(il} (R = 0.941) (1966-76)
A closer inspection, however, shows tnat these influences on the
propensity to consume relative to the accumulation of wealth are insigni-
ficant. For one, the effect of the inflation rate is extremely limited
though in the assumed direction. We have:
(v) et = 1.2477 WtO.9213 Cdplto.03Q4 (R=O.9978) (1954-76)
significant at the 1% level).
(the partial correlation coefficient between c and d is 0.5434,p
Moreover, the small increase in the propensity to consume suggested
by Ci I) can be easily accounted without any reference to the role of
inflation or housing credit. Most of the change resul ted from the drop
in the savings ratio in 1975-76 (see Table 5.2 in chapter 5). The decrease
in savings, however, can be explained by the stagnation in real incomes
per capita during 1974-76 and the need of households to maintain the
consumption expectations created in previous years of fast economic growth.
conceived as exhausting the relevant "population" of observations. Tests
of significance would have been meaningful in the case we understood the
data used as a sample from a wider "population", be it other countries or
other periods in the same country as in the case of a predictive model.
The explanatory power of the relations checked here derives from their
logical consistency, the assumptions of our model, and the degree to which
our theoretical "predictions" are corroborated by an acceptable goodness
of fit with the patterns observed in the period under study. Nevertheless.
as an additional measure of the statistical strength of so~e relationships
where a parameter or the correlation coefficient is small, we use a test
of significance based on the t-statistic. Since we are only interested
in "goodness of fitll, the tests used are the ones appropriate for
correlations and not for regressions.
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The structure of wealth allocation, in contrast to the savings-con-
sumption mechanism, does not show any significant change during the study
period. This is due to the fact that the elasticity of housing consumption
(hence of capital values based on rents] with regard to total consumption
showed a decrease and therefore compensated for the change in relation
(i). We have:
eR = O.996) {1966-76}
hence in conjunction with (i') and the capitalisation formula,
(HP) Wh,t = 8.3166 wt
O•811 (1966-76)
The relationships examined so far express the structure of the alloca-
tion of resources within the household sector. From the point of the housing
system as such these are essentially exogenous givens. By the same token,
they do not constitute in themselves specific hypotheses about the character
and functioning of the housing system vis-a-vis residential capital forma-
tion: they are more important in a comparative perspective and in this
regard, the values of the parameters measured in the above relationships
should be viewed in the light of the discussion in this and the previous
chapter concerning the institutional and socia-structural particularities
making for high (or low) levels of housing investment in a given country
(in this connection the very high exponents in relations (i) and (iii)
are suggestive). In terms of a check of the validity of our theoretical
model, the more specific hypotheses about the short- and medium-term
determinants of restdential investment, i.e. the ones concerning the
role of costs, rents and the equilibrium mechanism of the system are
more relevant.
Equation (91) in our model assumes that investment in housing is a
power function of the demand for new restdential assets and the volume
of housing cred it , Since the former variable can not be directly measured
we will examine a housing: investment function derived from the whole set
of formal relations (1) to (91) descri.bing asset allo.cation by households
and the behaviour of housing producers. Let us disregard the role of
depreciation and residential capital gains; their influence will be
minimal in short-run fluctuations (we also lack adequate data). It can
be easily seen from equations (1) to (5) that the demand for new resident-
ial wealth can be directly expressed either in terms of total household
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"savings" S = Id - C + S (where S 'is capital inflow to the householda a
sector from abroad), or in terms of the increase in liquid assets rdWs)'
The first alternative is logically more powerful since it constitutes
a relationship of determination~ whereas the second expresses only the
pattern of asset allocation between dWh and dWs; both of the latter
are simultaneously determined by a third factor, namely S.
A doub~e-log regression of Ih on Sand Fh (the sum of savings
out of income and capital inflow and the volume of housing credit) shows
extremely good results.
(vi) I = 20.97275 s 0.5104 F 0.1783 CR = 0.9928) (1958-76)h, t t h, t
(The partial correlation coefficient of Ih with Fh is 0.731213, signi-
ficant at the 1% level. The regression was restricted to 1958-76 because
of lack of reliable data for S for 1955-57. For-'the relevant time-series see
General Appendix A.7, A.8, A.9).
In equation (S'} of the model we have. advanced the hypothesis
that the demand for housing wealth will be influenced negatively by
construction costs and positively by housing rents (both relative to
general inflation) hut only to a minor extent. We have further assumed
that these variables will not affect the behaviour of housing producers
qua producers, f.e. as distinct from investors in housing wealth
(namely in the case of speculative developers). Lastly, we claimed
that the rate of inflation will not have any significant effect on the
pattern of asset allocation.
The high goodness of fit with actual trends shown in the case of
equation (vi) substantiates these hypotheses to a very large extent.
However, a detailed examination of short-run fluctuations indicates a
more complex pattern. We have run regressions of the deviations of
residential investment from the trends specified by (vi) on fluctuations
in the relative levels of rents and construction costs. If Ih,t/Ih,t*
is the ratio of actual housing investment to the level determined by
function (vi), and
(p-/pl t = [pp, t-/Pt-l + PP,t-2"Pt-~ /2 and
(PlIp) t = [Ph, t-/Pt-l + Ph, t-2"Pt-~/ 2
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where Pr is the price index of housing rents, Ph is the price index
of construction costs, and P is the price index of the Gross Domestic
Product (general price inflation), then we have:
(vii) III * = 318866 1452 ( I) -0.5226 ( /) -1.2505 (1958-76)h, t' h, t . Pr P t Ph P t
(R = 0.5828, significant at the 1% level).
In regression (vii) we have excepted years 1967 and 1974 in view of
the fact that deviations from normal building levels for these years were
mainly due to exceptional political circumstances. Two points are imme-
diately suggested by (vii).
First, that rents in relation to the general price index show a
substantial negative influence on housing investment contrary to our
hypothesis that they should show a limited but positive influence. Such
a contradiction, however, is theoretically meaningless: real rents can not
possibly have a strong negative influence on housing investment. The
observed relationship, therefore, must be spurious. A closer look reveals
that the relationship is the effect of the opposite causal influence:
that of investment fluctuations on rents. We have argued that rents
are negatively related to the oversupply of new housing. This is corro-
borated by the empirical evidence (see below). The downturn of the building
cycle will therefore be always preceded by a relative oversupply (the
peak of the cycle) and thus by deflated rents. The opposite applies in
the rising phase of the cycle which is preceded by a relative slump.
Since our investment regressions do not incorporate the mechanism of
the short-term building cycle, part of the fluctuation in building is
spuriously lIexplained"by rents. This argument accounts sufficiently
for the negative elasticity found in (vii). By implication, we also have
a minimal positive influence on investment. It should be added that the
distortion produced by our neglect of the building cycle does not involve
construction costs: as we argued, these should not be expected to react
significantly to building fluctuations; the evidence examined immediately
below corroborates this argument.
The second point concerns the role of relative construction costs.
This has obviously a much more substantial influence than we allowed for
in our theoretical assumptions, though we did assume a negative elasticity
of Ih with regard to costs which is corroborated by (vii). Disregarding
rents and including the general rate of inflation we get results that
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amplify the role of costs. We have:
(viii) Ih,~/Ih,t~ = 3106.4148 • (P~PJt-O.7512 (dp)tO.0251(1958_76)
(R = 0.4617, significant at the 5% level. Years 1967 and 1974 were excepted).
(dpJt = (Pt-Pt-l) . 100/p
where 'p" is the average GDP deflator for years t-l and t-2J.
Regressions (vii) and (viii) show that the speculative behaviour
(in the common use of the term) in house property demand, which would
have caused a positive elasticity vis-a-vis construction prices, is much
more insignificant that we have assumed. This dictates a certain revision
of our concept of the behaviour of households as well as our model of
the operation of the speculative building mode. We will return to this
issue later. With regard to the role of inflation, relationship (viii)
shows that it has insignificant effects on the level of residential
capital accumulation. This conforms to our theoretical expectation, but is
still quite impressive a result in view of the widespread belief among
Greek monetary authorities that inflation, by reducing the value of
liquid assets, has a strong effect on the propensity to invest in housing.
We may summarise our findings on the housing investment function. The
volume of housing credit exerts a definite positive influence, though
the elasticity of residential investment with respect to this variable
is rather small - less than +0.2. This effect of credit on the expansion
of housebuilding is most certainly caused by the much higher short-term
elasticity of speculative building and household demand to credit supply.57
We can thus safely say that the effects of credit expansion on the 10ng-
term propensity of households to accumulate housing relative to the growth
of resources are limited (though perhaps greater than we have assumed in
section 6). This is contingent, of course, on the specific pattern of
37. The value of mortgage loans to households in Greece is in general
less than half the construction cost of the dwelling that is purchased
or built. Since the share of new dwelling construction financed by loans
was on the average for the 1958-76 period in the order of 15% at least,
the short-term elasticity of the value of dwelling starts to new credit
must have normally been in the range of +0.3. This elasticity would have
certainly been increased by the severity of the speculative building cycle.
Thus, the estimation of a constant elasticity of Ih with respect to.th
for the 1958-76 period in the order of +0.18, suggests that the medlum-
and long-run effect of housing credit on residential investment is small.
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credit distribution observed in postwar Greece. As we pointed already,
credit expansion after 1968 mostly benefited social groups which already
had substantial capacity to accumulate housing wealth. This, incidentally,
explains the fact that despite credit expansion during 1968-1973, rates
of owner-occupation during the same period have remained stable or ,ett
throughout the social spectrum.
Given the fundamental influence of household savings and the flow of
credit on housing investment we must conclude that the latter responds
little to the factors assumed as significant by models of rentier-capi-
talist behaviour under conditions of a perfect property market, namely,
rents, the inflation rate, and interest rates. The fact that the negative
influence of construction costs is, contrary to what we expected on
grounds of theory, quite substantial, corroborates this general point.
It implies that the speculative component in the process of asset choice
by households is rather weak relative to the constraints on housing
wealth acquisition imposed by increasing costs, and thus does not compensate
the latter as we have assumed. It may be pointed that a similar effect may
result from a negative reaction of speculative buitdep8 to increasing costs.
This contradicts, to a certain extent, what we have assumed about the
behaviour of the latter, specifically their overriding dependence on the
flow of household funds with a consequent relative disregard for price-
cost relationships. But this issue must await the examination of invest-
ment behaviour in the speculative sector.
It remains to examine empirically the rest of the relationships
advanced in our model. These are an essential part of the process of
residential capital formation as a whole in that tfleyhelp maintain
the medium~ and long-term equilibrium between housing consumption demand
and the supply of stock in view of the built-in tendency for disequilibrium
resulting from the independence of the Ch = f(C) and Wh = few) functions.
More specifically, we have argued that the effect of excessive over- or
under-investment relative to the growth trend will have a minimal effect
on construction costs. Equilibrium is therefore most probably maintained
through the effect of investment disequilibria on rents and the depre-
ciation rate and the effects ·of rents on housing consumption demand.
If the effects of fluctuations in residential investment on construction
costs were substantial, they would have supplied an additional effective
mechanism for checking the inherent tendency of the speculative economy
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for oversupply. We had argued that the competitive and fragmented
character of the construction "industry" in an early capital ist economy
undergoing fast development and modernisation will make for high elasti-
cities in the supply of construction and fast application of innovations~
and thus for small price increases in response to relatively excessive
demand for structures. We argued, moreover, that similarly favourable
conditions will most probably prevail in the wider market of relevant
productive factors, namely labour and materials. In concrete cases, however,
the specific relationship between excessive demand and prices is an empi-
rical question contingent on the "tightness" of the economy. Conditions
in Greece during the 1960's and 1970's have been somewhat ambivalent in
this respect. On the one hand, there were very limited surpluses of labour
if any: since the mid·1960·s the economy operated near the full-employment
level. On the other hand, however, there was widespread underutilisation
of plant capacity in industry permitting the fast expansion of production
in the urban sector, a process that was helped, up to the early 1970·s,
by the control of agricultural product prices. The net effect was fast
growth with limited price rises for the period up to 1973, though it seems
that excessive demand has been the main determinant of these price increases
Ca case of "demand-pull" inflation).38
The last point indicates that major fluctuations in building,
demanding by their very nature large volumes of resources, may have had
appreciable effects on prices. Empirical analysis shows, however, that
this effect was most probably generalised without any special IIpu1111
exerted on construction prices over and above that shown in general
inflation. Relative construction costs show ni11 response to the deviations
of building (Ih) from the long-term trend 1ine (Ih *). We have:
0.02614
(ix) PhJ~Pt = 86.93898 (Ih· 100/Ih*}t_l
(R = 0.07995, 1955-76 except 1967,1974)
38. See, G.!. Economou, Em irica1 Anal sis of the Factors Determining
Wages, Salaries and Prices in Greek Industry Athens, 1975, in Greek):
188-92. For postwar trends in the utilisation of capacity in Greek industry.
see, O.E.C.O., Fconomic Surveys: Greece (Geneva, 1979), the Appendix.
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The trend values Ih* in regression (ix) have been estimated from the
following growth function:
Ih~t = 3241.9030 {1.13284)t (R = 0.988) (1955-76)
Since9 re~tive construction cost is the relevant price variable in terms
of the determinants of residential wealth formation, our hypothesis that
there is no effective feedback mechanism on the production side regulating
the volume of residential investment seems essentially correct. It may be
argued that such a regularing mechanism is effected through the response
of land costs to fluctuations in building. As a matter of fact, there is
some indirect evidence that land costs do respond, at least in the upward
direction, to excessive fluctuations in the volume housing starts (see
Appendix 6.1)~ This, combined with the substantial negative elasticity
of the demand for housing assets vis-a-vis costs indicated previously,
suggests that to some extent, and at least in the case of excessively
fast expansion, there are certain checks on building booms. Nevertheless9
these mechanisms, especially in view of the imperfect relationship between
costs and rents, can in no way regulate the fundamental tendency of the
system for a disequilibrium between housing consumption and the supply
of stock. We have advanced the hypothesis that the relevant interaction
is that between levels of building, rents and depreciation, and housing
consumption demand.
We have assumed that the oversupply or undersupply of stock relative
to consumption demand will result in lower or higher rents respectively,
which in turn will affect the consumption of space and the depreciation
rate in the direction of equilibrium. Vacancies will playa role similar
to rents. Empirical analysis indicates that these influences operate
indeed in the direction assumed. With regard to the response of housing
consumption to rents (relative to general inflation) we have:
(x) Ch,t = 0.01458 cO.90448 (Pp/p)tO.67787 (R = 0.9992) (1954-76)
Magnitudes in (x) are expressed in current prices (relative rents are
an average of levels for t-l and t-2J. Therefore, the positive price
elasticity should not be surprising. A 10% increase in p Ip will resultrin a 6.77% rise of Ch in money terms relative to C and therefore the net
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effect in real terms will be a 3.0% fall. An elasticity in the order
of -3.0% is corroborated by similar findings with constant price models.39
Turning now to the determinants of rents, we have proposed with
expression (12) of our model that these are a function of the inflation
rate and disequilibria in the relationship between changes in the housing
stock and changes in real housing consumption demand. We may operationalise
the latter in a simple way by assuming that these result from substantial
deviations of the volume of building from normal trends. Using the growth
function for Ih shown in the previous page and averaging the inflation
rates in years t-l and t-2, we have the following linear regression:r Idp)t l+(dpJt 2l *(xi) (dp)r~t= - 0.7316 + 0.8465[ ; - J + 0.0914 dIh~t-l
(R = 0.8166) (1955-76)
Whereas the inflation rate in relation (xi) is obviously a major
determinant of the change in rents (as predicted), the effect of dIh*
is minimal and the sign of the relationship is the opposite from that
expected on grounds of theory. This is in itself somewhat surprising
but can be easily explained away as resulting from the aggregate character
of relation (xiv). Aggregate movements in rents and building are the
composite outcome of largely independent regional and sectoral patterns.
Severe fluctuations in housebuilding are a trait of the urban speculative
sector. It is in this sector that we observe the greatest concentration
of rental housing and the operation of a structured rental market. Rents
in urban areas (including imputed rents) are mainly determined by the
movements observed in this segment of the housing system. The inter-
39. See, D. Emmanuel, Categories of Households, p. 15 where the results
of a double-log regression of C on Rand {Pr/p1t-l are presented. R
("resources") is the sum of hou~ehold sector wealth as defined here and
the Gross Domestic Product. All variables are in constant prices. We have
found:
ZogChJt = 0.5123 + 0.7542 logRt - 0.3163 log(p~P)t_l
eR = Q.9982}
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relationship between rents and disequilibria in the supply of stock should
thus be examined in the context of the speculative market. We may add,
however, that the "anomalous" finding in relation (xi) has a certain
significance. It testifies to the validity of our contention that the
fragmented, "dual" housing system in Greece deviates sharply in its
aggregate behaviour from the market model of housing production and
distribution.
We have run a linear regression of the rate of change of the relative
price of rents in urban areas (d ~) (the index of housing rents normalised
by the consumption price index as these are measured by the N.S.S.G. for
urban areas) on the percent deviations from the trend observed for specu-
lative building. The latter has been measured by the volume of permits
for buildings of four storeys or more and we used a weighted average
of the deviations in't-l and t-2. Deviations were measured against the
following trend (Bsp signifies the actual volume of speculative
building, Bsp*, trend values).
BSPt* = 6097.0 (1.081)t (R = 0.7127) (1961-76)
(see the time-series in General Appendix A.l).
We have found:
P(xii) (~)t = 0.9945 - 0.0956 DBSPt* (R = -0.7288) (1963-76)
where
The sign and strength of relationship (xii) is consistent with our
theoretical predictions. It also accounts, given the substantial fluctua-
tions produced by the speculative short-term cycle, for the negative
association of rents with the building fluctuations that fo~~ow(observed
as an "anomaly" in the analysis of investment). Over-supply of stock
leads to a fall in relative rents with an average elasticity of -0.1. The
latter, however, is small and, though consistent with a fragmented rental
market dominated by a household economy of petty owners, implies that even
quite excessive disequilibria will not be checked sufficiently by changes
in rents. The discrepancy will be compounded by the weak effect of rents
on housing consumption demand which is relatively inelastic to the former
(we have an elasticity in the order of -0.3). Thus, to sum up these last
points, we have found that relationships between building fluctuations,
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rents and housing consumption follow the predicted pattern but, in terms
of strength, are not sufficient for maintaining equilibrium. The conclusion
that must be drawn is that the system of residential capital fonnation we
have been describing shows an inherent tendency towards crises of over-
or under-supply relative to housing consumption demand. These tendencies may
be checked to a certain extent by the operation of vacancies and the
depreciation rate, as assumed in theory. We do not have the empirical
material to examine their role in this respect. We should add, however,
that these empirical findings are as good as the data on which they
were based. We do not see any specific reasons for qualifying our
conclusions in any major way but the imperfections of Greek housing
statistics noted in the beginning of our analysis give a tentative
character to most of our estimates.
12. Residential capital formation in the speculative sector
The theoretical model of capital formation in housing we have advanced
in the previous sections does not incorporate a systematic disaggregation
of the system into its two main sectors. This is a serious defect but was
unavoidable in view of the limitations in the data. We have tried, however,
to distinguis~when necessary, the particular form of the relationships
that should be expected to apply in each sector ; and more specifically, in
the speculative sector as opposed to' the bous1hg economy as a whole. Given
the results of the analysis, what are the conclusions that can be Brawn
with regard to capital formation in the speculative sector?
As a general point we would say that most of the points established
in the analysis apply in the case of the speculative sector, too. Thus both
the formal model and the empirical functions to a large extent answer the
question of the determinants of speculative building in the short run as
well as in the long run. The reasons are the following.
First, the short-run fluctuations of aggregate residential investment
are largely a product of the movements in speculative building. Non-specu-
lative building shows a much smoother time-series (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2
in chapter 4). The various parameters of short-term determinations, there-
fore, must largely reflect the behaviour of the speculative sector. By
implication, we should expect the elasticities operating in the latter to
be higher(more intensive) than the ones estimated with the macroecono~ic
data. fn fact, we could say that the analysis taught us more about specu-
lative building than precapitalist building.
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Second, we have argued that there is a fundamental continuity in
the patterns of household behaviour vis-a-vis consumption, savings and
wealth along the social class and housing sector spectrum. The speculative
sector incorporates, of course, a significant component that approaches
the pure model of rentier-speculator behaviour. This is, however, more
important in short-run fluctuations rather than in long-term patterns.
Third, we have pointed to the importance of differences in the "rela-
tions of housing production" (most especially in relation to land) with
regard to the ratio of actual housing investment to the savings flow
expressing household demand for real wealth. As it happens, the institution
of "antiparochi" in speculative_build'fng (the payment of the cost o_f land
with a share in the building) makes for a substantial similarity with owner-
building as far as the parameters relating savings to actual construction
are concerned. As a consequence the gross effects of differences between
the two sectors in this aspect will be small. There are radical differences
between the two housing modes, of course, in the distribution of the product
between users and landowners. This aspect, however, has not been considered
systematically anyway.
Lastly, the interrelationship of building with the rental market has
been mainly studied with data concerning the speculative sector. This
aspect, as we argued, has a crutial significance for the equilibrium of
the system as a whole. The rental market, however, is obviously more
important for the operation of the speculative sector. Thus, this major
specificity of the latter has been sufficiently studied in the process
of the analysis.
In conclusion, the preceding analysis may also be considered as an
(approximate) study of the structure and determinants of speculative
residential capital formation, though it must certainly be complemented
with the model advanced in chapter 4 witn its explicit emphasis on
sectoral change. The long.term expansion of the speculative system in
reZative terms can not be understood with the help of the model advanced
in this chapter by itself. In the light of tne previous points, few things
can be added to this model with regard to particularities of the behaviour
of speculative building. On theoretical grounds we should expect the
influence of housing credit to be stronger in this sector; we should also
expect the elasticity of investment with regard to rents, inflation. and
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construction costs to be more positive in comparison to the ones for the
system as a whole, given the stronger rentierist and "speculative" tendencies
involved (in the common sense application of the term). Let us examine some
evidence pertaining to these hypotheses before concluding.
We have run regressions of the volume of speculative building and its
fluctuations ("Bsp", defined in the previous section) on savings, housing
credit, relative rents, relative construction costs, and the rate of
inflation. These are similar with the ones run for gross private housing
investment as a whole. We have:
(xii i) B t = 523.01332 . S 0.0572 F 0.3189~ t ~t
(R = 0,8094, correlation significant at the 1% level)
(1961-76)
(B /B' *) = 739891 4028 ( I) -0.2811e _I J -2.6536 (1961-76)sp SF t ' Pr' P t PIt P t
(R = 0.3661, correlation not significant at the 5% level.
Years 1967 and 1974 have been excepted).
(xv) {Bsp/B'ap*)t = 182356913.0 (p~p)t-4.1846 {dpJtO.1601
(xiv)
(1961-76)
(R = 0.5357, correlation significant at the 5% level.
Years 1967 and 1974 have been excepted).
B' * in regressions (xiv) and (xv) denotes the trend values givensp
by the basic determination function (xiii). The ratio B /B I * thussp sp
denotes the fluctuations around this trend. B I * should not be confusedsp
(xii) which is derived from awith the value of B * used in equationsp
simple growth trend function.
Regression (xiii) compared with (vi) which refers to residential
investment as a whole shows that the influence of housing credit on
speculative building is, as predicted, much stronger - nearly double.
It also shows that the determinant role of savings is substantially weaker.
This should come as no surprise given the violent fluctuations that
speculative building normally undergoes compared with the steady growth
pattern of both savings and non-speculative housing. The extremely weak
role of savings in (xiii), however, is certainly impressive. It stresses,
by implication, the great dependence of speculative building on institu-
tional credit as well as the role of "exogenous" (mainly political) factors
in its growth.
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The influence of rents relative to the general price level is negative
as shown in (xiv). This finding is consistent with our previous observations
(see regression vii) and, as we pointed out, must be dismissed as a spurious
effect of the dynamic of the building cycle. The negative elasticity in
(xov). however, is much smaller than the one observed for the system as
a whole. This obviously corroborates our hypothesis about a more positive
reaction to rents in the speculative sector. A similar point can be made
about the role of the inflation rate. In regression {xv}, as well as in
the more aggregate regression (viii), its effect is positive. Whereas,
however, in the case of the system as a whole its effect is insignificant,
its role in the speculative sector is, as predicted, much more important.
This is again a mani.festation of the stronger rentierist-speculative
tendencies of the socioeconomic groups involved in this sector.
In contrast to the verification of our hypotheses in the case of
rents and inflation, the effect of relative construction costs as shown
in (xiv) and (xv) contradicts our predictions. It is obviously much greater
than the one observed in (vii) and (viii) for housing investment
as a whole. This may be partly accounted for by the fact that, as
we pointed earlier, demand elasticities even when uniform throughout
the system, are ampZified in the case of the speculative
sector by its tendency for violent fluctuaUons in building.
Still, there is a·strong 'case for'rejecting-our' hypothesi's
that property demand within the speculative sector will show more
"speculative" behaviour vis-a-vis rises in the price of housing compared
with the rest of the system. Alternatively, we should reconsider our
assumptions about the behaviour of speculative builders. We have assumed
that these are largely indifferent towards construction cost changes
given a constant property demand since they are mainly concerned with an
adequate flow of funds. This is most probably an oversimplification. It
should be remembered that whereas owner-builders can get a permission for
a building start without any immediate pressures for fast building,
speculative developers do not have this flexibility since they enter
into contractual arrangements with landowners that specify the rate of
construction. Thus, an adverse development in costs will always frighten
away a number of marginal developers who would otherwise have started
a venture on very tight margins and on the prospect of a steady trend in
demand. Rising costs will affect the demand side as well as the profit
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margins side. This argument, if valid, shows that the evidence on
the role of costs does not necessitate a revision of our assumptions
about the stronger rentierist-speculative tendencies in the speculative
sector. It certainly necessitates, however, a revision of our theses about
the behaviour of speculative producers vis-a-vis costs and profits.
Concluding remarks: Some limitations of the model
The analysis in this chapter has been essentially an elaboration of
the theory of the formation of aggregate residential investment advanced
in chapter 5. This stressed the role of wealth accumulation behaviour
in the household sector in relation to the postwar growth in incomes.
It also stressed the role of the inflow of capital from abroad, of the
favourable trends in housing costs, and of "institutional" factors such
as the property distribution and access to land. The present analysiS,
read in conjunction with Appendix 6.1, provides a formalisation and
empirical measurement of these influences. We have examined, in addition,
the role of certain secondary economic variables and the working of the
housing system as a whole. Going back.to the issue of housing "over-
investment" in Greece, the present more detailed analysis points to a
number of factors that contributed to high rates of building in general,
and speculative building in particular. These were: the positive effect
of credit expansion in the late 1960's that has checked the tendency of
housing investment to fall relative to savings; the lack of negative
feedback on the cost of factors of housing production (up to the beginning
of the 197Qts, at least); the limited role of influences pertaining to a
"pure" real estate market dominated by rentierist-capitalist rational ity
whicfL\'/ouldhave made for violent movements in asset-choice behaviour and
would thus facilitate the occurrence of market crashes; a mechanism of
equil tbr tum that offers extensive margins against the formation of crises
of housing overproduction; lastly, a pattern of production relations
in urban development that minimise the drain of household resources away
from housing to a distinct class of landowners and thus sustains a high
"multiplier effect" on real residential investment for a given volume
of housing demand.
In addition to these substantive issues, however, our analysis had
a broader purpose, namely, to contribute to the development of the
"economics" of early capitalist, "dual" housing systems. In view of the
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obvious bias of modern urban economics in favour of the paradigm of
perfect market and modern rentierist-capitalist relations, the effort to
theorise the patterns observed in alternative situations with respect
to productive relations and the institutional-historical context acquires
an importance in itself.
On the basis of our theoretical arguments and the strength of the
empirical corroboration of the predicted relationships, we would argue
that the model proposed here offers a framework of generality as well
as explanatory power. It is only fair to add, however, that there are
great inadequacies in the explicit specification of the economic
conditions of housing production and the behaviour of households and
builders (when distinct) vis-a.-vis these conditions and the wider
context of prices. Thus some relationships were determined to a great
extent on purely empirical grounds. Moreover, the model has an important
limitation in that it helps explain the formation of aggregate residential
investment but can not afford explicit treatment of the capitalist
transformation of the housing system. This was, of course, recognised
from the start and the suggestion was made that the present model
should be viewed as complementary to the model of sectoral composition
advanced in chapter 4. Both of these shortcomings boil down to the
question of the structure of housing production and distribution and thus
are closely interrelated. Having said this, we can only point out the main
ways in which such an analysis may be improved in future work.
First, there must certainly be an explicit and systematic incorporation
of land as a factor in housing production and land as a form of wealth. The
latter necessitates that we consider the allocation of household wealth
among three types of assets: residential, non-residential and undeveloped
land. Both from the point of wealth formation and that of production, it
is necessary that we consider the historical pattern of land-asset owner-
ship and the growth and distribution of capital gains in land as these
are determined by development rights and actual development potentials
in relation to the socio-geographical structure of urban growth and
housing demand.
An obvious second priority consists of the'dissaggregation of the model
in order to express the stratification of the system along fundamentaly
divergent modes of housing production which are in turn correlated with
different social classes and urban areas. Had adequate data been available,
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we should break down the system into two sectors preferably at the level
of ownership of stock and land with a division along class lines. We could
then correlate modes of housing production and characteristics of areas
with these sectors. As a first step, we would study the differences in
the form and parameters of the functions of the model of residential
capital formation between the two sectors at a more systematic level
than the one achieved here. As a second step, we could construct a
balance-sheet showing the distribution of housing consumption by social
class, property ownership and the flow of funds for new housing assets
between the sectors. This presents formidable problems in case we
have adopted an analytical definition of sectors and suggests that a
methodological strategy employing a spatial delineation of sectors may
be more practical (in which case standard methods of regional economic
accounting can be used}. We can examine toen toe degree to which consumption
or wealth resources flow from one sector to toe other. Thus the question
of changes in the sectoral structure of the system or, conversely, the
influence of the latter on aggregate investment trends can be studied
explicitly. This could also shed light on the vexing problem of the
extent of "integrationll of the system at different stages, and the role
of "integration" in the increase of the dominance of speculative-capitalist
relations, the main problem that occupied us in chapter 4 as well as in
most of this study.
.-
Cone Iusions
1.
During the first decade of the postwar period and the early 1960's
the Greek urban housing system manifested the characteristics of a "dual"
system of housing production and distribution. Alongside speculative
apartment building catering for the middle-class market, there was an
extensive precapitalist housing sector based on petty owner-building
associated with the working class and other low-income strata. By the
first half of the 1970' s ,nov/ever ~ this system had undergone major changes.
Petty owner-building was reduced to a much smaller share of the volume
of housebuilding in urban areas. The speculative mode in its main form
- i.e. relatively large apartment buildings ~ as well as in its More inter-
mediate forms of smaller three-storey and four-storey buildings, became
predominant. This change was not restricted to the larger Greek cities.
Speculative and petty-speculative building had also expanded fastly in
the smaller urban centres.
Our study of these changes has been restricted to the 1950-74 period.
As it happens, the years after 1974 have seen a continuation of the trend
of speculative sector expansion at even faster rates. This should come as
no surprise despite the more democratic character of the post-1974 regime.
The political constraints on precapitalist housing, namely the restrictions
on illegal building and on popular access to land, continued at similar
intensity. Economic constraints, however, have become much stronger than
in pre-1974 years: trends in incomes and costs have worsened drastically.
These have obviously affected most the chances for housing of low-income
strata. Using the measurement assumptions adopted in chapter 2, we esti-
mate that the share of precapitalist building in Athens has dropped from
39% in 1970-72 to 32% in 1976-78. In the smaller urban centres (excepting
Athens and Thessaloniki) speculative expansion has been much faster: the
share of precapitalist building has dropped from 69% in 1970-72 to 52%
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in 1976-78.1 The latter is apparently the effect of the relatively more
recent emergence of the.wave of speculative expansion in these cities.
We could say then, that the capitalist transformation of the housing
system has been pervasive, though an important element of "dualism" still
persisted. The spread of capitalist relations of production and distribution
was based, of course, on a rather primitive type of capitalist economic
structure. This has been described here by the concept of the "speculative"
mode as a form of commodity production in the housing sphere distinct from
"modern capitalistll modes of housing production (see chapter 1). Neverthe-
less, despite certain affinities with precapitalist patterns of petty
commodity production, the 1970's system represented the outcome of a
massive and thorough transformation of the Greek housing system. This
transformation as well as the growth of speculative building in absolute
terms can not be understood as the "natural" product of the economic
development and socioeconomic modernisation that took place during the
postwar period. Undoubtedly, the massive urbanisation and economic growth
of the period provided an indispensable IImaterial" basis for this trans-
formation. We have found, moreover, that the configuration of the para-
meters and contextual economic developments pertaining to the accumulation
of residential wealth within the household sector have been on the whole
very favourable to a fast expansion of housebuilding (see chapters 5 and 6).
These, in conjunction with the inherent capacity of the speculative mode
for fast expansion, go a long way in explaining the postwar wave of
specul atfve activity. These "soc toeconomic IIfactors, however, tell only
a part of the story of the postwar transformation of the housing system.
In each step of our analysis we found it necessary to stress the determi-
nant influence of imposed institutional and political factors favourable
to the increased dominance of the speculative sector. This issue has
occupied us explicitly in the analysis of the sectoral composition of
housebuilding in chapter 4, but we found occas ion "to make ana1ogous·
observations in the more aggregate analyses of chapters 5 and 6 most
especially with regard to monetary policies in the 1960's. Moreover,
•
1. Estimated from the series of building permits in N.S.S.G., Stati-
stical Yearbook of Greece, 1979. See, also, General Ap~endix, table A.l.
l'Precapitalist" building is buildings of one and two storeys and additions
to existing buildings. For the relevant assumptions, see chapter 2. Thessa-
loniki has not been examined since the 1978 earthquake has greatly affected
the building activity there.
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we have made sufficiently clear in chapter 3 that there has been a
strongly favourable political component among the "socioeconomic" founda-
tions of the precapitalist housing sector as these were formed historically.
Even neglecting the various public policies and legal-administrative
controls that were introduced during the 1960's with obvious negative
effects on precapitalist housing, the very fact that the political
circumstances which served in the past as important boosters of this
sector were not repeated, while on the contrary the institutions that
had resulted from these past political relations were being steadily
eroded, testifies to the crucial role of "politics" in the narrow sense
of the term in the transformation of the housing system.
2.
It should be stressed that our emphasis on the "political" factor should
not be confused with certain widespread modes of explanation of Greek urban
affairs. The latter are saturated with easy "political" explanations where
everything is ultimately the result of public policies (or lack of such).2
It has been repeatedly pointed out in this study that in confronting
the issue of changes in housing, such explanations, though immediately
suggestive must be carefully scrutinised. We have been at pains to
establ ish with some precision the extent to which "non-pol itical" factors
or, more generally, factors that are "endogenous" to the operation of the
housing "marKet" may account, in conjunction with the process of economic
development, for the changes observed. We have also examined the extent
2. It is ironic that most of these "political analyses" of the role
of the State in relation to changes in the housing system, have aimed at
showing that the main issue during the 1960's and early 1970's has been the
aggressive expansion of a highly modern capitalist sector based on large
firms, planned urban development and financial capital. There have indeed
been some institutional measures aiming at this effect (notably compulsory
law 1003/1971 on "Action planning" based on similar French legislation).
There was also some expression of interest for such activities by a number
of elite organisations (the National Mortgage Bank, the Federation of
Greek Industrialists, and the Ministry of Public Works). These, however,
concerned mainly special-purpose projects and had no significant involve-
ment in the residential economy. It suffices to say that by 1980 not one
single dwelling unit has been produced by this"sector". From the point
of the period we study, therefore, a complete disregard of this issue
seemed self-evident.
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to which these changes were the result of voluntary shifts in social
values or, alternatively, the result of forced adaptation to constraints
and therefore point to'latent or manifest - covert of overt - social
conflicts. The presence of such conflicts is strongly ~uggested by our
analysis of change as well as by the close interconnection between social
classes and housing production modes. We have a prima facie case therefore
that both "pol itics" in the narrow sense of State interventions and
"politics" in the broad sense of conflicts between major groups and
.ideologies and t~~ corresponding power relationships were involved in
the transformation of the housing system in a determinate way.
This latter issue has not been pursued here. The essential components
for a study of housing politics in the postwar period, however, have been
made sufficiently clear. let us expand somewhat more on the implications
of the analysis in chapters 3 and 4. We have established that to a certain
extent the change of the sectoral structure of the housing system in Athens -
most especially in the 1950's and early 1960's - has been the result of
the "natural" process of housing demand growth and allocation. Changes
in the 1960's,however, can only be understood as the product of "exogenous"
negative pressures on the precapitalist sector in combination with a strong
encouragement of speculative building. The housing system as a whole shows
during the same period a limited extent of objectively evidenced "inte-
gration", i.e. incorporation of lower-income demand into a hierarchically
ordered system of housing situations that favours the expansion of the
speculative sector. The extent of "integration" that is implied by the
trends in building, moreover, has most probably been the result of adaptation
to imposed political and economic constraints rather than the result of
drastic changes in values and preferences. The objective capacity of pre-
capitalist housing to operate outside an integrated system was based on
economic and political autonomy vis-a-vis capitalist relations and the
State and on the process of socioeconomic segregation in the distribution
of housing resources facilitated by a historically established alternative
system of access to land. The diminished capacity for growth in the pre-
capitalist sector and the increasing integration of the system resulted
from the erosion of these conditions rather than from voluntary assi-
milation and "modernisation".
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Speculative dominance and greater integration then, were based on
"system integration" rather than "social f nteqrat ion". \~e borrow here
the distinction introduced by David Lockwood as a composite description
of two fundamental aspects of all social systems: "system tnteqrat ion"
refers to the functional interdependence of the different parts or levels
of a social system whereas "social integration" refers to the existence
of widespread consensus over values and norms.3 Lockwood, aiming at a
critique of the functionalist consensus paradigm in sociology, argues that
whereas the existence of the second type of integration entails the first
it is not necessarily the other way around. Interdependence in ways that
promote the reproduction of the system as a whole and the influence of
its dominant sectors may very well be based on structured conflict and
behaviour that is determined by power relationships. Lockwood's argument
is highly abstract and does not go into the analysis of the components
of power in concrete situations. In the most general sense, however, we
may distinguish a "political" and an "economic" component. In our case,
in describing the nature of speculative sector dominance over the urban
system we can definitely say that the political took precedence in
historical terms. Political measures, in addition to imposing constraints
on prec~pitalist housing production, created general conditions in the
competition over land-use and resource-use that positively favoured
speculative expansion. The fact that wider economic trends in technology
and the cost of labour have placed petty owner-building in a relatively
d;sadvantaged position was perhaps i.mportant but secondary.
We can present the argument with the help of the following diagram:
Structure of the housing system
(B)
Speculative sector dominance/market-
orientated integration of the housing
system ~
(Bl) (B2)
"System integration" "Social integration"
(Bl.~(B1.2)
Political constraints Economic constraints/competition on unequal terms
CA)
Dualism/segregation/autonomy
as conditions of extended preca-
pitalist housing production
3. David Lockwood, "Social Integration and System Integration", in G.K.
Zollschan and W. Hirsh (eds) ~lorations in Social Change (London, 1964):
244 ..56.
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The emergence of speculative sector dominance can be described formally
in the following manner:
(A) (B1.1)-~)(81.1 + B1.2}-~)(?}(B1 + 82)
The question mark signifies the hypothesis that in the context of this
sequence of events there is a high probability but not a certainty for a
gradual adaptation of the majority of the urban population towards the
acceptance of the values and norms of a housing system dominated by
speculative production and market allocation. It can be said that there
are some aspects of the social structure of Greek society that facilitate
the social acceptance of this transformation. These are the inflated
role of petty-bourgeois strata, their social influence within the popular
non-capitalist sector, and their positive connection with the interests
of urban landed property and speculative building as well as with the
dominant system of class relations and social power. But this essentially
concerns the wider question of the socioeconomic and ideological basis of
the State actions that promoted the capitalist transformation of the
housing system which can not be examined nere.
We can go one step further, however, and pose the question of the
wider social significance of what apparently was a real antagonism between
broad housing sectors according to our account. Was the sometimes manifest
but more often incipient conflict between alternative housing systems
infused into the wider process of class relations, ideology and class
conflict? Was it perceived as a major antagonism along class lines? Did
it find expression in class-institutions and in public manifestations
of "structured conflictll as our account suggests?
These are difficult questions even in contexts where a tradition
of sociological surveys, historical studies and an active literate
popular culture supplies the necessary material - not to mention the
prerequisite of a lack of repression of class-conscious practices. Never-
theless, we can definitely say that the conflict between alternative
housing sectors as described here hae not tn any significant v-/ay acquired
the status of a recognised major issue in class. conflict and class institu-
tions in the way, say, the antagonism between public housing and private-
sector housing has been an established issue dividing class institutions
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(notably parties and unions) in Britain. Were the facts different in any
significant way,we would be undoubtedly in possession of ample evidence,
systematic or anecdotal.
A case can be made, however, that the situation we examine was
characterised by an altogether different kind of social conflict: the
conflict between "tradition" and IImodernity"endemic to a developing
society. In a simplistic sense this was indeed true: the speculative
mode was associated with IImodernll social strata, "modern" economic relations
and "modern" administrative norms. But such an interpretation does not tell
us much. It is either a mere imposition of an extraneous IImodel"of histo-
rical evolution or, in a more real sense, a reflection of the ideoZogy that
is associated (mostly as a legitimation mechanism) with the economic and
political practices that promote the expansion of speculative capitalism
in housing (as well as in society in general). It informs us incompletely
about the real nature of social relations and conflicting values, especially
from the point of the non-speculative sector. Can we say that the latter
was an organic part of a "traditional" cOl1l11unityculture - be it in the
form of IIvillagell or IIpeasant-type" social patterns or in the form of a
distinct "working-classll culture fonned and reproduced in particular
urban neighbourhoods? This is true again to a certain extent but only
in the way of an historical correlation. It would be misleading to assume
that the dynamic of the antagonism between alternative urban systems
derived simply from a pesistance against changes in traditional ways of
living. Popular strata in Athens,after all, 'were highly mobile and
individuated in their majority. They had either actively rejected village
life by migrating to the city or, in most cases of those born in Athens,
had abandoned the characteristic poor working-class communities formed
before the war. For such strata, economic improvement and the world of
the nuclear family determined the sphere of their preoccupations and
aspfrattons , In this they differred sharply from the sociological stereo-
typ-~~'Ofthe community-orientated worker or peasant bound by 1imited
aspirations and the stable patterns of a traditional culture.
We can say with certainty that the material values associated with
modernisation in living conditions and economic development were widely
accepted by Greek popular households in cities during the postwar period.
Though no systematic studies concerned with this issue are available,
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local surveys and the wider postwar social pattern suggest that instead
of the life patterns and values of "closed" "defensive" working-class or
peasant-like culture, individualistic and "instrumental" orientations
prevailed among popular strata. This did not result in a "classless"
social structure: on the contrary, given the realities of a class-divided
urban political economy,it resulted in class-specific practices and
household behaviour.4 This should be evident in the case of housing
practices: we showed at length that there were good practical reasons
for popular strata to be inclined towards "precapitalist" housing -
no necessity arose to draw into the picture any· "cultural" influence of
traditional ways qua tradition (in the sense that tradition implies
a resistance to alter established habits and ideas).
"Tradition" in a certain sense, however, ?Jas an important element
namely in the form of t~aditionaZ rights over land and petty property
and ways of adaptation to the facts of capitalist society and a hostile
State. Such rights have been gained or.been granted and have been defended
in history,and in that sense constitute an active "tradition". We noted
for instance in chapter 3 that the definition of a large part of pre-
capitalist building as "illegal" Simply results from the clash between
traditional small-holder rights over the use of one's land with the
(imposed) norms of a modern "urban-industrial" (in our case capitalist)
4. The disti.nction between a mainly "economic-instrumentalll model of
aspirations and subjective ordering of social groups by working-class
households and one that emphasises normative and relational aspects has
been developed in the well-known study of affluent and mobile workers byJ. Gordthorpe et al.,The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (London,
1969). Goldthorpe et al. contrasted this form of working-class conscious-
ness and values - the product of the postwar years of economic development
and mo~ility - with the pattern observed by students of older and stagnant
working-class communities. A similar contrast was observed in the increased
emphasis placed on life within the nuclear family and the improvement of
the standard of living instead of the traditional importance of the
community and the extended family. Goldthorpe et al. found, however, that
these changes did not result in a homogenisation of life patterns and
behaviour across classes.
In an older study of a working-class area of recent migrants to Athens
it was found that these theoretical concepts and observations also applied
in .the Greek context ito a great extent. CL. Leontidou and D. Emmanuel
Life' Patterns).
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system and its associated legal-administrative norms and property relations.5
The concepts of tradition and modernity thus acquire a definite class
connotation: "modern" institutions and controls are associated with the
capitalist sector, the middle class, and a State that promoted laws and
policies suited to the norms and interests of this part of society. The
clash between tradition and modernity then was in essence a class anta-
gonism, and in this respect we may return to our initial question about
the possible class character of the conflicts over the transformation
of the housin~ system and give an affirmative answer.
5. In the aforementioned 1971 study of an illegal housing area in
Athens it was suggested as a tentative hypothesis that illegal building
could be interpreted within the framework of the famous model of "deviance"
advanced by Robert Merton ("Social Structure and Anomie", American Socio-
logical Review, 3, 1938: pp. 672-82). Merton distinguished five modes of
adaptation to the "social orderll, when the latter is defined by the predo-
minant "culture goals" and "institutionalised means" of achieving these
goals. Of these, three are relevant here: "conformity" when both goals
and means are accepted, lIinnovation" when goals are accepted but the norms
determining means are not accepted, and "rebellion" when both are rejected
and are replaced by alternative ones. In our initial interpretation we
assumed that illegal building belongs to the category of "innovation":
an owned house is a generally accepted goal; lower-income strata do not
have the economic means to follow the institutionalised path for the
achievement of this goal and the prevailing institutional norms are loose
in the case of this group. As a result we have "deviance" of the type
of Merton's "innovation". (see Life Patterns, pp. 100-101). ~Jecan say
now that such an interpretation must be rejected. To a large extent its
misconceptions were the natural result of the lack of historical and
broader perspective in the older study. If a characterisation in terms
of Merton's typology should be given, the more appropriate one would be
"rebellion", i.e. the conflict between a dominant and an alternative
definition of goals and norms over means. Still, the concept of rebellion
is inadequate for it gives logical (and historical) precedence to the
dominant system whereas this is not necessarily the case. A better
theoretical account can be gained with the help of Raymond Williams'
distinction of cultures that stand as alternatives to the dominant one
into lIemergent" and "residual" (Marxism and Literature, Oxford, 1977,
chapter 8). He defines a "residual" cultural element as one "that has
been effectively formed in the past, but it is still active in the cultural
process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an
effective element of the present" (Marxism and Literature, p. 122). Thus
in terms of our interpretation of the period, we had a conflict between
the existing dominant culture and elements of an emerging bourgeois
"modern II culture on the one side, and a "residualll ("traditional") popular
culture on the other (with possibly significant elements of "emergent"
alternative and oppositional patterns as well as elements of "innovation-
deviance" in ~1erton's sense). This interpretation, of course, is valid
only for the later part of the postwar period: what appeared "residual-
traditional" then in th.e popular culture over land and housing was not so
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~/e must immediately add, however, that the concept of claee we use
in this context must differ radically from the one we are accustomed to,
derived from the history of class struggles_in nineteenth-century Europe.
For one, class antagonisms during the period we study were not direct
but were mediated by the "impersonal" forces of administrative processes
and the market; at crucial points they involved specific policy decisions
by the State. Their morphology did not resemble the familiar modern one
of parties, organised capitalists and unions, but a division between a
"formal", official, middle-class sector and a diffuse formation of "people"
or popular "masses". Class was thus present in a "statistical" aggregate
sense, defined by the distinct life-patterns of households, housing
situations and places in the economic division of labour but not in the
more active sense of a formed class-consciousness and crystallised
institutions and movements.6
3.
The question of the role of social classes, politics and the State
has been also encountered in the analysis of the determinants of the high
levels of speculative building relative to the Greek economy as a whole.
It is widely believed that the level of residential capital formation in
postwar Greece has been exceptionally high and that this has been a result
of the character and orientations of the Greek capitalist class and the
policies of the State with regard to the "strategy" of economic develop-
ment to be pursued. Such arguments have been mainly inspired by certain
influential theories of the persistence of underdevelopment in Third
World countries and the role of luxury housebuilding and land speculation
in such socioeconomic formations. Though their main object has been the
explanation of the high postwar level of housing investment as a whole,
they advance, by implication, a particular model of the determination
of speculative building.
in earl ier periods. Lila Leontidou Emmanue-l has argued that between the wars
these elements have been a dynamic emergent culture as an active response to
the conditions of early capitalist urbanisation (Working Class and Land
Allocation, passim).
6. Our concepts on the class character of the confl ict between "tra_dition"
and "modernity" and of situations of class struggle without the formation of
class in the modern sense derived from the post-nineteenth-century history
of ~Jestern advanced soc; eti es are borrowed from E.P. Thompson, "Eighteer:th-
century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?1I Social History
(3,2,1978): 133-165.
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We have argued in chapter 5 that such approaches have important
theoretical contradictions. To the extent, moreover, that they are
relevant, they apply only under special conditions. Such conditions
were not present in Greece save for a few years immediately after the
war. For the greatest part of the postwar period neither any direct
involvement of the State in the process of capital formation nor the
behaviour of the capitalist class determined the levels of housing
investment in any important extent. The level of the latter has often been
considered hiyh by comparison with the limited level of industrial invest-
ment. We have shown that there is no causal relationship between the two
phenomena and more specifically, that there is no direct or indirect nega-
tive influence of residential investment on the level of industrial invest-
ment. We showed, in fact, that after the mid-1950's there is a positive
association between the two.
There are sufficient grounds then for rejecting an approach to the
process of residential capital formation from the viewpoint of the process of
capital accumulation, i.e. "business" investment, and the behaviour of the
State and the capitalist class with regard to the latter. We have advanced
instead an alternative model stressing the pattern of wealth accumulation
within the household sector of the economy. The growth of speculative
housing results as a simple corollary of this process, given the size and
behaviour of the middle-class market. and the changes in sectoral structure
pointed out in chapter 4.
In the context of this approach., the "peculiarities" of Greece vis-a-vis
the high rates of housing investment become easily understandable. We have
pointed out in chapter 5 that the most important determinants of these
high rates in addition to the basic fact of the "middle-income" status of
the country, were the role of the high savings rate of households which
is reinforced by the relatively non-skewed income distribution, the diffused
access to land ownership, the high inflow of household savings from abroad,
and the favourable trend in costs. We have also argued, however, that most
of these aspects should be expected to be present in the case of a small
country that has managed to develop fastly along a "pure" capitalist path
during the postwar period. The same elements that make for high residential
investment. namely a relatively non-skewed distribution of incomes and
weal th, a high inflow of capital from abroad, and a favourable trend in
costsJ are also necessary parts of fast consumption-orientated capitalist
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development. The really exceptional chara.cteristic of postwar Greece in
a comparative perspective, therefore, has been the successful realisation
of such a development pattern rather than the high level of residential
investment in itself.
We may reexamine in the light of these conclusions the questions posed
in the introduction to this study with regard to the adequacy of some
common statistical-comparative "models" relating the level of residential
investment to economic development, urbanisation and modernisation. It was
then pointed out (see also chapter 5) that a much more systematic consi-
deration of socioeconomic and institutional structure as well as the
local political economy of housing is essential. Otherwise we are left
with statistical regularities of dubious theoretical as well as empirical
strength. The.1tst of major determinants pointed above for the Greek case
suggests the necessity of a much more comprehensive comparative approach.
Our critique, furthermore, of the theories of "structural underdevelopment"
offerred as explanations of the Greek pattern of capital accumulation
(including housing), pointed that these, though of limited relevance, may
apply under special conditions, This also suggests the need for a richer
comparative theoretical framework.
Of equal significance is the argument that the distinction between
different types of political economy with_ respect to the "model " of
capitalist development and the configuration of major determinants of
housing investment is better approached in a theoretically systematic
manner. Our rejection of the notion of the peculiarity of the Greek
case as a fortuitous combination of factors and the interconnection of
the necessary and sufficient characteristics of a "middle-income" fastly
developing capitalist country into a coherent whole have shown the
~ruitfulness of such an approach. This point in conjunction with the
previous one suggests that both of the more \'Jidespreadsimpl istic "compa-
rative" paradigms in this subject, the evolutionist-unilinear and its
opposite stress1ng in an ad hoc manner "culturally-specificll patterns,
should be considered as extremely inadequate.
The inadequacy of the evolutionist assumptions of statistical-compara-
tive models 1s most obvious in the issue of the interaction between the
expansion of housebu i1ding in "middle-income" countries and the capitalist
transfor~ation of the housing system. We have questionned in the intro-
duction the validity of the common assumption that building expansion is
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a corollary of the growth of market relations and the "modern" building
sector. I take it that the argument is essentially a Ittechnologicalll one:
the market system, a modern division of labour and modern-capitalist building
enterprises are more productive and growth-dynamic. This is probably so, but
the point is secondary for housing capital accumulation as a ~hoZe in an
early capitalist city. Were the Greek housing and land systems dominated
in the early 1950's by a speculative/capitalist mode with its attentant
social relations, aggregate housing investment would have been lower. The
high rates of accumulation in the postwar period were based on the highly
diffused pattern of access to land and housing property. This was inter-
linked, of course, with the existence of the "dual" system of housing
production and land allocation which means a limited speculative/capitalist
sector. The fast expansion of the latter, moreover, was based to a large
extent on the incipient capitalism and dynamism of small landowners and'
petty speculators previously outside its sphere, a growing middle-class
market with heavy financial assistance and, of course, the pressures
towards the stagnation of precapitalist housing and the increased inte-
gration of the system. These facts imply that it is not the growth of
the speculative mode that produced the postwar wave of building but the
other way around. The inherent dynamism of a competitive speculative
economy has added impetus to the process. Thus, to return to a point made
in the introduction, it is necessary to approach the study of the postwar
wave of building in middle-income countries in connection with the process of
capitalist transformation of the housing system. But it is the nature of
the process of transformation and the structure of the early capitalist
housing system as a whole that matter and not the productive character and
capacity of the speculative/capitalist mode in itself.
4.
In the last chapter of this study we have further advanced the alternative
approach to residential capital formation introduced in chapter 5. This has
taken the form of a more detailed model of household behaviour towards
consumption and accumulation and a consideration of the economic dynamic
of the housing system as a whole. We have been able, thus, to estimate
more precisely the role of the long-run behavioural parameters of housing
wealth accumulation as well as the role of short- and medium-term determi-
nants of investment.
The purpose of the model developed in chapter 6, however, was much
broader. We have noted in the introduction and the first chapter of this
study the limitations of some widespread comparative models based on an
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evolutionist framework. We have com~ented already on the implications
of such models for the growth and transformation of housebuilding. Similar
approaches, however, have been applied to the analysis of the socieconomic -,~
and spatial structure of "developing" cities. These have been considered
as intermediate stages in a continuum ranging from the "pre-industrial"
city (the European or the Third World variant) to the city found in advanced
capitalist societies. Their movement along the continuum is basically a
corollary of economic development and modernisation. To the extent that the
worldwide expansion of market relations and the industrial-capitalist
system introduce pressures for a fundamental uniformity, these approaches
contain an important element of truth. They are extremely poor instruments,
however, for the study of change in concrete situations lacking the concepts
for an understanding of the mechanism of change as well as for a systematic
differentiation of significant variations in the pattern of development.
This is especially evident in the case of the economy of housing and land.
More importantly, they essentially imply that the expansion of market
relations and modern capitalist structures is a "natural II corollary of
economic development and modernisation. This assumption has been sufficiently
undermined in the present study.
The theory of the "Third World" city has been advanced as an alternative
to these approaches. Despite its valuable contributions, however, towards
a more complex and sophisticated approach. to early capitalist cities, it
is essentially a logical variant of the evolutionist-diffusionist model
of capitalist development. It simply stresses the fact that ~he latter
is often arrested, especially at the level of structures. We have thus an
argument for the persistence of "dualism" and socioeconomic polarisation
especially in cities growing at fast rates without adequate industrialisation.
With regard to urban housing this approach is equally poor conceptually,
compared to evolutionist-diffusionist models. The structure of housing and
cities is conceived as a mere reflection of the fundamental socioeconomic
polarisation of the system and the arrested development of the capitalist
sector. Were the latter to expand sufficiently, the housing system would
"naturally" move towards market relations and the dominance of modern-
capitalist production. In this the two approaches agree. They disagree on
the possibility of such a change. Where the first sees a smooth process
of gradual diffusion and assimilation, the second stresses the reproduction
of a static pattern. These general hypotheses are derived from fundamental
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assumptions (partly ideological) with regard to capitalist development in
general. The economics and sociology of housing and land in early capitalist
citiest their character and significant variations are scarcely considered.
Given the inadequacies of these models the student of the housing
system of a tldevelopingtlcity is forced to turn to the urban economics
and sociology developed in advanced western societies. Needless to saYt
however, these require drastic revisions and a systematic questionning of
their assumptionst mainly with regard to the dominance of market relations
and rentier-speculative rationality, and the modes of housing production
and distribution. In chapter 6 we have tried to develop a model of the
housing system more suited to the character of an early capitalist city,
with an extensive household economy, a "dualtl structure and a primitive
speculative-capitalist sector in production and finance. This relatively
"macroeconomic" model, in conjunction with the theory of housing modes
and sectors in chapter 1, the sectoral model in chapter 4, and the theories
on housing costs and ground rents in Appendix 6.1 represents an effort to
establish a base towards the development of the sociology and economics
of early capitalist "dual" housing systems. This task is even more
essential in Greece where there is a complete lack of systematic studies
of housing and urban development.

Appendices to Chapters

Appendix 2.1.
The spatial distribution of population, building types and socioeconomic
categories in Greater Athens
This appendix supplies the data that were used in the analysis
of the spatial structure of Greater Athens in chapter 2. It contains
tables on the spatial distribution of occupational categories by place
of residence in 1971, of buildings of different types in 1970, (according
to the number of storeys) and of population in the three postwar census
years (1951-1971). The areal units used are the municipalities and
communes of Greater Athens. These are shown on map 2.1.1. The latter
shows in addition the boundaries of the major urban zones used by the
1965 Master Plan which are referred to in the analysis of chapter 3
and Appendix 6.1.
,
',.
Figure 2.1.1. Greater Athens area: Municipal Hies, Communes,and r1aster
Plan Zones
l.Aghios Ioannis
Rendis
2.Athens
3.Aegaleo
4.Amarousion
5.Byron
6.Glyfada
7.0afni
8.0rapetsona
9.Zografou
10. Irakl ion
11. Kesariani
12. Kall ithea
l3.Keratsinion
l4.Kifisia
15. Korydalos
16.Moskhaton
17.Nea Ionia
18.Nea Smyrni
19. Nea Phil adel-
p_bia
20.Nikaia
21.Paleon Phaliron
22.Piraeus
23.Peristerion
24. Tavros
25.Khaidari
26.Khalandrion
27.Aghia Varvara
28.Aghia Para3kevi
29.Aghios Dimitrios
30.Aghii Anarghiri
31.A 1 tmos
32.Argyroupolis
33.Voula
34.Vouliagmeni
35.Vrilissia
36.Galatsi
37.Ekali
38. Ilioupo 1is
39.Camateron
o 5 1"km=
40.Lycovrisi
41.Mel isia
42.Metamorphosis
43.Nea Erythrea
44.Nea Pendeli
4S.Nea Chalkidon
46.Neon Psykhicon
47.Nea Liossia
48.Papaqou
49.Pendeli
50.Perama
51. Petroupo 1is
52.Pevki
53.Hymittos
54.Philothei
55.Kholargos
56.Psykhikon
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Table 2.1.1. Economically active population by occupational category and
place of residence in the Municipalities and Communes of
Greater Athens, 1971 Census
Municipa1ities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)- Communes
1. Aghios Ioannis
Rendis 176 556 552 4,112 6,176
2. Athens 57,004 70,064 41,256 98,136 318,984
3. Aegaleo 1,092 2,676 2,476 18,476 28,476
4. Amarousion 900 1,116 848 4.172 8,516
5. Byron 1,496 2,932 2,212 7,380 16,076
6. Glyfada 580 852 856 3.192 7,500
7. Dafn; 696 1,324 1,260 4,648 9,088
8. Drapetsona 188 356 416 3,120 4,596
9. Zographou 2,932 4,600 2,172 6,488 19,332
10. Iraklion 528 1,152 772 4,988 8,248
11. Kesariani 808- 1,444 1,192 4,348 9,192
12. Ka11ithea 3,612 6,108 3,236 12,628 29,524
13. Keratsinion 1,096 1,516 1,948 13,440 20,216 .
14. Kifi sia 1,136 752 760 2,232 6,404
15. Kor~dalos 884 1,440 1.676 8a580 14a336
16. Moskhaton 472 1,048 764 4,136 7.376
17. Nea Ionia 744 1.628 2,012 12,032 18,668
18. Nea Smyrni 2,168 2,836 2,008 5,284 14,068
19. Nea Philadelpnia 472 1,044 844 3,376 6,552
20. Nikaia 12236 22200 22840 172880 27a164
21- Paleon Pha1;ron 1,776 3,264 1,588 4,004 11 ,604
22. Piraeus 6,480 8,512 6,944 30,632 60,460
23. Peristerion 1,352 3,4Q8 3,756 26,872 41,240
24. Tavros 172 376 616 3,984 5,824
25. Khaidari 788 864 852 52740 92768
26. Kha1andrion 1,388 .2,168 1;444 4,560 11 ,212
27. Aghia Varvara 292 536 644 5,604 8,472
28. Aghia Paraskevi 540 928 528 2,620 5,524
29. Aghios Dimitrios 528 1,432 1,380 8,892 14,100
30. Aghi i Anarghiri 396 1,048 896 5,524 9,064
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Municipal Hies (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)- Corrmunes
31. Alimos . 952 1,140 .1,000 3,200 7,924
32. Argyroupol is 216 572 436 2,540 4,344
33. Voula 528 172 140 468 1,840
34. Vouliagmeni 48 20 36 112 340
35. Vrilissia 164 176 128 456 1,140
36. Galatsi 472 1,280 976 5,536 9,452
37. Ekali 96 44 52 40 392
38. Ilioupol is 1,136 2,548 1,900 8,688 16,556
39. Kamateron 88 216 304 2,640 ·3,780
40. l~covrisi 56 76 76 804 1,212
4l. ~'elissia 276 120 96 612 1,428
42. Metamorphosis 148 440 384 4,340 6,120
43. Nea Erythrea 196 232 292 1,212 2,368
44. Nea Pendeli 32 24 36 268 420
45. Nea Chalkidon 328 568 360 1,344 2,968
46. Neon Psykhikon 532 484 416 808 2,760
47. Nea Liosia 560 1,568 1,540 12,596 18,680
48. Papagou 616 420 148 216 1,748
49. Pendeli 100 56 36 236 520
SQ. Perama 224 260 416 3,892 5,512
51. Petroupolis 224 672 524 3,744 5,984
52. Pevki 148 212 152 840 1,556
53. Hymittos 480 900 536 2,112 4,596
54. Philothei 456 196 192 104 1,208
55. Kholargos 764 1,068 568 1,544 4,620
56, Psykhi kon 1,184 412 436 260 3,064
Source: 1971 Census, 25% sample. Unpublished data supplied by the N.S.S.G.
(1) : Professions, Managers, Higher Administrative
(2): Clerical workers
(3): Tradesmen and Sales Workers
(4): Workers in Industry and Transport
(5): Totdl Economically Active
The table does not include workers in services. and the few active
in agriculture, fishing and forestry and unclassifiable. Their sum
(i.e. mainly Service workers) can be derived as a residual from the
total active.
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Table 2.1.2: Buildingsin Greater Athens by number of storeys, Municipalities
and Communes, 1970
Municipal ities (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)- Communes
1- Aghios IoannisRendis 2,089 569 264 4 2,926
2. Athens 30,747 20,710 11,753 9,760 72,970
3. Aegaleo 10,598 3,950 733 3 15,284
4. Amarousion 6,049 1,387 183 4 7,623
5. B~ron 4,734 2,591 764 76 8,165
6. Glyfada 6,653 1,314 276 17 6,653
7. Oafni 2,888 1,580 446 15 4,929
8. Drapetsona 2,212 637 155 10 3,014
9. Zographou 2,399 1,509 893 239 5,040
10. Iraklion 4,104 1,179 185 2 5,470
II. Kesariani 1,991 973 394 86 3,444
12. Kall ithea 4,621 3,291 1,345 252 9,509
13. Keratsinion 9,900 3,887 539 2 14,328
14. Kifisia 4,456 1,409 270 8 6,143
15. Kor~dalos 6,288 2,396 476 9,160
16. Moskhaton 2,520 1,532 302 11 4,365
17. Nea Ionia 7,852 3,714 567 1 12,134
18. Nea Smyrni 3,288 2,377 834 89 6,588
19. Nea Philadelphia 1,421 1,180 267 2,868
20. Nikaia 12,724 4,497 870 1 18,092
2l. Paleon Phaliron 3,206 1,688 717 94 5,705
22. Piraeus 17,615 10,830 2,828 636 31,909
23. Peristerion 20,020 5,096 707 14 25,837
24. Tavros 1,502 548 205 12 2,267
25. Khaidari 4,925 1,507 201 62633
26. Khalandrion 6,843 1,961 327 7 9,138
27. Aghia Varvara 3,309 1,070 195 2 4,576
28. Aghia Paraskevi 3,871 843 127 4,841
29. Aghios Dimitrios 6,833 1,775 269 3 8,880
30. Aghii Anarghiri 42267 12255 i94 51716
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Mun;c;pa 1ities
- Communes Ca) Cb} (c) (d) (e)
31. Al tmos 3,966 1,467 419 28 5,880
32. Argyroupolis 2,603 766 109 3,478
33. Voula 1,608 477 104 4 2,193
34. Vouliagmeni 536 138 115 2 791
35. Vrilisia 1,333 189 27 1,549
36. Galatsi 3,072 1,120 358 11 4,561
37. Ekali 292 334 2 628
38. Ilioupolis 6,340 3,349 687 12 10,388
39. Kamateron 3,256 193 11 3,460
40. tycovrisi 1,057 72 7 1,136
41. Melisia 1,256 192 19 1 1,467
42. Metamorphosis 3,451 443 103 3,997
43. Nea Erythrea 1,961 516 66 2,543
44. Nea Pendel i 967 1,122 6 1,095
45. Nea Chalkidon 817 604 152 1 1,574
46. Neon Psykhikon 1,122 655 165 1,942
47. Nea Ltesta 11 ,538 1,883 199 1 13,621
48. Papagou 1,263 708 75 2,046
49. Pendeli 750 179 10 939
50. Perama 4,344 651 53 5,048
51. Petroupolis 3,975 772 54 4,801
52. Pevki 1,345 231 43 2 1,621
53, Hymittos 1,673 980 221 2,874
54, Philotflei 418 492 124 , 1,034
55. Kholargos 1,826 741 136 13 2,716
56. Psykhikon 626 839 457 1,922
Greater Athens 261,320 105,368 31,008 11 ,423 409,119
Source: N.S.S.G., Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1976
(a~ Buildings of 1 storeyfb II of 2 storeys
cl It of 3-5 "
(d) " of 6 storeys and overeel All buildings
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Table 2.1.3: Population in Greater Athens by Municipalities and Communes,
1951-1971
Municipal Hies 1951 1961 1971- Communes
1. Aghios Ioannis Rendis 5,375 11,204 17,560
2. Athens 555,484 627,564 867,023
3. Aegaleo 29,464 57,840 79,961
4. Amarousion 13,913 20,135 27,112
5. Byron 31,588 39,079 47,335
6. Glyfada 8,256 12,361 23,449
7. Oafni 17,342 23,747 26,608
8. Orapetsona 17,568 14,103 14,586
9. Zographou 16,208 27,185 56,722
10. Irakl ion 5,360 12,228 24,302
11. Kesariani 22,093 23,733 26,915
12. Kall ithea 46,986 54,720 82,438
13. Keratsinion 40,179 61,673 67,672
14. Kifisia 13,124 14,193 20,082
15. Korydalos 15,125 30,859 47,335
16. ~loskhaton 12,905 18,536 22,138
17. Nea Ionia 33,821 48,149 54,906
18. Nea Smyrni 22,074 32,856 42,512
19. Nea Philadelphia 10,187 15,564 19,639
20. Nikaia 72 2176 83,266 86,269
2L Paleon Phaliron 12,894 22,157 35,066
22. Piraeus 192,626 189,728 187,458
23. Peristerion 35,733 79,335 118,413
24. Tavros 15,013 15,363 15,795
25. Khaidari l3!773 24,002 38,121
26. Khalandrion 15,092 25,774 35,944
27. Aghia Varvara 3,481 13,726 26,409
28. Aghia Paraskevi 6,977 12,122 18,345
29. Aghios Oimitrios 4,621 21,365 40,968
30. Aghii Anarghiri 8,416 18,448 26,094
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Municipa1ities
- Communes 1951 1961 1971
31. Alimos 5,703 13,014 26,957
32. Argyroupolis 425 4,021 13,956
33. Voula 2,106 3,864 5,575
34. Vouliagmeni 1,674 1,621 1,469
35. Vrilisia 1,224 2,352 3,841
36. Galatsi 9,600 13,743 27,240
37. Ekali 817 1,057 1,292
38. 11 ioupol is 8,052 27,638 49,215
39. Ka"materon 783 3,304 11 ,382
40. Llcovrisi 599 1,502 3,213
41. Melissia 2,525 3,348 5,374
42. Metamorphosis 2,807 7,952 16,880
43. Nea Erythrea 4,225 6,134 7,583
44. Mea Pendeli 811 1,181 1,453
45. Nea Chalkidon 3,504 6,695 8,768
46. Neon Psykhikon 3,305 7,560 9,139
47. Nea liosia 5,460 31,810 56,217
48. Papagou -* 6,000 8,083
49. Pendeli 1,289 1,794 1,871
so. Perama 4,900 14,694 18,258
5I. Petroupolis 1,612 8,520 18,631
52. Pevki 2,323 3,763 4,906
53. Hymittos 8,968 12,193 13,717
54. Philothei 1,538 3,088 4,087
55. Kholargos 2,775 7,637 14,904
56, Phykhikon 3,707 7,209 9,053
Greater Athens 1,378,586 1,852,709 2,540,241
Source: N.S.S.G., Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1976
* The commune Papagou was included in 1951 in the municipality
of Kholargos
Appendix 3.1.
The structure of land and housing ownership in Greek cities: A case
study of an area in the inner zone of Athens
1.
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate with the help of some
empirical material the extremely small sizes and large extent of fragment-
ation of land property holdings in Greek cities. More specifically, we
will examine the structure of ownership found in areas undergoing specu-
lative redevelopment, the effects of this process on land properties, and
the distribution of properties within apartment buildings. Our information
will be based on a case study of a fairly typical area in the inner zone
of Athens. This obviously limits the significance of the observations
but to a limited extent only. Land and housing ownership patterns in
Greece do not vary much between different neighbourhoods and different
cities. Such variation, moreover, is mainly due to the predictable effects
of the positive correlation between socioeconomic status and size of
property unit. The area we will describe has a mixed social structure
but with respect to the apartment sector had a fairly typical middle-
class/lower middle-class character.
The observations made in this appendix support the arguments on the
diffusion and sma11 size of land and housing property in chapter 3but
are also relevant to points in chapters 2 and 5. The need to go into a
case study for such supporting material stems from the complete lack of
any published information on these significant aspects. Although the
compilation of a land cadaster has begun since the end of the 1960's,
it is still incomplete and,as far as r know, no utilisation of the
available material in the study of urban landownership patterns has
been published. Though the information recorded in the cadaster is very
limited in scope, utilisation of its material on a conprehens ive scale
would have supplied us with urgently needed knowledge in an area of
extreme interest for Greek urban economics. The following analysis is
based on cadaster data. For obvious practical reasons the area studied
is small - roughly fifty blocks. An inspection of the patterns of the
subdivision of land into building plots in ~ f~r wider area .cover+nq .
the Athens central business district and'"an'extensive surrounding zone,
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however, showed that with the exception perhaps of the historical core and
areas with a high concentration of institutional owners of land, this area
is fairly representative of most sections of the inner part of the city.
In addition, it has the advantage of being a case where we have a mix of
older residential stock with recently developed sections of apartment
buildings, facilitating thus an examination of the effects of the postwar
pattern of speculative redevelopment of central areas. It is for this
latter reason that this particular area has been studied in terms of
social and physical characteristics in an earlier study: a further
factor that weighted in favour of its selection as the object of the
. present case study.l
2.
The neighbourhood we will examine is situated immediately at the N.W. of
of the Athens C.B.D. It is generally known as "Aghios Pavlos". It forms
a part of the older section of the city since it ;s within the limits of
the 1880 City Plan. It has been initially developed during the 1880's
with one-storey and two-storey houses and, to a lesser extent, with the
more substantial three-storey neoclassical houses of the early part of
this century. Its population in 1951 (for an area of 49 city blocks) was
8.800 persons. In 1961 its population fell to 7.700 as the area stagnated
in terms of res ident ie1 demand, caught between the twi,p forces of a
declining old housing stock and the expansion of non-residential uses
in the "zone of transition" surrounding the CBD. The fast postwar redevelop-
ment of central areas, however, and the gradual expansion of apartment
building outwards and to the west of the solid middle-class quarters north
and east of the centre, has reversed these trends and increased the
population in 1971 to 9.156. Redevelopment continued fastly in the 1970's.
The rapid changes effected can be easily seen in the changes in the distri-
bution of the plots among different types of buil dings and uses.
Table 3.1.1 'illustrates clearly the great extent of demolition of the
older stock by redevelopment for apartment buildings or multi-storey buildings
for non-residential uses (offices, "hotels and trade). The worst affected
were, of course, the older single-storey houses. Quite a few, however, of
1. See D. Emmanuel, The Ecology of the Inner Urban Zone of .L\thens,
Unpublished Diploma Thesis, Technical University of Athens, School of
Architecture, 1972.
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the two-storey and three-storey buildings (usually bourgeois mansions
that have undergone partial subdivision for low-income renters) have
been also demolished.
Table 3.1.1: "Aghios Pavlos": Distribution of building plots by type of use
1961 1972
Older* 2-3 Storey buildings 250 175
Older Single-storey " 100 70
New* 2-3 storey u 250 75
New Single-storey .. 30 5
Multi-Family .. 4Q 125
Exclusively Non-residential Uses 25 175
695 625
Source: Emmanuel, The Ecology of the Inner Urban Zone; *01der buildings
are roughly those built before the 1930's. All other buildings
have been·considered "new". This distinction is mainly based on
structural characteristics.
3.
As is usual in Greek cities, the layout of the area is a grid of streets
which form a number of small blocks subdivided into individual land plots.
The 49 blocks were divided into 563 building plots. With a few exceptions
determined by the street pattern, the sizes of blocks and plots do not
vary significantly; they are in general very small. We measured the
sizes found in the residential core of the area (22 blocks, 281 plots):
for a total area of 97,7 stremmas (9,77 Ha), the building plots amounted
to 63,55 stremmas ar 65% of the area. The rest of the area was covered by
pavements, streets and a square. The average size of blocks and plots was
2,888 square meters and 226 square meters respectively, giving an average
of 12,7 smallish plots per block. The plots of apartment buildings were
somewhat larger but still of a very small size: 316 square meters - hardly
four medium-sized apartments. We can say, therefore, that although a
measure of land-consolidation takes place in the process of speculative
redevelopment, it is not significant: the development process has been
evidently accomodated to the inherited pattern of urban landownership.
The sizes of plots observed in the area are fairly representative of
the conditions prevailing in the city as a whole. Although we do not have
340
any published studies on this issue,it seems that the matter has been given
some consideration 5n the context of studies for th~. ~thens Master Plan.
It has been reported that the sizes of b~ildings ~lots' in Greater Athens
vary between 112,5 m2 and 2,000 m2: only ~ few cases of plots smaller or
larger than these limits can be found. The most common sizes are between
150 and 300 m2.2
4.
Older buildings and ones of small size (including their land) are
generally held by single owners or jointly by members of a family (mainly
in cases of inheritance}. The structure of ownership is more complex in
the case of apartment buildings. In the case of old and small buildings
and in the very rare instance when a whole multi~storey building (usually
a commercial property) is held by a single o~~er, the land cadaster records
one "unit of ownership" which includes the land. In apartment buildings,
on the other hand, it records as separate units all the structurallY
distinct parts of floorspace: apartments, shops and offices. These are
referred to,following Greek legal terminology, as "parts of horizontal
property", Each, depending on its size, has a share of the ground plot.
However, since co~ownership of individual apartments is quite frequent,
ownership of a part of a unit is al,so recorded as an "ownership unit".
This is certainly complicated and confusing but reflects the real condi-
tions of the multiple ownership of structures and land in the case of
apartment buildings. The number of separate ownership units in a building
expresses in essence the number of snares into which the property is divided.
Actual, owners may be less in number since one person may own more than
one unit.
In the.4Q apartment ouildings studied in our area we had an average
of 23,3 units of ownership per building and 16,6 owners. This amounts to an
average of 1.4 units (separate apartments or shops or co-ownership in one),
per property owner. It is fairly clear that control of property in specula-
tively produced buildings is highly diffused among a broad class of small
owners. The pattern of distribution of property units among the owners
of a single unit and the relatively larger owners can be seen in the
fallowing tabl e.
2. Ministry of Public Works, Master Plan Service, The Master Plan of
Athens, 1975 (unpublished report, in Greek), p. 33.
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Table 3.1.2: Distribution of "property units" among classes of owners in
apartment buildings, "Aghios Pavlos" Area, 1971 (40 buildin~
Owners with 1 unit, 2 3 4 5 & more Total s
Owners 571 38 13 16 23 665
% 85.8 5.7 2.0 2.4 3.4 100.0
Property units 571 76 39 64 184 934
% 61.1 8.1 4.1 6.8 19.7 100.0
Source: Original data derived from the list of properties and owners in "'he
Cadaster Service, Ministry of Public 14orks.
Property owners of more than four units (among which there could be
quite a few shares in the co-ownership of apartments) control less than
20% of property in these buildings. This certainly shows the limited
degree of large landlordism in the apartment sector. Furthermore, it is
more than probable that this class of more substantial owners comes from
the previous owners of the building plot. In the common practice of exchange
arrangements ("antiparochi ") between specul ative buil der and 1andowner,
the latter is given, in place of money capital, a certain share of the
property to be built (usually more than 30%). It is obvious, then, that
substantial investors in residential property in the market sector are
missing. This point may require some qualification in the light of the
fact that this particular area could not be considered as one of high
demand or one of prestige residential and commercial property to which
larger rentiers would be attracted. Differences in this respect, however,
should not be expected to be significant outside the central business
district and perhaps a few truly "elite" residential sections in central
Athens.
Regardless of the distribution of property in structures, the pattern
in table 3.1.2. is perhaps more significant with respect to the structure
of Zand ownership. It points to the fact that ownership of urban land
is further fragmented through the widespread process of specula~ive
redevelopment: in the case of the apartment buildings we examined, each
distinct o~mer hardly controlled 19 square meters of urban land on the
average!
Appendix 4.1.
Population~ incomes, rent-class structure and housing stock depreciation
in Greater Athens 1950-1971
1. Population, households, incomes and housing expenditures
The population of Greater Athens grew with high rates throughout
the postwar period. During the same time the average size of households
decreased substantially. As a result, the rate of growth in the number
of households and thus in the demand for dwellings was even higher: we
had an annual rate of 3.76% in the 1950's and a rate of 4.1% in the 1960's.
Table 4.1.1: Population and households in Greater Athens 1951-1971
Census Population Households Average size Annual growth Annual growthYear CP} CN} of households rate of (P) rate of eN}
1951 1,378.586 361,100 3.817
1961 1,852,709 522,587 3.545 3.0%- 3.76%
1971 2,540,241 781,140 3.252 3.2% 4.1%
Source: 1959 Statistical Yearbook N.S.S.G.; 1961 Census Vol.2; 1971 CensusVol. 7.
These rates of growth did not operate in any uniform manner during each
decade. Whereas, h.owever, we lack the data to reconstruct the exact time-
pattern of growth, there is sufficient evidence that points to a Significant
rise in the rate of urean growth in the second half of the 1950's (mainly
due to an increase of internal migration) which continued at even higher
rates up to the mid-1960's, and a slowing down in the second half of the
1960's. We know from the 1961 Census that during the 1950's about 269,000
persons moved from the rest of the country to Athens: of these, 116,000
settled in the city during 1951-55 and 153,000 during 1956-60.1 The first
figure amounts to 8.4% of the 1951 population, while the second to 9.6% of
the population estimated for 1955 (assuming that the 3.0% decennial rate
applied uniformly throughout the period). This certainly implies a higher
1. D.G, Tsaousis, The Morphology of Modern Greek Soci~ (Athens, 1971),
p. 221 (in Greek),
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internal migration inflow in the second half of the 1950's. On the strength
of available evidence we have no reason to assume that important fluctuations
in the rate of fertility, mortality and the movement to and from abroad
compensated for this inflow of population. The rate of urban growth as a whole
was thus similarly high in the second half of the 1950's. With regard
to the 1960's, we know from the 1971 census that 1,915,680 persons living
in Athens in 1971 and born before 1966 have been living in the city in
1965. To estimate the total of the 1965 population we must add the number
of persons that lived in Athens in 1965 and ~ere not present in 1971 due
to death, immigration or a move to other parts of the country. Table
4.1.2 presents the relevant information.
Table 4.1.2: Greater Athens: Residents in 1965 and losses of population
due to deaths, immigration and internal migration during
1966-70
1. Household members born before 1966 and resident
in Athens in 1971 and 1965
2. Number of deaths 1966-1970 approx.
3. Permanent i'mmigrants
4. Migration from Athens to the rest of the country
Estimated popul ation for 1965
1,915,680
81,000
63,346
65,240
2,133,000
Source: (I) and (4): 1971 Census, Vol. 1. (2) and {3}: Statistical
Yearbooks, 1967-73.
. "
Given the evidence in table 4.1.2, the average annual rate of
population growth for 1961-65 (4-year period) is 3.6% and that for
1965-71 3.0%. Of course, a number of deaths and movements away from
the city may have taken place among post-1965 migrants. This amount,
however, is certainly compensated by the effect of temporary immigration
(intended stay abroad less than a year) which during 1966-70 amounted
to 30,000 persons a year. A large part of this category for 1969 and
1970 must have been abroad during the 1971 census. The estimated population
growth rates combined with the trends of growth in the average size of
households, give the following rates of growth in the number of house-
holds: 1961-1965: 4.5% and 1965-1971: 3.9%.
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let us now examine the rates of growth in incomes and housing expendi-
tures in Athens. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (in constant 1958
prices) increased during the 1960's by an annual rate of' 6.58% (from 12,151
drs or $ 405 in 1961, to 22,991 drs or $ 766 in 1971). The rate of increase
was slower during the previous decade: GNI per capita (in 1958 pdces) was
7,558 drs in 1951 which implies an average annual growth rate for 1951-1961
of 4.86%.2 As we pointed out in chapter 4, however, the concept of current
income is not adequate for the analysis of consumption. The relevant determi-
nants are "normal" income and, more generally, the structurally determined
resources available to a household. Let us assume in accordance with modern
theories of household behaviour that consumption and saving are proportional
functions of "normal" income. Total consumption, then, may be considered
as a surrogate variable for "normal" income and the socioeconomic position
of a household and, thus, taRe the place of the independent variable in
the study of consumption of particular goods such as housing. Alternatively,
we may take total consumption expenditure in itseZf as the relevant independent
variable for the cross-sectional and time-series determination of housing
consumption (rent expenditures, including imputed rent). Table 4.1.3 presents
the trends in the latter as well as in total consumption at the macro-
economic 1evel •
Row (4) in table 4.L3 shows the share of Musing consumption in total
consumption expenditure. The very slow decrease in this share ind icates an
elasticity smaller than +1 but only marginally so. Thus our assumption in
chapter 4 of a proportional relationship between "income" (operational ised
by total consumption expenditure) and housing consumption (i.e. rent-
expenditure) does not deviate si.gnificantly from real ity with regard to
time-series data at 1east. In fact, the elasticlty of housing consumption
in the first half of the 1950ts and towards tfle beginning of the 1970's
was equal to and higher than +1 respectively.3
2. National Accounts 1958-1972, p. 20 and National Accounts 1948-1970.
3. Let us denote National Private Consumption by "C" and Housing
Consumption by "CW'. Using National Accounts data (constant 1958 prices)
we have found that CH (1961-71) = 0.63 CO.909 (i.e. elasticity for 0.909)
and CH (1961-71) = 0.059 C1.049 (i.e. an elasticity of 1.049), which clearly
imply a significant rise in elasticities in the early 1970's. (D. Emmanuel,
Categories of Households, pp. 45-46).
345
Table 4.1.3: Trends in national private consumption expenditure (NPC) and
housing consumption (He), Total Greece, 1951-1971
Constant 1958 prices
1951 1955 1961 1965 1971 Annual rates of growth
51-55 55-61 61-65 65-71
1.National
private 53,072 64,083 84,095 109,623 163,662
con-
sumption (NPC)
2.Housing
con- 6,223
sumption(HC)
3.Population
(p) (in
thousands)
4.HC/NPC
5.NPC/P
6.HC/P
7,440 9,566 11,614 16,897
7,646.4 7,965.5 8,398.0 8,550.3 8,851.9
0.116 0.113 0.106 0.103
8,045 10,013 12,820 18,488
934 1,139 1,358 1,909
3.75% 3.71% 6.37% 6.30%
3.49% 3.36% 4.49% 5.84%
0.117
6,942
814
Source: National Accounts 1948-1970 and 1958-1972, Statistical Yearbook for 1973,
and our estimates. Rows 1 and 2 in mill. drs. Rows 5 and 6 in drs. Row
2, "Hous ing Consumpt ion", is the category "Ownersh! p of Dwell ings II
in the National Accounts.
The trends in rent expenditures presented in table 4.1.3. refer to the
country as a whole and are, moreover, based on per capita magnitudes. The
construction of similar series for the case of households in Athens presents
great difficulties. We know from the data in table 4.1.1 that households in
Athens decreased in size by an average annual rate of 0.7 - 0.8%. The per
capita rates should be therefore lowered accordingly. We do not know, how-
ever, to what extent trends in incomes and consumption in Athens conformed
to the national pattern. This is obviously a question of trends in inter-
regional income and consumption differentials for which the available
evidence in Greece is very poor. \~e can argue that the high postwar flow
of internal migration from rural areas and small urban centres towards
Athens led to a reduction in differences between average incomes in Athens
and the country as a whole. Rates of income growth in the capital should
. thus have been lower than national ones. The high rate of immigration
abroad, moreover, concerned mostly rural areas and this should produce
similar statistical effects. Lastly, we would expect the reduction of
income differentials thus produced to slow down during the second half
of the 1960ls since - as we showed previously - the rate of internal
migration to Athens decreased.
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The sparse information we have on regional income differentials seem
to support these points. Estimates of regional product per capita show
that the ratio of values for Athens to those for the country as a whole
declined from 165:100 in 1958 to 163:100 in 1962 and 152:100 in 1965.4
Actual income in a region, of course, differs from the regional product.
The relationship between the two is similar to that between "National
Income" and "Domestic Product" in national accounts in that it involves
payments and receipts between a region and the rest of the world. In the
case of regions, however, the regional distribution of subsidies and
indirect taxation is also important. Regional IIIncomell is in general
higher than regional "Domestic Product": tneir ratio in 1958 was 117:100
for Athens and 113:100 for the country as a whole.5 Assuming a constancy
in this ratio for the period we study we may arrive at a rough estimate
of trends in regional differentials in income per capita from 1958 to
1970. We know that the relationship between incomes in the latter year
was 157:100.° The resulting trend in the ratio of incomes per capita in
. Athens to that of the country as a whole is as follows:
1958 1962 1965 197Q
170:100 168:100 157:100 157:100
This pattern confirms our initial hypothesis. As a result, we can
say with certainty that the rate of income growth in Athens during the
first part of the 1960's was lower than the national one. We will assume
that a similar point applies to total consumption expenditures.
The previous discussion suffices for the derivation of some rough
estimates of the time-pattern in the rates of growth of households and
rent expenditures per household (Ch) in Athens for the purposes of the
housing market analysis in chapter 4. These are presented in the following
table. For the rates of Ch we took into account the evidence of trends
in income elasticities in conjunction with the fact that incomes in
Athens are nigher than the national average.
·4. C.Papageorghiou, Regional Employment in Greece, Vol.1 (Athens,1973)p.45.
5. Papageorghiou, Regional Employment, p. 121
6. Doxiadi5 Associates, Reoional Plan and Program for the Capital ,vol. 1
(Athens, 1976, in Greek) p. 88.
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Table 4.1.4: Average annual rates of growth in the number of households and
rent expenditure per household; Athens 1951-71
Period Number ofhouseholds
Rent expenditure per household
(including imputed rent)
1951-1961
1961-1965
1965-1971
3.7%
5.1%
3.5%
3.0 - 3.3%
3.5%
6.0%
Source: Our estimates, see text.
2. Depreciation of the housing stock
The depreciation of housing results from the operation of two factors.
The first is the physical deterioration of the structure with time -
especially the decay of woodwork, water and sewage piping and other
installations and appliances. The second is social in nature expressing
the shift in the standards of acceptable housing conditions and the
effects of moderni.sation in the material culture of a society. It is
apparent that a serious estimate of the rate of depreciation of the
housing stock involves the consideration of a multitude of factors that
vary with the history and the social context of the city in question and
require detail ed expert recording of house values'and physical characteristics
over extended periods. Such studies are rarely undertaken even in countries
with a long tradition of housing research? and, needless to say, are non-
existent in Greece where even intelligent estimates of the rate of depre-
ciation are not available - a fact that reflects the embryonic development
of the real estate Dusiness and related professions (e.g. valuers). The
official reports on housing in Greece are concerned at most with rough
estimates of the annual replacement: rate' - the percentage of housing
units abandoned, demolished or changing use yearly. The replacement rate,
however, is an entirely different matter: considering only the abandoned
7. See C. Clark & G.T. Jones, The Demand for Housing, Centre of
Environmental Studies, University Working Paper (London, 1971, mimeo),
p. 51. Clark & Jones report only one such study: University·of California,
Institute of Business and Economic Research, The Dynamics of Central City
Land Values, San Francisco and Oakland 1950-60, Real Estate Research
Programme, Report No. 18.
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units, we know from the analysis in chapter 4 that their number is determined
by quite a few variables besides the depreciation rate '~" - income growth
(g), population growth (n), the pattern of income distribution (k) and the
extent of "integration" of the housing market. For instance, if we assume
an "integrated" housing system in the terminology of chapter 4, and
further assume k = 0.2, g = 0.04, a depreciation rate d = 0.01 and zero
population growth, by using expression (4) in chapter 4 in order to estimate
the necessary new units due to abandonment, we get a replacement rate of
3% - three times higher than the depreciation rate. Given the fact that the
Greek housing system displays strong elements of "segregationll in the
mechanism of demand allocation which implies lower rates of stock utilisation
and therefore higher abandonement rates, the officially estimated replace-
ment rates seem rather low: 1.05% of stock for the 1950's and 0.7% for the
1960ts.8 These appear even more unrealistic if we take into account the
high incidence of demolitions of sound structures due to the piecemeal
speculative redevelopment of central areas in large urban centres (see
Appendix 3.1). Speculative redevelopment is less influenced by the
remaining economic life of a given building than by the opportunity to
realise a more intensive and better use of the plot. Thus structures that
would have not otherwise been abandoned are torn down. This factor
suggests that if the official estimates of the replacement rate were
realistic the depreciation rate should have been lower than 0.002 or
0.003% a year.
Such rates of depreciation seem high_ly improbable, especially if we
take into account the socioeconomic context determining housing valuation
in the postwar period. The low valuation of old housing stock and the
emphasis on modern and newl y buil t houses are we ll-known social facts.
The large numoers of vacant houses in Greek urban areas which approach
more than one-tenth of the housing stock testify to this. Such vacancy
rates could hardly be accounted solely by the existence of second homes and
the normal friction of the housing market.9 Still our information is very
8, U.N., E.C.E., National Monograph, p. 216
9. In 1971, 13% of regular dwellings in urban areas were vacant
(National r1onograph, p. 213). It can be argued, however, that this high
rate of vacancies does not signify any excessive rate of depreciation but
is a normal product of the Greek system of housing production and distri-
bution, namely the effect of the high level of fragmentation in the housing
market and an inherent tendency for oversupply (see chapter 6).
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incomplete and the choice of a realistic average depreciation rate must
be in the nature of an intelligent guess. Estimates for Britain and the
U.S. propose a twenty to thirty-year period during which the house does
not depreciate and, subsequently, a straight-line depreciation by 1.33%
to 2.0% per annum.10 This seems rather conservative for Greek urban condi-
tions though in estimating the average rate we must take into account the
fact that the housing stock in Greek cities is in general of more recent
origin. In our opinion, a realistic average rate should lie between 0.5%
and 1.0% aompound. For the analysis in chapter 4 we have chosen the high~r
value applied uniformely throughout the period and for all classes of
stock. These latter assumptions are hardly realistic, of course; they
have been adopted as a matter of convenience and with the thought that
since small fluctuations in the depreciation rate have marginal effects
on the sectoral structure of housebuilding. our analysis will not be
affected significantly.
3. The pattern of income distribution and social differentials in housing
consumption
In our model of the housing system we have introduced some Simple
assumptions about the shape of the lIincomell distribution ("normalll income),
its relation to the social pattern of housing expenditures and the change
of these distribution through time. More specifically we have assumed:
a. A pyramidal income distribution that can be described graphically by a
triangle determined at any given time by three parameters: the total
number of households N, the maximum income level Y ,and the relationmax
between the minimum income level Y ~ and the former, k = Y . /1 .m~n m~n max
Income levels refer to the average income of a number of categories
or class-situations which can be thought of as groups with "structurally
determined II income and into which we divide the population. In our case,
these are usually occupational categories. The income distribution
pattern is then described as follows:
dN/I ::a....bI where dN is number of households in income-class Y and
2a = 2N/Y • (l-kJ Jmax b = 2N/Y 2. (1_kJ
2
ma»
10. Clark & Jones, Demand for Housing, p. 51.
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b. A proportional relationship between incomes and housing (rent) expendi-
tures i.e. Ch = r.Y and thus a similarly pyramidal distribution of the
rent-classes of households which will also be those of the housing
stock in conditions of equilibrium between" demand and the supply of
housing.
c. Uniformly applied rates of growth in incomes and numbers of households.
Using this schematic formulation as a yardstick we will examine the
actual trends and patterns in Athens in order to, first, assess the relative
realism of such a simple model and then estimate the relevant parameters,
namely ''k'' and "p", The latter is the ratio YalY where Y denotes themax a
income (or rent) level determining the social boundary of the potential
speculative market (see chapter 4). Our empirical material will be drawn
exclusively from that available for the 1958-1974 period since we lack
data for the earlier part of the postwar period but also because the
1960's present the greatest theoretical interest for the problems we study.
Table 4.1.5. shows the pattern of social stratification in Athens in
1961 and 1971, i ,e, the distribution of households by the occupational
category of t~e head of household, and the averages of total consumption
expenditure and housing expenditure for each social category. The latter
two had been taken from the household surveys of 1957-58 and 1974 for urban
areas, since we lack similar material for Athens, on the assumption that
the differentials in expenditure levels are more or less similar in Athens.
It is immediately evident that our hypothesis of a uniformely applied rate
of demographic growth conforms closely to the facts. The occupational
composition of households in Athens has remained stable to a surprising
degree save for a relative growth in the category of "non-gainfully
employed". The stability in structure can be observed more easily if
we disregard the latter category and group households into three main
occupational strata, as in table 4.1.6.
We may note in passing that though in the earlier part of the period
there were certain differences between Athens and urban areas as a whole
in the pattern of occupational stratification, by the beginning of the
1970's the patterns were identical.
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Table 4.1.6: Shares of main occupational strata - Athens and urban areas
Occupa tiona1 1961 1971 1957-58 1974
categories Athens Urban areas
A-B 12.6% 13.5% 9.5% 13.2%
c..o 27.5% 27.1% 33.0% 27.1%
E-F 59.9% 59.4% 57.3% 59.6%
Source: Table 4.1.5.
We can not say the same, however, for our simple assumptions about
expenditure behaviour. First, the ratio ChiC, at least in 1957-58, increases as
we go up the income hierarchy. This implies that instead of a simple pro-
portional relationship Ch=rC we have CfLkc!' where z (the cross-sectional
elasticity of Ch with respect to C) is greater than +1. Second, table
4.1.5 indicates that this interclass pattern has not remained stable: the
differentials in the ChiC ratio have decreased substantially, a fact that
implies significant differences between the sime-series elasticities (as
opposed to cross-sectional ones) observed for the.various categories. Th.e
time-series elasticity for w~rKing-class groups has been higher than +1
whereas that for middle and upper ones lower than +1. Lastly, this
difference in consumption behaviour through time was not the sole reason
for the observed closing of the gap between rent-expenditure levels:
differentials in total consumption expenditure have also been decreased.
The following table shows these trends more clearly.
Table 4.1.7: Social differentiation of C and Ch per household, 1957/58 and
1974
Occupa tiona1 Total consumption expenditures CC) Housing ~xpenditures (Ch)
categories 1957-58 1974 1957-58 1974
A .. B 1779.4 (2.28) 21330.6 u.sn 298.6 (3.21) 2887.1 0.94 )
C-O 1079.8 (1.38) 14549.4 (1.23) 153.2 (1.64) 1892.1 (1. 27)
E..F 779.7 (1.00) 11790.0 (1.00) 93.0 (1. OO) 1487.4 (1. 00)
Source: Table 4.1.5. For 1957-58, weekly rates in drs; for 1974 monthly rdtes.
We do not know with certainty whether this improvement has been the
product of a corresponding improvement in the personal income distribution.
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There is some evidence that this is indeed so.11 After all, the approach
to conditions of full employment coupled with emigration must have con-
tributed substantially to the income of:\,lOrking-classhouseholds since
the latter usually have a larger number of gainfully employed members
than average and receive most of income transfers from abroad (remittances
etc.). Thus the personal income distribution may have improved even if the
functionaZ one (i,e, between wages and profits) did not. Since we lack
adequate data about personal incomes and the saving propensity of the
var-ious social c.asses, we can not arrive at any definite conclusions
on this issue. Nevertheless, the fact is that the combined influence of
the reduction in consumption level differentials and the difference in
housing consumption elasticities led to significant changes in the pattern
of social stratification by rent-classes. In terms of the model advanced
in chapter·4 this implies an increase in parameter k=Y . /Y and,. . m1,n ma:r:
ceteris paribus, an increased share of the higher rent-class market and
therefore of the speculative housing sector. Since we showed, however, that
the effect of ''1<.'' on sectoral structure is marginal' (see the sensitivity
analysis in chapter 4) we will disregard these changes - however important
in themselves they may be - and assume for convenience a stable pattern
in the rent-class distribution throughout the period. Let us then estimate
the relevant descriptive parameters.
11. M. Negreponti-Delivani reports "that-between 1961 and 1971 thedistribution of personal income improved slightly since the Gini coefficient of
concentration decreased. The trend was reversed during 1971-76. The
figures she gives are the following:
1961 1966 1971 1976
Gini coefficient before tax, 0.378 0.363 0.377
Gini coefficient after indirect
and direct taxation and transfers 0.317 0.314 0.302 0.316
See, her liOnthe Tax Burden, Tax Evasion and the Goals and Achievements
of Fiscal Policy", Economicos Tach dromos, 1296, 8/3/1979, p. 15 (in Greek),
and Analysis of the Greek Economy Athens, 1979): 156-161 (in Greek). For
the estimates of income concentration before tax she used data on family
income reported to the taxation authorities. This is a notoriously unreliable
source, however, and one furthermore that covers only a minority of the popu-
lation. For the after~t~x.measures she does not give any specifics about
sources or method.
Lianos and Prodromidis using similar data have found that the Gini coeffi-
cient for before-tax reported income has indeed decreased between 1966 and
1971; in contrast to the previous report, however, they have found a
pronounced ~orsening in the distribution between 1960 and 1971 (Aspects of
Income Distribution in Greece, Athens, 1974, p. 58).
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As we pointed earlier, in order to arrive at a description of the
pattern of income distribution among households that is theoretically
valid for the analysis of consumption. we must use categories that are
the socioeconomic determinants of "normal" income. A detailed breakdown
of households according to the occupation of the main breadwinner, owner-
ship of wealth or means of production, skill and educational qualifications
would have covered most of the important determinants of the IIlife-chances"
of a household and would have provided a solid basis for a stratification
analysis from our point of view. Unfortunately the relevant material is
not available. The breakdown by main occupational strata, though adequate
for most purposes, is not detailed enough so as to provide a relatively
continuous stratification pattern necessary for a model of the housing
market. Thus we are forced into using the more detailed data on the
distribution of households by current cash income given by the 1957-58
Househo 1d Survey.
This has evident drawbacks. To repeat some earlier points, the level
of current cash income is influenced to an important degree by random
and transitory factors, th.e size of th.e nouseftold and its stage in the
life-cycle. All these cut across structurally determined economic classes
(though the two latter characteristics may be'easily incorporated into
a systematic classification). In turn, the rent classes that correspond
to a stratification by current income do not represent the normal and
permanent rent-class structure since the latter should be derived from
the "normalll income distribution. They reflect, moreover, the influence
of household size and the life-cycle stage in a way that differs signi-
ficantly from the way these variables influence current income. Whereas
income increases with a larger household size (most especially in working-
class households) rent expenrliture shows important "economies of scalell in
larger households.12 Similarly, whereas household income shows a definite
decline after a peak period in a household's life, housing consumption may
remain at disproportionally high levels, due to the fact that most "older"
households are owner-occupiers. Still, the data on current cash income are
the only available for the time-period we examine; it is hoped that by
means of an aggregation into larger classes some of these drawbacks will
have less of an effect on the validity of our analysis.
12. See Clark and Jones, The Demand for Housing and D. Emmanuel,
Categories of Households, Table A.5.
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Since we are mostly interested in developments during the 1960's, the
data on the rent-class distribution should refer to the beginning of this
period. As we noted earlier we have adequate data on households' consumption
only for two years: 1957/58 and 1974. Since it is preferable to make esti-
mates for a year near the midpoint of the study period, the obvious choice
is 1957/58 having the additional advantage that the relevant report contains
detailed income distribution whereas the one for 1974 does not. As before,
we must use material on urban areas as a ,whole. This, as we saw in table 4.1.5,
does not entail important errors: judging from the pattern of occupational
stratification, the distribution by income-classes is fairly similar in
Athens save for an overrepresentation of higher-income groups. In table
4.1.8 we present the income and rent-class distribution for 1957-58. The
rent-class pattern that corresponds to the income distribution has beeno 748·derived with the help of equation Ch = 0.843r ' (R = 0.992) constructed
from columns 1 and 3 in the table.
Table 4.1.8: Rent-class distribution of urban households, 1957/58
Classes of Average income Number of Housing (Rent) Rent-classes
current caSh of class CV) households expenditure rC tU
income
Cl) (2) (3) (4)
1. 1600 + 2736.8 205 347.0 210 +
2. 1100-1599 1463.5 231 194.3 160-209
3. 800-1099 1073.Q 372 148.5 125-159
4. 450-799 724.8 797 107.1 81-124
5. 250-449 451.7 ,615 77.3 53-80
6. Up to 249 228.7 348 54.8 up to 52
Total 830.5 2568 125.8
Source: 1957/58 Household SurveyN.S.S.G., and our calculations {see text}.
Weekly rates in drachmas. Rents are the weighted average of the
paid and imputed rent of renters and owner-occupiers respectively.
Let us take the amount of 40 drs per week as the minimum rent level
in terms of the structure of the housing market at the time. Aggregating
the rent classes in table 4.1.~ into three main groups we have:
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Broad Rent-classes Households
I. 210 + drs
II. 12"5-210drs
III. 40-125 drs
205
.603
1760
Total 2568
No simple straight-line function fits this distribution with exactness.
After a number of trials we found that the following function gives a
good approximation of the distribution pattern:
dNldeh = 1103 - 170Ch
dN is households per rent-class, eh the rent level, and the intercept
with the y-axis is 1103. The intercept with the x-axis is the maximum
rent-level (Y in the model of chapter 4} and has the value of 260;max
parameter "k" therefore where k=C.,_. le.,_ (or Y . IY· assumingnmin nmax tmri max
proportionality in the rent-income relationship} is k = 40/260 = 0.1538.
The distribution model described by this linear function underestimates
the number of households in low incomes and overestimates households in the
middle levels. Its relationship with the actual distribution can be seen
in the following figure.
Figure 4.1.1: Formalised rent-class dtstrtbut ton of urban households in
the late 1950ts: Actual and linear model
Q
,;IN dY
o Yrr,in=40 Ye.ISO Ymax.260
The rent level Ye noted in figure 4.1 signifies the dividing line
between middle and upper-class demand and the lower-class one and thus
determines formally the share of the speculative sector. As we argued in
chapter 4, this dividing point may remain fixed relative to the distribution
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or it may move "downwards". It is i.mportant tha.t we.make a rough estimate
of its level at the base-year (in this case the end of the 1950's). We
know that during the 1950's roughly 35% of the volume of residential
building in Athens was speculative apartment housing. Assuming that this
activity formed the bulk of speculative sector housing stock by the end
of the decade we estimate that households living in apartments in Athens
in 1960 should have formed approximately 15% of the total. This figure
accords well with descriptions of conditions at the time which took for
granted that apartment housing was essentiully a "luxury" sector catering
for a restricted upper-class, professional and whtte-~ollar market.13
Given this estimate and the patterns in table 4.1.8 and 4.1.5, we may
say that the boundary between housing sectors at the end of the 1950's
should be set roughly at a weekly rent-level of 160 drs: thus the parameter
p = Ya/Y in the model of chapter 4 should have the value of 0.60 for 1960.max
,. -.' ..
13. See for instance, C.P.E.R., Housing (1966), pp. 25-26.
Appendix 6.1.
Postwar trends in the cost of housing and the mechanism of land price
formation
This appendix deals with the postwar trends in the three main aspects
of the cost of housing: rents, construction costs, and land costs. The
trends in the market price of dwellings where market relations predominate,
i.e. in the case of apartments, are not studied mainly because of the lack
of rel-table data;'such a study would have only helped us ascertain impli-
citly the changes in land costs and would therefore have not added much.
We will not examine developments in the cost of mortgage credit. From the
viewpoint of the formation of residential capital the significance of the
cost of credit, as we argued in chapter 6, is secondary compared to the
role of fluctuations in its volume and the pattern of its distribution.
The descriptive account of trends in costs will be complemented with a
discussion of the factors making for such trends. This discussion adds few
things to the points made in chapter 5 and 6 and should be read in conjunction
with the latter. We will expand more, however, on the subject of the forma-
tion of the cost of land since this issue is controversial in current urban
tneory as well as closely related to the character of the Greek housing
system as a whole.
1. The trend of rents and construction costs
Tables 6.1.1. and 6.1.2. present tne avaflable evidence on the trend
of housing rents and the cost of investment in dwellings in current prices
as well as in relation to general inflation. The series in table 6.1.1
are the deflators implicit in National Accounts and thus the price of
"investment in dwellings" reflects the trend of construction costs (the
cost of land is not included). It is well known that the National Accounts
estimatesof housing price indices in Greece are rather crude (see note 33
in chapter 6) but for an examination of general trends these indices will
suffice. With respect to rents, the trends in table 6.1.1 are corroborated
by the more reliable estimates shown in table 6.1.2. The latter shows the
price indices of rents, "housing expenditures" (which contain, in addition
to rent, expenses on fuel, electricity, water charges and current repairs),
and the general consumer price index; these are measured directly from
samples drawn from urban areas and thus are more relevant to our analysis.
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Table 6.1.1: Trends in the price index of rents and investment in dwellings
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Investment Rents of GOP
in dwellings dwellings deflator (1)/(3) (2)/(3)
price index price index x 100 x 100
1950 54.0 51.2 55.8 96.7 91.7
1954 82.7 81.2 84.6 97.7 95.9
1958 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1962 110.1 111.2 112.2 98.1 99.1
1966 115.9 120.6 123.9 93.5 97.3
1970 130.5 133.6 136.1 95.8 98.1
1972 141.7 137.7 146.8 96.5 93.8
1974 228.3 169.0 218.0 104.7 77.5
1976 282.7 191.7 272.2 103.8 70.4
Source: National Accounts 1948-70 and 1958-72; Statistical Yearbook 1975.For the full series see General Appendix, table A.lO.
Table 6.1.2: Trends in the price index of rents, housing expenditures and
total consumer expenditures
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)Rent expendi- Housing expendi-Consumer Index
ture index ture index (June 1959=100) (1)/(3)
(1959=100) (June 1959=100)
(5)
(2)/(3)
1959 100.0 101.1 100.7 99.3 100.4
1962 108.9 107.1 103.8 104.9 103.1
1966 ns.o 115.9 116.6 102.0 99.4
1970 132.5 124.9 125.5 105.5 99.5
1972 137.2 128.1 134,9 101.7 94.9
1974 163.9 173.4 197.7 82.9 87.7
1976 199.8* 215.0 250.2 79.8 85.9
Source: S. Orosos, liTheDevelopment of Housing Rents", in EconomicosTachydromos, issue of 6.5.1976 (in Greek) and various Statlstical
Yearbooks. (*): The rents index for 1976 has been estimated from
the National Accounts index for rents (column 1 in table 6.1.1).
For the full series see General Appendix, table A.l1.
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It is evident that both construction costs and rents had moved during
the period extending from the late 1950's to the early 1970's either with
rates similar to those of general inflation or at a slower pace. Both show
rises in relative terms during 1950-1958 though these are rather limited,
especially if we take into account the fact that increases in rents
during the period reflect the gradual lift of rent control. In relation
to inflation, rents show a definite falling trend after 1972, whereas
relative construction costs show a substantial increase. With regard to
the broad picture presented by these trends it can not be disputed that, on
the whole, changes in housing costs during 1950-1974 have been very favour-
able, a point we have repeatedly stressed in chapters 5 and 6. With respect
to construction costs, the most favourable period has been 1959-1967: eight
years of steady decline in relative prices. This has certainly been an
important positive factor behind the fast expansion of low-income precapi-
talist building during the same period (see chapter 4). During the years of
fast speculative expansion that followed 1968, price inflation in construction
as well as in the economy as a whole was not as favourable and became posi-
tively adverse after 1973. In contrast, relative rents show a steady decline
after 1967, most probably due to the speculative "overinvestment" that took
place during 1968-1973 (see chapter 6}.
The 1950's, when both construction costs and rents showed a rlslng
trend (in relative tenms), should be considered apart from the rest of the
postwar period. Their specificity can be easily understood: productivity
in the industries producing materials and in the construction sector itself
started to take off fastly only after the end of the decade. With regard
to rents, the scarcity of housing stock created by the years of war, the
occupation and the civil war was still effective; combined with the gradual
1ift of rent contro 1,this can more than account for the slightly upward
trend in rents.
2. The favourabl e trend in construction costs: Productivity, mechani sation
and supply of labour
The virtual constancy of relative construction costs during the
greatest part of the postwar period has been a major influence behind the
postwar building wave, This favourable trend can not be treated as "natural II
or unproblematic. Judging at least from the experience of advanced capitalist
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countries, the price of outp~t in the construction sector'is normally
expected to increase faster than prices in the economy as a whole. This
derives from a lag in the growth of productivity in construction relative to
other sectors, most notably industry and agriculture. Such a lag has been
evident in productivity trends since the First World War.l It has also
been evident among advanced countries during the postwar years.2 Since
Greece in the postwar period appears to differ in this respect, let us
review the relevant evidence. Table 6.1.3 presents the trends in productivity.
Table 6.1.3: Average annual growth of labour productivity in construction,
manufacturing and the economy a~ a whole, 1951-1971
Sector Average annual rates of growth
1951-71 1951-61 1961-71 1958-70
Construction
Manufacturing
All sectors
3.8
6.5
6.2
2.3
4.2
4.0
5.4
8.8
8.2
5.4
8.9
5.5
Source: Derived from tables 5.1 and 5.3 in Kassimatis, The Construction
Industry in Greece.
The evidence on table 6.1.3 suggests that the usual pattern of lagging
construction productivity also applies to Greece. The lag is more pronounced
when construction is compared to manufacturing. These estimates, however,
should be treated with caution. It is notoriously difficult to measure
employment in man-hours in most sectors outside organised industry, espe-
cially in a country like Greece where non-wage labour and small, "informal"
units of production are widespread. Kassimatis' estimates of productivity
are not based on man-hours but on average employment in persons and thus
measure the output-employment ratio and not productivity in the strict
sence. Moreover, for the years between successive censuses (1951, 1961, 1971)
no employment figures are available save for manufacturing and thus very
1. Needleman, Economics of Housing, pp. 104-105.
2. All DECO countries except France and Spain showed during 1958-70
average annual rates of labour productivity growth in construction that
were substantially lower than those for the economy as a whole; this lag
in productivity growth was even more pronounced in relation to industry.
See, Kassimatis, Construction Industry, p. 69 and table 5.3.
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rough estimates have to be constructed. Kassimatis' series of total
employment show substantial fluctuations in the late 1950's and therefore
figures of output per man for that period show great variance. As a result,
by choosing a different base-year we get drastically different productivity
trends for the 1960's: the 1958-70 trend in table 6.1.3 shows much more
favourable relationship between construction and the economy as a whole.S
Although the evidence on.productivity is too imperfect for secure
conclusions, it suggests that productivity growth in construction alone
can not account for the favourable trends in prices. Perhaps an even more
important factor has been the fast productivity growth in the industries
producing building materials. Between 1958 and 1969, labour productivity
in wood products increased by an average rate of 6.2%, in stone and glass
by 8.5%, in basic metals by 20.7% and in metal products, electrical and
engineering products, by 5.2%.4 These rates show on the whole a fast
improvement which is not reflected in the value added of construction
but which influences, of course, the price of the gross product. It should
be remembered that an important form of technological change in housebuilding
is capital-labour substitution through the replacement of work on the site
by industrially made components. This process, in addition to reducing the
cost of labour in situations of rising construction wages, incorporates
productivity increases that originate in the wider industrial environment.
Building in Greece nas utilised such substitution to a great extent. Pro-
ductivity growtb UJithin the construction sector,on the other hand, has been
mainly based on mechanisation. Increases in the latter have ~een impressive:
the capital-to-labour ratio in construction (which mainly concerns machinery)
has increased oy 2.87 times in 1958-71, while in industry it increased by
2.35 times.5
Greece and other fastly d.ive loplnq countries during the postwar period
had a substantial comparative advantage vis-a-vis advanced industrial
nations. Starting from a low technological base, they could tap the large
J. See, Kass;matis, Construction Industrx, tables Fl, F2, F3 in the
appendix. It should be noted that the sharp fluctuations in productivity in
the late 1950's are caused from changes in employment. Kassimatis' table SI
shows an unexplained drop in the labour force of the country in 1958 to its
lowest level for the postwar period, as much as 2Q% less than the 1961
employment level.
4. Kassimatis, Construction Industry, p. 81
5. Kassimatis, Construction Industry, tables FI, F2 in the appendix.
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pool of innovations in building materials and techniques developed in
advanced countries and thus modernise construction at very fast rates.
Capital-labour substitution by mechanisation or by the introduction of
industrialised components permitted fast rises in productivity as well
as in construction wages.6 Such a pattern may at first look peculiar
for developing countries with ample supplies of labour and high costs of
capital (construction machinery in Greece is almost wholly imported). This
is a natural corollary, however, of the highly competitive and fragmented
organisation of the building sector and its tendency towards explosive
growth, characteristics that are particularly strong in the case of specu-
lative building. It is doubtful in the case of Greece, anyway, whether
conditions of a relatively unlimited supply of labour can be taken for
granted after 1960, even if extraneous standards of "proper" productivity
are applied. The actual labour market was rather "tight" and wages rose
fastly. Wages rose equally fast, if not faster, in construction and were
in general substantially higher than those in industry; extensive capital-
labour substitution, however, succeeded in lowering the share of wages in
value added in the late 1950's and early 1960's and then keep it at constant
levels throughout the 1960'5.7
Extensive mechanisation has introduced radical changes in Greek housing
construction: whereas in the 1950's extremely.labour-intensive methods were
used, by the end of the 1960's the use of cranes, lifts, pre-mixed concrete
6. For a similar process recorded for the case of Mexico, see Strassman,
"Construction Productivity".
7. The average hourly wage in construction in 1973 was 50 drs whereas
that in industry, 35. Annual average incomes, however, differed less since
construction workers are employed fewer days in a year (265 on the average
to 300 in industry) and work a seven-hour day (to an eight-hour in industry).
Thus we have:
Construction: 265 x 7 x 50 = 92,75Q drs annual income
Industry : 300 x 8 x 35 = 84,000 drs annual income.
(See, Kassimatis, Construction Industry, p. 88).
The share of wages in value added in Construction (at factor cost) has
developed as follows: 1958: 64.8%, 1966: 51.6%, 1970: 51.5%. See, T.A.
Skountzos, Interindustry Relationships in the Greek Economy (Athens, 1975,
in Greek), table 3.5 and Ministry of Coordination, National Accounts Service,
Input-Output Table of the-Greek Economy for the ·Year 1970 (Athens, 1978,
in Greek).
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and earth moving machinery was generalised. By their nature such innovations
were used almost exclusively in speculative building. Given the economic
organisation of the latter we could safely assume that such capital-labour
substitution was not based on a response to rising wages or on a price-
reduction strategy. For one, the high cost of mechanised capital in Greece
reduces drastically the gains from the reduction in labour costs. Moreover,
interviews with a number of building entrepreneurs suggest that capital-
labour substitution has been adopted as a means for reducing the need for
labour in conditions of relative labour scarcity (especially in periods
of a building boom) and in order to shorten the production period and thus
improve the cash flow of the builder with early sales. These motives induce
under conditions of fierce competition a pattern of stable relative prices
and rising wages.
As we pointed already, housing prices started to rise at rates faster
than general inflation after 1971-72. Analysis of price changes in building
materials suggests that these are not the determinant factor behind this
trend.8 Rising costs, then derived from either wages, profits, services,
and indirect taxation or a combination of these. It seems that the main
factor has been the exhaustion of opportunities for innovations in mechanisa-
tion, bullding material s and components within, at least, the dominant mode
of housing production, i.e. apartment housing. It is premature to say, how-
ever, to what extent this represents a permanent long-term trend.
3. The cost of land
The role of the cost of land in the final price of housing can be
expressed in either of two ways: as a share in the full price which can
be easily compared with the prevailing levels of "antiparochi" in the
speculative sector at any given time (i.e. the share of the real product
offered to landowners in exchange for their land) or in terms of the
"valuation ratio" (introduced in chapter 6], i.e. the ratio of the full
market price to the construction cost inclusive of profits. In real
8. See,D. Emmanuel, "Housing Investment rin the Context of Balanced
Socioeconomic Development" in Technical Chamber of Greece, Construction
in Greece, Vol. 2 (Athens, 1979, in Greek): 84-99.
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situations, the manner of the calculation of land costs by the landowner
relative to the value of the structure takes many forms depending on the
mode of housing production; in peripheral plots aimed for owner-building,
for instance, none of the above formulations is meaningful. A detailed
examination of land costs in a disaggregated manner, however, is impossible
given the limitations of the available material. We will thus examine some
information on the share of land costs in speculative building and the
trends in land values relative to construction costs and "building
coefficients", i.e. the permitted floorspace to land ratio which, by
implication, indicates the share of land in the full production price of
housing. Our analysis will be restricted to Athens where sufficient
information is available.
It has been estimated that the tlantiparochi" share in Athens has
increased from an average level of 25% in the early 1960's to 35% in the
early 1970's.9 We do not have any information on the trend of land costs in
the 1950's. Available data on land values are also restricted to the 1960's
and early 1970's. To what extent is the above estimate reliable? To what
extent, moreover, does it represent the trends in the cost of land in the
housing system as a whole? Fortunately we have sufficient data on land
values during the same period for an answer to these questions. Having
established the extent of changes in the cost of land we must also examine
the more pertinent question of its effects on the growth of housing capital.
Were these trends relatively favourable in relation to the demand for housing
wealth as the fast growth of building in the 1960's indicates? This issue
will necessarily involve us into an examination of the determinants of the
cost of land. The discu~sion will be somewhat long but we consider it '
necessary given the complete lack of systematic studies of the issue in
Greece and the specifities of the Greek housing system.
Let us define the share of land in the full price of housing as 8J
the "valuation ratio", i.e. the ratio of the full price to the non-land
part,as v, the "building coefficient" as d, Ute value of a square meter
of floorspace as p, and the full development value of land (per meter)
as L. For any given time we have the following identities:
9. See, C.P.E.R., Housing (1966), p. 52 and C.P.E.R., Housing (1976)
p. 227.
366
(1) L =, s·d·p/(l-s)
(2) v = 1 /(1-B)
Given (1) and (2), changes in land values and the valuation ratio are
given by:
C3} Lt=(st/so)· (dt/do)· (pt/Po)· [(1-S0}/(I_St~ • Lo
(4) vt = [(I-SO)/(I-Bt~ • va
Table 6.1.4 shows the per cent change in land value in the major zones
of the Athens agglomeration between 1964 and 1972 (see Figure 2.1.1 in
Appendix 2.1). Are these consistent with the previous estimates about the
share of land, given the formal relationships between this share and land
values?
Table 6.1.4: Change in land values and implied changes in average building
coefficients in the major zones of Greater Athens, 1964-1972.
Urban zones
C p E NE W NW Average
l.Per cent
change in
land value
2.Implied
change in
building
coefficient
146.9 102.2 159.1 191.4 302.8 183.0 162.0
17.5% -3.7% 23.4% 38.7% 91.8% 34.7% 24.7%
(21.0%)
Source: For row 1, see table 3.3 in chapter 3, and P.K. ~~andikas,
Economic Anal sis of the Athens Master Plan Vol. 4, (Athens, 1973
mimeo, in Greek, table 9. Row 2, estimated on the basis of row 1
and formula (3) in the text, with changes in B, and p in the order
of 40% and 30% respec~ively. (*): estimated with an increase in s
of 20%. The zones are shown in figure 2.1.1, appendix 2.1.
We know that construction costs have increased by 27% during 1964-1972
whereas the characteristics and real value of the typical unit area of
housing floorspace in new construction has improved little if at all. Thus
the price of housing floorspace minus land costs (p) has increased by a
rate of at least 30% for the period. We also know that the "antiparochi"
share has increased from a level of 25% in the early 1960·s to 35% in the
early 1970's. Assuming that this rate of change in the share of land has
been typical, we have a 40% increase in B in the housing market as a whole.
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let us further assume for simplicity that the share s is uniform throughout
the system. Given the change in sand p we can calculate the change in full
development building coefficients implied by the changes in land values
between 1964 and 1972. The results are shown in table 6.1.4. Land value per
meter of plot area has increased in the average from a value of 1050
drachmas in 1964 to 2750 in 1972;10 this implies a change in the average
legally permitted building coefficient in the order of 25%.
Such a change has indeed taken place during the period we examine.
Compulsory law 395/1968 increased building coefficients throughout Greece
by rates as higf\as 40% depending on the number of storeys permitted by
previous building controls. With regard to the Greater Athens Area it was
decreed that zones where previous law set a limit of three storeys, building
coefficients were to be raised by 40%, whereas in areas of four and five
storeys by 25% and 20% respectively. In the centre of the city and the
central area of Piraeus where six or more storeys were permitted, no
increases were offered. Table 6.1.4 shows tne changes in the building
coefficient implied by the actual changes tn land values, the trends in
construction costs and the average share of land in housing prices. These
conform substantially to the changes prescribed by Law 395/1968 given the
spatial pattern of the pre-196B rules on permitted storeys11 and thus
corroborate the estimates of the trend in the snare of land. There are
two anomalies in the table: zone W, the western working-class suburbs,
and zone P, Piraeus and its suburbs, The?e, nowever, are easily accountable.
In the case of zone W we had during the period a substantial expansion of
the official town plan into illegal housing areas (see figure 3.4 chapter 3),
10. See, P.K. Mandikas, Economic Anal sis of the Athens Master Plan,
Vol. 4 (Athens, 1973, mimeo, in Gree ,p. 45. T is c ange in land va ues
when deflated with the consumer price index implies an average annual increase
of land values in real terms in the order of 10%. While the share of land in
housing prices is very high in Greece, this rate of change compared with
international evidence is neither high nor low. Cities in developed nations
showed during the postwar period a very broad spectrum of rates of increase
in land values measured in real terms: on the one hand we had low rates of
less than 5% (U.S. cities, Stockholm) and, on the other, very high ones
surpassing 15% (Paris, Madrid, Japanese cities). Cities in developing
countries show a similarly diverse spectrum. See, H. Darin-Drabkin, Land
Policy and Urban Growth (London, 1977), p. 65 and p. 77. --
11. See Map 29 showing the maximum number of storeys permitted in the
areas of Athens ci~ca 1963-64 in the Ministry of Public Works, The Master
Plan of Athens (Athens, 1965).
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which obviously increased the legal building coefficient by much more than
40%. Piraeus and its suburbs, on the other hand, have been throughout the
postwar period a zone of depressed housing demand characterised by loss
of population in contrast to the rest of the city. It is natural, therefore,
that the share of land in housing prices has not increased as much as in the
rest of the city; a c~ange in the share of land for 1964-72 in the order of
20% when the total average was 40% gives a realistic implied change in
the building coefficient f~r this zone (shown wit.h an asterisk in table
6.1.4).
4. Determinants of the long-run increase in land costs
.'
We have shown that there are no reasons for rejecting our initial
estimates in the change of land casts. These rates of change imply that. in
the decade from the early 1960ts to the early 1970's the price of housing
must have increased by approximately 20% due to the land factor alone. It
could be argued, however, that such a cnange was not particularly unfavour-
able from the point of housing demand. Real housing expenditures Increased
during this period by approximately 60%. We estimate that half of this
change was transformed into improved floorspace standards.12 This implies
an increase in housing expenditures (rents) per unit of floorspace of more
than 20%. Since rent expenditure may be considered as an index of the value
of housing and since, moreover, we know that little improvement in the real
value of housing floorspace took place in this period (most especially in
apartments where construction quality remained stable), we can say that
the change in rent expenditures due to income increases can very well account
for the equivalent increase in the price of land. We could therefore say
that the increases in land costs were not particularly unfavourable given
the changes in housing consumption demand.
We must immediately add that this in no way implies that demand IIcausedli
the increase in land prices as if the latter signified the consumption of
land of higher quality and thus price. As we argue below, pricing in the
land market is monopolistic, imposing increases insofar as the market will
"bear" them. The 1atter depends on the behaviour of demand, rnainly '.'lith
12. This is based an the elasticity of rooms per capita with respect to
housing expenditures suggested by the data in table 4.1.5, Appendix 4.1 and
table 4.5, chapter 4.
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respect to prices. But not only in this respect: the process of spatial
competition makes that the increased capacity to pay for better locations
as incomes grow will ultimately result in a transfer of part or the whole
of the increased expenditures to landowners. Thus, though the fast increase
in incomes and housing consumption demand in the 1960's helps explain the
rise of land costs, it does not suffice. We must examine the mechanism
of land pricing and the factors that contributed to the imposition of
increased costs.
~lewill advance the following model of the formation of 1and prices
(see also chapter 6). The "valuation ratio" (or, alternatively, the share
of land costs in full prices) tends to remain constant under conditions
of "equilibrium growth". "Equilibrium growth" refers, first, to conditions
where housebuilding follows a steady growth path reflecting the growth
of property demand by households. When disequilibrium prevails, i.e.
when there are severe fluctuations in building in the short and medium-
run, the "valuation ratio" will tend to increase, other things being equal.
"Equilibrium growth" also requires the lack.of any radical changes in the
institutionally controlled supply of developable land and in the level and
distribution of legallyperml'tted intensities of land use (the "building
coefficients") •
Let us examine more closely the mechanism of land-cast formation in the
housing marRet. ~Jeaccept as a general hypothesis that landowners claim a
certain share of the housing product in a way akin to monopoly pricing
in industry by a mark-up on costs.13 This is based on the share of land
formed in the past and develops along the lines typical to pricing under
monopolistic competition, i.e. as a result of the behavioural tendencies
of landowners and the influence of demand elasticities {"what the market
13. This does not presuppose a concentration of economic power in the
hands of few large landowners. The urban land and housing market is a typical
case of "monopolistic competition", i.e. a situation characterised by-a large
number of small suppliers of the same'product but with a great extent of
differentiation in the latter (in this case housing of various types located
in different neighbourhoods). In such situations suppliers will act in
concert, though without open collusion, in raising prices in a monopolistic
fashion within the limits set by the aggregate supply-demand balance for the
product. The classic references for monopolistic pricing and monopolistic
competition are, of course, Joan Robinson's The Economics of Imperfect
Competition (1933, 2nd Edn 1969) and E.H. Chamberlin's The Theory of
Monopolistic Competition (1932, 7th Edn 1956).
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will bear") and the price of alternatives, namely, the transfer price of.
land att~e urban margin. As long as the value of a constant unit of ~ousing
space rises (due to improvements and inflated construction costs) and the
public controls of the intensity of land use (the "bui1ding coefficients")
develop favourably, landowners will tend to be satisfied with the gains
resulting from a constant share in the housing product. This is conditional
on relatively steady growth. Under such conditions landowners will in general
avoid increases in their claims that may cause a reduction in the level of
residential development activity; their main interest, after all, lies in
the development of their property according to current speculative
expectations. Given the diffused distributi.on of landownership and the
general availability of plots for development, landowners will do act in
concert but only in the sense of following certain common rules and not
in the way of genuine 01igopo1 ists that impose scarcities in order to
achieve higher prices.
The housing system, however, does not typically follow a steady growth
path. We have, for one, changes in the pattern of the institutionally
controlled intenstty of land use. Sudden shifts in city planning policy
or even an orderly change in the direction of an expansion of speculative
opportunities will produce discrepancies between expected development land
values and current realisable ones. This will most probably increase land-
owners' claims relative to the steady pattern, It is seldom realised that
a reduction of permitted intensities of land use will al.eo raise land costs
(though it will reduce land values}, perhaps more so; when development
values fall due to unfavourable planning controls, landowners will try to
compensate by raising their mark-up on unit costs.
In addition to the above we have the. important influence of violent
fluctuations in apartment demand and speculative- building. A short-run
upswing in the demand for properties will f'acilitate an increase of prices.
Theoretically, the opposite should take place in a downturn of demand. Land-
owners, however, do not permit the orderly function of such an equilibrium
mechanism, This derives from the essentially monopolistic nature of land-cost
formation. Housing prices in the long run are determined by production prices
with an exogenousZy given share of land in the product, rather than by any
fictional supply-demand equilibrium, Theyare therefore in a very real
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sense abritrary.14 When a short-term rise in prices takes place, developers
may benefit for some time, but ultimately such rises over normal construction
costs will accrue to land, thus raising the average share of land in the
product. When conditions turn to \10rSe, landowners will refuse to lose
all of their gains and by virtue of their class-monopoly power, will
increase the long-term level of the share of land. The overall effect is
that land-cost formation follows in the aggregate the rule of a historically
formed fixed share but the latter will move upwards under conditions of fast
and unstable urban growth, in a rachett-like pattern. This increasing
tendency has, of course, certain limits; after a point high prices would
have throttled property demand. $ucn an upper limit, however, is not known
beforehand and, given the fragmented character of landownership in Greek
urban areas~ no single landowner can test the limits of the market as a
whoZe by acting as a real oligopolist. The increase in land costs, therefore,
would not have taken place anyway but only in the aforementioned incremental
manner. By virtue of this same fragmentation. on the other hand, individual
landowners may wltflfloldland for quite. long when their expectations as a
aZass have been raised and, therefore, once such a rise in expectations
takes place the probability for increases in land costs is very high. For
the curtailment of these demands or for a permanent decrease in average
land costs, a far~reaching change in conditions must take place: either
a prolonged breakdown of the property market, or a major expansion in the
supply of land and housing in the margtn of the market at substantially
lower prices.
Our theoretical account of the,process of land pricing makes the
positive effect exerted on land costs by the speculative boom of the 1960's
and by the fast rise in incomes easily understandable. It points~ however,
to the possible significance of two additional major factors: institutional
restrictions on the supply of land and the pressure from rising agricultural
land prices. It seems that both of these factors contributed substantially
to the process of rising land costs. We have already noted (see the last
14. Needless to say, most urban economists preoccupied with short-run
market relationships would not adhere to this view. The issue is, of course,
of much broader significance reflecting fundamental divisions in modern
economic theory, namely the conflict between models that view production
relations and production prices as the important determinants of prices, and
models that put emphasis on demand factors, short-term price formation in the
market place, and the rewards of factors as a derived datum given the spectrum
of available techniques of production.
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section of chapter 41 that after 1955 severe restrictions were imposed
on the expansion of the City Plan of Athens. This policy was accentuated
by the ban on illegal urban development in 1967. Given the fast urban
growth of the period, the ratio of the demand for floorspace to the capa-
city for supply (t.e. the area of the city plan minus roads etc. multiplied
by the "building coefftcIent ") increased rapidly. This negative trend was
not sufficiently reversed by the liberal offer of high building coefficients
in 1968 and the expansion of the city plan durtng 1968-1970. Conditions
in 1971 were much worse than condttions in 1961.15
Trends in the price of agricultural land have apparently exerted a
similarly positive pressure on the increase of urban land costs. They
rose during the period we examine at rates that were much faster than
those of housing and therefore must have certainly pressed the transfer
price of land at the urban margin towards a higher share in the production
price of housing. The price of parcels of agricultural land in transfers
registered with the taxation authorities in the country as a whole increased
during 1964-72 by 2.77 times whereas that of apartments increased by only
1.68 times. The divergence in price trends was less sharp in the early
1970's: the price of agricultural parcels transferred during 1972-75 rose
by 1.68 times while those of apartments rose by 1.35 times.16 It is well
known that this sort of information is highly unreliable. The differences
it points to, however, are so large that they can hardly be the product
of imperfections.
5. The intra-urban pattern of land costs and the role of IIdifferential
ground rents"
Up to now we have not paid any attention to intra-urban differentials
in the share of land in housing costs. Given our emphasis on time-series
analysis and the assumptions of our theoretical approach, an examination
15. I have found elsewhere that the ratio of built floorspace to legally
permitted maximum capacity in Greater Athens was 0.14 in 1961 and 0.22 in
1971. The ratios were 0.20 and 0.42 respectively for the central zone of
the city (the municipal ity of Athens). (Information f'roman unfinished
research project in the research department of the Public Corporation of
Housing and Urban Development).
16. Estimates from N.S.S.G., Public Finance Statistics volumes for 1975
and 1976 (Athens 1977, 1979). See, also, CPER, "Development Plan for 1976-80:
Urban Structure, (Athens, 1976, in Greek), Appendix 1.
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of this issue was considered unnecessary. This may sound surprising to
most urban economists. The currently dominant theory of land price forma-
tion lays heavy emphasis on the intra-urban pattern of land costs ("ground
rents") from which it also derives a model for their long-run development.
This is, of course, the well-known theory of "differential ground rents"
based on Ricardo and Von ThUnen and the concept of the negative rent
gradient generated by differentials in transport costs. The model of
differential rents suggests a radically different approach to the process
of land cost formation compared with our own. It moreover suggests that
the major determinant of a long-run rise in land costs is most probably
the increase in transportation costs that accompanies urban growth. It
seems necessary, then, to tackle the issues raised by this approach.
Let us examine the intra-urban pattern in the price of land in Greater
Athens. The major determinant of land values is, of course, the "building
coefficient" determining the development potential of residential plots.
The relationship of land values with this factor will, ceteris paribus~
be a simple linear one. It is more interesting therefore to examine the
sources of variation in the LID ratio where L is the land value and D
the "building coefficient": this ratio provides a first approximation to
land costs since it measures the price of the land input per unit area of
floorspace. We expect that this ratio will vary positively with the in-
come level of an area, for two reasons: first, due to the increase of the
real value of a unit of floorspace in higher incomes and second, due to
the increase in housing expenditures (rents or house prices) per url'.itarea
of constant real value that will most probably follow increased incomes.
The last hypothesis assumes that land in higher-income areas will either
be more valuable in itself or that it will attract higher payments as a
result of the process of spatial competition and social segregation.
Another commonly considered determinant of the price of land is the
spatial pattern of accessibil ity to centres of employment and services.
With regard to this factor two alternative hypotheses can be made. The first
follows from the currently dominant theory of differential ground rents:
households are willing to pay more for land in direct proportion to the
economy in travel time and transport costs that results from locations
nearer to the centres of employment, especially the centre of the city.
Land costs will thus vary negatively with distance from the centre
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(hence a negative IIrentgradientll). The second derives from the model of
monopolistic pricing we have advanced. Variations in the mark-up on costs
imposed by landowners will be the result of systematic disequilibria between
the spatial distribution of the volume of housing demand relative to the
supply of land. The latter is mainly determined by the institutionally
permitted capacities of supply set by "building coefficientsll. Accessibility
thus, does not enter the argument directly but only as a determinant of the
spatial distribution of demand relative to the capacity of areas for the
supply of stock (as in Lowry-type models). In this model, moreover, the
emergence of a negative rent gradient in relation to distance from the city
centre is not necessary. It all depends on the configuration of the distri-
bution of demand (which will be influenced by 'more factors than simple
accessibility), the institutionally patterned supply of land, and the
monopolistic behaviour of landowners vis-a-vis these facts. The latter
point suggests that there is no determinate relationship between the absolute
level of transport costs and ground rents. Therefore, there is no reason
to expect that the long-run rise of the transport costs associated with the
urban extensive margin will necessarily lead to a rise of ground rents in
inner zones. This, in contrast, is a necessary implication of the model
of differential ground rents. We may assume, more specifically, that in
a manner analogous to Kalecki's formulation,tne mark-up on costs imposed
by landowners in a certain sub-market of the city at any given time
reflects the "degree of monopoly" enjoyed by landowners in this sub-market.
The general IIdegreeof monopoly" in the city as a whole is the weighted
average of the latter according to their share of demand. Assuming that
the "degree of monopoly" is a simple proportional function of the relation-
ship between the demand allocated to an area and its capacity for supply,
local "degrees of monopoly" will be proportional to the general though with
different ratios. It follows that when the general level of mark-up on
costs remains stable in conditions of equilibrium growth, local levels
will also remain stable if the respective conditions relative to the city
as a whole do not change.
We have run regressions of the land value/building coefficient ratio
in Greater Athens in 1972 on the variables suggested by these alternative
hypotheses. The relevant data were mainly taken from table 3.3 in chapter 3.
We had to add information on travel times from the city centre and the
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floorspace parameters of housing demand.17 The data are presented in an
addendum to this appendix. We have:
(l)
( II)
L. =
1-
DL =
1-
Y. =
1-
TL =
1.
G. =1.
Zn(L/D). = 6.96350 + 0.30181·ZnY.· - 0.63849·ZnT.
1. 1. 1. (R=0.83916)
Zn(L/D). = 1.03444 + 1.OOS06·ZnY. + 0.S2640·ZnG.
1. 1. 1.
(R=0.68048)
drachmas per square meter of land (average per zone i)
average building coefficient.tn zone i
average income per capita 'inzone i .
travel time with public transportation from the city
centre to the centroid_of zone i in minutes
an index of the relative. concentrat ten of housing demand' in i
measured by the ratio P.·b./A .•D. where P. is population
1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
in i in 1971, b. is average number of rooms per capita in
1.
il Di the building coefficient,and Ai total building plot
area in i (P. and A. are given in table 3.3). The index for
1. 1.
each area has been divided by the value of the index for
Greater Athens as a whole.
Since there are great differences in the sizes of the Master Plan zones
for which we run the regressions, a certain weighting had to be done. We
had opted for the'simple solution of counting the larger zones as more than
a single observation. Thus regressions (I) and (II) were run for 26
observations instead of the available 13. As a consequence, the regression
coefficients have been influenced upwards and should be considered as
simply indicative. Relations (I) and (II) represent in essence empirical
models rather than statistical regressions proper. The number of observations
that were used for each zone is shown in the addendum to this appendix.
17. Tra~el times 0i~hpublic-transport from the city centre were
adapted from Ministry of Public Works, Wilbur Smith and Assoc. Athens-
Attica Traffic and Transportation Study, vol 1 (Athens, 1974), Figure 2.1S.
Data on rooms per capita per major zone in 1971 were taken from Mandikas,
Economic Analysis, vol. 4.
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Models (I) and (II) show that both of the alternative theories
considered previously are corroborated by the actual pattern of land
costs. Income shows an important positive influence in both cases, though
much greater in model II, a fact that is consistent with the theoretical
emphasis of the latter on spatial competition and monopolistic pricing.
Model {L) indicates that accessibil ity influences land pricing strongly
and that there is indeed a clear-cut negative rent gradient. Equally
satisfactory results, however, are achieved by model (r ) without the
questionable theoretical commitments demanded by the theory of differential
rents whjch. supports (1). The relatively better fit shown by model (1)
can be easily accounted for by the strong positive relationship between
accessibility to the city centre and concentrations of non-residential
activities which raise land prices.
Given the ambivalence of the empirical findings, a choice between the
two theoretical approaches must, at this stage, reside on theoretical
argument. This argument we consider necessary: first, because of the
stultifying influence the dominant paradigm has exerted on the study of
land prices and, second, because of the necessity of clearing the ground
for the elaboration of a theory of ground rents that is consistent with
the wider theoretical framework for the analysis of the Greek urban
political economy we have advanced in this study.
We will argue that the application of the Ricardo-von Thunen model
of differential rents in an urban context has been unduly emphasised;
that despite its apparent universal validity and formal beau~y, it is
ridden with conceptual and methodological problems; lastly, that the
emphasis on the spatial equilibrium of household location and differ-
entials in transport costs suggested by this model has diverted attention
away from more important aspects of land cost formation and urban growth.
Consider the typical Ricardian-Marxian model of ground rent formation.
Ground rents are composed by "absolute rent" and "differential rent". The
first is based on the monopolistic power of landowners as a cZass to impose
a certain price for the conversion of undeveloped land to residential use.
This constitutes a claim to a share of the product that under conditions of
an integrated market (i.e. uniform prices) will tend to be similar throughout
the urban system. The second, "differential rent", is added to the first
and is determined by the increasing cost of produci.ng a unit of housing
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services in the "margin". The latter may be either the perimeter of
the city ("extensive" margin) or the addition of housing units in more
central areas at higher intensities of land use ("intensive" margin).
Given a relatively integrated housing market, the price of a unit of
housing services will be uniform and therefore the differentials in
production cost will generate differentials in ground rents (assuming
a uniform profit rate) between areas of the city. Following the Ricardian
model, assume an increasing marginal cost in the production of housing
services as the ;;ty grows. The share of ground rents in the price of
housing services (or of land costs in the price of new housing) will
show an increasing tendency. Almost all modern theories of ground rent
formation start with this model combined with the Von ThUnen model of
agricultural rents where transport costs (obviously increasing at the
extensive margin) provide the basic mechanism for differential rent
formation.18
18. We should add that the Marxist theory of ground rent considers
the category of "monopoly" rents as an important additional category
of ground rent. This is formed in highly desirable areas where a permanent
supply-demand disequilibrium offers the opportunity for monopolistic price
increases over and above the rent levels determined by the lIabsolutelland
"differential" rent mechanisms. This category has been usually applied to
exceptional circumstances (areas of environmental and social value). In
this sense it defies systematic analytical treatment as all very specific
monopolistic situations. It requires, moreover, a rather detailed spatial
dissaggregation which may be congenial to realtors and landowners but is
secondary in the context of broad structural and historical analysis. It
cauld be argued that Marx' s introduction of "monopolyll rents as a fully
important third type derives from his peculiar and wholly unconvincing
theorisation of "absolute" rents based on the theory of::value and the
transfers ~f value due to differences in the organic composition of capital.
Thus, since absolute rents were not conceived as a.typical case of monopo-
listic pricing shares (albeit at the level of the system as a whole), a
third, somewhat residual, category was clearly needed. Given tbe rejection
of the "organic composition" theory in this context and accept+nq absolute rent
as a case of monopolistic pricing, the category of 'monopolyllrent must
be either generalised or restricted to the study of very specific cases in
the intr~-urban variation of land rents with limited theoretical value.
For short expositions of the Marx-Ricardo theory of ground rent and the
different types mentioned above, see Arghiri Emmanuel, Une~ual Exchange,
pp. 205-228 (containing also a clear-cut rejection of Marx s theory of
absolute rent); A.J. Scott, "Land and Land Rent"; D. Harvey, Social Justice
and the City (London, 1973): Chapter 5; ~1.Edel; I'Marx'sTheory of Rent:
Urban Applications", in Conference of Socialist Economists, Political
Economy of Housing ~lorkshoPt Housing and Class in Britain (London, 1976):
7.23.
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The common appeal of the Ricardian analogy is often based on a very
crude misconception. Ricardo' s model of agricul tural rents +s based, of
course, on the differential productivity of .various types of land. This
concept of differential productivity has been uncritically applied in an
urban context as analogous to the extensive differentials in the density
of development at different locations. It is especially important to stress
that this particular reasoning rests on sheer nonsense. Ricardo thought,
of course, in terms of commodity units; differences in productivity between
locations meant different costs in the production of a unit, say a bushed
of corn. The amount of produce per unit area does not enter into the
argument; it might happen, on the contrary, that higher intensities of
land utilisation are associated with higher unit costs. Similarly, higher
building densities do not signify higher productivities. Higher producti-
vities and higher rents should be understood as cases of a higher share
of rents in unit price regardless of the productivity per unit area.19
The rent gradient then expresses the spatial distribution of the share
of ground rents or land costs in a "unit of housing" assuming the latter
can be measured in different locations. It is almost universally accepted
among modern urban economists that Ca) such differences in rent shares do
exist, Cb) they are determined by differentials in transport costs and
Cc) since the centre of the city is the major concentration of employment,
differential rent declines with distance from the centre. Hence the near-
universal acceptance of the Von ThUnen analogy and the assumption of a
negative rent gradient. The argument usually goes as follows: if we assume
for simplicity uniform incomes, uniform utility functions, and locational
equilibrium of households (i.e. similar utility levels at different loca-
tions), then the amount paid for housing and transport at different locations
(reflecting utility) must be equal. Since transport costs increase with
distance from the centre, ground rents must decline with distance. In static
terms, this accounts for the emergence of differential rent and the negative
rent gradient. The same mechanism is used to extend the Ricardo-Von ThUnen
analogy to a dynamic perspective: since the urban margin, where transport
19. For a case of erroneous equation of high differentials in land
vaZues within cities and between cities with an incidence of high differ-
ential rents, see M. Edel, "Marx's Theory of Rent".
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costs are highest, moves away from the centre as the city grows, differ-
ences in costs intensify and the level of differential rents in the
• • 201nner zones 1ncreases.
There have been quite a few formulations of this model and our short
account can not do justice to the theoretical and formal elegance achieved
in this area. The argument is certainly powerful and can be advanced in
various ways not necessarily dependent upon the neo-classical paradigm of
marginal utility and marginalist theories of production and distribution;
hence its appeal to Neo-Ricardians and Marxists.21
It has been recently pointed out, however, that the differential rent
model has some major theoretical weaknesses and rests on very special
assumptions.22 We may by-pass as secondary the obvious criticisms levelled
against the assumptions of a monocentric city and a well-integrated land
market. These assumptions are perfectly justifiable in a highly general
20. The differential rent model is usually applied in a static manner.
The dynamic tmpl ication, however, follows easily given the exclusive emphasis
on transport cost differentials and the Ricardian rationale. The literature
on the transport cost model of differential rent as applied in the urban
land market is enormous. For a recent review see H.W. Richardson, The New
Urban Economics: and Alternatives (London, 1977): Chapter 3. The most wel1-
known members of this school are W. Alonso, R. Muth, L. Wingo and E. Mills.
See, respectively, Location and Land Use (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), Cities
and Housin1 (Chicago, 1969), Transportation and Urban Land (WashingtonD.C., 1961 and Studies in the Structure of the Urban Economy (Baltimore,1972).
21. For some very successful formulations, see, A. Farhi, "Urban Economic
Growth and Conflicts: A Theoretical Approach", Papers of the Regional Science
Association, 28 (1973): 95-124, G.R. Walter, "Urban Growth, Rent and Quasi-
Rentll, in I. Masser (ed.) Theory and Practice in Regional Science (London,
1976): 30-41 and J.M. Hartwick - P.G. Hartwick, "The Activity Analysis
Approach to Urban Model Building", Papers of the Regional Science Asso-
ciation, 35 (1975): 75-85.
22. Notably by Harry W. Richardson whose New Urban Economics and
Regional and Urban Economics (Penguin Books, 1978) gave maX1mum dissemination
to the increasing aissatisfaction with this model felt within mainstream
urban economics. Criticism from the "Left" goes back to the early 1970's.
It has been waged, however, mainly tn doctrinal terms and thus had 1imited
effect in terms of the constructive revision of urban theory the successful
elaboration of Alternative models. The continuing hegemony of the Ricardo- Von
Thlrerr model even among professed non-neoclassical economists demonstrates
as much. 0
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theory. Neither the reiteration of the importance of the categories of
"absolute" and "monopoly" rent203 constitute more than useful correctives:
they can be very easily added to the usual models of differential rent
with no inconsistency. The main difficulty lies elsewhere. How do we
define and measure a unit of housing services? Ricardo and Von ThUnen spoke,
of course, of corn and vegetables - commodities that are easily defined
and measured. "Housing", however, is an extremely complex commodity. How do
we compare house-units of the same physical standard (rooms, construction
quality) but at different densities, with or without a garden, in high-rise
or low-rise buildings, etc.? In order to measure ground rents the costs of
common units must be measured. If housing units differ in kind with distance
from the city centre and households value the type and location of housing
as such then the whole edifice of differential rent models becomes shaky.
The way out for most theorists is to assume explicitly that preferences
for location or housing type as such do not enter the argument: house-
holds are neutral vis-a-vis these aspects. Were it otherwise, i.e. in the
case households valued, say, low-density housing strongly, the rent gradient
could take any form whatsoever. It could very well be positive and therefore
ground rents would increase with distance.24 Such an indeterminancy would
diminish drastically the effectiveness and universality of the differential
rents model.
203. Notably by David Harvey. See his influential "Use Value, Exchange
Value and the Theory of Urban Land Use", in his Social Justice and the City
(London, 1973), Chapter 5.
24. This has 1ed Richard t·1uthto reject the notion of a util ity of loca-
tion as such as an important element of the model sirice this "renders the
theory devoid of substance" (Cities and Housing, p. 41). As H.W. Richardson
has retorted, "The weakness of this argument is that it assumes that the
residential rent function must be negative. The empirical support for this
is not as strong or as unanimous as is sometimes argued" (New Urban Economics.
p. 105, his emphasis). Richardson goes on to point that the whole issue
depends on the particular configuration of the preferences of the various
classes in a city vis-a-vis location, house types, and neighbourhood types
(New Urban Economics, pp. 105-106). This is indeed one possible theoretical
solution to the impasse. Richardson, however, does not realise that the
introduction of relativism and agnosticism to such an extent deals a death
blow to the whole model. It is clear to us that the debate has shown that
unless we are satisfied with particularistic accounts of a largely empirical
nature, the quest for a theory of ground rents should abandon the von ThUnen
analogy save for some special issues and search for pattern at a more
aggregate socia-structural and ~;storical level.
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As it happens, we have repeatedly pointed out that Greek households are
not neutral towards differences in the type of housing. All social surveys
in the postwar have found that urban households prefer single-family low-
density housing much more than high-density apartment housing. These aspects
are, of course, directly related to distance from the city centre. Moreover,
transport costs in Greek cities are low relative to incomes. Only the upper
class lives at very long distances from the city centre but these locations
are highly valued from the housing type and environmental viewpoint and thus
are associated with increases in land rents. Thus. there is a p'l'imafaaie
case for a very weak operation of a negative rent gradient. By implication,
the strong negative gradient observed in model (I) above loses much of its
credibility and points to the operation of a different set of forces.
It has been suggested that the inclusion of matters of housing and
neighbourhood type into the "utility function" of households and the
particular conditions of specific cities with regard to the distribution of
centres of employment can account for lIanomaliesllin the differential rent
gradient. Certain theoretical revisions of the dominant Ricardo-Von Thunen
model suggest as much: we may retain, they argue, the rationale of the
model but incorporate a variety of patterns of household preferences and
urban structure that produce a multiplicity of rent gradient forms.25 In
I would add that neither non-neoclassical, "production-oriented" models
in the Ricardian-Von ThUnen tradition (see the references in note 21) can
avoid the theoretical problems of "New Urban Economics". The problem of
establishing the universality of a negative rent gradient is solved in such
models by total rejection of the relevance of the concept of utility or
preferences. Land "produces" in these models, in direct analogy to Ricardo's
agricultural commodities, Zaboup power. Since the price of the latter is
uniform and its production costs differ at various locations due to transport
costs, a negative differential rent gradient (assuming central employment)
is bound to arise. There is again the assumption that housing as a commodity
in the wage bundle is a determinate physical unit with a uniform price. This
is simply not true. "Preferences" are by necessity involved in the determi-
nation of the comparability of housing-units of different type and location.
"Demand've lements are, alas, indispensable in dissaggregated models of ground
rent and doctrinaire arguments against "neo-classical" impurities as compared
to "classical" purities will not do. (For such a dogmatic response, see the
critical asides by A.J. Scott in his "Land and Land Rent" against Arghiri
Emmanuel's powerful - and thoroughly Marxian, I would add - model of differ-
ential rents based on demand elasticities in his Unequal Exchange).
25. See, H.W. Richardson, New Urban Economics, pp. 105-106 and our
comments on this issue in the previous note.
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terms of this approach'we' should expect that a clear-cut negative rent·
gradient will arise in cases where extreme transport cost differentials
exist in areas with broadly similar housing types, say, in the vast
suburban zones of American and English cities. In Athens, and to a much
greater degree in other Greek cities, residential densities and building
types follow each 'other in rapid succession along narrow concentric zones.
As a result,strong type-preferences may compensate for differences in
transport costs and may thus produce a zero rent gradient and, more
generally, conditions making for a limited significance of the differential
rent mechanism. How are we then to interpret the evidence for Athens? In
, ,
this perspective, we ~ay assume a strong preference for low-rise housing
and an even stronger preference for accessibility as well as various other
preferences. All these must be reflected in varying ground rents. But this
obviously puts an absurdly heavy emphasis on the sensitivity of the pricing
mechanism in its response to the utility calculus of households.
r consider this "solution" of the theoretical problems of the dominant
paradigm in the face of the requirements for explanation presented by
concrete cases as highly artificial. We are offered an endless regression
into ever more complex utility functions which may explain more complex
patterns of locatlonal equilibrium of households (and thus, uniform utility
levels sustained by differential rent) whereas the root of the problem lies
precisely in the concept of locational equilibrium, the responsiveness of
the price mechanism and the underlying notion of perfect spatial competition.
Consider the behaviour of landowners supplying a diverse spectrum of housing
types to a non-homogeneous aggregate of households. We are asked to believe
that landowners will take into account the various preference curves of
different household categories and compete through prices so as to create
conditions of equilibrium, i.r. a neutral behaviour of households vis-a-vis
different locations. This is patently unrealistic: we know that landowners
will opt in general for a strategy that secures a good part of the market
and a fast rate of development at the highest intensity of land utilisation.
Given the fact that the latter is institutionally controlled and that, in
general, landowners can bid their time contrary to the requirements of
static models that prescribe instantaneous utilisation of land under current
conditions, it is only natural that competition will be based on the type
of the product, rather than on price, with an aim at attracting the better
parts of the market. This is, of course, a typical case of monopolistic
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competition through product differentiation with a monopolistic mechanism
of price formation based on a structured pattern of constant mark-ups on
costs. The operation of the differential rents mechanism should be viewed
in a light similar to the operation of any other technological cost-
reducing or cost-increasing development in the economy. Sometimes this
development will occur at the urban spatial margin and may thus generate
a distinct spatial differentiation of ground rents. But this is not
necessarily so; changes in housing production costs do indeed often occur
at the urban margin but their effects usua1ly concern the housing system
as a whole instead of varying with distance from the city centre (changes
in infrastructure costs and in the transfer price of agricultural land are
a case in point).
Differential rents due to distance Will, of course, emerge as an
important element in case we are interested in relatively homogeneous
sub-markets, in the price of housing in particular locations, and we
furthermore take for granted the wider pattern of costs and price formation
present at a given time. It is high time, however, that urban economics
abandon theoretical models suited to· the interests of realtors concerned
with land values in particular locations of homogeneous sub-markets and
examine the more fundamental problem of the formation of average land costs
in a long-run perspective and in the system as a whole.
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Addendum: The data used for models (I) and (II~---------------------
Zone i (L/D) •
1-
T.
1-
G.
1-
Number of
observations
1- NE1 960 7382 60 0.323 1
2. NE3 1535 5293 . 27 0.923 1
3. C1+C2 2616 4831 15 1.240 6
4. E3 2617 4220 60 0.612 1
5. NE4 1167 4076 . 40 1.154 1
6. C3 1541 4054 23 1.411 2
7. El 1311 3733 40 0.735 1
8. NW2 942 3674 35 1.158 2
9. NE2 1155 3609 50 0.384 1
10. E2 1040 3502 40 1.081 1
II. Pl+P2 943 3067 45 0.948 4
12. WI 1054 2948 40 1.126 3
13. W2 1518 2645 35 1.139 2
Sour·ce: Table 3.3 in chapter 3 and the sources referred in note 17 in
this Appendix. For the symbols see th.e text. The zones are shown
in Figure 2.1.1, Appendix 2.1.
General Appendix
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Table A.1: Private building activity. 1961-1978
NBUA(1-2), NBUA(3-4}, NBUA(5+): New buildings in urban areas according to
the number of storeys on the basis of building pennits. Buildings of one
and two storeys, three and four storeys and five or more storeys. Number
of new buildings and volume in thousand m3•
NBGA(1-2}, NBGA(3-4}, NBGA(5+): New buildings in the Greater Athens Area.
Categories similar to the above.
NBGT(1-2), NBGT(3-4), NBGT(5+): New buildings in the Greater Thessaloniki
Area. Categories similar to the above.
NBUA(3}, NBUA(4}: New buildings in urban areas of three and four storeys
respectively on the basis of building permits. Number of new buildings
and volume in thousand m3•
VNB(UA), VNB(GA), VNB(GT): Total volume of new buildings on the basis of
permits in urban areas, Greater Athens and Greater Thessaloniki respectively.
Volume in thousand m3.
EB(UA), EB(GA), EB(GT}: Volume of extensions of buildings on the basis of
permits in urban areas, Greater Athens and Greater. Th.essaloniki. Volume
in thousand m3
Source: National Statistical servtce of Greece (NSSG), Statistical Yearbook
of Greece, various years. (*1 Extenstons in Greater Athens in 1961and 1962 have been derived tmpltcttly.
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Table A.1: Private building activity (volume in thousand m3)
Year NBUA(1 ..2} NBUA(3-4} NBUA{5+}
No Volume No Volume No Volume
1961 12,442 5,388 293 844 694 4,245
1962 11,158 4,739 401 1,104 918 5,540
1963 10,452 5,263 482 1,348 947 5,775
1964 12,104 6,682 731 2,083 1,250 7,536
1965 ·12,518 6,723 1,285 3,381 1,442 8,557
1966 11,839 7,518 1,703 4,834 1,322 7,700
1967 11,638 6,814 1,247 3,222 790 4,721
1968 12,588 8,134 1,442 3,695 1,297 7.227
1969 11,945 8,313 1,724 4,469 2,348 12,810
1970 12,528 8,456 1,767 4,675 2,142 11 ,395
1971 14,189 9,335 2,046 5,353 2,533 13,804
1972 18,054 12,280 3,110 8,766 3,915 20,924
.1973 24,059 16,323 3,602 9,156 3,933 19,814
1974 9,882 9,343 1,788 4,355 1,015 4,975
1975 12,474 10,278 3,274 7,601 2,088 9,220
1976 9,807 10,005 3,654 9,523 2,979 13,996
1977 10,133 10,447 4,982 13,251 3,846 17,945
1978 11,976 12,120 6,383 16,918 4,459 21,046
Table A.l: {cont.)
Year NBGA(I ..2} NBGA(_3..4} NBGA(5+)
No Volume No Volume No Volume
1961 7,554 3,073 195 611 560 3,419
1962 6,186 2,627 221 690 676 4,078
1963 5,592 2,820 243 802 700 4,280
1964 5,833 3,266 401 1,276 839 5,223
1965 61166 32487 600 1,556 12011 6,214
1966 5,560 3,507 734 2,356 968 5,561
1967 5,078 3,189 546 1,533 542 3,301
1968 4,887 . 3,651 640 1,700 901 5,126
1969 4,904 3,699 797 2,295 1,833 9,812
1970 4,581 3,705 774 2,344 1,595 8,388
1971 5,858 4,446 1,017 2,812 1,820 10,108
1972 6,365 5,646 1,835 5,558 2,769 14,983
1973 7,007 6,837 2,027 5,068 2,453 12,228
1974 3,753 3,395 1,013 2,445 644 3,220
1975 4z229 32575 12657 3,946 1,167 5.199
1976 2,995 3,201 2,026 5,353 1,766 8,233
1977 2,921 3,229 2,506 6,937 . 2,160 10,109
1978 32489 3,881 3,728 9,843 2,881 12,799
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Table A.l: (cont.}
Year .NBGT{l-2} NBGT(3-4} NBGT(5+)
No Volume No Volume No Volume
1961 479 389 28 98 126 774
1962 610 328 85 215 225 1,348
1963 563 298 104 276 226 1,373
1964 745 546 124 393 378 2,139
1965 563 365 385 1,042 374 2,022
1966 547 651 584 1,520 281 1,749
1967 333 316 326 842 182 1,046
1968 386 441 415 1,045 294 1,511
1969 327 348 473 1,099 321 1,477
197Q 364 413 544 1,277 344 1,855
1971 354 377 489 1,209 454 2,221
1972 407 494 488 1,189 684 3,257
1973 541 672 576 1,520 853 4,133
1974 388 571 260 831 207 972
1975 384 702 682 1,623 500 2,082
1976 235 446 556 1,432 514 2,316
1977' ", 351 694 1,115 2,708 831 3,467
1978 180 379 501 1,232 306 1,456
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Table A.1: (cont.)
Year NBUA{3) NBUA(4)
No Volume No Volume
1961 164 420 129 424
1962 249 559 152 545
1963 295 618 187 730
1964 391 858 340 1,225
1965 676 1,480 609 1,901
1966 1,001 2,180 702 2,654
1967 781 1,595 466 1,627
1968 819 1,684 623 2,011
1969 860 1,898 864 2,571
1970 864 2,020 903 2,655
1971 1,088 2,281 958 3,072
1972 1,678 3,824 1,432 4,942
1973 2,106 4,388 1,496 4,768
1974 1,168 2,475 620 1,880
1975 1,911 3!551 1!363 4,050
1976 2,031 4,228 1,623 5,295
1977 2,547 5,420 2,435 7,831
1978 3,356 6,956 31027 9,962
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Table A.1: (cont.)
Year VNB(UA) VNB(GA)· VNB(GT) EB UA) EB(GA) EB(GT)
1961 10.,477 7,103 1,261 2,0.39*
1962 11 ,383 7,395 . 1,891 en.a.l 2,0.66* (n ,a .1
1963 12,386 7,90.2 1,947 4,532 3,130. 386
1964 16,30.1 9,765 3,0.78 4,939 3,182 511
1965 182661 112257 3,429 5,493 3,816 388
1966 20.,0.52 11 ,424 3,920. 5,446 3,732 269
1967 14,757 8,0.23 2,20.4 5,317 3,387 449
1968 19,0.56 10.,477 2,997 6,503 4,0.77 698
1969 25,592 15,80.6 3.284 7,192 4,627 427
1970. 242527 .142437 3,545 7,468 4,557 597
1971 28,491 17,365 3,80.7 7,146 4,661 347
1972 41,971 26,187 4,939 8,510. 5,372 750.
1973 45,293 24,131 6,325 10.,586 6,845 50.8
1974 18,672 9,0.60. 2,374 6,992 4,221 439
1975 27,0.99 12,719 4,40.7 8,628 5,278 366
1976 33,524 16,787 4,194 7,412 4,316 276
1977 41,645 20.,276 6,869 7,874 4,468 276
1978 50.,0.84 26,523 3,0.67 9,534 5,486 131
Note: (*l Extenstons in Greater Athens 1n 1961 and 190.2 have been
estimated from the volume of private dwelling building plus
the volume of building for "establishments" (commercial,
industrial etc.) minus the volume of entirely new structures,
i.e. VNB(GA). See, N.S.S.G., Statistical Yearbook of Greece
1964. It should be noted, however, that the derived figures
seem to be underestimations to a certain extent.
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Table A.2: New dwellings, private authorised activity
ND(G), ND(UA), ND{GA): New dwellings: Greece,total, urban areas, total
and Greater Athens Area on the basis of building permits. Number of
new dwellings and volume in thousand m3•
Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various years
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Table A.2: New dwell in9s, Erivate authorised actlvit~
Yeqr ND(G) ND(UA} ND(GA)
No Volume No Volume No Volume
1948 5,862 1,885 3,647 1,281
1949 7,189 2,415 4,653 1,714
1950 102641 32440 51984 2,134
1951 12,119 3,815 6,703 2,298
1952 14,297 4,343 7,523 2,548
1953 17,867* 5,611* 9,100 3,100
1954 23,526 6,802 9,671 3,348
1955 26,871 7,758 13,075 4,452
1956 30,116 8,189 15,104 4,'583
1957 29,737 7,710 14,043 3,995
1958 36,597 9,637 16,154 4,754
1959 35,619 9,648 en. a. } (n.a, } 16,187 4,965
1960 38,479 10,648 19,635 5,639
1961 45,243 12,065 23,643 6,764
1962 46,951 12,586 24,217 6,861
1963 52,360 14,538 39,936 11 ,656 26,799 8,031
1964 66,236 18,329 52,348 14,966 32,582 9,619
, ....~1965 79,385 21,904 63,869 18,032 40,210 11,548
1966 83,944 23,593 65,147 18,923 41,214 12,028
1967 81,939 22,415 48,794 14,477 28,803 8,482
1968 112,392 30,327 64,404 18,558 37,746 10,800
1969 130,538 35,657 85,235 24,482 57,963 16,364
1970 114,618 32,140 78,992 23,029 50,742 14,480
1971 124,924 35,667 88,839 26,085 57,927 16,')72
1972 178,558 51,163 128,603 37,836 83,824 24,549
1973 188,105 53,815 132,205 39,478 75,041 22,843
1974 81,616 25,747 49,137 15,887 27,947 9,051
1975 120,869 37,765 82,301 25,837 44,505 14,080
1976 128,601 40,852 89,759 28,518 48,868 15,755
1977 158,269 51,155 110,469 35,688 56,878 19,051
1978 186,981 63,521 134,644 45,846 74,652 26,222
Note: (*) The figures for 1948-1953 for the country as a whole based on ~he
1958 Yearbook and earlier ones show a certain underestimation. Thelr
figures for 1954, 1955 and 1956 are 19,245, 24,044 and 26,122 respectively,
roughly 15% lower than more recent series.
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Table A.3: New dwellings 1955-1972: All sectors (public, private
authorised and private unauthorised activity)
TND(G), TND(GA), TND{RC): Total new dwellings including public activity,
private authorised and private unauthorised activity ("illegal building"):
Greec~ total, Greater Athens Area and rest of the country respectively.
Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, Housing, Building
and Planning Committee, Greece: National Monograph, (Athens, 1973~,
p. 101.
Table A.3: New dwell ings, 1955-1972: All sectors
Year TND(G) TND(GA) TND(RC)
1955 60,996 18,175 42,8'21
1956 62,610 22,590 40,020
1957 58,527 20,772 37,755
1958 64,912 25,911 39,001
1959 57,501 25,823 31,578
1960 60,739 31,036 29,703
1961 68,094 37,681 30,413
1962 75,159 40,804 34,355
1963 76,438 30,314 36,124
1964 95,736 47,852 47,784
1965 108,372 54,76-3 531609
1966 130,906 63,345 67,561
1967 117,636 42,679 74,957
1968 135,465 43,025 92,440
1969 153,159 66,403 86,756
1970 138,075 58,736 79,339
1971 146,554 64,775 81,779
1972 185,737 75,275 110,462
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Table A.4: Unauthorised dwelling construction (Uillegal building").
. "
UND(G), UND(GA): Unauthorised dwelling construction ("illegal building")
Greece, total, and Greater Athens Area respectively. Estimates of the
Ministry of Public Works and the National Statistical Service.
UND(G)*, UND(GA)*: Unauthorised dwelling construction, Greece, total, and
Greater Athens Area. Alternative series based on 1971 estimates of the
Ministry of Public Works.
Source: UND(G), UND(GA): NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1958 and 1955.
UND(G)*, UND(GA)*: Unpublished material from the study by Leontidou
and Emmanuel, Life Patterns in an Illegal Housing Area, (Athens,
1972, mtmec): supplied by the Ministry of Publ ic Works in 1971.
Note: When figures for the same year differed between yearbooks we have kept
those in later ones.
Table A.4: Unauthorised dwelling construction
Year UNO(G) UNO(GA) UND(G)* UND(GA)*
1948 4,222 3,465
1949 5,286 4,420
1950 8,262 5,685 6,884
1951 9,365 6,368 7,854
1952 11,286 7,147 8,947 (n.a.)
1953 19,532 8,645 11 ,756
1954 17,482 4,327 9,925
1955 16,099 1,948 3,877 2,650
1956 16,071 2,178 4,429 2,914
1957 14,917 1,882 4,466 2,839
1958 5,393 3,189
1959 5,968 3,195
1960 (n.a, } (n.a.} 72933 4,578
1961 11 ,431 7,076
1962 11,761 7,350
1963 13,998 9,360
1964 17,078 10,720
1965 14!679 9,434
1966 21,486 14,623
1967 11 ,401 8,296
1968 5167Q 3,733
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Table A.S: Public sector activity in dwell ing construction
PSDC(G), PSDC(GA): Construction of new dwellings effected by government
activity in general, 1948-1962; Greece, total, and Greater Athens
respect ive.ly, .. ., .
~ - . . '. '" "'~'.. '.
MSSDC: New dwellings constructed by the housing programs of the Ministry
of Social Services, 1960-1972; Greece, total.
WHODC: New dwellings constructed by the Workers' Housing Organisation
1955-1972; Greece, total.
Source: PSDC: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece. 1955, 1958, 1964.
MSSDC: Technical Chamber of Greece, Housing in Greece: Government
Activity (Athens, 1975 in Greek with English translation), part II.
l-JHODC:"Workers' Housing" in Economi cos Tachydromos, ;ssue of
July 11, 1974, (in Greek). .
Notes: When figures for the same year differred between Yearbooks we have
kept those in later ones. Contradictions between the series for
1960 and 1961 are probably due to revisions and backdating of data
at later dates. It should be noted that the Workers' Housing
Organisation was created in 1954.
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Table A.S: Public Sector activity in dwelling construction
Year PSDC(G) PSDC(GA) MSSDC WHODC
1948 8,750 150
1949 9,205 155
1950 29,840 160
1951 22,420 120
1952 33,(00
1953 13,700
1954 8,336 479
1955 18,291 785 {n.a.}
1956 18,074 1,243 1955-57: 1,233
1957 16,422 1,598
1958 10,770 2,069 696
1959 3,897 998 1,376
1960 3,301 1,422 32608 1,209
1961 2,047 966 3,673 929
1962 3,036 1,543 2,263 271
1963 3,555 600
1964 4,514 170
1965 4!06o 132
1966 6,564 1,101
1967 (n.a.) (n.a. ) 5,802 2,434
1968 8,192 798
1969 9,107 843
1970 8!373 667
1971 7,256 410
1972 4 419 555
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Table A.6: Real estate transfers (sales), 1956-1975:
Apartments, urban building plots and agricultural
land plots
APT(G}, P,PT(GA): Number of transfers (sales) of apartments reported
to the tax authorities; Greece, total, and Greater Athens Area
respect ive ly.
BPT(G), BPT{GA): Number of transfers (sales) of urban building plots
reported to the tax authorities; Greece, total, and Greater Athens
Area respectively.
ALT(G), ALT(GA): Number,of agricultural land transfers (sales) reported
to the tax authorities; Greece, total, and Greater Athens Area respectively.
Source: NSSG, Statistics of Public Finance, various yearbooks and monthly
bulletins.
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Table A.6: Real estate transfers 1956-1975
Year APT(G) APT(GA) BPT(G) BPT(GA) ALT(G) ALT(GA)
1956 6,172 34,200 75,013
1957 7,501 (n.a.) 35,239 (n.a.) 75,745 (n.a.)
1958 10,458 7,742 36,328 19,188 83,017 4,803
1959 10,271 7,440 34,255 18,322 73,651 4,720
1960 14,024 10,702 38,518 21,809 82,321 4,192
1961 14,840 11,176 37,901 22,799 80,517 3,136
1962 17,843 13,075 40,226 23,345 88,413 3,341
1963 18,922 14,356 41,136 24,741 92,222 4,198
1964 25,160 19,170 47,457 29,207 100,193 7,478
1965 26,393 19,555 49,432 28,243 126,687 10,554
1966 23,602 18,191 49,130 26,468 139,876 13,140
1967 27,901 20,469 43,876 22,887 120,987 6,281
1968 27,882 19,864 47,528 22,856 110,507 4,343
1969 35,128 25,119 52,438 29,305 118,660 3,525
1970 40,921 28,847 53,532 30,834 119,911 2,398
1971 48,740 34,088 61,211 35,456 118,627 1,377
1972 58,921 40,967 76,845 41,832 134,135 1,666
1973 65,134 42,549 85,185 50,456 139,437 45,852
1974 46,032 24,742 56,310 24,243 93,714 1.749
1975 512605 26,613 67,727 26,845 108,349 2,330
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Table A.7: Trends in fixed capital formation, 1948-1978
GOP: Gross domestic product, million drachmas in 1970 prices.
FCF: Gross fixed capital formation, million drachmas in 1970 prices.
FCFH: Gross fixed capital formation in dwellings, (private and public),
million drachmas in 1970 prices.
FCFHP: Gross fixed capital formation in dwellingsby the public sector,
million drachmas in 1970 prices.
FCFM: Gr.oss fixed capital formation in manufacturing, million drachmas
in'1970' prices.
Source: Ministry of Coordination, National Accounts of Greece (Athens 1976,
1979, 1980).
(*) Provisional data.
Table A.7: Trends in fixed ca~ital formation, 1948-78
Year GOP FCF FCFH . FCFHP FCFM
1948 58,288 9,435 3,107 1,165 1,960
1949 69,982 10,681 3,577 1,209 1.821
1950 74,355 16,262 4,831 1,734 3,696
1951 80,511 15,095 4,333 542 3.222
1952 80,746 13,980 4,491 63 3,197
1953 91,291 14,252 6,090 500 2.039
1954 94,123 14,389 6,095 500 1,781
1955 100,533 15,944 7,045 979 1.941
1956 109,277 19,395 7,818 1,243 2.372
1957 115.858 19,120 6,911 878 2,819
1958 120,481 24,169 8,352 889 3,473
1959 125,308 25,264 7,857 538 3,081
1960 129,201 29,121 8,506 247 2.873
1961 143,772 31,476 9.132 203 3,634
1962 144,612 34,128 10.391 218 4,280
1963 159,171 35,996 11 ,287 182 4.390
1964 171,177 43,445 13,712 209 5,628
1965 187,009 49,003 15,482 205 7,006
1966 197,011 50,567 15,642 387 6,660
1967 206,176 49,770 13,956 341 6.053
1968 217,895 60,397 19,445 336 7,245
1969 238,201 71,653 23,212 373 8,426
1970 258,000 70,663 19,740 297 10,044
1971 278,551 80,558 23,641 698 11,198
1972 303,973 92,977 29,964 674 13.238
1973 329,269 100,093 30,756 348 14.457
1974 323,255 74,500 15,869 190 14,914
1975 339,833 74,660 20,476 294 13,132
1976 359,749 79,750 21,909 312 13,288
1977* 370,583 86,600 26,450 270 122538
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Table A.8: Trends in incomes, consumption and savings
YD: Personal disposable income, million drachmas, current prices*.
SN: Savings of households and private non-profit institutions, million
drachmas, current prices.
SANB: Net non-business capital inflow, million drachmas, current pri~es.
SAED: Foreign exchange deposits in banKs, million drachmas, current
prices.
c: National private consumption, million drachmas, current prices;
based on the direct method of estimation.
Source: Ministry of Coordination, National Accounts of Greece, 1958-75,
1973-77. N.S.S.G., National Accounts, Greece, 1948-1970. Bank
of Greece, Report of the Governor, various years; N.S.S.G.,
Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various years. SA has been
estimated from the equivalents in US dollars; the conversion
rate has been 30 drs for the years up to 1974, 32,3 for 1975
and 36,9 for 1976. (*) YD 1948-57 and 1975-76 includes
savings of corporations.
Table A.8: Trends in incomes, consumEtion and savings
Year YD SN SANB SAED C
1948 18,113 -1,084
1949 24,043 2,153
1950 282710 1,493 29,426
1951 33,168 1,987 33,737
1952 34,660 1,467 37~097
1953 46.545 4,659 44,408
1954 53,047 1,635 52,184
1955 612096 52032 592047
1956 71 ,579 7,252 66,738
1957 76,878 7,574 71 ,514
1958 79,396 6,096 76,230
1959 82,383 6,160 79,837
1960 872820 62671 (n.a.) 842429
1961 98,824 9,023 91,160
1962 104,409 10,904 96,251
1963 1l7,627 11,950 104,510
1964 131,529 17,374 1,593 1l6,227
1965 1511555 201288 12740 1302843
1966 166,960 20,677 1,959 144,521
1967 179,830 24,642 1,632 156,510
1968 191,825 21,645 2,16Q 300 168,497
1969 214,604 27,784 2,403 681 184,316
1970 2401023 382650 22868 12308 . 2062390
1971 272,127 49,642 4,146 2,550 222,004
1972 310,554 59,948 5,706 4,551 250,570 •
1973 399,195 92,029 8,118 5,298 310,041
1974 463,933 89,790 7,359 1,902 386,834
1975 5572807 (n.a.) 102090 378 4622451
1976 6752085 13,310 42266 5462814
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Table A.9: Trends in private r~sidential investment, household
-,.liquid assets, housing credit and housing consumption
IHPR: "Private residential investment": Gross private fixed capital
formation in dwellings, million drachmas, current prices.
WS: "Household liquid assets": currency in circulation and sight,
savings and time deposits by individuals and private enterprises,
mill ion drachmas.!.current prices.
FH: Bank financing of housing: annual cash outflows for housing loans
by special financial institutions, million drachmas, current
prices.
CH: "Housing consumption": procilJctof the sector "ownership of
dwellings" in national accounts, million drachmas, current prices.
Source: IHPR: ~1inistry of Coordination, National Accounts of Greece,
(Athens 1976, 1979).
WS: NSSG, Statistical Yearbooks of Greece, various years.
FH: U.N., E.C.E., National Monograph, pp. 133-134, CPER,
Development Program for 1976-80: Housing, (Athens, 1976), p. 12,
and National Mortgage Bank of Greece, Annual Reports, various years.
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Table A.9: Trends in private residential investment, household liquid
wealth and housing consumEtion
Year IHPR WS FH CH
1948 484 1,917
1949 764 2,553
1950 1 123 3,039
1951 1,599 (n.a.) 3,742
1952 1,957 (n.a) 4,186
1953 2,695 4,838
1954 3,109 5,948 5,776
1955 3,731 7,641 6,764
1956 4,188 9,969 7,283
1957 3,946 14,062 7,986
1958 5,009 17,014 222 8,371
1959 4,945 21,694 315 8,927
1960 51620 26!057 367 9,653
1961 6,081 30,042 237 10,388
1962 7,381 37,032 346 11,060-
1963 8,075 .45,169 500 11,782
1964 9,974 52,274 695 12,498
1965 11,930 58,904 753 13,727,
1966 13,190 69,752 1,099 14,699
1967 11 ,955 81,411 2,169 16,082
1968 16,805 95,815 4,205 17,836
1969 20,739 111 ,492 4,742 19,551
1970 192443 133,656 42426 211°99
1971 22,906 163,186 5,079 22,865
1972 31,832 201,870 7,292 25,048
1973 41,071 231,968 6,191 28,798
1974 27,438 280,391 3,060 33,888
1975 371437 3552687 5,752 382508
1976 46,800 448,889 82897 43,650
· ".'
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Table A.I0: Trends in dwelling construction costs, rents and
the general price level
P: "General-price:level": implicit deflator of the gross domestic
product.1958~100.0
PR: "Price index of rents": implicit deflator of the sector "ownership
of dwellings" in national accounts. 1958=100.0
PH: "Pr ice index of dwell ;ng construction": implicit defl ator of gross
fixed capital formation in dwellings. 1958=100.0
PR/P: Relative price index of rents
PH/P: Relative price index of dwelling construction
- - .
Source: Ministry of Coordination, National Accounts of Greece (Athens,
1973,1976,1979). N.S.S.G., National Accounts of Greece,
1948-1970 (Athens, 1972] -
Tabl e A.lO: Trends in dwell ;ng construction costs ~ rents and
the general Qrice level.
Year P PR PH PR/P PH/P
1950 55.8 51.2 54.0 91.7 96.7
1951 62.6 60.5 62.8 96.6 100.3
1952 65.2 63.9 65.8 98.0 100.9
1953 75.7 70.7 71.8 93.3 94.8
1954 84.6 81.2 82.7 95.9 97.7
1955 91.0 91.5 91.6 100.5 100.6
1956 99.4 94.3 94.8 94.8 95.0
1957 98.4 97.2 97.4 98.7 98.9
1958 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1959 99.7 101.1 100.7 101.. 101.0
1960 103.5 105.0 101.4 101.4 97.9
1961 105.6 107.7 101.5 101.9 96.1
1962 109.2 111.2 109.2 99.1 98.1
1963 112.2 112.8 110.1 100.5 98.1
1964 115.3 114 ..2 111.1 99.0 96.3
1965 121.9 116.2 114.3 95.3 93.7
1966 123.9 120.6 115.9 97.3 93.5
1967 127.1 125.0 117.9 98.3 . 92.7
1968 128.9 129.6 126.3 100.5 97.9
1969 132.1 132.2 130.5 100.1 98.7
1970 136.1 133.6 130.5 98.1 95.8
1971 139,9 135.6 127.9 96.9 91.4
1972 146.8 137 ..6 141,7 93.8 96.5
1973 167.2 146.0 177.2 87.3 105.9
1974 218.0 169.Q 228.3 77.8 104.7
1975 237.4 177 .1 242.0 74.8 101.9
1976 272.2 191.7 282.7 70.4 103.8
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Table A.ll: Trends in the consumer price index, rents, and the
cost of housing expenditures: Urban Areas
P(U): The general consumer price index, measured for urban areas: June
1959=100.0
PR(U): The price index for rents, measured for urban areas. 1973=100.0
PRE(U}: The price index for housing expenditures (rents, water, fuel,
electricity), measured for urban areas. June 1959=100.0
PR(U}/P(U}: Relative price index of rents, urban areas.
PRE(U)/P(U}: Relative price index of housing expenditures, urban areas.
Source: P(U), PRE{U}: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, various years.
PR(U}: S. Drosos, "The Development of Housing Rents", in Economicos
Tachydromos, May 6,1976 (in Greek) (based on unpublished data).(*): PR(U} and PR(U}/P(U} for 1976 are based on PR in table A.10.
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Table A.11: Trends in the consumer price index of rents and the cost of
housing eXEenditures: Urban Areas.
Year P(U) PR(U) PRE(U) PR(U)/P(U) PRE(U)/P(U)
1959 100.7 71.5 101.1 71.0 100.3
1960 102.3 74.2 103.6 72.5 101.2
1961 104.1 76.0 105.1 73.0 100.9
1962 103.8 77.9 107.1 75.0 103.1
1963 106.9 79.6 109.5 74.4 102.4
1964 107.8 80.5 111.4 74.6 103.3
1965 111.0 83.8 112.6 75.5 101.4
1966 116.6 85.1 115.9 72.9 99.3
1967 118.6 88.3 118.3 74.4 99.7
1968 119.0 91.7 122.2 77.0 102.6
1969 121.9 93.7 124.3 76.8 101.9
1970 125.5 94.8 124.9 75.5 99.5
1971 129.8 96.2 125.6 74.1 96.7
1972 134.9 98.1 127.6 72.7 94.5
1973 155.8 104.4 136.1 67.0 87.3
1974 197.7 117.2 173.4 59.2 87.7
1975 220.8 127.8 124.1 57.8 56.2
1976 250.2 142.9* 137.8 57.1* 55.0
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